Deciding, Planning, and Practical Reasoning: Elements towards a Cognitive Architecture

I intend to show some of the limits of the decision-theoretic model in connection with the analysis of cognitive agency. Although the concept of maximum expected utility can be helpful for explaining the decision-making process, it is certainly not the primary motor that moves agents to action. Moreover, it has been noticed elsewhere that this model is inadequate to the analysis of single cases of practical reasoning. A theory is proposed that introduces a plan-structure as a basic idea. In order to know its very conceptual scope, we need to accommodate that theory to a cognitive architecture whereby the rational and autonomous agent makes choices and deliberates between courses of action to achieve specific goals that are of its interest. The paper endeavours also to clarify the relationship between the different modules that should constitute the architecture of an agent to accomplish the requisites of efficiency and autonomy in a changeable and dynamic world.     

The effect of goal activation on the evaluation of hybrid products1

A hybrid product (i.e. a multifinal means) is connected with goals relevant to the key functionalities best served by the product categories constituting the product. Given that single‐ or multiple‐category inference for a hybrid product can be elicited in individuals, we propose that single‐ (vs. multiple‐) category inference can lead to a relatively higher preference for the hybrid product if only one of the key focal goals that the hybrid product can satisfy is activated. We also explore whether the evaluation of a hybrid product in single‐category inference will reflect valuation and/or devaluation effects if only one of multiple key focal goals attached to the hybrid product is active.     

A verification framework for agent programming with declarative goals

A long and lasting problem in agent research has been to close the gap between agent logics and agent programming frameworks. The main reason for this problem of establishing a link between agent logics and agent programming frameworks is identified and explained by the fact that agent programming frameworks have hardly incorporated the concept of a declarative goal. Instead, such frameworks have focused mainly on plans or goals-to-do instead of the end goals to be realised which are also called goals-to-be. In this paper, the programming language GOAL is introduced which incorporates such declarative goals. The notion of a commitment strategy—one of the main theoretical insights due to agent logics, which explains the relation between beliefs and goals—is used to construct a computational semantics for GOAL. Finally, a proof theory for proving properties of GOAL agents is introduced. Thus, the main contribution of this paper, rather than the language GOAL itself, is that we offer a complete theory of agent programming in the sense that our theory provides both for a programming framework and a programming logic for such agents. An example program is proven correct by using this programming logic.     

When goals collide: Monitoring the goals of multiple characters

Most story plots contain multiple characters who are independent, interact, and often have conflicting goals. One would expect that narrative understanding would require monitoring of the goals, concerns, and situations of multiple agents. There is considerable evidence that understanders monitor the primary protagonist's goal plans (e.g., Suh & Trabasso, 1993). However, there is relatively little research on the extent to which understanders monitor the goals of multiple agents. We investigated the impact of characters' roles and prominence on the extent to which understanders monitor the goal plans of multiple characters in a feature length film. In Experiment 1, participants made situation change judgments, and in Experiment 2, they verbally described scenes. Both types of judgments indicated that viewers monitor the goals and plans of multiple agents but do so to a greater extent for characters more prominent to the plotline.     

Agent communication pragmatics: the cognitive coherence approach

Different approaches have investigated the syntax and semantics of agent communication languages. However, these approaches have not indicated how agents should dynamically use communications. Instead of filling this pragmatics gap, most approaches have mainly focused on the ‘structure’ of dialogues even though developers are more interested in agents’ capabilities of having ‘useful’ automated conversations with respect to their goals rather than in their abilities to structure dialogues. This led us to work on a theory of the use of conversations between agents. In this paper, we propose a pragmatics theory which extends and adapts the cognitive dissonance theory (a major theory of social psychology) to multi-agent systems by unifying it with the theory of coherence in thought and action that issues from computational philosophy of mind. Precisely, we show how this theory allows us to provide generic conceptual tools for the automation of both agent communicational behavior and attitude change processes. This new motivational model is formulated in terms of constraints and elements of cognition and allows us to define cognitive incoherences and dialogue utility measures. We show how these measures could be used to solve common problems and answer some critical questions concerning agent communication frameworks use. Finally, our exploration in applying the cognitive coherence pragmatics theory as a new communication layer over classical BDI agents is presented. It relies on our dialogue games based agent communication language (DIAGAL) and our dialogue games simulator toolbox (DGS). The resulting framework provides the necessary theoretical and practical elements for implementing our theory. In doing so, it brings in a general scheme for automatizing agents’ communicational behavior as it is exemplified in this article.     

From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia

This paper focuses on (an interpretation of) the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for goals in plans, and a normal operator for derived oughts. We prove two completeness theorems for the resulting logic, and provide a dynamic extension of the logic by means of product updates. We illustrate how this setting informs deontic logic by considering issues related to the filtering of inconsistent oughts, the restricted validity of deontic closure, and the stability of oughts and goals under dynamics.

     

Levels of modality for BDI Logic

The use of rational agents for modelling real world problems has both been heavily investigated and become well accepted, with BDI (Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions) Logic being a widely used architecture to represent and reason about rational agency. However, in the real world, we often have to deal with different levels of confidence in the beliefs we hold, desires we have, and intentions that we commit to. This paper extends our previous framework that integrated qualitative levels of beliefs, desires, and intentions into BDI Logic. We describe an expanded set of axioms and properties of the extended logic. We present a modular structure for the semantics which involves a non-normal Kripke type semantics that may be used for other agent systems. Further, we demonstrate the usefulness of our framework with a scheduling task example.     

Femininity and work plans protect women against postpartum dysphoria

This study examined contributions of the following variables to postpartum depressive symptomatology: level of antepartum depression, loss of social reinforcement, assertiveness, sex-role orientation, and work plans. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), Pleasant Events Schedule (PES), Assertion Inventory, and Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) were administered to 69 women during the eighth month of pregnancy. One month after delivery, subjects were administered the PES, postdelivery questionnaire, and BDI. A hierarchical regression analysis revealed that antepartum BDI scores predicted postpartum depressive symptomatology, and BSRI Femininity scores and work plans were significant negative predictors. A one-way analysis of variance of sex role orientation on postpartum BDI scores showed that undifferentiated women reported more depression than other sex role groups.     

Sparse distributed memory for ‘conscious’ software agents

In this work we are reporting a case study on the use of SDM as the associative memory for a software agent, CMattie, whose architecture is modeled on human cognition. Sparse distributed memory (SDM) is a content-addressable memory technique that relies on close memory items tending to be clustered together. In this work, we used an enhanced version of SDM augmented with the use of genetic algorithms as an associative memory in our ‘conscious’ software agent, CMattie, who is responsible for emailing seminar announcements in an academic department. Interacting with seminar organizers via email in natural language, CMattie can replace the secretary who normally handles such announcements. SDM is a key ingredient in a complex agent architecture that implements global workspace theory, a psychological theory of consciousness and cognition. In this architecture, SDM, as the primary memory for the agent, provides associations with incoming percepts. These include disambiguation of the percept by removing noise, correcting misspellings, and adding missing pieces of information. It also retrieves behaviors and emotions associated with the percept. These associations are based on previous similar percepts, and their consequences, that have been recorded earlier. SDM also possesses several key psychological features. Some enhancements to SDM including multiple writes of important items, use of error detection and correction, and the use of hashing to map the original information into fixed size keys were used. Test results indicate that SDM can be used successfully as an associative memory in such complex agent architectures. The results show that SDM is capable of recovering a percept based on a part of that percept, and finding defaults for empty perception registers. The evaluation of suggested actions and emotional states is satisfactory. We think that this work opens the door to more scientific and empirical uses for SDM.     

An information theoretical approach to prefrontal executive function

The prefrontal cortex subserves executive control--that is, the ability to select actions or thoughts in relation to internal goals. Here, we propose a theory that draws upon concepts from information theory to describe the architecture of executive control in the lateral prefrontal cortex. Supported by evidence from brain imaging in human subjects, the model proposes that action selection is guided by hierarchically ordered control signals, processed in a network of brain regions organized along the anterior-posterior axis of the lateral prefrontal cortex. The theory clarifies how executive control can operate as a unitary function, despite the requirement that information be integrated across multiple distinct, functionally specialized prefrontal regions.     

COMBINING TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS WITH EVALUATOR RELATIVISM: A PROMISING RESULT

Abstract: Consequentialism is an agent‐neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an agent‐relative non‐teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of the two – namely, non‐egoistic agent‐relative teleological ethics (NATE) – is quite promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs. Yet unlike consequentialism and like deontology, NATE accords well with our commonsense moral intuitions.     

The Beck Depression Inventory as a Measure of Subjective Well-Being: A Cross-National Study

The present study examined the question whether the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), which is one of the most widely used instruments to assess depression, can be used to measure differences in subjective well-being at national level. In order to establish the meaning of depression scores at country level, the functional equivalence (i.e., similarity of meaning) of depression scores at individual and country level was examined. Studies using the BDI in normal populations from 28 countries were collected. Depression showed the same correlates at individual and country level, which supports the functional equivalence of the BDI at the two levels. BDI scores and subjective well-being were then correlated with a number of country characteristics in order to test three theories of cross-national differences in subjective well-being. Livability theory stresses the importance of objective living conditions, comparison theory focuses on relative living conditions, and folklore theory states that cross-national differences can be explained by some national trait (e.g., beliefs and values concerning happiness). Cross-national differences in depression and subjective well-being could be explained by livability theory and folklore theory. BDI scores were negatively correlated with subjective well-being and other happiness-related variables. These findings suggest that depression had the same meaning at individual and country level and that depression is an adequate measure of (a lack of) subjective well-being at country level.     

Perceptions of the behavioral influence of goals: A mediational relationship to exercise

Abstract

In the present study, it is argued that a more fundamental approach is necessary for the study of exercise goals and exercise behavior if we are to understand their relationship. The specific purposes of the investigation were to a) examine the relationships between perceptions of the behavioral influence of goals, moderators of goal influence (i.e., goal clarity) and perceptions of required exercise behavior (frequency and intensity), (b) examine changes that occurred over time to measures of goal-related variables and (c) describe various personal exercise goals and related action plans to achieve goals. Ninety-nine healthy adults in intermediate level university fitness classes were volunteers in this prospective study. The present study revealed that exercisers have multiple goals and action plans and are also knowledgeable about the specific behavioral strategies and exercise behaviors required to attain these goals. Also, the clarity, commitment, and perceived behavioral influence of goals increased as adherers gained experience with the exercise program. Finally, perceptions of the way goals influence behavior was found to mediate the goal clarity-exercise intensity and the goal commitment-exercise intensity relationships at the beginning of the exercise program but not at mid-program. Instead, independent relationships emerged at midprogram between goal clarity and goal influence, goal commitment and goal influence, goal clarity and exercise intensity, goal commitment and exercise intensity, and goal influence and exercise intensity. Results an discussed in terms of the complex and changing nature of the perceptions people hold of their goals and how these goals influence their exercise.     

Consider it done! Plan making can eliminate the cognitive effects of unfulfilled goals

Unfulfilled goals persist in the mind, as asserted by ample theory and evidence (e.g., the Zeigarnik effect). The standard assumption has been that such cognitive activation persists until the goal is fulfilled. However, we predicted that contributing to goal pursuit through plan making could satisfy the various cognitive processes that usually promote goal pursuit. In several studies, we activated unfulfilled goals and demonstrated persistent goal activation over time. Unfinished goals caused intrusive thoughts during an unrelated reading task (Studies 1 and 5B), high mental accessibility of goal-related words (Studies 2 and 3), and poor performance on an unrelated anagram task (Study 4). Allowing participants to formulate specific plans for their unfulfilled goals eliminated the various activation and interference effects. Reduction of the effects was mediated by the earnestness of participants' plans: Those who ultimately executed their plans were those who also exhibited no more intrusions (Study 4). Moreover, changes in goal-related emotions did not appear to be a necessary component of the observed cognitive effects (Studies 5A and 5B). Committing to a specific plan for a goal may therefore not only facilitate attainment of the goal but may also free cognitive resources for other pursuits. Once a plan is made, the drive to attain a goal is suspended--allowing goal-related cognitive activity to cease--and is resumed at the specified later time.     

Encoding Processes in the Production of Multiple-Goal Messages

It is commonly recognized that interpersonal messages function in the service of multiple social goals. Despite this, relatively little is known of the encoding processes underlying the production of such messages. One possible account of these encoding processes is found in action assembly theory. This article explicates the production of multiple-goal messages from the perspective of action assembly theory and reports an experimental investigation of this account. In this study, the speech of participants assigned the task of pursuing multiple social goals was contrasted with that of people assigned a single task. Consistent with the theory, the results revealed that participants pursuing multiple goals had longer onset latencies than their counterparts given a single goal. Similarly, multiple goals were associated with greater pause/phonation ratios after the onset of speech. The effects of opportunity for advance message preparation were also examined. As expected, participants given the opportunity for advance planning exhibited shorter response latencies than those who spoke spontaneously. In keeping with previous research in this area, filled-pause rate was not significantly affected by either number of goals or the opportunity for advance preparation.     

大学生目标内容与主观幸福感的关系：一个有调节的中介模型

基于自我决定理论考察了目标内容对主观幸福感的影响,以及基本心理需要、自尊在其中的作用。采用欲望指数量表、基本心理需要满足量表、自尊量表、正负情绪量表、生活满意度问卷对535名大学生进行了调查。结果显示：（1）目标内部性显著正向预测主观幸福感;（2）基本心理需要在目标内部性和主观幸福感之间起部分中介作用;（3）基本需要的中介作用受到自尊的调节。因此,目标内部性对主观幸福感的影响是一个有调节的中介效应。     

Memory Bias in Recovered Clinical Depressives

Abstract

Emotions can be regarded as the manifestations of a system that realises multiple concerns and operates in an uncertain environment. Taking the concern realisation function as a starting point, it is argued that the major phenomena of emotion follow from considerations of what properties a subsystem implementing that function should have. The major phenomena are: the existence of the feelings of pleasure and pain, the importance of cognitive or appraisal variables, the presence of innate, pre-programmed behaviours as well as of complex constructed plans for achieving emotion goals, and the occurrence of behavioural interruption, disturbance and impulse-like priority of emotional goals. The system properties underlying these phenomena are facilities for relevance detection of events with regard to the multiple concerns, availability of relevance signals that can be recognised by the action system, and facilities for control precedence, or flexible goal priority ordering and shift.

A computer program, ACRES, is described that is built upon the specifications provided by this emotion theory. It operates in an operator-machine interaction involving the task of executing a knowledge manipulation task (the knowledge domain happens to be about emotions). ACRES responds emotionally when one of his concerns (e.g. errorless input, being kept busy, receiving varied input, not being killed) is touched upon. Responses are social signals, shifts in resource allocations to the operator, interruption of current task-directed processing, and refusal to accept instructions. His flow of behaviour shows much of the preference-based predictability, response interference, goalshifts, and social signalling of human and animal emotional behaviour.     

The Causal Organisation of Emotional Knowledge: A Developmental Study

Abstract

Using a theory of emotional understanding, the basis for distinguishing among happiness, anger, and sadness was investigated. Three and six-year-old children and adults predicted and explained people's emotional responses to different types of events. The events varied as to whether a person's goal was to attain or to avoid a state, whether the goal was achieved or not, who or what was responsible for success or failure, and whether the outcome was intentional or accidental. For all groups, the attainment and maintenance of goals was the primary focus of explanations for emotions and for the plans that followed emotions. A distinct set of features was used to infer and explain happiness as opposed to anger and sadness. Happiness was elicited by goal success and was followed by plans to maintain or enjoy current goal states. Anger and sadness were elicited by goal failure and were followed by plans to reinstate, replace, or forfeit goals. Anger occurred more frequently than sadness when an aversive rather than a loss state occurred, when an animate agent rather than a natural event caused a negative outcome, and when attention was focused on the cause rather than the consequence of goal failure. Two dimensions associated with anger changed as a function of age. First grade children, and adults were more likely than preschool children to predict anger in response to intentional harm, and their explanations for anger were more likely to refer to the agent or cause of goal failure. For all age groups, however, the majority of subjects responded to aversive situations with anger responses, independent of the causal conditions that produced the aversive state. The results therefore indicate that anger can be produced without intentional harm, but that intentional harm becomes an important dimension in attributing anger, especially as a function of development.     

The Anatomy of Disappointment: A Naturalistic Test of Appraisal Models of Sadness,Anger, and Hope

Vignette and autobiographical recall studies have often been used to test models of the appraisals associated with specific emotions. Recently, critiques of both methodologies have called into question the applicability of appraisal theory to naturally-occurring emotional responses. This study examined supporter's responses to Ross Perot's withdrawal from the 1992 presidential race to assess the extent to which appraisal models accurately capture responses to a naturally-occurring event. Supporters in Riverside County, California (N = 227) completed questionnaires concerning their interpretations of the event, their initial emotional reactions, changes in their reactions in the weeks immediately following Perot's withdrawal, and their plans. Appraisal models correctly predicted the dimensions of agency and coping potential that served to differentiate sadness from anger, and the appraisals and plans associated with hope. Appraisal models did not predict the strong focus of sad supporters on their past goals and beliefs, and the plans associated with sadness and anger. Changes in emotional intensity occurred as a function of changes in goals and plans rather than merely as a function of time. These findings demonstrate the applicability of appraisal theory to naturally-occurring emotional responses, but also show that models may understate the complexity of the planning processes associated with emotions.