东巴文认知研究对心理语言学的贡献及展望

本文介绍了东巴文的构字特点及其性质的争论, 综述了对东巴文认知的研究, 评述了东巴文认知研究对于心理语言学的贡献, 指出了东巴文认知研究的未来发展方向, 包括继续利用东巴文解决语言认知的一些重大理论问题, 为文字进化规律提供证据, 使少数民族语言认知研究在心理语言学研究中发挥不可替代的作用。     

OUTSOURCED COGNITION

Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes of the individual are substantially and explanatorily distinct from the relevant external states and processes. In consequence, the individual remains a cognitive unit that is both central and indispensable in the explanations of cognitive science. As a case study, I consider the epistemology of testimony. I will argue that important epistemological categories may be preserved by adopting the hypothesis of outsourced cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition. Moreover, I will argue that the outsourced cognition hypothesis deepens the problems that beset an extended epistemology of testimony.     

Non-representationalist cognitive science and realism

Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that one can develop a form of realism that reflects rather than just accommodates the core principles of non-representationalist embodied cognitive science.     

Perception: The interface between cognition and the external world

In contrast to researchers who emphasize the distinction between perception and cognition it is claimed that the perceptual system is closely intertwined with cognition and with our comprehension of the external world. This claim is supported by evidence for two characteristic features of human information processing. One of these features is the use of mental models. If mental models are assumed to be anchored in the perceptual system it will not be necessary to assume a "little man in the head" who reads off the model. Moreover, perceptually based mental models will provide a referential semantics by anchoring mentally represented concepts in the external world. The other feature is the use of perceptually based perspectives in cognition, such as actor or observer perspectives in social cognition. It is concluded that human beings consistently interact within the real world--also when they are just thinking--and that this becomes possible via perceptual processes.     

Radicalizing numerical cognition

In recent decades, non-representational approaches to mental phenomena and cognition have been gaining traction in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. In these alternative approach, mental representations either lose their central status or, in its most radical form, are banned completely. While there is growing agreement that non-representational accounts may succeed in explaining some cognitive capacities (e.g. perception), there is widespread skepticism about the possibility of giving non-representational accounts of cognitive capacities such as memory, imagination or abstract thought. In this paper, I will critically examine the view that there are fundamental limitations to non-representational explanations of cognition. Rather than challenging these arguments on general grounds, I will examine a set of human cognitive capacities that are generally thought to fall outside the scope of non-representational accounts, i.e. numerical cognition. After criticizing standard representational accounts of numerical cognition for their lack of explanatory power, I will argue that a non-representational approach that is inspired by radical enactivism offers the best hope for developing a genuine naturalistic explanatory account for these cognitive capacities.

     

Ten questions concerning extended cognition

This paper considers ten questions that those puzzled by or skeptical of extended cognition have posed. Discussion of these questions ranges across substantive, methodological, and dialectical issues in the ongoing debate over extended cognition, such as whether the issue between proponents and opponents of extended cognition is merely semantic or a matter of convention; whether extended cognition should be treated in the same way as extended biology; and whether conscious mental states pose a special problem for the extended mind thesis. Lethocerus, the giant water bug, will be a recurrent reference point for much of the discussion.     

How are religious concepts created? A form of cognition and its effects

Science that needs logical demonstration has failed to eliminate religious concepts. It is as if they have own validity that cannot be broken by scientific knowledge we trust the most at present. In this paper, I will attempt to establish a new cognitive theory to help explain the basis of belief in religious concepts. This form of cognition will be named simply unifying-induction or unifying-inductive cognition. As illustrations, I will consider some typical religious discourses involving concepts such as “all-in-one” or “one is everything.” It is these typically religious discourses that science has not been able to easily sweep away by its logical scientific proofs. In the end, although we perhaps cannot know if the religious beings such as gods really exist or not, we may understand these concepts are very the creation of human cognition. It also has important implications for other disciplines such as robotics, developmental psychology, cognitive archaeology, the history of science, the study of religion and so on.     

How do natural environments shape adaptive cognition across the lifespan?

How does human cognition adapt to idiosyncratic features of our real-world experiences across our lifetimes? The dynamic interaction between individuals and their natural environments is rarely the focus of study within cognitive science, but I argue that a more ecological approach will be critical for advancing developmental science and revealing the adaptive nature of cognition.     

Criterial problems in creative cognition research

In creative cognition research, the Romantic view about creative cognition is traditionally rejected in favor of the modern view. The modern view about creative cognition maintains that creativity is neither mysterious nor unintelligible and that it is indeed susceptible to analysis. The paradigmatic objects of analysis in creative cognition research have been creative output and the creative process. The degree of creativity of an output is assessed in accordance with certain criterial definitions. The degree of creativity of a cognitive process is assessed in accordance with certain models of creative cognition, psychometric test measures, and neuroimaging studies that are grounded in certain criteria for assessment. The reliance on criterial definitions and criteria for assessment in analyzing either the creative output or the creative process suggests that creative cognition researchers remain under the sway of the classical, bundles-of-criteria theory of meaning. In this paper, I will critically evaluate the criterial problems that confront both criterial definitions and criteria for assessment before proposing an alternative theory of meaning.     

Where the Motivation Resides and Self‐Deception Hides: How Motivated Cognition Accomplishes Self‐Deception

How do people remain blind to the motives underlying their flattering self‐construals, attitudes, and social judgments? This paper explores how motivated cognition accomplishes the goal of self‐deception. It proposes that self‐serving conclusions are produced although the influence of such distortions remains hidden from conscious awareness because of the ubiquitous presence and specialized nature of motivated cognition. I will discuss how motivations infiltrate four stages of cognitive processing, including information gathering and the creation of filters, the deployment of attention, information processing, and memory. In doing so, I will suggest that perhaps it is precisely because of this multicomponent system of checks and balances, the efficiency of motivational biases, and the specialized neural pathways used by motivated cognition that self‐deception is successful.     

Emotion as patheception

Emotions cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms. Nor can they be fully understood as mere feelings with no content. But it has not been easy to give an account of the relation of affect and cognition in a way that preserves the perceived unity of emotional experience. Consequently, emotion theories tend to lean either toward cognitivism, or, alternatively, the view that emotions are basically non-cognitive affairs. The aim of this paper is to argue for an account of emotion as a unity of affect and cognition. Emotions, it will be suggested, do not combine, blend, add, or causally relate cognition to affect, or affect to cognition, but are rather original unities which should be viewed as coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, either cognition, perception, feeling, or any other basic mental category.     

Index to Media Psychology Volume 8

This study suggests that diversity of media diet mediates the relation between cognitive needs and accurate perception of public opinion. It was hypothesized that people with high need for cognition will expose themselves to various media outlets that support and that oppose their views; as a result, they will develop a more accurate perception of public opinion. In contrast, people with high need to evaluate will show preferences to like-minded media outlets and, consequently, will perceive their opinion to be more popular than it actually is. The hypotheses were tested using a survey conducted with a sample of 450 Israeli participants. The results confirmed the hypotheses regarding need for cognition, but the results regarding need to evaluate pointed to cognitive biases other than selective exposure.     

统计认知理论及应用研究

长期以来大家认为人类认知尽管可以看成是非确定的推理计算过程,但它的知识表达、模型结构、及计算方法和概率统计理论在本质上是不同的,因此认知科学和概率统计方法存在巨大的鸿沟,过去两者基本上独立发展。近年来随着Bayesian概率统计模型研究的一系列突破性工作和认知过程本质的不断被发现和挖掘,两者的相关性和互补性逐渐突显出来。许多研究者认为认知是近似遵循概率统计推理原则的,一些研究工作显示两者的结合有可能对人工智能发展产生深远的影响。本文对当前统计认知理论及应用研究的现状进行系统的梳理,并结合自身的研究对它今后的发展提出自己的看法。     

Neuropsychology and temporal lobe epilepsy

The purpose of this article is to review aspects of the neuropsychology of temporal lobe epilepsy. Evidence will be presented to demonstrate that the cognitive consequences of this focal seizure disorder can be more generalized in nature than expected. Consistent with the extratemporal neurocognitive findings, careful quantitative magnetic resonance imaging volumetrics have shown that structural brain changes may be detected outside the temporal lobes. Many factors can potentially affect cognition and brain structure. We focus on the potential neurodevelopmental impact of early-onset temporal lobe epilepsy on brain structure and cognition positing that this disorder can have both immediate and lifespan implications for cognition and psychosocial status.     

Inscribing the body, exscribing space

The present paper briefly reviews recent advances in spatial cognition. A central tenet in spatial cognition is that spatial information is simultaneously encoded in multiple formats. It also appears that at the level of neural processing there is no clear distinction between the representation of space and the control of action. I will argue that these findings offer novel insight into the nature of dance and choreography and that the concepts used by cognitive neuroscientists to frame their findings can be fruitfully applied in a choreographic setting. Finally, I will speculate that both dancing oneself and watching dance may enhance one’s experience of space.     

Action, mindreading and embodied social cognition

One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent??s actional processes and states??her goals, needs, intentions, desires, and so on??likely play important roles in and for mindreading processes. If so, a full understanding of mindreading processes and their role in cognition more broadly will require an understanding of how actional mental processes interact with, influence, or take part in mindreading processes.     

Functional scaffolding and self-scaffolding

Models of the nature of representation and cognition ground and constrain models of the construction of representation in learning and development: models of what is being constructed ground and constrain models of the processes of construction. Insofar as the notion of scaffolding is intended to refer to particular kinds of supports for learning and development, it too will be variously enabled and constrained by underlying assumptions concerning representation and cognition. I will argue that action based models of representation, which have their own powerful supports, also make possible a functional notion of scaffolding that, in turn, makes sense of processes of self-scaffolding as a central field of development.     

The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimization,embodiment, and representation

In his (2014) paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization (PEM), which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight what we believe is a more significant role for the body than Hohwy suggests. In detailing these claims, we will expose some of the challenges that PEM raises for providing an account of representation.     

信息加工认知心理学的发展和面临的挑战

本文认为当代信息加工认知心理学发展的特点是：（１）与高新科学技术结合．在基础理论的研究方面有较大的突破;（２）将自然认知与社会认知的研究结合起来,促使信息加工的研究能更接近人类实际的认知过程：（３）将基础理论研究与应用研究相结合,不断扩大认知心理学的研究领域和应用范围．为了迎接面临的挑战和适应社会发展的需要,信息加工认知心理学应更充分地体现时代精神,坚持走实验研究和现象学研究相结合、定量研究与定性研究相结合、微观研究与宏观研究相结合,以及文理互补、多科渗透的发展道路。