Chalmers on the objects of credence

Chalmers (Mind 120(479): 587–636, 2011a) presents an argument against “referentialism” (and for his own view) that employs Bayesianism. He aims to make progress in a debate over the objects of belief, which seems to be at a standstill between referentialists and non-referentialists. Chalmers’ argument, in sketch, is that Bayesianism is incompatible with referentialism, and natural attempts to salvage the theory, Chalmers contends, requires giving up referentialism. Given the power and success of Bayesianism, the incompatibility is prima facie evidence against referentialism. In this paper, I review Chalmers’ arguments and give some responses on behalf of the referentialist.     

God − Moore = Ramsey (A Reply to Chalmers and Hájek)

Famously, Frank P. Ramsey suggested a test for the acceptability of conditionals. Recently, David Chalmers and Alan Hájek (2007) have criticized a qualitative variant of the Ramsey test for indicative conditionals. In this paper we argue for the following three claims: (i) Chalmers and Hájek are right that the variant of the Ramsey test that they attack is not the correct way of spelling out an acceptability test for indicative conditionals. But there is a suppositional variant of the Ramsey test which is still stated in purely qualitative terms, which avoids the problems, and which looks correct. (ii) While the variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek criticize is not correct, it is still a good approximation of a correct formulation of the Ramsey test which may be usefully employed in various contexts. (iii) The variant of the Ramsey test that Chalmers and Hájek suggest as a substitute for the deficient version of the Ramsey test is itself subject to worries similar to those raised by Chalmers and Hájek, if it is given a non-suppositional interpretation.     

Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments

We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind (TCM) , David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. I argue that Chalmers is unable to sustain this claim.     

Having it Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly

I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized phenomenally, then Chalmers’ demand that PCS should explain our epistemic situation is misplaced. PCS can explain our epistemic situation only if there is a reductive explanation of consciousness. But according to PCS, no reductive explanation of consciousness can be given. On the other hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized topic-neutrally, then PCS is not only physically explicable, but it also explains our epistemic situation. Either way, PCS is safe.     

The Compatibility of the Structure‐and‐Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism about Space

Chalmers argues against physicalism using the premise that no truth about consciousness is deducible a priori from purely structural truths, and later defines what it is for a truth to be structural, which turns out to include spatiotemporal truths. But Chalmers then defines spatiotemporal terms by reference to their role in causing spatiotemporal experiences. Stoljar and Ebbers argue that these definitions allow for the trivial falsification of Chalmers premise about structure and consciousness. I show that this result can be avoided by tweaking the relevant premise, and that this tweak is not ad hoc.     

A model of transitive choice

We report a formal model of transitive inference based on protocols from experiments on squirrel monkeys solving the 5-term series problem (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977, 1992). These studies generate databases featuring transitive choice, task transfer (where at first a significant decrement is observed, and later substantial improvement without explicit training), and, finally, a Symbolic Distance Effect (SDE) based on decision-time data. Using a rule-based (production) system, we first established rule stacks at the group, then at the individual level, on the basis of triadic transfer performance first recorded in the McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) study. The models for each subject then accommodated data from the more intensive, later study with the same subjects (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992). We found the initial model capable of dealing with all choice and reaction-time phenomena reported thus far, with only small changes in a rule search procedure. In common with an independent assay by McGonigle and Chalmers (1992), our model-based reassessment of decision times indicates that a major source of reaction time variation is item prominence in the rule stack rather than interitem (ordinal) distance per se.     

What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the “Hard Problem”1

Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for.     

Can Bayesianism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?

Philosophia - Chalmers (Mind, 125, 499–510, 2016), responding to Braun (Mind, 125, 469–497, 2016), continues arguments from Chalmers (Mind, 120, 587–636, 2011a) for the conclusion...     

Direct phenomenal beliefs,cognitive significance,and the specious present

Chalmers (The character of consciousness, 2010) argues for an acquaintance theory of the justification of direct phenomenal beliefs. A central part of this defense is the claim that direct phenomenal beliefs are cognitively significant. I argue against this. Direct phenomenal beliefs are justified within the specious present, and yet the resources available with the present ‘now’ are so impoverished that it barely constrains the content of a direct phenomenal belief. I argue that Chalmers’s account does not have the resources for explaining how direct phenomenal beliefs support the inference from ‘this _E is R’ to ‘that was R.’     

On the Determination of Planetary Distances in the Ptolemaic System

In 1975, Imre Lakatos and Elie Zahar claimed that the determination of planetary distances represents excess empirical content of Copernicus’s theory over that of Ptolemy. This claim provoked an interesting discussion during the first half of the 1980s. The discussion started when Alan Chalmers affirmed that it is not correct to attribute this advantage to the Copernican system over the Ptolemaic. Other scholars criticized Chalmers’s assertion, reaffirming the position of Lakatos and Zahar: one went even further, asserting that Copernicus has not one but two methods for calculating distances, even though this claim was subsequently also criticized. But all participants assumed that Ptolemy has no method for calculating planetary distances. In this article, I argue that this is not correct. I argue, in fact, that Ptolemy has two independent methods for calculating the distances of some of the planets and, therefore, as far as the calculation of planetary distances is concerned, Ptolemy’s system surpasses that of Copernicus.     

Mental Muscles and the Extended Will

In the wake of Clark and Chalmers famous argument for extended cognition some people have argued that willpower equally can extend into the environment (e.g. Heath and Anderson in The thief of time: philosophical essays on procrastination. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 233–252, 2010). In a recent paper Fabio Paglieri (Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 179–206, 2012) provides an interesting argument to the effect that there might well be extended self control, but that willpower does not lend itself to extension. This paper argues that Paglieri is right in claiming that previous attempts to extend the will are flawed. It then provides an argument for extending the will that does not fall foul of Paglieri’s argument and actually provides us with an even stronger case for extension than the one that Clark and Chalmers provide for cognition.     

Qualia that It Is Right to Quine*

Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information‐processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitu‐tively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett‐like argument can be based.     

Review of 'Naturalizing Epistemology', by Fred D'Agostino

Two-dimensional accounts of speech and thought make use of so-called ‘diagonal’ propositions. If diagonals are indeed propositions, they can be negated: an ‘anti-diagonal’ is the negation of a diagonal. However, the existence of anti-diagonals is inconsistent with very natural assumptions to which two-dimensionalists like Chalmers and Stalnaker are committed, as shown by an argument that closely resembles more familiar paradoxes.     

The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”

Philosophia - Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i.e. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various...     

迈向整合脑与经验的意识科学——Varela的神经现象学述评

意识的困难问题引发了当代意识科学所面临的最大困境：构建一个能同时阐明意识的主观性及其神经生物学基础的研究纲领。为此,Varela提出了神经现象学方案,即意识经验是脑内大尺度神经集合活动的涌现结果,神经相位同步模式就是表现形式之一。意识的主观性决定了在意识研究中必须将第一人称方法与第三人称方法结合起来,使得主观与客观数据间形成互惠的约束。     

Logical versus Associative Performance on Transitive Reasoning Tasks by Children: Implications for the Status of Animals Performance

Although monkeys, pigeons, rats and chimpanzees all appear to be able to draw transitive inferences, young children fail to do so in some situations. If we take successful performance to be indicative of rationality-as animal researchers sometimes do (Monkeys are rational!McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992)-we have the paradox that animals are, on this criterion, more rational than are school-age children. It is possible, however, to complete 5-term transitive tasks by recruiting associative rather than logical processes; and, indeed, the tasks given to animals not only afford associative solutions but seem to require them (M&C tasks, after McGonigle & Chalmers, 1992). We asked whether 5- to 6-year-old children find a task that naturally affords the application of a logical rule (a B&T task, after Bryant & Trabasso, 1971) easier to perform than an M&C task that does not. The children found the B&T task easiera difference that could not be explained in terms of difference in memory for the premises. This leaves open the possibility that, although children are not restricted to associative strategies when completing 5-term series tasks, animals may be thus restricted.     

Counterfactuals cannot count: a rejoinder to David Chalmers

The initial argument presented herein is not significantly original--it is a simple reflection upon a notion of computation originally developed by Putnam (Putnam 1988; see also Searle, 1990) and criticised by Chalmers et al. (Chalmers, 1994; 1996a, b; see also the special issue, What is Computation?, in Minds and Machines, 4:4, November 1994). In what follows, instead of seeking to justify Putnam's conclusion that every open system implements every Finite State Automaton (FSA) and hence that psychological states of the brain cannot be functional states of a computer, I will establish the weaker result that, over a finite time window every open system implements the trace of FSA Q, as it executes program (P) on input (I). If correct the resulting bold philosophical claim is that phenomenal states--such as feelings and visual experiences--can never be understood or explained functionally.     

Extended mind,functionalism and personal identity

Synthese - In this paper, I address one recent objection to Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s functionalist argument for the extended mind thesis (EM). This objection is posed by Kengo...     

On Bayne and Chalmers’ Phenomenal Unity Thesis (or: Much Ado about Nothing)

Philosophia - According to the Phenomenal Unity Thesis (“PUT”) – most prominently defended by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers – necessarily, any set of phenomenal states of a...