Rationality and reasoning with metaphors

Traditional accounts of rationality typically preclude metaphorical reasoning. We review research that has highlighted the pervasiveness of metaphors in creative problem solving, jurisprudence and history of science, and argue that any account of rationality must explicitly acknowledge the ontology of representation and include an ontology-changing mechanism. From these considerations, we present an interaction-based view of cognition and examine the problem of rationality in its terms. We argue that rationality is closely related to the attitude of a cognitive agent towards incoherency—by which we do not mean internal inconsistency but operational incongruity in the external world. We conclude that though rationality permits a change of ontology, it requires a healthy respect towards the autonomous structure of the environment.     

What matters in scientific explanations: effects of elaboration and content

Given the breadth and depth of available information, determining which components of an explanation are most important is a crucial process for simplifying learning. Three experiments tested whether people believe that components of an explanation with more elaboration are more important. In Experiment 1, participants read separate and unstructured components that comprised explanations of real-world scientific phenomena, rated the components on their importance for understanding the explanations, and drew graphs depicting which components elaborated on which other components. Participants gave higher importance scores for components that they judged to be elaborated upon by other components. Experiment 2 demonstrated that experimentally increasing the amount of elaboration of a component increased the perceived importance of the elaborated component. Furthermore, Experiment 3 demonstrated that elaboration increases the importance of the elaborated information by providing insight into understanding the elaborated information; information that was too technical to provide insight into the elaborated component did not increase the importance of the elaborated component. While learning an explanation, people piece together the structure of elaboration relationships between components and use the insight provided by elaboration to identify important components.     

Prolegomena to Concise Theories of Action

A new methodology for developing theories of action has recently emerged which provides means for formally evaluating the correctness of such theories. Yet, for a theory of action to qualify as a solution to the frame problem, not only does it need to produce correct inferences, but moreover, it needs to derive these inferences from a concise representation of the domain at hand. The new methodology however offers no means for assessing conciseness. Such a formal account of conciseness is developed in this paper. Combined with the existing criterion for correctness, our account of conciseness offers a framework where proposed solutions to the frame problem can be formally evaluated.     

An overview of algorithmic approaches to compute optimum entropy distributions in the expert system shell MECore (extended version)

The expert system shell MECore provides a series of knowledge management operations to define probabilistic knowledge bases and to reason under uncertainty. To provide a reference work for MECore algorithmics, we bring together results from different sources that have been applied in MECore and explain their intuitive ideas. Additionally, we report on our ongoing work regarding further development of MECore's algorithms to compute optimum entropy distributions and provide some empirical results. Altogether this paper explains the intuition of important theoretical results and their practical implications, compares old and new algorithmic approaches and points out their benefits as well as possible limitations and pitfalls.     

Attention switching and working memory spans

Barrouillet and Camos () concluded from their developmental study on working memory that when performing complex span tasks, individuals maintain memory items by switching rapidly their attention from processing to storage while performing the concurrent task. Thus, a processing component that would require a continuous attentional focusing should have a highly detrimental effect on span. The present study verifies two predictions issuing from this hypothesis by comparing the classical self‐paced reading and operation span tasks with new computer‐paced tasks in adults. First, any increase in the pace at which the processing component of a working memory span task has to be performed impedes switching and then leads to lower spans. Second, when presented at a fast pace, even simple activities such as reading letters or adding and subtracting 1 to small numbers have an effect on spans as detrimental as complex activities like reading and understanding sentences or solving complex equations.     

Ontological Phenomenology: The Philosophical Project of Hedwig Conrad-Martius

The special importance of the system of Hedwig Conrad-Martius lies in that she takes up the ideas of her teacher Husserl and pursues them on an independent path of phenomenology carefully anchored in the history of philosophy. This above all made possible the philosophical grasping of the then revolutionary findings in the modern natural sciences, especially in physics and medicine. The question concerning the border between the natural sciences and philosophy is today still debated with just as much urgency—indeed, ethically with even more urgency—as it was in her time. By virtue of this alone, her ideas can be of great help to us. The natural scientific progress made since her time does not, however, present a barrier; rather it corresponds to the spirit of phenomenology: not to produce results with rigid intellectual frameworks, but to make available a tool with which the world in its diversity—and thus also for its modern, ever-changing issues—can be disclosed ever anew. The essay will consist of an overview of the life of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, an introduction to the essential ideas of her work: her concept of essence and her formulation of phenomenological ideation [Wesensschau], a brief sketch of her epistemology and an exposition of her ontological conception of “real ontology” [Realontologie].

Young children's reasoning about the order of past events

Four studies are reported that employed an object location task to assess temporal-causal reasoning. In Experiments 1-3, successfully locating the object required a retrospective consideration of the order in which two events had occurred. In Experiment 1, 5- but not 4-year-olds were successful; 4-year-olds also failed to perform at above-chance levels in modified versions of the task in Experiments 2 and 3. However, in Experiment 4, 3-year-olds were successful when they were able to see the object being placed first in one location and then in the other, rather than having to consider retrospectively the sequence in which two events had happened. The results suggest that reasoning about the causal significance of the temporal order of events may not be fully developed before 5 years.     

A Trajectory Approach to Causality

In this paper we propose a new approach to address the ramification problem in common-sense reasoning about action and change. We contrast the methods of McCain and Turner, Thielscher and Sandewall and, based on some of the limitations they encounter, we introduce a trajectory-based approach which keeps a history of the states through which a system evolves to characterise its dynamical state. We furnish an underlying state-transition semantics and a logic that admits an expressive, dynamical account of some typical scenarios which encounter modelling difficulties in the other approaches mentioned.     

Adding possibilities can reduce the Gambler's Fallacy: A naïve-probability paradox

This paper reports a novel paradox of intuitive probabilistic reasoning detected in naïve reasoners’ responses in two separate experiments where we manipulated the number of sets (or possibilities) of the problem keeping constant the probability of the critical set. Experiment 1 showed that the incidence of the Gambler's Fallacy (GF) was reduced when the number of sets was increased. In Experiment 2, a reduction of the GF also occurred but, more importantly, the percentage of correct responses of the participants increased when three sets of possibilities instead of two were used. Therefore, both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that an increase in the extensional complexity of a problem can, under certain circumstances, lead to facilitation. These results support the importance of the extensional features in solving chance problems and are consistent with the model theory of reasoning.     

The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding about conjunction?

It is easy to construct pairs of sentences X, Y that lead many people to ascribe higher probability to the conjunction X-and-Y than to the conjuncts X, Y. Whether an error is thereby committed depends on reasoners’ interpretation of the expressions “probability” and “and.” We report two experiments designed to clarify the normative status of typical responses to conjunction problems.