Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle

An important suggestion of objective Bayesians is that the maximum entropy principle can replace a principle which is known to get into paradoxical difficulties: the principle of indifference. No one has previously determined whether the maximum entropy principle is better able to solve Bertrand's chord paradox than the principle of indifference. In this paper I show that it is not. Additionally, the course of the analysis brings to light a new paradox, a revenge paradox of the chords, that is unique to the maximum entropy principle.     

A test of the minimum principle requires a perceptual coding system

The minimum principle states that a perceiver will see the simplest possible interpretation of a pattern. Some theorists of human perception take this principle as a core explanatory concept. Others, especially Rock and Hochberg, hold the view that a perceptual minimum principle is untenable. Rock presents a great number of demonstrations which, in his opinion, rule out the minimum principle. Hochberg states that 'impossible' figures especially present a difficulty for this principle. It is argued here that, in order to test the minimum principle, a method is needed to describe interpretations of patterns in such a way that they can be ordered according to simplicity. To achieve this, Leeuwenberg's coding system was used. The analyses reported here of the patterns which Rock produces as evidence against the principle show that, contrary to Rock's claim, the way these patterns are preferentially perceived provides strong support for the minimum principle. Next, it is demonstrated that interpreting certain patterns as 'impossible' figures is not incompatible with the principle. Finally, it is argued that a test of the minimum principle is necessarily conflated with two other hypotheses, one concerning the metric of simplicity and one concerning the task conception of the experimental subjects.     

好意原则的局限性

Radical interpretation is used by Davison in his linguistic theory not only as an interesting thought experiment but also a general pattern that is believed to be able to give an essential and general account of linguistic interpretation. If the principle of charity is absolutely necessary to radical interpretation, it becomes, in this sense, a general methodological principle. However, radical interpretation is a local pattern that is proper only for exploring certain interpretation in a specific case, and consequently the principle of charity is an applicable principle in the limited scope. It is neither the case that every linguistic interpretation is in nature radical nor that the principle of charity is the primary and fundamental principle for all linguistic interpretation as Davidson believes.      

无意识研究新进展:无意识思维理论述评

无意识思维理论(UTT)是近期对无意识思维研究的最新成果。该文主要从无意识思维原理、容量原理、自下而上对自上而下加工原理、权重原理、规则原理、聚合对发散原理等6个方面对UTT进行了详细阐述。在此基础上,简评了UTT的理论特点及存在问题,并进一步从信息编码、目标和无意识思维加工机制等三个方面提出了今后的研究方向。     

R and Relevance Principle Revisited

This paper first shows that some versions of the logic R of Relevance do not satisfy the relevance principle introduced by Anderson and Belnap, the principle of which is generally accepted as the principle for relevance. After considering several possible (but defective) improvements of the relevance principle, this paper presents a new relevance principle for (three versions of) R, and explains why this principle is better than the original and others.     

Charity Implies Meta-Charity

The principle of charity says that all agents are rational. The principle of meta-charity says that all agents believe all agents are rational. My thesis is that the arguments which are used to support charity also support meta-charity. Meta-charity implies meta-meta-charity. By recursion, the principle of charity implies that it is common knowledge. But there appears to be intelligent, well-informed disagreement with the principle of charity. So if the entailment thesis holds, opponents of the principle of charity have a new objection to the principle. Defenders of the principle of charity must either refute the entailment thesis or accept much stronger consequences than they expected.
"As I am, so I see."—Ralph Waldo Emerson     

解读现代版希波克拉底誓言

随着医学的飞速发展,医学伦理学、医学哲学被赋予了新的科学内涵。这一内涵在现代版"希波克拉底誓言"中得以具体体现。从行善原则、生命价值原则、尊重自主原则、公平公益原则、有利与不伤害原则、医疗最优化原则、医疗保密原则等方面对该誓言进行了全面阐述,其中蕴涵着丰富的社会哲学、价值哲学、道德哲学等哲学思想。     

SELF‐OWNERSHIP AND THE STATE: A DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUE

Libertarians often invoke the principle of self‐ownership to discredit distributive interventions authorized by the more‐than‐minimal state. But if one takes a democratic approach to the justification of ownership claims, including claims of ownership over oneself, the validity of the self‐ownership principle is theoretically inseparable from the normative justification of the state. Since the idea of the state is essential to the very assertion (not just the positive enforcement) of the principle of self‐ownership, invoking the principle to discredit a distribution of ownership authorized by the state commits libertarians also to weakening that principle's validity. Put differently, appealing to the self‐ownership principle to circumscribe the state's power to distribute property is problematic when the state is necessary to assert the validity of that principle. This is because anytime the self‐ownership principle is used to undermine a state‐based distribution of property it is also implicitly eroding the ground for asserting its own validity. 1     

《物种起源》中的类比方法及其论证作用

达尔文在《物种起源》中区分了自然选择学说包括的两种不同的原理：适应原理和性状分歧原理。他对类比方法的应用也有两种：一是类比论证,二是发现的启发法。关于适应原理的类比只起到了启发法的作用,达尔文对这种类比的理解是假说一演绎主义的;关于性状分歧原理的类比是一种归纳推理,达尔文对这种类比的理解是归纳主义的。     

On Wright's Argument against Deflationism

I consider Crispin Wright's much discussed 'inflationary' argument against deflationism about truth. I identify a principle apparently involved in it, which I call Wright's principle, and present Wright's argument with the following dilemma. If Wright's principle is sound, the deflationist has a straightforward rejoinder to Wright's argument. If Wright's principle is unsound, the central part of Wright's argument, concerned with how 'true' commutes with the negation operator, is rendered superfluous. I conclude that Wright's argument is either a straightforward failure or completely otiose.     

A new formulation of the Principle of Indifference

The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. Later, the paper investigates some implications of the new principle of indifference. To conclude, a re-examination of the foundations of the so-called objective Bayesian inference is called for.     

宫颈癌普查与人文关怀

随着不育症患者的不断增多,不育症治疗技术的迅速发展及医学模式的转化,在不育症临床诊疗中应树立人文关怀的理念,强化人性化服务的意识。在工作中应遵循患者第一的原则并恪守心身统一原则、保密原则、最优化原则、知情同意等原则。在治疗过程对患者同情、鼓励以及进行心理治疗,体现人文关怀,构建和谐的诊疗气氛。     

Examining the suitability of the principle of subsidiarity for bioethics

The political and social principle of subsidiarity can be useful as a general principle of bioethics. The principle states that only those decisions and tasks that cannot be effectively decided upon or performed by a supported or subsidized lower level authority ought to be relegated to a more central or higher authority. The concept of subsidiarity has been embedded tacitly in Western political thought for two millennia, but it has been articulated expressly only in the twentieth century. The principle has unique strengths: it is the only principle that addresses the issue of locus of decision making; it is strongly linked to human dignity, democracy, and solidarity; and it can assist in reaching agreements on the common good. There are also potential drawbacks that need to be taken into account when developing rules and guidelines for the principle's application in bioethics. The principle is particularly helpful in public health ethics, but it is also of use in the ethics of personal care and human research ethics.     

Interpreting Surrogate Consent using Counterfactuals

Philosophers such as Dan Brock believe that surrogates who make health care decisions on behalf of previously competent patients, in the absence of an advance directive, should make these decisions based upon a substituted judgment principle. Brock favours substituted judgment over a best interests standard. However, Edward Wierenga claims that the substituted judgment principle ought to be abandoned in favour of a best interests standard, because of an inherent problem with the substituted judgment principle. Wierenga's version of the substituted judgment principle and his counterexample to the principle's successful interpretation of valid surrogate consent is presented. A new version of what is meant by the substituted judgment principle is advanced. The new version is not beset with the problems Wierenga initially ascribed to the substituted judgment principle.     

论罗尔斯的政治义务理论

政治义务是政治哲学的核心问题。哈特首先用“相互限制原则”来解释政治义务,这一原则为罗尔斯所继承并加以修正。鉴于该原则存在的诸多问题,罗尔斯在《正义论》中削减了它在政治义务的道德证明中的作用,而诉诸正义的自然责任原则。这个原则仍然受到来自多方面的批评,许多罗尔斯的追随者对这些批评作了回应。罗尔斯从公平游戏原则到自然责任原则的转变反映了他对契约论不同的态度。     

Knowledge,reasoning, and deliberation

Epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the practical role of knowledge. One prominent principle, which I call PREMISE, states that if you know that p, then you are justified in using p as a premise in your reasoning. In response, a number of critics have proposed a variety of counter-examples. In order to evaluate these problem cases, we need to consider the broader context in which this principle is situated by specifying in greater detail the types of activity that the principle governs. I argue that if PREMISE is interpreted as governing deductive reasoning, then the examples lose their force. In addition, I consider the cases, discussed by Keith DeRose, where the subject is in more than one practical context at the same time. In order to account for these latter cases, we need to further specify the scope of PREMISE. I distinguish two ways of understanding PREMISE, as a knowledge-action principle and as a knowledge-deliberation principle. I conclude by arguing for the knowledge-deliberation version of the principle and by exploring what this principle says about the practical role of knowledge.     

The moral significance of the genetic relation

Our ordinary moral attitudes give a prominent place to the principle that each person ought specially to care for any child who is his or her genetic offspring. From this principle of genetic-parental responsibility and other plausible premises, we can derive the principle that each person has the right to control the genetic use of his or her own genes. But there are competing principles of parental responsibility that require consideration. Principles of nurture are among the important competitors. Also, the view that a woman has the right to control her own body for reproductive purposes may be based on a principle that denies the genetic-parental principle. An analysis is developed of the relations that constitute the criteria for the various possible principles of parental responsibility. Causality, temporality, spatiality, and resemblance are considered. The genetic relation is not any one of these relations, but it includes some of them. The justification of any principle of parental responsibility requires a detailed consideration of the principle from the viewpoint of a deontological or consequentialist moral theory. This examination is beyond the scope of this paper, but consideration is given to some issues and problems of justification, and difficult or unusual cases are discussed. There remain, then, complexities that require further study.     

The Aspect‐Perception Passages: A Critical Investigation of Köhler's Isomorphism Principle1

In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein's aim in the aspect‐perception passages is to critically evaluate a specific hypothesis. The target hypothesis in these passages is the Gestalt psychologist Köhler's “isomorphism principle.” According to this principle, there are neural correlates of conscious perceptual experience, and these neural correlates determine the content of our perceptual experiences. Wittgenstein's argument against the isomorphism principle comprises two steps. First, he diffuses the substantiveness of the principle by undermining an important assumption that underpins this principle, namely, that there is a unitary concept of seeing. Next, Wittgenstein argues that some forms of aspect‐perception involve recognitional capacities, the exercise of which is normatively constrained. The normative nature of aspect‐perceiving plays a pivotal role in Wittgenstein's rejection of the isomorphism principle. Aside from the clear exegetical benefits gained from identifying the target hypothesis in the aspect‐perception passages as the isomorphism principle, construing the remarks in the way suggested here is also philosophically interesting in its own right: it shows Wittgenstein engaging directly in the mind–body problem, construed as the problem of intentionality.     

中国古代亲隐原则探讨

亲隐原则是为解决情与法的冲突,依据两害相权取其轻的方法原则所确立的价值取舍原则,其现实基础是以血缘根基和家庭伦理本位为基本特点的中国传统社会。它适合中国过去的社会实际,对我国的传统伦理和古代法律都产生了重要影响,在今天也具有一定的立法意义。     

INEQUALITY,INJUSTICE AND LEVELLING DOWN

The levelling down objection is the most serious objection to the principle of equality, but we think it can be conclusively defeated. It is serious because it pits the principle of equality squarely against the welfares of the persons whose welfares or resources are equalized. It suggests that there is something perverse about the principle of equality. In this paper, we argue that levelling down is not an implication of the principle of equality. To show this we offer a defence of, and partial elaboration of, what we call a common good conception of the principle of equality, which principle favours states in which everyone is better off to those in which everyone is worse off. We contrast this with what we call a purely structural conception of the principle of equality. The common good conception of equality involves two basic components: (1) in each circumstance there exists an ideal egalitarian distribution, which distributes equally all the available good in the distribution with the highest average welfare and (2) in evaluating how just the world is, it will matter how far the actual distribution is from the ideal distribution. The ideal egalitarian distribution in the circumstance is Pareto optimal and the approximation rule implies that Pareto superior states are less unjust than Pareto inferior states. 1