Free-flying honeybees extrapolate relational size rules to sort successively visited artificial flowers in a realistic foraging situation

Learning and applying relational concepts to solve novel tasks is considered an indicator of cognitive-like ability. It requires the abstraction of relational concepts to different objects independent to the physical nature of the individual objects. Recent research has revealed the honeybee’s ability to rapidly learn and manipulate relations between visual stimuli such as ‘same/different’, ‘above/below’, or ‘larger/smaller’ despite having a miniature-sized brain. While honeybees can solve problems using rule-based relative size comparison, it remains unresolved as to whether bees can apply size rules when stimuli are encountered successively, which requires reliance on working memory for stimuli comparison. Additionally, the potential ability of bees to extrapolate acquired information to novel sizes beyond training sets remains to be investigated. We tested whether individual free-flying honeybees could learn ‘larger/smaller’ size rules when visual stimuli were presented successively, and whether such rules could then be extrapolated to novel stimulus sizes. Honeybees were individually trained to a set of four sizes such that individual elements might be correct, or incorrect, depending upon the alternative stimulus. In a learning test, bees preferred the correct size relation for their respective learning group. Bees were also able to successfully extrapolate the learnt relation during transfer tests by maintaining the correct size relationships when considering either two smaller, or two larger, novel stimulus sizes. This performance demonstrates that an insect operating in a complex environment has sufficient cognitive capacity to learn rules that can be abstracted to novel problems. We discuss the possible learning mechanisms which allow their success.     

Reaction time and intelligence: Comparing associations based on two response modes

People who score highly on intelligence tests also tend to have faster and less variable reaction times. Effect size estimates for the reaction time–intelligence association are larger in samples that are more representative of the population. However, such samples have often been tested on a reaction time device that requires reading a number and processing its association with a specific response location (Cox, Huppert, & Whichelow, 1993). Here, we use this device and another reaction time device (Dykiert et al., 2010) that is similar, except that the responses require less processing; subjects simply press a button that is adjacent to the stimulus light. We focus on the possibility that lights as stimuli require less higher-order cognitive engagement than numbers, and then test whether parameters from these two tasks are highly correlated and similarly associated with age and higher cognitive abilities. Both tasks measured simple and choice reaction times and their intra-individual variation across trials. The parameters of the two tasks were very highly correlated and parameters from both tasks were similarly associated with age, social factors, and differences in higher cognitive abilities. The respective choice reaction time parameters from either task accounted for much of the age- and higher cognitive ability-associations of the other task's parameters. These findings are important in establishing that the effect sizes of higher cognitive ability associations with processing speed measures may be found when the processing demands are minimal.     

Cognitive Development in Young-old Type-2 Diabetes Patients: A Longitudinal Analysis From The “Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of Aging”

In the present study, we investigated cognitive status and cognitive development in young-old Type-2 diabetes patients. Extending previous research, using the sample of the ILSE study (“Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study of Aging”), we applied a comprehensive cognitive test battery to 38 Type-2 diabetes patients (mean age at T1: 63 years) and 421 control participants and tested both cognitive status and longitudinal changes after four years in several cognitive domains (crystallized intelligence, verbal memory, visual memory, executive functioning, psychomotor speed, and fluid intelligence). Results revealed no cross-sectional group differences in any cognitive domain at T1 nor at T2. However, testing group differences in intraindividual change over time, reliable group differences in the change of crystallized intelligence and fluid intelligence were revealed. While controls improved in crystallized intelligence as well as in fluid intelligence over time, diabetes patients’ performance decreased. The results demonstrate that in young-old adults the effects of diabetes on cognition may only be detected by analyzing within-person changes instead of mean level differences.

INTELLIGENCE: PAST AND FUTURE

In this paper it is argued that enquiry concerning intelligence in the 20th century has been dominated by a particular theory which we call the ‘strength’ model of intelligence. After briefly considering the history of the strength model we argue that this dominance has severely distorted the logic of research programmes in the area of intelligence, resulting in the crisis of professional uncertainty and public confidence which we currently find ourselves in. Various illustrations of this distortion of logic are considered in three areas of research, (i) the construction of intelligence tests; (ii) enquiry into the ‘structure’ of intelligence; (iii) nature-nurture research. We go on to examine alternatives to the strength model, and then make a plea for a wider and deeper consideration of concept formation, and concept usage, as the basis of a ‘polyphenic’ cognitive system. Some of the implications of this consideration for the nature of future research programmes are also discussed.     

General intelligence predicts reasoning ability even for evolutionarily familiar content

The existence of general-purpose cognitive mechanisms related to intelligence, which appear to facilitate all forms of problem solving, conflicts with the strong modularity view of the mind espoused by some evolutionary psychologists. The current study assessed the contribution of general intelligence (g) to explaining variation in contextualized deductive reasoning. One hundred and twelve participants solved 70 contextualized reasoning problems in a computerized version of the Wason Card Selection Task that recorded both accuracy and reaction time. Consistent with prior research, in the sample as a whole, precautionary and social exchange reasoning problems were solved more frequently and more quickly than reasoning problems about arbitrary rules. At the individual-differences level of analysis, however, performance on all reasoning tests was significantly correlated and loaded on a single deductive-reasoning accuracy factor. Further, this factor was significantly correlated with g. There was no relation, however, between g and the speed of arriving at the correct answer for any form of deductive reasoning. We discuss the implications of these findings for evolutionary psychology, intelligence, and reasoning.     

Inspection time and the relationship among elementary cognitive tasks, general intelligence, and specific cognitive abilities

The relationship between inspection time (IT) and paper-and-pencil tests of cognitive ability is well documented. However, the extent to which IT relates to cognitive ability through general intelligence or through group factors such as performance has not been fully addressed. Another unresolved issue is whether IT relates to psychometric intelligence independent from other elementary cognitive tasks. The current study examined these issues in a sample of 6–13-year-old twins drawn from the Western Reserve Twin Project (WRTP) (n=568 participants). Analyses suggest that IT and other elementary tasks predict general intelligence. IT also predicts Performance ability while other elementary tasks do not. Furthermore, IT contributes variance to cognitive ability independent from other elementary tasks. These suggest that multiple indices of elementary cognitive ability are necessary to fully understand their relationship with complex psychometric measures.     

An anthropomorphic method for number sequence problems

Number sequence problems appear frequently in IQ tests, where the task is to extrapolate finite sequences of integers. This paper presents a computational method for solving number sequence problems appearing in IQ tests. The assumption that these problems are solvable by humans is actively exploited to keep the computational complexity manageable. The method combines elements of artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology and is referred to as anthropomorphic because it makes use of a model of human reasoning. This model features a set of cognitive resources, a repertoire of patterns that encode integer sequences, and a notion of bounded computation for decoding patterns. The model facilitates the search for patterns matching a given integer sequence by quickly discarding many patterns on the grounds that they are too demanding to decode. The computational method was implemented as a computer program called Asolver and then tested against the programs Mathematica and Maple. On the number sequence problems of the IQ test PJP, Asolver scored above IQ 140, whereas the other programs scored below IQ 100.     

Test‐Specificity of the Advantage of Retaking Cognitive Ability Tests

In selection settings, when people retake the same cognitive ability tests, scores are generally positively biased. Our approach aimed to test whether these previous exposure effects are test‐specific or transferable to other tests. We compared the differences between scores for first‐time test takers and retakers for 2 kinds of material: ‘old’ tests, known only to the retakers, and ‘new’ tests, unknown to both groups. The current study used data collected during 2 sessions –S and S+1 – of a selection process for entry into the French national air transport pilot training system, with at least 500 first‐time test takers and 130 retakers in each session. For Session S, on average, retakers scored higher on the ‘old’ tests, but not on the ‘new’ tests. Moreover, the material that was new to retakers at Session S was old at Session S+1, and the finding for old tests could be replicated at Session S+1. The finding that the acquired skills that led to higher scores on old tests were only test‐specific is discussed.     

Parents’ Intelligence Mindsets Relate to Child Internalizing Problems: Moderation Through Child Gender

Parental belief systems can strongly influence children’s affect, behavior, and mental health. However, associations between specific kinds of parental beliefs and children’s mental health have not been thoroughly explored. One relevant belief system is parental intelligence mindset: beliefs about the malleability of intelligence. Children of parents who view intelligence as static (known as a fixed intelligence mindset), rather than malleable through effort (known as a growth intelligence mindset), experience more academic, self-regulatory, and motivational difficulty. However, associations between parental intelligence mindset and child mental health problems are unclear. Accordingly, we tested whether parents’ intelligence mindsets related to internalizing problems in their children (N?=?131, ages 5–8). Overall, parents with stronger fixed intelligence mindsets had children with greater internalizing problems, particularly social anxiety (characterized by fear of negative evaluation). Results further revealed that parents’ fixed intelligence mindsets were associated with overall internalizing problems and depressive symptoms in boys, but not girls. Results are the first to suggest and parse direct links between parents’ intelligence mindsets and youth internalizing problems.     

The comparability of intelligence test results: Group- and individual-level comparisons of seven intelligence tests

A significant body of research has demonstrated that IQs obtained from different intelligence tests substantially correlate at the group level. Yet, there is minimal research investigating whether different intelligence tests yield comparable results for individuals. Examining this issue is paramount given that high-stakes decisions are based on individual test results. Consequently, we investigated whether seven current and widely used intelligence tests yielded comparable results for individuals between the ages of 4–20 years. Results mostly indicated substantial correlations between tests, although several significant mean differences at the group level were identified. Results associated with individual-level comparability indicated that the interpretation of exact IQ scores cannot be empirically supported, as the 95% confidence intervals could not be reliably replicated with different intelligence tests. Similar patterns also appeared for the individual-level comparability of nonverbal and verbal intelligence factor scores. Furthermore, the nominal level of intelligence systematically predicted IQ differences between tests, with above- and below-average IQ scores associated with larger differences as compared to average IQ scores. Analyses based on continuous data confirmed that differences appeared to increase toward the above-average IQ score range. These findings are critical as these are the ranges in which diagnostic questions most often arise in practice. Implications for test interpretation and test construction are discussed.     

A Neuropsychological Approach to Intelligence

This paper proposes that current psychometric intelligence tests are limited in evaluating cognitive activity. From a neuropsychological perspective, they fail to measure some fundamental cognitive abilities such as executive functions, memory, and visuospatial abilities. The analysis of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale presented shows that the original rationale for selecting the specific subtests included in the WAIS was unclear. The concept of a g factor in cognition is also analyzed, with the conclusion that the g factor continues to be controversial. The value of intelligence tests in predicting school performance is also criticized. It is proposed that the psychometric concept of general intelligence should be deleted from cognitive and neurological sciences. Finally, it is proposed that, in the future, neuropsychological instruments sensitive to more specific cognitive abilities replace current psychometric intelligence tests.     

The role of general cognitive ability in moderating the relation of adverse life events to emotional and behavioural problems

Previous studies have established the role of various measures of cognitive functioning in dampening the association between adverse life events (‘life stress’) and adolescents’ emotional and behavioural problems. However, it is not yet clear if general cognitive ability (‘intelligence’) is a protective factor. In this study of 1,175 10‐ to 19‐year‐olds in five secondary schools in England, we explored this issue. We found that even after controlling for sex, age, family poverty, and special educational needs, the association of life stress with emotional, hyperactivity, and conduct problems was significant. General cognitive ability moderated the association between life stress and conduct problems; among adolescents with higher than average general cognitive ability, the association between life stress and conduct problems was non‐significant.     

A smarter brain is associated with stronger neural interaction in healthy young females: A resting EEG coherence study

General intelligence, the g factor, is a major issue in psychology and neuroscience. However, the neural mechanism of the g factor is still not clear. It is suggested that the g factor should be non-modular (a property across the brain) and show good colinearity with various cognitive tests. This study examines the hypothesis that functional connectivity may be a good candidate for the g factor. We recorded resting state eyes-closed EEG signals in 184 healthy young females. Coherence values of 38 selected channel pairs across delta, theta, alpha, beta and gamma frequencies were correlated with six intelligence quotient (IQ) subtests, including symbol search, block design, object assembly, digit span, similarity and arithmetic. A three-stage analytic flow was constructed to delineate common (g factor) and unique neural components of intelligence. It is noticed that the coherence pattern demonstrates good correlation with five of the IQ subtests (except symbol search) and non-modularity in the brain. Our commonality analyses support connectivity strength in the brain as a good indicator of the g factor. For the digit span and arithmetic tests, the uniqueness analyses provide left-lateralized topography relevant to the operation of working memory. Performance on the arithmetic test is further correlated with strengths at left temporo-parietal and bilateral temporal connections. All the significant correlations are positive, indicating that the stronger the connectivity strengths, the higher the intelligence. Our analyses conclude that a smarter brain is associated with stronger interaction in the central nervous system. The implication and why the symbol search does not show parallel results are discussed.     

Adaptive n-back training does not improve fluid intelligence at the construct level: Gains on individual tests suggest that training may enhance visuospatial processing

Short-term adaptive cognitive training based on the n-back task is reported to increase scores on individual ability tests, but the key question of whether such increases generalize to the intelligence construct is not clear. Here we evaluate fluid/abstract intelligence (Gf), crystallized/verbal intelligence (Gc), working memory capacity (WMC), and attention control (ATT) using diverse measures, with equivalent versions, for estimating any changes at the construct level after training. Beginning with a sample of 169 participants, two groups of twenty-eight women each were selected and matched for their general cognitive ability scores and demographic variables. Under strict supervision in the laboratory, the training group completed an intensive adaptive training program based on the n-back task (visual, auditory, and dual versions) across twenty-four sessions distributed over twelve weeks. Results showed that this group had the expected systematic improvements in n-back performance over time; this performance systematically correlated across sessions with Gf, Gc, and WMC, but not with ATT. However, the main finding showed no significant changes in the assessed psychological constructs for the training group as compared with the control group. Nevertheless, post-hoc analyses suggested that specific tests and tasks tapping visuospatial processing might be sensitive to training.     

Review for Cognitive Systems Research of the book The Brain and AI,by authors Karl Schlagenhauf and Fanji Gu

The human brain is often considered the most complex system known. It has a fantastic capacity to learn and remember, to recognize patterns in space and time, solve problems of all kinds, innovate tools and machines, create beautiful art and science. Is it reasonable to believe that we, in a foreseeable future, will be able to understand all the wonders of our own brain, enough to be able to mimic it and build artificial brains and minds that correspond to or even surpass the capacity of the human origin? Can we seriously believe that we (soon, or ever) will be able to build robots that know of and can reflect upon their own existence?This review of the book, The Brain and AI, deals with such issues, but in a very special way. It is written as a fascinating dialogue between the two authors, Chinese scientist Fanji Gu and German engineer Karl Schlagenhauf, where they discuss the development of neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI) with a critical examination of given “truths” in these fields. The Brain and AI is indeed worth reading for many reasons, regardless if you are a student or researcher in any of the many fields of science discussed here (e.g. physics, computer science, neuroscience, cognitive science psychology, social science), or if you are just interested in the current and future development of brain research and artificial intelligence. The book is both educating and entertaining and can be strongly recommended.     

Impacts of artificial intelligence on organizational decision making

Of all of the new technologies emerging in the late 20th century, the production of artificial intelligence may provide the most profound impacts on organizational decision making. Because the development of artificial intelligence technologies and models has largely been based on psychological models of human cognition, the effects of their implementation in complex social settings have not been thoroughly examined. This paper is an attempt to generate research which will develop a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of artificial intelligence and its role in complex organizations. A set of 11 hypotheses has been developed which examine the relationships between artificial intelligence technologies and the dimensions of organizational decision making. It is argued here that the implementation of expert systems will lead to less complex and political decision processes, while the implementation of natural language systems will lead to more complex and political decision processes.     

The association between IQ in adolescence and a range of health outcomes at 40 in the 1979 US National Longitudinal Study of Youth

A link between pre-morbid intelligence and all cause mortality is becoming well established, but the aetiology of the association is not understood. Less is known about links with cause specific mortality and with morbidity. The aim of this study is to examine the association between intelligence measured in adolescence and a broad range of health outcomes ascertained at 40 years of age. We use data on 7476 participants in the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 who had their cognitive ability measured at baseline and completed the ‘Health at 40’ interview module between 1998 and 2004. The Health at 40 module includes assessments of general health and depression, nine medically diagnosed conditions, and 33 common health problems. Higher mental test scores were associated with lower depression scores, better general health, significantly lower odds of having five of the nine diagnosed conditions and 15 of the 33 health problems. A health disadvantage of higher cognitive ability was evident for only three of the 33 health problems.     

Learning Łukasiewicz logic

The integration between connectionist learning and logic-based reasoning is a longstanding foundational question in artificial intelligence, cognitive systems, and computer science in general. Research into neural-symbolic integration aims to tackle this challenge, developing approaches bridging the gap between sub-symbolic and symbolic representation and computation. In this line of work the core method has been suggested as a way of translating logic programs into a multilayer perceptron computing least models of the programs. In particular, a variant of the core method for three valued Łukasiewicz logic has proven to be applicable to cognitive modelling among others in the context of Byrne’s suppression task. Building on the underlying formal results and the corresponding computational framework, the present article provides a modified core method suitable for the supervised learning of Łukasiewicz logic (and of a closely-related variant thereof), implements and executes the corresponding supervised learning with the backpropagation algorithm and, finally, constructs a rule extraction method in order to close the neural-symbolic cycle. The resulting system is then evaluated in several empirical test cases, and recommendations for future developments are derived.     

Nonhuman rationality: a predictive coding perspective

Cognitive Processing - How can we rethink ‘rationality’ in the wake of animal and artificial intelligence studies? Can nonhuman systems be rational in any nontrivial sense? In this...