Picture recognition of food by macaques (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca silenus</Emphasis>)

Pictorial representations of three-dimensional objects are often used to investigate animal cognitive abilities; however, investigators rarely evaluate whether the animals conceptualize the two-dimensional image as the object it is intended to represent. We tested for picture recognition in lion-tailed macaques by presenting five monkeys with digitized images of familiar foods on a touch screen. Monkeys viewed images of two different foods and learned that they would receive a piece of the one they touched first. After demonstrating that they would reliably select images of their preferred foods on one set of foods, animals were transferred to images of a second set of familiar foods. We assumed that if the monkeys recognized the images, they would spontaneously select images of their preferred foods on the second set of foods. Three monkeys selected images of their preferred foods significantly more often than chance on their first transfer session. In an additional test of the monkeys’ picture recognition abilities, animals were presented with pairs of food images containing a medium-preference food paired with either a high-preference food or a low-preference food. The same three monkeys selected the medium-preference foods significantly more often when they were paired with low-preference foods and significantly less often when those same foods were paired with high-preference foods. Our novel design provided convincing evidence that macaques recognized the content of two-dimensional images on a touch screen. Results also suggested that the animals understood the connection between the two-dimensional images and the three-dimensional objects they represented.     

Familiar Verbs Are Not Always Easier Than Novel Verbs: How German Pre‐School Children Comprehend Active and Passive Sentences

Many studies show a developmental advantage for transitive sentences with familiar verbs over those with novel verbs. It might be that once familiar verbs become entrenched in particular constructions, they would be more difficult to understand (than would novel verbs) in non‐prototypical constructions. We provide support for this hypothesis investigating German children using a forced‐choice pointing paradigm with reversed agent‐patient roles. We tested active transitive verbs in study 1. The 2‐year olds were better with familiar than novel verbs, while the 2½‐year olds pointed correctly for both. In study 2, we tested passives: 2½‐year olds were significantly below chance for familiar verbs and at chance for novel verbs, supporting the hypothesis that the entrenchment of the familiar verbs in the active transitive voice was interfering with interpreting them in the passive voice construction. The 3½‐year olds were also at chance for novel verbs but above chance with familiar verbs. We interpret this as reflecting a lessening of the verb‐in‐construction entrenchment as the child develops knowledge that particular verbs can occur in a range of constructions. The 4½‐year olds were above chance for both familiar and novel verbs. We discuss our findings in terms of the relative entrenchment of lexical and syntactic information and to interference between them.     

STRUCTURAL ALIGNMENT IN COMPARISON:

Abstract— Theories of similarity generally agree that the similarity of a pair increases with its commonalities and decreases with its differences. Recent research suggests that this comparison process involves an alignment of structured representations yielding commonalities, differences related to the commonalities, and differences unrelated to the commonalities. One counterintuitive prediction of this view is that it should be easier to find the differences between pairs of similar items than to find the differences between pairs of dissimilar items. This prediction is particularly strong for differences that are related to the commonalities. We tested this prediction in two experiments in which subjects listed a single difference for each of a number of word pairs. The results are consistent with the predictions of structural alignment. In light of these findings, we discuss the potential role of structural alignment in other cognitive processes that involve comparisons.     

Visual expertise does not predict the composite effect across species: A comparison between spider (Ateles geoffroyi) and rhesus (Macaca mulatta) monkeys

Humans are subject to the composite illusion: two identical top halves of a face are perceived as “different” when they are presented with different bottom halves. This observation suggests that when building a mental representation of a face, the underlying system perceives the whole face, and has difficulty decomposing facial features. We adapted a behavioural task that measures the composite illusion to examine the perception of faces in two nonhuman species. Specifically we had spider (Ateles geoffroyi) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) perform a two-forced choice, match-to-sample task where only the top half of sample was relevant to the task. The results of Experiment 1 show that spider monkeys (N = 2) process the faces of familiar species (conspecifics and humans, but not chimpanzees, sheep, or sticks), holistically. The second experiment tested rhesus monkeys (N = 7) with the faces of humans, chimpanzees, gorillas, sheep, and sticks. Contrary to prediction, there was no evidence of a composite effect in the human (or familiar primate) condition. Instead, we present evidence of a composite illusion in the chimpanzee condition (an unfamiliar primate). Together, these experiments show that visual expertise does not predict the composite effect across the primate order.     

The Effects of Choice Between Nonpreferred Foods on the Food Consumption of Individuals with Food Selectivity

Previous research has concluded that presenting individuals with the opportunity to choose is a viable treatment for escape‐maintained behavior. Considering that food refusal behavior has been generally described as avoidant behavior, the present study aimed to evaluate the role of choice between nonpreferred foods on the food consumption and problematic mealtime behavior of two children with food selectivity. Each participant was allowed to choose between four nonpreferred foods in the choice condition and was not allowed to choose in the no‐choice condition. Further, the role of choice as an antecedent manipulation in mediating extinction‐induced responding was evaluated when choice alone was demonstrated to be ineffective in increasing consumption and a nonremoval of the spoon procedure was introduced. Results indicated that providing choices was effective in increasing the food consumption of one participant and was advantageous in decreasing emotional responding when a nonremoval of the spoon procedure was introduced for the second participant. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social transmission of food preferences in Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata) after mere exposure or aversion training

In Experiment 1, 3 mother-child pairs of Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata) were given simultaneous choice tests between raisins and popcorn. The mothers and offspring showed different choice patterns. Cofeeding opportunities were then alternated with individual choice tests. In Experiment 2,2 other pairs were added. Each animal was again offered simultaneous choice tests between marshmallows and almonds. Food aversion conditioning was used to create different choice patterns for mothers and offspring. After cofeeding and choice tests, the differences in choice patterns disappeared in both experiments. The changes after contact with the other's eating pattern during cofeeding was as follows: foods consumed by either came to be eaten by both; foods consumed by both continued to be eaten by both; and foods consumed by neither continued to be ignored. The results provide evidence for social transmission of food preferences in this species.     

Panoramic search: the interaction of memory and vision in search through a familiar scene

How do observers search through familiar scenes? A novel panoramic search method is used to study the interaction of memory and vision in natural search behavior. In panoramic search, observers see part of an unchanging scene larger than their current field of view. A target object can be visible, present in the display but hidden from view, or absent. Visual search efficiency does not change after hundreds of trials through an unchanging scene (Experiment 1). Memory search, in contrast, begins inefficiently but becomes efficient with practice. Given a choice between vision and memory, observers choose vision (Experiments 2 and 3). However, if forced to use their memory on some trials, they learn to use memory on all trials, even when reliable visual information remains available (Experiment 4). The results suggest that observers make a pragmatic choice between vision and memory, with a strong bias toward visual search even for memorized stimuli.     

Mechanisms of inferential order judgments in humans (Homo sapiens) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

If A > B, and B > C, it follows logically that A > C. The process of reaching that conclusion is called transitive inference (TI). Several mechanisms have been offered to explain transitive performance. Scanning models claim that the list is scanned from the ends of the list inward until a match is found. Positional discrimination models claim that positional uncertainty accounts for accuracy and reaction time patterns. In Experiment 1, we trained rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens) on adjacent pairs (e.g., AB, BC, CD, DE, EF) and tested them with previously untrained nonadjacent pairs (e.g., BD). In Experiment 2, we trained a second list and tested with nonadjacent pairs selected between lists (e.g., B from List 1, D from List 2). We then introduced associative competition between adjacent items in Experiment 3 by training 2 items per position (e.g., B?C?, B?C?) before testing with untrained nonadjacent items. In all 3 experiments, humans and monkeys showed distance effects in which accuracy increased, and reaction time decreased, as the distance between items in each pair increased (e.g., BD vs. BE). In Experiment 4, we trained adjacent pairs with separate 9- and 5-item lists. We then tested with nonadjacent pairs selected between lists to determine whether list items were chosen according to their absolute position (e.g., D, 5-item list > E, 9-item list), or their relative position (e.g., D, 5-item list < E, 9-item list). Both monkeys' and humans' choices were most consistent with a relative positional organization.     

Metamemory in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Whereas evidence for metacognition by nonhuman primates has been obtained in great apes and old world monkeys, it is weaker in new world monkeys. For instance, capuchin monkeys may fail to recognize their own knowledge of the location of invisible bait. In the present study, we tested whether tufted capuchin monkeys would flexibly change their behavior in a delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) test depending upon the strength of their memory trace of the sample. In Experiment 1, two monkeys were tested on a modified 9-alternative DMTS task with various delays on a computerized display. In some trials, the monkeys could choose whether to go for a memory test or for a simple key touch as an escape from the test. In other trials, they were forced to go for the memory test. Both monkeys escaped from the memory test more often when their matching accuracy on forced tests was lower. In one of the monkeys, the matching accuracies on chosen memory tests decreased more slowly as a function of delay length, and were higher after long delays than those on forced memory tests. This suggests that at least one capuchin monkey was able to recognize the strength of his own memory trace. Experiment 2 employed occasional no-sample tests, in which the monkeys faced the task choice without presentation of any sample for the trial. The monkey who was successful in Experiment 1 declined the memory test more often in no-sample trials than regular trials, further indicating metamemory in this individual. In Experiment 3, this successful monkey received a task, in which he was sometimes able to choose between shape MTS or texture MTS tasks. However, his matching accuracies did not differ between chosen tasks and forced tasks. Thus, the metamemory possessed by this new world monkey species may be more like a flag, showing strength of memory trace, than an elaborate representation showing details of the memory trace.     

More or less: spontaneous quantity discrimination in the domestic cat

We examined spontaneous quantity discrimination in untrained domestic cats in three food choice experiments. In Experiment 1, we presented the cats with two different quantities of food in eight numerical combinations. Overall, the subjects chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller one, and significantly so when the ratio between the quantities was less than 0.5. In Experiment 2, we presented the cats with two pieces of food in four different size combinations. Again, subjects chose the larger piece above chance, although not in the combination where the largest item was presented. In Experiment 3, a subset of the cats was presented multiple times with two different quantities of food, which were hidden from view. In this case, the cats did not choose the larger quantity more often than the smaller one, suggesting that in the present experiments they mainly used visual cues when comparing quantities. We conclude that domestic cats are capable of spontaneously discriminating quantities when faced with different numbers or sizes of food items, and we suggest why they may not always be motivated to choose the larger quantity. In doing so, we highlight the advantages of testing spontaneous choice behavior, which is more likely to reflect animals’ everyday manner of responding than is the case when training them in order to test their absolute limits of performance which may not always coincide with their daily needs.     

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) let lesser rewards pass them by to get better rewards

Self-control is defined as foregoing an immediate reward to gain a larger delayed reward. Methods used to test self-control comparatively include inter-temporal choice tasks, delay of gratification tasks, and accumulation tasks. To date, capuchin monkeys have shown different levels of self-control across tasks. This study introduced a new task that could be used comparatively to measure self-control in an intuitive context that involved responses that required no explicit training. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were given a choice between two food items that were presented on a mechanized, revolving tray that moved those foods sequentially toward the monkeys. A monkey could grab the first item or wait for the second, but was only allowed one item. Most monkeys in the study waited for a more highly preferred food item or a larger amount of the same food item when those came later, and they inhibited the prepotent response to grab food by not reaching out to take less-preferred foods or smaller amounts of food that passed directly in front of them first. These data confirm that the mechanisms necessary for self-control are present in capuchin monkeys and indicate that the methodology can be useful for broader comparative assessments of self-control.     

Rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting

Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.     

Monkeys match and tally quantities across senses

We report here that monkeys can actively match the number of sounds they hear to the number of shapes they see and present the first evidence that monkeys sum over sounds and sights. In Experiment 1, two monkeys were trained to choose a simultaneous array of 1-9 squares that numerically matched a sample sequence of shapes or sounds. Monkeys numerically matched across (audio-visual) and within (visual-visual) modalities with equal accuracy and transferred to novel numerical values. In Experiment 2, monkeys presented with sample sequences of randomly ordered shapes or tones were able to choose an array of 2-9 squares that was the numerical sum of the shapes and sounds in the sample sequence. In both experiments, accuracy and reaction time depended on the ratio between the correct numerical match and incorrect choice. These findings suggest monkeys and humans share an abstract numerical code that can be divorced from the modality in which stimuli are first experienced.     

Tied to expectations: Predicting features speeds processing even under adverse circumstances

When participants predict the upcoming stimulus in a randomized choice reaction task, a match between prediction and stimulus increases processing speed at a level similar to that observed in cueing studies with highly valid cues. This might be taken to suggest that people cannot help but fully use their self-generated, verbalized predictions for preparing task processing. Thus, we tested how flexibly participants can control formation and implementation of predictions. In Experiment 1, we varied validity and response-relevance of predictions. We observed that prediction effects on RT can be boosted by increasing validity, but prevail under adverse circumstances. This was not the case in a control group who read rather than predicted the feature words, suggesting that the effect was specific to predictions as such. Experiment 2 provided further evidence for limited control of participants over implementing and forming predictions. Participants were provided with practice on stimuli occurring with varying frequency, but neither learned to strategically choose predictions to maximize the number of match trials, nor did they reduce the amount of prediction-based preparation when predicting an infrequent stimulus. As sequential aftereffects of prediction match did not vary with validity, they were identified as an independent effect of verbalizing a response-relevant stimulus feature. The results are consistent with the view that the predicted stimulus feature is represented in the focus of attention in working memory and that the amount of implementation can be subject to weighting.     

囚徒选择和中国人的义

通过对囚徒困境博弈的囚徒策略选择发现,中国被试的囚徒策略选择受到中国传统文化中的义的影响：在一次囚徒博弈中,并不像传统博弈论预测的那样被试选择坦白为最优策略,而是有一半多的被试选择了不坦白策略;在进行囚徒选择时大多数被试都意识到了囚徒之间的熟悉关系。囚徒关系被激活后,选择不坦白策略的被试与选择坦白策略的被试之间有显著差异,但性别差异不显著。结果表明,中国传统文化中的“义”以及相应的人际信任是导致被试选择不坦白策略的主要原因。     

Socially learned preferences for differentially rewarded tokens in the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella)

Social learning is assumed to underlie traditions, yet evidence indicating social learning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), which exhibit traditions, is sparse. The authors tested capuchins for their ability to learn the value of novel tokens using a previously familiar token-exchange economy. Capuchins change their preferences in favor of a token worth a high-value food reward after watching a conspecific model exchange 2 differentially rewarded tokens, yet they fail to develop a similar preference after watching tokens paired with foods in the absence of a conspecific model. They also fail to learn that the value of familiar tokens has changed. Information about token value is available in all situations, but capuchins seem to pay more attention in a social situation involving novel tokens.     

Disconnect in concept learning by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): judgment of relations and relations-between-relations

The authors investigated the role that entropy measures, discriminative cues, and symbolic knowledge play for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in the acquisition of the concepts of same and different for use in a computerized relational matching-to-sample task. After repeatedly failing to perceive relations between pairs of stimuli in a 2-choice discrimination paradigm, monkeys rapidly learned to discriminate between 8-element arrays. Subsequent tests with smaller arrays, however, suggested that, although important for the initial acquisition of the concept, entropy is not a variable on which monkeys are dependent. Not only do monkeys choose a corresponding relational pair in the presence of a cue, but they also choose the cue itself in the presence of the relational pair--in essence, labeling those relations. Subsequent failure in the judgment of relations-between-relations, however, suggests that perhaps a qualitatively different cognitive component exists that prevents monkeys from behaving analogically.     

Monkeys fail to reciprocate in an exchange task

Exchanges form the basis of human economies. Animals too can engage in reciprocal interactions but they do not barter goods like humans, which raises the question of the abilities necessary for trading to occur. Previous studies have shown that non-human primates can exchange food with human partners. Here, we tested the ability of brown capuchin monkeys and Tonkean macaques to reciprocate in a task requiring two conspecifics to exchange tokens in order to obtain rewards from an experimenter. We recorded 56 transfers between subjects in capuchin monkeys and 10 in Tonkean macaques. All transfers were passive in both species. Capuchins preferentially picked up tokens valuable for them in the partner’s compartment. They tended to manipulate the partner-valued tokens more often than the no-value ones, leading to more opportunities for these tokens to end up within reach of the partner. Despite optimal conditions where values of goods were defined and known by partners, however, none of the pairs tested engaged in short-term reciprocal interactions. These results indicate that calculated reciprocity was difficult if not impossible in the animals tested.     

The Heuristic and Motivational Value of Video Reinforcement

Four rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were tested on joystick-based computer tasks in which they could choose to be reinforced either with pellets-only or with pellets + video. A variety of videotapes were used to reinforce task performance. The monkeys significantly preferred to be rewarded with a pellet and 10 s of a blank screen than a pellet plus 10 s of videotape. When they did choose to see videotaped images, however, they were significantly more likely to view video of themselves than video of their roommate or of unfamiliar conspecifics. These data support earlier findings of individual differences in preference for video reinforcement, and have clear implications for the study of face-recognition and self-recognition by nonhuman primates.     

Robust representations of individual faces in chimpanzees (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pan troglodytes</Emphasis>) but not monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>)

Being able to recognize the faces of our friends and family members no matter where we see them represents a substantial challenge for the visual system because the retinal image of a face can be degraded by both changes in the person (age, expression, pose, hairstyle, etc.) and changes in the viewing conditions (direction and degree of illumination). Yet most of us are able to recognize familiar people effortlessly. A popular theory for how face recognition is achieved has argued that the brain stabilizes facial appearance by building average representations that enhance diagnostic features that reliably vary between people while diluting features that vary between instances of the same person. This explains why people find it easier to recognize average images of people, created by averaging multiple images of the same person together, than single instances (i.e. photographs). Although this theory is gathering momentum in the psychological and computer sciences, there is no evidence of whether this mechanism represents a unique specialization for individual recognition in humans. Here we tested two species, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), to determine whether average images of different familiar individuals were easier to discriminate than photographs of familiar individuals. Using a two-alternative forced-choice, match-to-sample procedure, we report a behaviour response profile that suggests chimpanzees encode the faces of conspecifics differently than rhesus monkeys and in a manner similar to humans.