Kant,the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

In this paper, I consider whether a reading of Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy can offer material for devising a new model of transcendental argument. The problem that this form of argument is meant to address is an antinomy between two apparently contradictory claims, q and ¬q, where we seem equally justified in holding both. The model has the following form: p; q is a necessary condition of p; the only justification we have for q is that it is a necessary condition of p; p is justified only in domain X (where X is a domain of objects of cognition); therefore, q is justified only in domain X. Because the argument shows that our justification for q is valid only in X, it also establishes that there is conceptual space to hold ¬q outside of X.     

Informative Aboutness

Pretheoretically, (B) ‘all believers are immortal’ is about all believers, but (1) B is not about any unbeliever. Similarly, (M) ‘all mortals are unbelievers’ is not about any immortal, but (2) M is about all mortals. But B and M are logically equivalent universal generalizations, so arguably they are about exactly the same objects; by (2), they are about those mortals who are unbelievers, contradicting (1). If one responds by giving up (1), is there still a sense in which B treats unbelievers differently from believers? I argue that there is. B is uninformative about unbelievers but informative about believers, in the following sense: for any object o, the information that B provides only about o—namely, ‘o is a believer only if o is immortal’—is entailed (and thus rendered redundant) by ‘o is an unbeliever’ but not by ‘o is a believer’.     

The logic of ability,freedom and responsibility

The aim of this paper is to offer a rigorous explication of statements ascribing ability to agents and to develop the logic of such statements. A world is said to be feasible iff it is compatible with the actual past-and-present. W is a P-world iff W is feasible and P is true in W (where P is a proposition). P is a sufficient condition for Q iff every P world is a Q world. P is a necessary condition for Q iff Q is a sufficient condition forP. Each individual property S is shown to generate a rule for an agent X. X heeds S iff X makes all his future choices in accordance with S. (Note that X may heed S and yet fail to have it). S is a P-strategy for X iff X's heeding S together with P is a necessary and sufficient condition for X to have S. (P-strategies are thus rules which X is able to implement on the proviso P).Provisional opportunity: X has the opportunity to A provided P iff there is an S such that S is a P-strategy for X and X's implementing S is a sufficient condition for X's doing A. P is etiologically complete iff for every event E which P reports P also reports an etiological ancestry of E, and P is true. Categorical opportunity: X has the opportunity to A iff there is a P such that P is etiologically complete and X has the opportunity to A provided P. For X to have the ability to A there must not only be an appropriate strategy, but X must have a command of that strategy. X steadfastly intends A iff X intends A at every future moment at which his doing A is not yet inevitable. X has a command of S w.r.t. A and P iff X's steadfastly intending A together with P is a sufficient condition for X to implement S. Provisional ability: X can A provided P iff there is an S such that S is a P-strategy for X, X's implementing S is a sufficient condition for X's doing A, and X has a command of S w.r.t. A and P. Categorical ability: X can A iff there is a P such that P is etiologically complete and X can A provided P. X is free w.r.t. to A iff X can A and X can non- A. X is free iff there is an A such that X is free w.r.t. A.     

Gricean Communication and Transmission of Thoughts

Gricean communication is communication between utterers and their audiences, where the utterer means something and the audience understands what is meant. The weak transmission idea is that, whenever such communication takes place, there is something which is transmitted from utterer to audience; the strong transmission idea adds that what is transmitted is nothing else than what is communicated. We try to salvage these ideas from a seemingly forceful attack by Wayne Davis. Davis attaches too much significance to the surface structure of sentences of the type ‘S communicates the belief (desire …) that p to A’ by assuming that the communicated entity is denoted by the grammatical object following ‘communicates’. On our proposal, what is communicated in all Gricean cases is a thought. And since S communicates the thought that p to A only if S means that p and A understands what S means, the thought that p will be transmitted from S to A.     

Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth

Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on the nature of truth. After the introduction, in Sect. 2, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In Sect. 3, i is polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This polarization is normalised in Sect. 4, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In Sects. 5 and 6, it is argued that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates Q by verifying and validating it (in the computer science’s sense of “verification” and “validation”); that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q; that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in the computer science’s sense of “proxy”) and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category theory’s sense of “commutation”); and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer science’s technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. Sect. 7 provides some further clarifications about CTT, in the light of semantic paradoxes. Section 8 draws a general conclusion about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users. In the course of the article all technical expressions from computer science are explained.     

A Logic for Multiple-source Approximation Systems with Distributed Knowledge Base

The theory of rough sets starts with the notion of an approximation space, which is a pair (U,R), U being the domain of discourse, and R an equivalence relation on U. R is taken to represent the knowledge base of an agent, and the induced partition reflects a granularity of U that is the result of a lack of complete information about the objects in U. The focus then is on approximations of concepts on the domain, in the context of the granularity. The present article studies the theory in the situation where information is obtained from different sources. The notion of approximation space is extended to define a multiple-source approximation system with distributed knowledge base, which is a tuple (U,R_P)_{Pßf N}(U,R_P)_{P\ss_f N}, where N is a set of sources and P ranges over all finite subsets of N. Each R _P is an equivalence relation on U satisfying some additional conditions, representing the knowledge base of the group P of sources. Thus each finite group of sources and hence individual source perceives the same domain differently (depending on what information the group/individual source has about the domain), and the same concept may then have approximations that differ with the groups. In order to express the notions and properties related with rough set theory in this multiple-source situation, a quantified modal logic LMSAS ^D is proposed. In LMSAS ^D , quantification ranges over modalities, making it different from modal predicate logic and modal logic with propositional quantifiers. Some fragments of LMSAS ^D are discussed and it is shown that the modal system KTB is embedded in LMSAS ^D . The epistemic logic S5^D_nS5^D_n is also embedded in LMSAS ^D , and cannot replace the latter to serve our purpose. The relationship of LMSAS ^D with first and second-order logics is presented. Issues of expressibility, axiomatization and decidability are addressed.     

Alpha-maximized factor analysis (alphamax): Its relation to alpha and canonical factor analysis

An alpha-O coefficient of internal consistency is defined for an observed score composite. Maximizing alpha-O leads to a system of psychometric (vs. statistical) factor analysis in which successive factors describe dimensions of successively less internal-consistency. Factoring stops when alpha-O is zero or less. In contrast to Kaiser-Caffrey's alpha-C analysis, when the factored matrix is rank 1, alpha-O does not reach unity; it can approach unity only as the number of variables reach infinity. The relative usefulness and domains of generalization of alpha-C and alpha-O are compared. Basically, alpha-C analysis is concerned with the representativeness of factors while alpha-O analysis is concerned with the assessibility of factors. Consequently, either system of factoring can and should be summarized by both the alpha-C and alpha-O coefficients. Not surprisingly, alpha-O analysis is computationally analogous to Rao's canonical factor analysis.     

The relation of multiserial eta to other measures of correlation

Ordinary product-moment correlation and regression methods are frequently not immediately applicable to qualitative data, whereas multiserialr, point-multiserialr, and multiserial eta can be easily applied. The multiserialr is rejected for prediction since it tells us only what the correlationmight be if certain assumptionswere true and if wecould measure what isnot now measured. The point-multiserialr and multiserial eta are identical when the number of categories is two but differ when it is three or greater. The multiserial eta is identical with the product-momentr when categories are assigned scale values equal to their means on the continuous variable. With three or more categories, the point-multiserialr, whichassumes linearity withequal step intervals, is always lower than the multiserial eta, whichforces linearity by adoption ofunequal step intervals based upon difference in criterion attainment. While the multiserial eta expends one degree of freedom with the weighting of each category, this is known and correctable, whereas the vague partial loss of degrees of freedom due to the ordering of categories in the point-multiserial is not correctable.Personnel Research Section, A.G.O.     

A probability model for errors of classification. I. General considerations

This paper seeks to meet the need for a general treatment of the problem of error in classification. Within an m-attribute classificatory system, an object's typical subclass is that subclass to which it is most often allocated under repeated experimentally independent applications of the classificatory criteria. In these terms, an error of classification is an atypical subclass allocation. This leads to definition of probabilitiesO of occasional subclass membership, probabilitiesT of typical subclass membership, and probabilitiesE of error or, more generally, occasional subclass membership conditional upon typical subclass membership. In the relationshipf: (O, T, E) the relative incidence of independentO, T, andE values is such that generally one can specifyO values givenT andE, but one cannot generally specifyT andE values givenO. Under the restrictions of homogeneity ofE values for all members of a given typical subclass, mutual stochastic independence of errors of classification, and suitable conditions of replication, one can find particular systemsO =f(T, E) which are solvable forT andE givenO. A minimum of three replications of occasional classification is necessary for a solution of systems for marginal attributes, and a minimum of two replications is needed with any cross-classification. Although for such systems one can always specifyT andE values givenO values, the solution is unique for dichotomous systems only.With grateful acknowledgement to the Rockefeller Foundation; and to the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, for N. I. M. H. Grant M-3950.     

Further Ado concerning Dasein's “Undifferentiated Mode”: Distinguishing the Indifferent Inauthenticity of Average Everyday Dasein from the Possibility of Genuine Failure

In this paper, I argue against the interpretive view that locates an “undifferentiated mode” – a mode in which Dasein is neither authentic nor inauthentic – in Being and Time. Where Heidegger seems to be claiming that Dasein can exist in an “undifferentiated mode”, he is better understood as discussing a phenomenon I call indifferent inauthenticity. The average everyday “Indifferenz” which is often taken as an indication of an “undifferentiated mode”, that is, is better understood as a failure to distinguish between the possibilities of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. Dasein's average everyday self-understanding is indifferent to this distinction, and I show that this is precisely what renders it inauthentic. Recognizing this distinction, however, is not enough to render Dasein authentic. Rather, it opens up the possibility of a non-indifferent inauthenticity and what Heidegger calls the possibility of “genuine failure”. To read an “undifferentiated mode” into Being and Time is to misunderstand its methodological progression from Dasein's average everyday, inauthentic self-understanding to its authenticity – “to the thing itself”. A select few passages may at first seem to indicate otherwise. However, Being and Time – like both being in general and Dasein itself – cannot be properly understood “without further ado”.     

Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?

To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epistemically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one's information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is an epistemic problem with x for S is to ask if x is a problem for S’s ability to acquire true belief and avoid false belief. To ask if there is a problem for S with x as such is to ask if it is impossible to solve the problem for S while leaving x as is. I argue that, if we consider the five most plausible candidate epistemic problems raised by cognitive outsourcing—i.e., unreliability, gullibility, irrationality, dependency, and lack of epistemic autonomy—we see for each candidate that it is either not an epistemic problem, or not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such.     

The adequacy of the theories of deductive systems with respect to sentential calculi

Summary The sentential calculiR, under discussion, are axiomatizable and implication is among their primitive terms. The modus ponens and the rule of substitution are their primitive rules. ByS _r is denoted the set of sentences obtained from the formulae of the calculusR by substituting sentences of a given language for all variables. The variablesx, y, z ... represent the elements of the setS _r , the variablesX, Y, Z ... represent the subsets ofS _R . The formulacxy designates an implication withx as its antecedent andy as its consequent,cxy is always an element ofS _R δ(X) means, thatX is closed with respect to the modus ponens rule.A _R designates the class of allS _R -substitutions of the axioms of the sentential calculusR.     

Opportunistic use of cognitive smokescreens by araneophagic jumping spiders

Little is known about how a prey species' cognitive limitations might shape a predator's prey-capture strategy. A specific hypothesis is investigated: predators take advantage of times when the prey's attention is focussed on its own prey. Portia fimbriata, an araneophagic jumping spider (Salticidae) from Queensland, is shown in a series of 11 experiments to exploit opportunistically a situation in which a web-building spider on which it preys, Zosis genicularis (Uloboridae), is preoccupied with wrapping up its own prey. Experimental evidence supports three conclusions: (1) while relying on optical cues alone, P. fimbriata perceives when Z. genicularis is wrapping up prey; (2) when busy wrapping up prey, the responsiveness of Z. genicularis to cues from potential predators is diminished; and (3) P. fimbriata moves primarily during intervals when Z. genicularis is busy wrapping up prey. P. fimbriata's strategy is effective partly because the wrapping behaviour of Z. genicularis masks the web signals generated by the advancing P. fimbriata's footsteps and also because, while wrapping, Z. genicularis' attention is diverted away from predator-revealing cues. Electronic Publication     

Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy

Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations (better than, worse than, and equally good): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V, (ii) it is false that x is worse than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V. Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy. In this paper I aim to further Broome’s view in two ways. Firstly, I want to supply independent reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our comparative predicates. Secondly, I attempt to defend Broome’s account by warding off several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang.     

Restricted ranking

This paper is a study of certain aspects of restricted ranking, a method intended for use by a panel ofm judges evaluating the relative merits ofN subjects, candidates for scholarships, awards, etc. Each judge divides theN subjects intoR classes so thatn _i individuals receive a gradei (i = 1, 2, ...,R; Σn _i =N) where theR numbersn _i are close toN/R (n _i =N/R whenN is divisible byR) and are preassigned and the same for all judges. This method is superior in several respects to other likely alternatives. Under the null hypothesis that allnR =N subjects are of equal merit, four tests of significance are developed. The effectiveness of the method is investigated both theoretically by means of the asymptotic relative efficiency and more generally by simulation studies. When the numbersn _i are not restricted to values close to or equal toN/R but instead are given values conforming to a normally distributed pattern, the resulting method is known as theQ-sort, so designated by certain investigators in psychotherapy. The simulation studies reveal that restricted ranking is only slightly inferior to complete ranking and generally superior in the cases considered to theQ-sort, although there are likely to be other situations when the latter is superior. The authors are indebted to Dr. Clyde Kramer of Virginia Polytechnic Institute for bringing theQ-sort ranking technique of psychotherapy to their attention.     

On the correlation of a naturally and an artificially dichotomized variable

A method is suggested for estimating the correlation of a naturally (X) and an artificially (Y) dichotomized variable. It is assumed that a normal random variable (L) underlies the artificially dichotomized variable. The proposed correlation coefficient recovers the product moment correlation coefficient between X and L from a fourfold table of X and Y. The suggested correlation coefficient ν is contrasted with the phi correlation and the biserial η. The biserial η was proposed by Karl Pearson and is conceptually related to the new correlation coefficient. However, in addition, Pearson's biserial η invokes the assumption that the marginal distribution of L is normal, which contradicts its basic assumptions and thus does not recover the true correlation of L and X. Finally, an approximation is provided to simplify the calculation of ν and its standard error.     

Characterizing Simpler Recognizable Sets of Integers

For a given numeration system U, a set X of integers is said to be U-star-free if the language of the normalized U-representations of the elements in X is star-free. Adapting a result of McNaughton and Papert, we give a first-order logical characterization of these sets for various numeration systems including integer base systems and the Fibonacci system. For k-ary systems, the problem of the base dependence of this property is also studied. Finally, the case of k-adic systems is developed.