Love In-Between

In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray’s account of love to present a phenomenology of loving interactions and then our enactive account. Finally, we draw some implications for ethics. These concern language, difference, vulnerability, desire, and self-transformation.

     

Indian mate preferences: Continuity,sex differences,and cultural change across a quarter of a century

Expressed mate preferences provide unique windows into evolved mating psychology. The current study used two research instruments—one ranking and one rating procedure—to examine mate preferences in India. We compared modern Indians (n = 536) with a more modest Indian sample studied a quarter of a century earlier (n = 105) to test the hypothesis that sex-specific mate preferences—as hypothesized by parental investment theory—would persist during this time period. Mate preferences for mutual attraction and love remained important and invariant over time, despite India’s history of arranged marriages. Sex differences in mate preferences for cues to fertility (youth, physical attractiveness) and resources (good financial prospects, social status) remained relatively invariant over time. Several changes in mate preferences emerged, including a greater preference for mates who are “creative and artistic,” “ambitious and industrious,” and “a good cook and housekeeper” for both sexes. Despite cultural changes in India over the past 25 years, evolved mate preferences have persisted during this time period. Discussion highlights limitations of this research.     

ON A PARADOX OF CHRISTIAN LOVE

The two love commands attributed to Jesus clearly show the basic feature of Christianity as a “religion of love.” However, it may be argued that there is conflict between these commands, so that the Christian idea of love confronts a deep paradox: on the one hand, it takes loving God as the ultimate foundation of loving one's neighbor and loving one's neighbor as the perfect manifestation of loving God. On the other hand, it gives supremacy to loving God over loving one's neighbor, with the result that, in cases of conflict, Christianity has to sacrifice loving one's neighbor to loving God and thus to negate the second great command by the first.     

Unpacking “evil”: Claiming the core of the Dark Triad

Understanding the nature of “evil” has been challenging for a number of reasons. A productive psychological approach to this problem has been to study antisocial traits associated with negative outcomes. One such approach has grouped together three antisocial personalities known as the “Dark Triad”: Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy. Researchers have proposed various models to account for the common core of these antisocial personalities – a core that might well be considered the psychological equivalent of the core of “evil” – and these models have not been directly compared, to date. We conducted two studies (total N > 700) to compare the utility of the various models using Canonical Correlation Analyses (CCAs). Results confirm that the HEXACO personality model (and, in particular, the Honesty–Humility factor) is not only the most theoretically parsimonious model, it also best accounts for the empirical overlap between these constructs that represents the core of the Dark Triad. Results also support the idea that the core of the Dark Triad represents an alternative life history strategy.     

Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’

This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally obligated to φ only if the person can φ. The rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ include considerations related to intuitive plausibility, action‐guidance, blameworthiness and fairness, and the nature of practical reasons. 1     

The “Loving Parent” analogy

A crucial part of William Rowe’s evidential argument from evil implies that God, like a loving parent, would ensure that every suffering person would be aware of his comforting presence. Rowe’s use of the “loving parent” analogy however fails to survive scrutiny as it implies that God maximally loves all persons. It is the argument of this paper that no one could maximally love every person; and whatever variation there is in the divine love undercuts the claim that every suffering person would be aware of the divine presence.     

Balancing Critique and Commitment: A Synthetic Approach to Teaching Religion and the Environment

Courses about religion and the environment should work toward a synthesis of critical thinking – teaching students to examine and question the interplay of environmental degradation, religious traditions, and new religious movements – and advocacy – helping students to embrace, articulate, and refine their own environmentalist commitments, in religious terms when appropriate. To meet these goals, teachers of religion and the environment can learn from literature on balancing faith and critical analysis in other religion courses. This literature will help us to clarify the goals of our courses, critically examine the environmental movement with our students, and remain trustworthy to those who do not share environmentalist commitments. See a companion essay in this issue of the journal (Jennifer R. Ayres, “Learning on the Ground”) and a response to both of these essays (Forrest Clingerman, “Pedagogy as a Field Guide to the Ecology of the Classroom”) also published in this issue of the journal.     

New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives,Consistency, and Quantifiers*

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: “kiss me and hug me” is the conjunction of “kiss me” with “hug me”. This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, I argue. “If you love me, kiss me”, a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent (“you love me”) with an imperative consequent (“kiss me”); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three‐valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic.     

Misers or lovers? How a reflection on Christian mysticism caused a shift in Jacques Lacan’s object theory

In his sixth seminar, Desire and Its Interpretation (1956–1957), Lacan patiently elaborates his theory of the ‘phantasm’ ($?a), in which the object of desire (object small a) is ascribed a constitutive role in the architecture of the libidinal subject. In that seminar, Lacan shows his fascination for an aphorism of the twentieth century Christian mystic Simone Weil in her assertion: “to ascertain exactly what the miser whose treasure was stolen lost: thus we would learn much.” This is why, in his theory, Lacan conceptualizes the object of desire as the unconsumed treasure—and, in that sense, the “nothing”—on which the miser’s desire is focused. But the more Lacan develops his new object theory, the more he realizes how close it is to Christian mysticism in locating the ultimate object of desire in God, in a sevenfold “nothing” (to quote the famous last step in the ascent of the Mount Carmel as described by John of the Cross). An analysis of Shakespeare’s Hamlet allows Lacan to escape the Christian logic and to rearticulate the object of desire in an ‘unchristian’ tragic grammar. When he replaces the miser by the lover as paradigm of the subject’s relation to its object of desire, he substitutes a strictly Greek kind of love—eros, not agape—for the miser’s relationship to his treasure. Even when, in the late Lacan, “love” becomes a proper concept, its structure remains deeply “tragic.”     

“Part of the Very Concept”: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy1

X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life?     

Nominalism and Realism. How Not to Read the Tractatus' Conception of a Name

This paper focuses on a central aspect of the “picture theory” in the Tractatus – the “identity requirement” – namely the idea that a proposition represents elements in reality as combined in the same way as its elements are combined. After introducing the Tractatus' views on the nature of the proposition, I engage with a “nominalist” interpretation, according to which the Tractatus holds that relations are not named in propositions. I claim that the nominalist account can only be maintained by rejecting the “identity requirement.” I then consider an opposite – “realist” – interpretation, according to which Tractarian names include names of properties and relations. I argue that, although it can accommodate the “identity requirement,” the realist interpretation falls short of providing a correct interpretation of the Tractatus' conception of a name. I conclude by presenting an alternative account (to both nominalism and realism) of the Tractatus' conception of a name.     

Love,Desire, Jouissance: Two out of Three Ain't Bad

The author demonstrates in this paper the different dynamics of love, desire, and jouissance. This impossible affair of loving whom one does not desire and desiring whom one does not love is analyzed through the writings of Jacques Lacan and Stephen Mitchell. The author illustrates Lacan's use of the “objeta” as the fragment in the Other that gives the desiring individual the illusion of completeness whereas the desired Other has no notion for whom or what she or he is desired. Desire is unmasked as this hide-and-seek game of narcissistic illusions where one is wanted for what one does not have and one desires what one cannot have. Both Lacan and Mitchell suggest that love is a far more risky encounter because all narcissistic illusions risk to be jettisoned. Although Mitchell suggests that it is only through the Other that one can discover the otherness in oneself, Lacan states that to love is to give nothing of oneself and to accept the emptinessin the Other. Texts from popular culture are used to illustrate the dynamics of live and desire and the limits of jouissance.     

Subjective determinants of attraction: Self-perceived causes of the rise and decline of liking,love, and being in love

Eighty-one female students at a German university were asked to indicate in writing (a) how they would come to like, love, and be in love with someone, and (b) how in their case liking, loving, and being in love with someone would come to an end. The responses were analyzed using a comprehensive list of 117 determinants developed for this study, which were grouped into four causal categories–P (person), O (other), P×O (relational), and E (environmental) conditions. Regarding the rise of attraction, the most frequent determinant for liking and for being in love was the existence of positive attributes of O (69% and 63%); for love, it was the existence of positive feelings from O (29%). Regarding the decline of attraction, the most frequent determinant for liking was negative behavior on O's part (42%); for love, abuse of one's trust by O (25%); and for being in love, disillusionment with regard to O (44%). Further analyses (including ANOVAs) involved the mean frequencies for the four causal categories. Concerning the rise of attraction sentiments, P causes were predominant for love and O causes were predominant for liking and for being in love; P×O causes were particularly infrequent for being in love. Concerning the decline of attraction sentiments, only for liking was one causal category predominant (O causes). E causes were hardly mentioned for both the rise and the decline focus. The findings are discussed in the context of both the more traditional research on “objective” determinants of attraction and, in particular, of recent research on the subjective (common-sense or implicit) understanding of liking, love, and being in love.     

A Lover’s Shame

Shame is one of the more painful consequences of loving someone; my beloved’s doing something immoral can cause me to be ashamed of her. The guiding thought behind this paper is that explaining this phenomenon can tell us something about what it means to love. The phenomenon of beloved-induced shame has been largely neglected by philosophers working on shame, most of whom conceive of shame as being a reflexive attitude. Bennett Helm has recently suggested that in order to account for beloved-induced shame, we should deny the reflexivity of shame. After arguing that Helm’s account is inadequate, I proceed to develop an account of beloved-induced shame that rightly preserves its reflexivity. A familiar feature of love is that it involves an evaluative dependence; when I love someone, my well-being depends upon her life’s going well. I argue that loving someone also involves a persistent tendency to believe that her life is going well, in the sense that she is a good person, that she is not prone to wickedness. Lovers are inclined, more strongly than they otherwise would be, to give their beloveds the moral benefit of the doubt. These two features of loving—an evaluative dependence and a persistent tendency to believe in the beloved’s moral goodness—provide the conditions for a lover to experience shame when he discovers that his beloved has morally transgressed.     

Christ-Centred Solidarity in a Time of Pandemic

The article proposes a reading of Colossians 1:15-20 for the time of COVID-19, arguing that the assertion that all things “hold together” in the incarnate Christ should lead Christians not only to practise solidarity with those most at risk, but also to evaluate societal and systemic responses to COVID-19 in the light of their effects on the most vulnerable members of society. The article considers the use and misuse of the rhetoric of self-sacrificial love or loving self-sacrifice, and the use and misuse of the image of warfare – arguing that in both of these areas, Christian communities offer urgent challenges and correctives on the basis of their traditions of Christ-centred solidarity.     

Strict Confidentiality: An Alternative to Pre’s “Limited Confidentiality” Doctrine

In “Advisory Opinion on Confidentiality, Its Limits and Duties to Others” the Canadian Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics (PRE) articulates a rationale for a priori limitations to research confidentiality, based largely on putative legal duties to violate confidentiality in certain circumstances. We argue that PRE promotes a “Law of the Land” doctrine of research ethics that is but one approach to resolving potential conflicts between law and research ethics. PRE emphasises risks that have never materialized, and ignores jurisprudence on challenges to research confidentiality. When we examine what the courts have actually done with research-based claims of privilege, we find they clearly recognize and affirm researchers’ ethical obligations to maintain strict confidentiality and protect research participants. Ironically, the one exception – where the court ordered that information be disclosed – occurred precisely because the researchers had limited confidentiality. The passive approach PRE espouses leaves vital questions about what protecting confidentiality to the “full extent possible in law” means, and leaves the impression that academics should accept whatever limitations the courts may impose without participating in the courtroom dialogue determining where those limits are drawn. In contrast, we believe confidentiality is so important to the protection of research participants and the integrity of the research enterprise that it is worth fighting for. The “ethics-first” doctrine of “strict confidentiality” we describe adheres to the social sciences’ and humanities’ longstanding commitment to research confidentiality and duty to the research participant.     

Investigating temporal variations in pedestrian crossing behavior at semi-controlled crosswalks: A Bayesian multilevel modeling approach

“Semi-controlled” crosswalks are unsignalized, but have clear pavement markings and “yield to pedestrian” signs. At these locations, pedestrians and motorists frequently interact to determine who should proceed first. When interacting with drivers, pedestrian crossing decisions are complex events that involve a variety of human responses, as well as vehicle dynamics, traffic characteristics, and environmental conditions. In addition, these complexities can be subject to temporal effects. Without considering temporal variations in pedestrian-motorist interaction, statistical methods could lead to biased coefficient estimates and inaccurate conclusions.The study developed a Bayesian multilevel logistic regression (BMLR) model to capture heterogeneities in pedestrian interaction behavior during four different time periods. The proposed method incorporates time-specific effects that vary randomly between time-periods based on a weakly informative prior. The results indicate significant factors, some of which confirm previous research and some that are new ways to explain pedestrian behavior at the individual level. The identification of variables such as FlowOn and FlowWait sheds light on the interactions between pedestrians – providing more information than the single GroupSize measure.Some consequent safety implications are discussed from the perspectives of vehicle dynamics, vehicle flow rate and pedestrian volume. The more detailed metrics developed in this paper will provide a valuable starting point. for the design of crosswalk controls that will foster a higher degree of compliance and less delay.     

The Queer Art of Biblical Reading: Matthew 25:31–46 (Caritas Christiana) Through Caritas Romana

The place of eros in Christian theology has always been a contested one, not least because it is positioned as being at odds with agape, the kind of love that embodies gospel ethics. Matthew 25:31–46 calls us to “feed the hungry,” “quench the thirsty,” “shelter the homeless,” “clothe the naked,” and “visit the imprisoned” as emblematic examples of agapic love. This essay shows how a queer act, specifically that of a woman breastfeeding a starving man as depicted in the tradition of Caritas Romana, can fulfill the ethical demands in Matthew's pericope. It demonstrates how the action first narrated by Valerius Maximus and then represented by Paul Peter Rubens beautifully fulfills the Matthean agapic demands, and concludes that queer practices have the potential to fulfill the gospel demands, situating the erotic at the core of the agapic.