Do infants bind mental states to agents?

Recent findings suggest that infants understand others’ preferential choice and can use the perspectives and beliefs of others to interpret their actions. The standard interpretation in the field is that infants understand preferential choice as a dispositional state of the agent. It is possible, however, that these social situations trigger the acquisition of more general, not person-specific knowledge. In a looking-time study we showed an Agent A demonstrating a choice, that only could have been interpreted as preferential based on the perspective (and thus the belief) of the agent, not the observer. Then we introduced a new agent (Agent B), who chose consistently or inconsistently with Agent A; also varying whether Agent B was an adult or a child. Results show that infants expected Agent B (both the adult and the child) to choose as Agent A, but only in the condition where according to Agent A’s knowledge two objects were present in familiarization(confirming previous evidence on the importance of contrastive choice). We interpret these results in the following way: (1) infants do not encode the perspectives of other agents as person-specific sources of knowledge and (2) they learn about the object, rather than the agent’s disposition towards that object. We propose that early theory of mind processes lack the binding of belief content to the belief holder. However, such limitation may in fact serve an important function, allowing infants to acquire information through the perspectives of others in the form of universal access to general information.     

Do speakers have access to a mental syllabary?

The first, theoretical part of this paper sketches a framework for phonological encoding in which the speaker successively generates phonological syllables in connected speech. The final stage of this process, phonetic encoding, consists of accessing articulatory gestural scores for each of these syllables in a “mental syllabary”. The second, experimental part studies various predictions derived from this theory. The main finding is a syllable frequency effect: words ending in a high-frequent syllable are named faster than words ending in a low-frequent syllable. As predicted, this syllable frequency effect is independent of and additive to the effect of word frequency on naming latency. The effect, moreover, is not due to the complexity of the word-final syllable. In the General Discussion, the syllabary model is further elaborated with respect to phonological underspecification and activation spreading. Alternative accounts of the empirical findings in terms of core syllables and demisyllables are considered.     

Are mental health awareness efforts contributing to the rise in reported mental health problems? A call to test the prevalence inflation hypothesis

In the past decade, there have been extensive efforts in the Western world to raise public awareness about mental health problems, with the goal of reducing or preventing these symptoms across the population. Despite these efforts, reported rates of mental health problems have increased in these countries over the same period. In this paper, we present the hypothesis that, paradoxically, awareness efforts are contributing to this reported increase in mental health problems. We term this the prevalence inflation hypothesis. First, we argue that mental health awareness efforts are leading to more accurate reporting of previously under-recognised symptoms, a beneficial outcome. Second, and more problematically, we propose that awareness efforts are leading some individuals to interpret and report milder forms of distress as mental health problems. We propose that this then leads some individuals to experience a genuine increase in symptoms, because labelling distress as a mental health problem can affect an individual's self-concept and behaviour in a way that is ultimately self-fulfilling. For example, interpreting low levels of anxiety as symptomatic of an anxiety disorder might lead to behavioural avoidance, which can further exacerbate anxiety symptoms. We propose that the increase in reported symptoms then drives further awareness efforts: the two processes influence each other in a cyclical, intensifying manner. We end by suggesting ways to test this hypothesis and argue that future awareness efforts need to mitigate the issues we present.     

Mapping drivers’ mental models of adaptive cruise control to performance

Driver support features (DSF) have the potential to improve safety, but they also change the driver-vehicle relationship —as well as their respective roles and responsibilities. To maximize safety, it is important to understand how drivers’ knowledge and understanding of these technologies—referred to as drivers’ mental models—impact performance and safety. This simulator study examined how drivers with different mental models of adaptive cruise control performed in edge cases. The study compared the responses of groups of drivers, with strong and weak mental models of ACC, established through a combination of screening, training, and exposure, in edge case situations in a high-fidelity driving simulator. In general, participants with strong mental models were faster than those with weak mental models to respond in edge-case situations—defined as cases where the ACC did not detect an approaching object, such as a slow-moving motorcycle. The performance deficits observed for drivers with weak mental models appear to reflect uncertainty surrounding how ACC will behave in edge cases.     

Challenges of patient‐led mental health services to psychoanalytic clinicians

This paper considers implications to psychoanalytic psychotherapy of the British Government's decision to implement a patient choice agenda for state‐funded mental health services in England and Wales. It places the patient choice agenda in the context of consumerist society and argues that the complex nature of psychoanalytic psychotherapy leaves it more vulnerable than other psychological therapy modalities to compete in the current reality of ‘consumer’‐led public mental health, which, in turn reflects a profoundly changed social context from that to which psychoanalysis traces its roots. Unless psychoanalytic clinicians recognize and find ways to adjust to this context they will jeopardize the survival of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in an increasingly market‐orientated model of mental healthcare provision in the public sector, eager to promote more ‘consumer friendly’ psychological therapy models.     

When is a mental health professional competent to assess a person's decision to hasten death?

As the country continues to debate the legality of aid-in-dying, it appears inevitable that at some point there will be a need for mental health professionals to be involved in assessments of individuals asking for a hastened death. I designed this article to provide a set of guidelines that will allow both mental health professionals and potential consultees to determine if a professional has the training and expertise necessary to be a competent consultant.     

Neural response to evaluating depression predicts perceivers’ mental health treatment recommendations

Nonstigmatized perceivers’ initial evaluations of stigmatized individuals have profound consequences for the well-being of those stigmatized individuals. However, the mechanism by which this occurs remains underexplored. Specifically, what beliefs about the stigmatized condition (stigma-related beliefs) shape how nonstigmatized perceivers evaluate and behave toward stigmatized individuals? We examined these questions with respect to depression-related stigmatization because depression is highly stigmatized and nondepressed individuals’ behavior (e.g., willingness to recommend treatment) directly relates to removing stigma and increasing well-being. In Study 1, we identified common stigma-related beliefs associated with depression (e.g., not a serious illness, controllable, threatening), and found that only perceptions that depression is a serious condition predicted nondepressed perceivers’ willingness to recommend mental health treatment. Moreover, perceivers’ beliefs that depression is a distressing condition mediated the relationship between perceived seriousness and treatment recommendations (Study 1). In Study 2, we used fMRI to disentangle the potential processes connecting distress to nondepressed perceivers’ self-reported treatment intentions. Heightened activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC)—a region widely implicated in evaluating others—and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC)—a region widely implicated in regulating negative emotions—emerged when nondepressed perceivers evaluated individuals who were ostensibly depressed. Beliefs that depression is a distressing condition mediated the relationship between dmPFC (but not vlPFC) activity and nondepressed individuals’ self-reported treatment recommendations.     

Children’s mental health: Time to stop using psychiatric diagnosis

Hegemonic mental health service approaches stress the need for ‘accurate’ diagnosis in order to understand what the correct ‘treatment’ should be. I review the evidence on how far diagnosis in psychiatry has helped advance scientific knowledge and clinical practice and conclude that it hasn’t. I then examine how National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines in relation to children’s behaviour problems reflects the lack of progress that results from adopting a diagnostic approach. Taking mental health practice beyond reliance on narrow non-evidence-based diagnostic algorithms can be developed by adopting existing projects such as the Partners for Change Outcome Management Systems project.     

Colic: What's maternal mental health got to do with it?

Families can benefit when pediatric and mental health professionals have a greater appreciation of psychological and relational issues that arise in the course of caring for an infant with colic. The Infant Behavior, Cry, and Sleep Clinic is a multidisciplinary, clinical intervention for parents who identify infant crying as adversely affecting infant, parental, and/or family functioning. Pairing pediatric and mental health expertise provides parents with strategies to manage infant colic within a context that recognizes parental mental health needs. Clinical case material illustrates varying responses and degrees of psychological distress in mothers whose infants have colic. Treatment approaches to colic that take into account maternal mental health needs may contribute to more optimal infant, maternal, and family outcomes.     

Can infants use video to update mental representations of absent objects?

Before their second birthday, infants can update their knowledge based on what someone tells them, but can they do so based on what a video shows them? The current study explored whether infants can update their representation of an absent object’s properties after seeing a video of something happening to it, following seminal work showing that they can update their representation after being told about something happening to it (Ganea et al., 2007). It thus adapted an existing paradigm for testing infants’ understanding of references to absent objects (using language) to investigate a different symbolic medium (video). Twenty-two-month-olds first played with a toy and later saw on video that the toy underwent a change in state while they were out of the room. Infants in the current study did not subsequently identify the toy based on this new information, whereas those in previous research did. Infants this age thus appear less likely to update their representation of an absent object’s properties using video than using language. This result is consistent with the possibility that infants may understand the representational function of symbolic objects later in development than they understand the representational function of language. It also aligns with evidence of the video deficit in which infants learn less effectively from video than from firsthand experience.     

Adaptation to an autoimmune disorder: Does mental flexibility impact illness-related self-regulation?

Objective: To examine whether mental flexibility moderates the relationship between illness representations of control and coping behaviour in individuals suffering from rheumatoid arthritis (RA) and systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE).

Design: Recently, diagnosed RA (N = 80) and SLE (N = 75) patients completed questionnaires about illness representations of personal and treatment control and four coping behaviours: instrumental coping, adherence to medical advice, palliative coping and wishful thinking. Mental flexibility was assessed with the Trail Making Test Part B (TMT-B), while visuomotor processing speed, as a confounder, was assessed with the Trail Making Test Part A (TMT-A). Moderated mediation models were tested within a bootstrapped multiple regression framework.

Results: TMT-A scores had no statistically significant moderation effects on the relation between representations and coping behaviour. Conversely, in those participants with SLE, TMT-B scores moderated the relation of personal control to wishful thinking and palliative coping, as well as the relation of treatment control to both wishful thinking and palliative coping. All significant effects were restricted to the SLE group.

Conclusion: Interactions between neurocognitive factors and the process of illness adaptation may emerge early during the course of SLE. The present findings highlight the role of cognitive functioning as an integral part of the illness-related self-regulation mechanism.     

Do 18-month-olds really attribute mental states to others? A critical test

In the research reported here, we investigated whether 18-month-olds would use their own past experience of visual access to attribute perception and consequent beliefs to other people. Infants in this study wore either opaque blindfolds (opaque condition) or trick blindfolds that looked opaque but were actually transparent (trick condition). Then both groups of infants observed an actor wearing one of the same blindfolds that they themselves had experienced, while a puppet removed an object from its location. Anticipatory eye movements revealed that infants who had experienced opaque blindfolds expected the actor to behave in accordance with a false belief about the object's location, but that infants who had experienced trick blindfolds did not exhibit that expectation. Our results suggest that 18-month-olds used self-experience with the blindfolds to assess the actor's visual access and to update her belief state accordingly. These data constitute compelling evidence that 18-month-olds infer perceptual access and appreciate its causal role in altering the epistemic states of other people.     

Is a change in work motivation related to a change in mental well-being?

The purpose of the study was to investigate the effect of changes on work motivation and the effect of the changes on future mental well-being. This prospective study comprised 577 employees who were followed up 18 months after a comprehensive baseline measurement. The response rate was 81% for the baseline and 72% for the follow-up. The results show that both negative and positive changes in work motivation over time (18 months) were related to exhaustion. A similar correlation was found between negative changes in work motivation and depression. The results show that employees with a decreased level of work motivation had a higher risk of experiencing more exhaustion and depression in the future. Thus, investing in activities to promote work motivation may be an effective means of preventing long-term sick leave for stress-related mental illness and of providing energy for successful career advancement.     

Can we define mental disorder by using the criterion of mental dysfunction?

The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart serves the goal of pumping blood. But can we single out mental functions in the same way? Can we identify mental functions scientifically, for instance, by applying evolutionary theory? Or are models of mental functions necessarily value-laden? I want to identify several philosophical problems regarding the notion of mental function and dysfunction and point out some possible solutions. As long as these questions remain unanswered, definitions of mental disorder that rest upon the concept of mental dysfunction will lack a secure foundation.     

Are people with high and low mental rotation abilities differently susceptible to the alignment effect?

We investigated whether the alignment effect (Levine et al, 1982 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 111 157-175) is influenced by mental rotation abilities. In two experiments, groups of undergraduate students with high and low performance in mental rotation tasks were required to study either schematic (experiment 1) or more complex (experiment 2) maps, and to perform a number of pointing tasks adopting a perspective which could be aligned, misaligned (45 degrees, 135 degrees), or counteraligned (180 degrees) with the perspective assumed during learning. Cognitive styles in spatial representation have also been considered. Results of experiment 1 show that people with low performance in mental rotation tasks prefer to adopt a representation of space focused more on landmarks. Their performance in the pointing tasks depends on the alignment conditions, with more errors in the counteraligned condition followed by the two misaligned and aligned ones. In contrast to this, high-ability mental rotators prefer survey and route spatial representations and are affected only by the aligned and non-aligned conditions. In the second experiment, practice was studied as a function of mental rotation and alignment. The group high in mental rotation ability was found to be free from the alignment effect in the pointing tasks performed after the final of four learning phases.     

What is mental representation? A study of its elements and how they lead to language

Mental representation as a psychoanalytic concept has never found a central place in the family of psychoanalytic concepts and gradually has become a stepchild. A modest conceptual outline of infant mental development may help the mental representation concept become more central. The following ideas are hypothesized: (1) Registration is viewed separately from representation so that two distinct types of registration are initiated, one for distinctly mental phenomena, the other for unconscious, reflexive phenomena. (2) Perceptual-apperceptual focus is central, so that consciousness and interest in thinking always occur together whenever registrations are of the mental type. (3) A developmental schema process is proposed that will fill the humanistic object-self and motivational gap between Piaget's and Freud's ideas. (4) Analogy, metaphor, and syntax are seen to contribute to (in addition to being contributed to by) schema formation. (5) The mind is conceived as both an organization of information and as an organizer of information. This allows the separateness of representability from physical influences to be understood as both motivational and basically as process. With these hypotheses, mental representation may be viewed as central to mental organization.     

Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are stored, not as representations in the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip.     

Cumulative culture and future thinking: Is mental time travel a prerequisite to cumulative cultural evolution?

Cumulative culture denotes the, arguably, human capacity to build on the cultural behaviors of one's predecessors, allowing increases in cultural complexity to occur such that many of our cultural artifacts, products and technologies have progressed beyond what a single individual could invent alone. This process of cumulative cultural evolution underlies human cultural success and has enabled us to reach and inhabit some of the most inhospitable environments on this planet. Why humans, but not other animals, have exhibited a cultural explosion has caused much deliberation. The human propensity to imitate, teach, “mind-read” and cooperate have all featured prominently in accounts of the prerequisites for cumulative culture. However, this may not represent the complete picture. In this article we consider whether there exists a link between future thinking, specifically prospective mental time travel, and the observed distribution of cumulative culture.