WOMEN'S SOCIAL BEHAVIOR WHEN MEETING NEW MEN: THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE

Heavy alcohol consumption ( Testa & Parks, 1996 ) and childhood sexual abuse (CSA; Messman-Moore & Long, 2003 ) have been associated with adult sexual victimization. We examined the social behavior of 42 women under two alcohol conditions (high dose and low dose) in a bar laboratory. Women were videotaped interacting with a man they had just met. Women in the higher dose condition engaged in more open body position and talked, stood, and walked more than women in the lower dose condition. These behaviors are consistent with signs of intoxication or romantic interest. The women in the high-dose condition also frowned more than women in the low-dose condition. An increase in frowning could indicate less comfort or may be considered consistent with an increase in animation during the social interaction given the concomitant increase in other behaviors. Thus, the nonverbal behavior of women in the high-dose condition could be interpreted as mixed signals. CSA victims exhibited fewer head movements (e.g., nods), were less animated, and frowned more than non-CSA victims. These behaviors convey reticence or possibly even anxiety or discomfort during the social interaction. Thus, the nonverbal behavior of women with a history of CSA may convey an unease that could be viewed by a potential perpetrator as vulnerability. Our findings suggest that both acute alcohol consumption and history of CSA may influence nonverbal social behavior and may influence risk for sexual assault by sending mixed cues of romantic interest or signs of vulnerability to potential perpetrators.     

Vulnerability to psychosis, I-thou intersubjectivity and the praecox-feeling

Psychotic and prodromal states are characterized by distortions of intersubjectivity, and a number of psychopathologists see in the concrete I-You frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such impairment. Rümke has coined the term of ‘praecox-feeling’, designated to describe a feeling of unease emanating in the interviewer that reflects the detachment of the patient and the failure of an ‘affective exchange.’ While the reliability of the praecox-feeling as a diagnostic tool has since been established, the explanation and theoretical framing of the phenomena is still lacking. By drawing on enactivist approaches to social cognition, the paper will attempt to provide such an explanation. This is relevant, since such an explanation could contribute to a more precise understanding of the phenomena in question and possibly add to our knowledge regarding the link between experiential vulnerability to psychosis and disturbed I-Thou intersubjectivity.     

Public health, well-being and reciprocity

Public-health measures are very effective and efficient means of improving health, yet public health is either neglected by the literature or fraught with unease, mainly due to the combination of the aggregate-distributive tension with the element of compulsion. I argue that this unease can be decreased by 1) a pluralist-holistic view of health, situating the normative value of health in its effect on well-being, incorporating both the objective and subjective source of the value of health; and 2) by a rich concept of reciprocity. This article supports Martha Nussbaum's critique of social-contract thinking for placing too much weight on the scale of normal functioning and productive reciprocity, as well as Sen's distinction between well-being and agency freedom. To reach an adequate understanding of the value and goal of public health within the general setting of health care, a pluralist conception of health, well-being and reciprocity is necessary.     

Upper- and lower-limb amputees show reduced levels of eeriness for images of prosthetic hands

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - The “uncanny phenomenon” describes the feeling of unease associated with seeing an image that is close to appearing human. Prosthetic hands in...     

Hamlet and psychoanalytic experience

Hamlet draws us into its rendered world, enabling us to experience it with depth, awareness, and resonance, in a mode we recognize as aesthetic. By way of Shakespeare's play--primarily the first act--and a detailed case study, aesthetic and psychoanalytic experience are compared, to suggest that, for our own analytic discourse, we revalue Freud's unease that his case studies read like short stories.     

The role of an early-life variant of the oedipus complex in motivating religious endeavors

A close reading of sources Freud used in writing Totem and Taboo supports the thesis that a predecessor archaic oedipus complex is instrumental in motivating religious worship. This early-life complex manifests a psychodynamic in which birth, growth, and self-realization, to varying degree in each individual, tend to be psychically correlated with diminution and harm vis-à-vis one's procreators. As a result, the psychodynamic is likely to induce unease over youth exercising its powers. The story of Adam and Eve, which depicts a growing self-determination being stymied and coming to grief, is a mythic epitome of this psychodynamic. Religious practices serve to expiate the sense of unease, partly by replenishing and even recasting seemingly diminished procreators, through myth and ritual, into omnipotent, immortal entities, and partly by reversing individuation's challenge to authority by exhorting submission to, and even union, with the divine parent. The sources used in demonstrating the various means whereby religious practices serve to ameliorate the burden of "original sin" include W. R. Smith (1894), the Old Testament, and studies of archaic religious rites, including those of the Aztecs.     

Compatibilism and personal identity

Compatibilists disagree over whether there are historical conditions on moral responsibility. Historicists claim there are, whilst structuralists deny this. Historicists motivate their position by claiming to avoid the counter-intuitive implications of structuralism. I do two things in this paper. First, I argue that historicism has just as counter-intuitive implications as structuralism when faced with thought experiments inspired by those found in the personal identity literature. Hence, historicism is not automatically preferable to structuralism. Second, I argue that structuralism is much more plausible once we accept that personal identity is irrelevant to moral responsibility. This paves the way for a new structuralist account that makes clear what it takes to be the diachronic ownership condition (which is normally taken to be personal identity) and the locus of moral responsibility (which is normally taken to be ‘whole’ person), and helps to alleviate the intuitive unease many have with respect to structuralism.     

The Grotesque Female in Malaysian Poems: Shaping the Migrant��s Psyche

The works of Malaysian poet, Wong Phui Nam's Against the Wilderness (vii) China bride and Variations on a Birthday Theme (iv) Kali, illustrate a bride and a mother in terrifying images. Wong's stylistic form of representing the female body through startling images of inversion and degradation evoke feelings of unease. The suspension between the known and the unknown causes a bewildering reality verging on madness. Interpreted through the lens of the carnivalesque, specifically, the grotesque body, festive language and parody, I attempt to reconstruct the psyche of the Chinese migrant which underpins these poems. The migrant who arrived in Malaya during the colonial era in the early nineteenth century faced political and social struggles in adapting to a new land. In the poems, the migrant juxtaposes his position to a female and uses the female body as a site of contention to intensify the torment of the psyche and to reflect the despair of the Chinese in Malaysia.     

Justifying a presumption of restraint in animal biotechnology research

Articulating the public's widespread unease about animal biotechnology has not been easy, and the first attempts have not been able to provide an effective tool for navigating the moral permissibility of this research. Because these moral intuitions have been difficult to cash out, they have been belittled as representing nothing more than fear or confusion. But there are sound philosophical reasons supporting the public's opposition to animal biotechnology and these arguments justify a default position of resistance I call the Presumption of Restraint. The Presumption of Restraint constitutes a justificatory process that sets out the criteria for permitting or rejecting individual biotechnology projects. This Presumption of Restraint can be overridden by compelling arguments that speak to a project's moral and scientific merit. This strategy creates a middle-of-the-road stance that can embrace particular projects, while rejecting others. The Presumption of Restraint can also serve as a model for assessing moral permissibility in other areas of technological innovation.     

Borges and the Art of Mourning

In my reply to Susi Federici-Nebbiosi, I emphasize and elaborate on the points of agreement between us, as well as the points where our thinking differs. My primary point of difference regards the suggestion that my accepting Yossi for short-term treatment was acquiescence to his request. This is only partially true. From his point of view, I offered him a treatment substantially longer than the one he wanted, thus I was agreeing and not agreeing to his request simultaneously.

The main idea that I put forth in my paper is that we always construct our setting together with our patients and that this is, in itself, a therapeutic factor. I share Federici-Nebbiosi's observation that the setting has undergone a great deal more change in practice than is reflected in the literature, and that there is unease discussing the issue of setting. I offer some thoughts on this and express the hope that the present exchange of ideas will lead to further discussion.     

Hume and the Problem of Paternalism: When is Humanity Sufficient?

Hume states that if a group of powerless, rational creatures lived amongst human beings, then humans would be required to treat this species with humanity but not with justice. Michael Ridge has argued that this implies humans would be required to engage in a morally dubious form of paternalism toward this imagined species. I argue that a proper understanding of why this imagined species is excluded from the scope of justice shows Hume has a plausible moral reason for requiring paternalism in this instance. The reason the imagined species is excluded is that they are incapable of feeling what I term “the pain of dependence,” or unease arising from complete dependence upon those who are more powerful. Those capable of the pain of dependence will have reason to resent exclusion from the scope of justice (and the accompanying susceptibility to paternalism). However, I contend that Hume did not think that the imagined species was capable of feeling the pain of dependence. This means that the imagined species would not consider themselves wronged when subject to paternalistic treatment, and, consequently, there is good reason to think the sort of paternalism that Hume's theory allows is not morally objectionable.     

Better brains, better selves? The ethics of neuroenhancements

The idea of enhancing our mental functions through medical means makes many people uncomfortable. People have a vague feeling that altering our brains tinkers with the core of our personalities and the core of ourselves. It changes who we are, and doing so seems wrong, even if the exact reasons for the unease are difficult to define. Many of the standard arguments against neuroenhancements--that they are unsafe, that they violate the distinction between therapy and enhancements, that they undermine equality, and that they will be used coercively--fail to show why the use of any such technologies is wrong in principle. Two other objections--the arguments that such changes undermine our integrity and that they prevent us from living authentic lives--will condemn only a few of the uses that are proposed. The result is that very few uses of these drugs are morally suspect and that most uses are morally permissible.     

Fear of missing out and depressive symptoms during the COVID-19 pandemic

During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments issued public health safety measures (e.g., “stay-at-home” ordinances), leaving many people “missing out” on integral social aspects of their own lives. The fear of missing out, popularly shortened as, “FoMO,” is a felt sense of unease one experiences when they perceive they may be missing out on rewarding and/or enjoyable experiences. Among 76 participants (ages M = 69.36, SD = 5.34), who were at risk for hospitalization or death if infected with COVID-19, we found that FoMO was associated with depressive symptoms at Time 1, even when controlling for perceived stress, loneliness, and fear of COVID-19. However, FoMO did not predict future depressive symptoms, about 1 week later, when controlling for Time 1 depressive symptoms. These findings provide further evidence that FoMO is associated with depressive symptoms in a short period of time even when accounting for other powerful social factors such as loneliness. Future research should explore the potential causal relationships between FoMO and depression, especially those that may establish temporal precedence.     

The Mission and Role of Psychology in a Traumatised and Changing Society: The Case of South Africa

At present there is a “crisis” in psychology in South Africa. A mental health investigation has been initiated and a national task force appointed in order to reform the profession in all its aspects. These events are the result of a deep sense of unease about the mission, relevance and image of the profession and an awareness that mainstream psychology is irrelevant to the nature and needs of the majority black population. Presently psychology in South Africa is at a crossroads. This paper identifies the mental health needs of the majority black population and suggests professional training programmes for future psychologists and the utilisation of services and resources in delivery systems. The article also re-defines the psychologist's role in a divided and traumatised society.     

Dewey and the Question of Realism

An interpretation is given of John Dewey's views about “realism” in metaphysics, and of how these views relate to contemporary debates. Dewey rejected standard formulations of realism as a general metaphysical position, and interpreters have often been taken him to be sympathetic to some form of verificationism or constructivism. I argue that these interpretations are mistaken, as Dewey's unease with standard formulations of realism comes from his philosophical emphasis on intelligent control of events, by means of ordinary action. Because of his views about relations, Dewey's views in this area do risk collapsing into an overly holistic position. I discuss how these problems might be avoided, and consider also how Dewey's views about naturalism and realism might usefully inform ongoing work.     

Bodily Disorientation and Moral Change

Neglect of the moral promise of disorientation is a persistent gap in even the most sophisticated philosophies of embodiment. In this article, I begin to correct this neglect by expanding our sense of the range and nature of disoriented experience and proposing new visions of disorientation as benefiting moral agency. Disorientations are experienced through complex interactions of corporeal, affective, and cognitive processes, and are characterized by feelings of shock, surprise, unease, and discomfort; felt disorientations almost always make us unsure of how to go on. I argue that experiences of disorientation can strengthen the moral agency of individuals. I begin by clarifying experiences of felt ease and orientation. I then characterize disoriented embodiment by investigating select experiences that often involve or accompany disorientation, focusing throughout on how disorientation prompts changes in motivation and action. I conclude by charting how disoriented embodiments can help individuals become better moral agents overall, in part by challenging norms that restrict embodiment and undermining dualistic conceptions of the self.     

An Experimental Manipulation of Social Comparison in Social Anxiety

Negative self-appraisal is thought to maintain social anxiety particularly when comparing oneself to others. Work on social comparison suggests that gender may moderate the effects of social comparison in social anxiety. Self-appraisals of the desirability of one's personality may be more important to women, whereas self-appraisal of signs of anxiety may be more important to men. Within each gender, those with high social anxiety are expected to report more negative self-appraisal when comparing themselves to someone else described as high achieving. This study is the first we are aware of that examined gender-based interactive effects after a social comparison manipulation. Participants read a bogus profile of a fellow student's adjustment to college. They were randomly assigned to read a profile suggesting that the fellow student was “high achieving” or more normative in his/her achievements. When comparing to a “high achieving” individual, men with high social anxiety reported the most negative self-appraisals of their signs of anxiety. In addition, greater social anxiety was associated with a poorer self-appraisal of personality only among men. The implications of the findings for conceptualizing the role of social comparison in social anxiety are discussed.     

The problem of privacy in transcultural research: reflections on an ethnographic study in Sri Lanka

Western laws and codes of ethics frequently require that private health information be treated confidentially. However, cross-cultural research shows that it is not always easy to determine what members of a culture consider to be private or how they wish private information to be handled. This article begins by presenting an ethnographic study of patient-healer relationships in Sri Lanka; researchers were surprised to find that participants' views of health and privacy differed greatly from typical Western views, and that the privacy protections they had put in place caused discomfort among participants. Building on this ethics case study, the article explores two main questions. First, can a single definition of privacy possibly do justice to the cultural variations that exist, or does a conceptual definition inevitably run the risk of ethnocentrism? Second, to what extent is strict compliance with research regulations or ethics codes ethically justifiable when following the rules will obviously cause unease in international participants?