Solving distant analogies reduces belief-based responding in transitive inference

ABSTRACT

Previous research demonstrated that relational processing in transitive inference problems can be disrupted by belief-based content. Given the premises, The horse is larger than the goat, and The goat is larger than the elephant, accepting the valid conclusion, The horse is larger than the elephant suggests use of relational processing whereas accepting the invalid conclusion The elephant is larger than the horse indicates belief-based responding. This research examined whether solving analogies influenced participants’ reliance on belief-based or relational processing. Participants generated solutions to either distant analogies (e.g. nose:scent::antenna: ______) or near analogies (e.g. nose:scent::tongue:______) before evaluating the conclusions of transitive inference problems that were valid (V) or invalid (I) and believable (B), unbelievable (U) or neutral (N). Solving distant analogies eliminated belief-based responding (possibly reflecting improved inhibitory control) and facilitated relational responding on VU problems.     

Structural priming as structure-mapping: children use analogies from previous utterances to guide sentence production

What mechanisms underlie children’s language production? Structural priming—the repetition of sentence structure across utterances—is an important measure of the developing production system. We propose its mechanism in children is the same as may underlie analogical reasoning: structure‐mapping. Under this view, structural priming is the result of making an analogy between utterances, such that children map semantic and syntactic structure from previous to future utterances. Because the ability to map relationally complex structures develops with age, younger children are less successful than older children at mapping both semantic and syntactic relations. Consistent with this account, 4‐year‐old children showed priming only of semantic relations when surface similarity across utterances was limited, whereas 5‐year‐olds showed priming of both semantic and syntactic structure regardless of shared surface similarity. The priming of semantic structure without syntactic structure is uniquely predicted by the structure‐mapping account because others have interpreted structural priming as a reflection of developing syntactic knowledge.     

Children's development of analogical reasoning: insights from scene analogy problems

We explored how relational complexity and featural distraction, as varied in scene analogy problems, affect children's analogical reasoning performance. Results with 3- and 4-year-olds, 6- and 7-year-olds, 9- to 11-year-olds, and 13- and 14-year-olds indicate that when children can identify the critical structural relations in a scene analogy problem, development of their ability to reason analogically interacts with both relational complexity and featural distraction. Error patterns suggest that children are more likely to select a distracting object than to make a relational error for problems that present both possibilities. This tendency decreases with age, and older children make fewer errors overall. The results suggest that changes in analogical reasoning with age depend on the interplay among increases in relational knowledge, the capacity to integrate multiple relations, and inhibitory control over featural distraction.     

Rules vs. analogy in English past tenses: a computational/experimental study

Are morphological patterns learned in the form of rules? Some models deny this, attributing all morphology to analogical mechanisms. The dual mechanism model (Pinker, S., & Prince, A. (1998). On language and connectionism: analysis of a parallel distributed processing model of language acquisition. Cognition, 28, 73-193) posits that speakers do internalize rules, but that these rules are few and cover only regular processes; the remaining patterns are attributed to analogy. This article advocates a third approach, which uses multiple stochastic rules and no analogy. We propose a model that employs inductive learning to discover multiple rules, and assigns them confidence scores based on their performance in the lexicon. Our model is supported over the two alternatives by new "wug test" data on English past tenses, which show that participant ratings of novel pasts depend on the phonological shape of the stem, both for irregulars and, surprisingly, also for regulars. The latter observation cannot be explained under the dual mechanism approach, which derives all regulars with a single rule. To evaluate the alternative hypothesis that all morphology is analogical, we implemented a purely analogical model, which evaluates novel pasts based solely on their similarity to existing verbs. Tested against experimental data, this analogical model also failed in key respects: it could not locate patterns that require abstract structural characterizations, and it favored implausible responses based on single, highly similar exemplars. We conclude that speakers extend morphological patterns based on abstract structural properties, of a kind appropriately described with rules.     

Connecting instances to promote children's relational reasoning

The practice of learning from multiple instances seems to allow children to learn about relational structure. The experiments reported here focused on two issues regarding relational learning from multiple instances: (a) what kind of perceptual situations foster such learning and (b) how particular object properties, such as complexity and similarity, interact with relational learning. Two kinds of perceptual situations were of interest here: simultaneous view, where instances are viewed at once, and sequential view, where instances are viewed one at a time (one right after the other). We examined the influence of particular perceptual situations and object properties using two tests of relational reasoning: a common match-to-sample task, where new instances are compared with a common sample, and a variable match-to-sample task, where new instances are compared with a sample that varies on each trial. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that simultaneous presentation of even highly dissimilar instances, one simple and one complex, effectively connects them together and improves relational generalization in both match-to-sample tasks. Experiment 3 shows that simple samples are more effective than complex ones in the common match-to-sample task. However, when one instance is not used a common sample and various pairs of instances are simply compared, as in Experiment 4, simple and rich instances are equally effective at promoting relational learning. These results bear on our understanding of how children connect instances and how those initial connections affect learning and generalization.     

They do what they are told to do: the influence of instruction on (chess) expert perception-commentary on linhares and brum (2007)

Linhares and Brum (2007) argue that they provide evidence for analogy as the main principle behind experts' acquisition of perceptual knowledge. However, the methodology they used—asking players to pair positions using abstract similarity—raises the possibility that the task reflects more the effect of directional instructions than the principles underlying the acquisition of knowledge. Here we replicate and extend Linhares and Brum's experiment and show that the matching task they used is inadequate for drawing any conclusions about the nature of experts' perception. When expert chess players were instructed to match problems based on similarities at the abstract level (analogy), they produced more abstract pairs than pairs based on concrete similarity. However, the same experts produced more concrete pairs than abstract ones when instructed to match the problems based on concrete similarity. Asking experts to match problems using explicit instructions is not an appropriate way to show the importance of either analogy or similarity in the acquisition of expert knowledge. Experts simply do what they are told to do.     

Familiarity,Priming, and Perception in Similarity Judgments

We present a novel way of accounting for similarity judgments. Our approach posits that similarity stems from three main sources—familiarity, priming, and inherent perceptual likeness. Here, we explore each of these constructs and demonstrate their individual and combined effectiveness in explaining similarity judgments. Using these three measures, our account of similarity explains ratings of simple, color‐based perceptual stimuli that display asymmetry effects, as well as more complicated perceptual stimuli with structural properties; more traditional approaches to similarity solve one or the other and have difficulty accounting for both. Overall, our work demonstrates the importance of each of these components of similarity in explaining similarity judgments, both individually and together, and suggests important implications for other similarity approaches.     

Oscillations and analogies. Thomas Young, MD, FRS, genius

Thomas Young is arguably one of the greatest geniuses who ever lived, but most people have never heard of him, though he was renowned in his own era. He did important work in a large variety of scientific disciplines, but that was his downfall. Given the specialization of the present era, physicists do not appreciate how important his work in linguistics was, linguists do not appreciate the importance of his work in psychology, and so on. Despite his obscurity today, Young nicely exemplifies the traits that one finds in a genius of the first order: tendency toward analogical thinking, high intelligence, an amazing capacity for hard work, extremely wide interests, distaste for traditional dogmas, and very high self-esteem.     

Harm,risk, and doping analogies: A counter-response to Kious

Brent Kious has objected to our previous criticism of his views on doping, maintaining that we, by and large, misrepresented his position. In this response, we strengthen our original misgivings, arguing that (1) his views on risk of harm in sport are either uncontroversially true (not inconsistent with the views of many doping opponents) or demonstrably false (attribute to doping opponents an overly simplistic view), (2) his use of analogies (still) indicates an oversimplification of many issues surrounding the question of doping in sports, and (3) his doping analogies are insufficiently precise to support his conclusions.     

Dutch plural inflection: the exception that proves the analogy

We develop the view that inflection is driven partly by non-phonological analogy and that non-phonological information is of particular importance to the inflection of non-canonical roots, which in the view of [Marcus, G. F., Brinkmann, U., Clahsen, H., Wiese, R., & Pinker, S. (1995). German inflection: the exception that proves the rule. Cognitive Psychology, 29, 189-256.] are inflected by a symbolic rule process. We used the Dutch plural to evaluate these claims. An analysis of corpus data shows that a model using non-phonological information (orthography) produces significantly fewer errors on plurals of non-canonical Dutch nouns, in particular borrowings, than a model that includes only phonological information. Moreover, we show that a double default system, as proposed by Pinker [Pinker, S. (1999). Words and rules. London: Phoenix.], does not offer an advantage over the latter model. A second study, examining the use of orthography in an online plural production task, shows that, in Dutch, the chosen pseudoword plural is significantly affected by non-phonological information. A final simulation study confirms that these results are in line with a model of inflectional morphology that explains the inflection of non-canonical roots by non-phonological analogy instead of by a default rule process.     

Similarity and causality in the use of social analogies

The present paper examines whether causal relations are necessary for the use of social analogies. Although causal relations increase the use of social analogies, it is not known whether they are necessary. Establishing this is important for understanding both analogical reasoning and learning in novel situations where people lack knowledge of the causal relations. Study 1 demonstrated that, in the absence of an explicit causal relation, as the similarity between a target individual and a previously encountered individual (the base) increased, people thought the target was increasingly likely to perform the same behavior as the base. Thus, a causal relation is not necessary. Two additional studies used asymmetries in similarity judgments to provide additional evidence that when reasoning analogically people relied on similarity. Manipulating whether subjects focused primarily on the target or the base completely reversed asymmetries both in judgments of how similar the target was to the base and in predictions of how likely the target was to perform the same behavior as the base. The asymmetries for similarity and prediction were completely parallel. Thus, in the absence of an explicit causal relation, use of the analogy was based on judgments of global similarity. The implications of these asymmetries in similarity judgments and predictions for other judgments, such as stereotyping, are also discussed.     

Seek,and ye shall find: Differences between spontaneous and voluntary analogical retrieval

The present study tackles two overlooked aspects of analogical retrieval: (a) whether argumentation activities elicit a spontaneous search for analogical sources, and (b) whether strategic search can relax the superficial bias typically obtained in experimental studies of analogical retrieval. In Experiment 1, participants had to generate arguments for a target situation under three conditions: without indication to use analogies, with indication to use analogies, and with indication to search for sources within domains provided by the experimenters. Results showed that while voluntary search yields analogical retrievals reliably, the argumentation activity seldom elicits spontaneous remindings. A second set of results demonstrated that the superficial bias can be strategically relaxed, leading to a majority of distant retrievals. Experiment 2 replicated this result with the instruction to search within domains different from that of the target, and without providing a list of specific domains. The theoretical and educational implications of these findings are discussed.     

Extending SME to Handle Large‐Scale Cognitive Modeling

Analogy and similarity are central phenomena in human cognition, involved in processes ranging from visual perception to conceptual change. To capture this centrality requires that a model of comparison must be able to integrate with other processes and handle the size and complexity of the representations required by the tasks being modeled. This paper describes extensions to Structure‐Mapping Engine (SME) since its inception in 1986 that have increased its scope of operation. We first review the basic SME algorithm, describe psychological evidence for SME as a process model, and summarize its role in simulating similarity‐based retrieval and generalization. Then we describe five techniques now incorporated into the SME that have enabled it to tackle large‐scale modeling tasks: (a) Greedy merging rapidly constructs one or more best interpretations of a match in polynomial time: O(n²log(n)); (b) Incremental operation enables mappings to be extended as new information is retrieved or derived about the base or target, to model situations where information in a task is updated over time; (c) Ubiquitous predicates model the varying degrees to which items may suggest alignment; (d) Structural evaluation of analogical inferences models aspects of plausibility judgments; (e) Match filters enable large‐scale task models to communicate constraints to SME to influence the mapping process. We illustrate via examples from published studies how these enable it to capture a broader range of psychological phenomena than before.     

Fictional objects, non-existence, and the principle of characterization

I advance an objection to Graham Priest??s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to fictional characters, a kind of fictional entities, involve a crucial reference to the world in which they are supposed to be instantiated. I argue that these representational properties are problematic for Priest??s theory and that he cannot accept an unrestricted version of the principle of characterization. Thus, while not refuting Priest??s theory, I show that it is no better off than other Meinongian theories.     

The Role of Surface Similarity in Analogical Retrieval: Bridging the Gap Between the Naturalistic and the Experimental Traditions

Blanchette and Dunbar (2000) have claimed that when participants are allowed to draw on their own source analogs in the service of analogical argumentation, retrieval is less constrained by surface similarity than traditional experiments suggest. In two studies, we adapted this production paradigm to control for the potentially distorting effects of analogy fabrication and uneven availability of close and distant sources in memory. Experiment 1 assessed whether participants were reminded of central episodes from popular movies while generating analogies for superficially similar versus superficially dissimilar target situations. In Experiment 2, we modified this procedure to assess the retrieval of autobiographic memories, more familiar to participants than fictional episodes. Both studies revealed a strong effect of surface similarity on the retrieval of participants' own sources, thus suggesting that the superficial bias typically observed in experimental studies—and simulated by most computational models—does not originate in a lack of ecological validity.