The Therapeutic Alliance in Multicultural Practice

Abstract

The therapeutic relationship rests on both an emotional bond with the therapist and a rational, “working” connection. Both dimensions of the alliance have relevance for multicultural clinical work. There have been many contributions to multicultural practice that emphasize either cognitive or emotional levels of the alliance. This paper uses both empirical studies and clinical papers to synthesize both the emotional and the rational perspectives on the multicultural alliance. Examples are drawn from literature, published case examples, and the author's own clinical practice.     

Dispute Irrational Beliefs and Teach Rational Beliefs: An Interview with Albert Ellis

In this interview, Ellis acknowledges that irrational beliefs have a higher biological basis than rational beliefs and that they are not at opposite ends of the same continuum. Ellis agrees that irrational beliefs are more involved in mental health problems while rational beliefs contribute to the psychology of success. The strength of conviction in both rational and irrational beliefs including self-acceptance and self-downing is explored. Ellis equates the conviction with which rational beliefs need to be held to influence emotions and behaviors with “faith.” He acknowledges the importance of faith built on facts rather than religiosity. Ellis agrees that ridding strongly motivated individuals of self-depreciation may lead to a decrease in their high frustration tolerance and, ultimately, their drive for and achievement of success. Ellis supports adding an “F” to the ABCDE model—forcefully agreeing with and applying new rational beliefs. Ellis discusses the need to develop a literature on therapeutic techniques and methods for helping people to apply rational beliefs more strongly to different areas of their lives. Ellis highlights the perils of self-efficacy positive psychology interventions if people’s innate tendency towards self-depreciation is ignored. The interviewer concludes the interview expressing the view that if we listen to Ellis, “we” need to re-think the ways we teach people of all ages to think rationally knowing that the rational re-statement of previously disputed irrational beliefs is only one of many different teaching methods. This interview was conducted in January, 2005, at the Albert Ellis Institute. At the time of the interview, Dr. Ellis was in good health. In this interview held over two separate sessions, a series of questions prepared by the interviewer were presented to Albert Ellis that were designed to stimulate discussion on differences between rational and irrational beliefs and on the issue of whether once irrational beliefs have been disputed, more time and REBT methods need to be devoted to helping clients strengthen their conviction in and application of rational beliefs.     

Probability,rational single-case decisions and the Monty Hall Problem

The application of probabilistic arguments to rational decisions in a single case is a contentious philosophical issue which arises in various contexts. Some authors (e.g. Horgan, Philos Pap 24:209–222, 1995; Levy, Synthese 158:139–151, 2007) affirm the normative force of probabilistic arguments in single cases while others (Baumann, Am Philos Q 42:71–79, 2005; Synthese 162:265–273, 2008) deny it. I demonstrate that both sides do not give convincing arguments for their case and propose a new account of the relationship between probabilistic reasoning and rational decisions. In particular, I elaborate a flaw in Baumann’s reductio of rational single-case decisions in a modified Monty Hall Problem.     

Semantics for Dual Preferential Entailment

We introduce and explore the notion of duality for entailment relations induced by preference orderings on states. We discuss the relationship between these preferential entailment relations from the perspectives of Boolean algebra, inference rules, and modal axiomatisation. Interpreting the preference relations as accessibility relations establishes modular Gödel-Löb logic as a suitable modal framework for rational preferential reasoning.     

Perceptions of Familial Risk in those Seeking a Genetic Risk Assessment for Alzheimer’s Disease

Perceived risk is a complex concept that influences the genetic counseling process and can affect client coping and behavior. Although the association between family history and risk perception is well recognized in the literature, no studies have explored this relationship specifically in those seeking genetic susceptibility testing for a common chronic condition. REVEAL is a randomized trial assessing the impact of APOE disclosure and genetic risk assessment for Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Using baseline REVEAL data, we hypothesized that there would be a significant association between the degree of AD family history and risk perception of AD, and that this relationship would be stronger in those who believed that genetics is a very important AD risk factor. In our sample of 293 participants, we found that a higher self-perceived risk of AD was associated with strength of family history of AD (p < 0.001), belief in genetics as an important AD risk factor (p < 0.001), being female (p < 0.001) and being Caucasian (p = 0.02). These results are the first to demonstrate the association between family history and risk perception in persons volunteering for genetic susceptibility testing for a common complex disease.     

On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy

Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.     

作为一项权利的人的尊严

The concept of human dignity and the relationship between dignity and human rights have been important subjects in contemporary international academia. This article first analyzes the different understandings of the concept of dignity, which has left great influences in history (including the “theory of attribution-dignity”, the “theory of autonomy-dignity” or the “theory of moral completeness/achievement-dignity”, and the “theory of end-in-itself-dignity”); it then exposes the obvious defects of these modes of understanding; finally, it tries to define dignity as a moral right to be free from insult. Meanwhile, the relationship between human dignity and human rights is clarified as a result of this research: Rather than being the foundation of human rights, human dignity is one of human rights. The idea of dignity nevertheless has a particular status in ethics in that it embodies a kind of core moral concern, representing a basic demand rooted in the human self or individuality, and hence representing an important aspect of human rights. We may anticipate that sooner or later, the idea of human dignity will become, together with other human rights, the only intangible cultural heritage of human society. __________ Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2008, (6): 85–92     

Rational Choice and Moral Theory

Contemporary discussions of the positive relation between rational choice and moral theory are a special case of a much older tradition that seeks to show that mutual agreement upon certain moral rules works to the mutual advantage, or in the interests, of those who so agree. I make a few remarks about the history of discussions of the connection between morality and self-interest, after which I argue that the modern theory of rational choice can be naturally understood as a continuation of this older tradition. I then go on to argue for a controversial three-fold thesis: (1) that grounding a theory of morality in terms of rational self-interest is the only epistemologically respectable way to proceed with the justification of moral principles; (2) that despite this, most of the contemporary explorations of rational choice foundations for moral principles do not work—that the models of rational choice to which they appeal yield less than the substantial results that they are intended to yield; but (3) that if one rethinks just what it means to be rational, one can find in fact a promising way to connect the two—specifically through the development of a theory of genuinely cooperative activity.     

The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument

It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.     

儒家差异思想阐微

Difference is a category of relationship lying between identity and non-identity, and equality and inequality. This concept is both the Confucian reflection of the real relationship between things in the world and the value ideal of Confucianism. The Confucian idea of difference, embodied in the view of human relationships, of world, and of nature, seeks to build a rational order based on difference, so as to reach a harmonious, united and ideal state. Confucians in the past dynasties continually interpreted difference and raised it to the level of ontology, enriching the system of Confucianism. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2006, (3): 32–37     

Counseling applications of RET in a Chinese cultural context

To explore the potential of Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) with clients of Chinese background, a brief review is conducted with respect to parallels between RET philosophy and some key components of Chinese culture and ways in which Chinese think. Arguments are advanced as to why RET is particularly suitable for use within a Chinese cultural context. Issues involved in using RET with Chinese clients are addressed including the appreciation many Chinese have for the logical and rational aspects of RET, the most appropriate type of client-counselor relationship to facilitate RET therapeutic progress, appropriate ways to dispute, and some cautionary words on the use of “emotive methods”. Areas where the RET counselor needs to be particularly sensitive to the cultural background of the client are highlighted. Charles P. Chen holds a master's degree in educational counseling and is currently a Ph.D. student and instructor in the Department of Counselling Psychology at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. His interests include cross-cultural and multi-cultural counseling, career counseling, and group counseling.     

Thinking and Feeling: A Buddhist Perspective

The work ‘Thinking and Feeling’ edited by Robert C. Solomon may be considered as a landmark in the history of the philosophy of the emotions. The work also has assembled together some of the best minds in the Anglo American Traditions. The central focus in this work is to mediate between the physiological arousal theories of emotions and the cognitive appraisal theories of emotions. My article is an attempt to mediate from my Asian background and in specific terms using the Buddhist perspectives on emotion studies, to find answers, a subject on which I have worked over several decades. The Buddha has discouraged people in attempting to find ultimate answers to the body- mind relationships, but use pragmatic and practical perspectives for a two way interactionism. Thus, in the Buddhist analysis the mental and the cognitive, as well as bodily and the physiological are recognised, thus giving room for a holistic understanding of emotions concepts. In fact, Buddhism expects the body, feelings, perceptions, interpretations, and evaluations as facets of emotion concepts. The second point is the domination of the metaphor of reasons as the charioteer in managing unruly emotions in the West. But Buddhism introduces the factor of ‘mindfulness’ as an important ally in the management of emotions. My personal work in therapy and counselling has helped me to explore new dimensions for managing emotions through mindfulness practice.     

The Cultural Community: An Husserlian Approach and Reproach

What types of unity and disunity belong to a group of people sharing a culture? Husserl illuminates these communities by helping us trace their origin to two types of interpersonal act—cooperation and influence—though cultural communities are distinguished from both cooperative groups and mere communities of related influences. This analysis has consequences for contemporary concerns about multi- or mono-culturalism and the relationship between culture and politics. It also leads us to critique Husserl’s desire for a new humanity, one that is rational, cooperatively united, and animated by a universal philosophical culture. Reflecting on culture, a spiritually shaped and shared domain of the world, draws us to reflect also on ourselves as social and rational animals, and to ask, what should we reasonably hope for—and aim for—in a human culture that expresses and supports our shared lives of reason? Aristotle is used for occasional comparisons and contrasts.     

Within-Family Differences in Internalizing Behaviors: The Role of Children’s Perspectives of the Mother-child Relationship

The goal of this exploratory, within-family, longitudinal study was to examine whether children’s perspectives of the mother-child relationship explained within-family differences in children’s responses to a shared family stressor (maternal depressive symptoms) over time. Children (ages 8 to 15 years; N = 68) residing in 34 families were drawn from a general population study in the UK. Predictor variables were assessed at Time 1 and change in internalizing behavior from Time 1 to Time 2 (2 years later) was examined. As children were nested within families, data were analyzed using multilevel modeling, controlling for previous child behavior. Child perspective of the mother-child relationship, in interaction with maternal depressive symptoms, was found to explain within-family differences in internalizing over time. Children with a negative perspective (compared to mothers’ perspectives) were the most vulnerable to the adverse effects of maternal depressive symptoms.     

Philosophy—what is to be done?

Philosophical thinking, in the historically original sense, is simply the human mind in operation, unaided by anything supernatural and unfettered by any human authority or any procedure for reaching some pre-given end. This means that “philosophy” originally included far more than it does now, including all the natural sciences, as well as rational reflection on society, history, and art. What this means for us now is that philosophy must be an essentially outward-facing discipline, open to others. Most importantly, it needs now to be open to the sciences, to practical social reflection, and to its own history. But what philosophy brings to all its reflections is above all a spirit of critical reflection, respect for evidence and argument, and a ruthless honesty that demands of people that they form their beliefs and views of life according to the best reasons and information they have, rather than forming their views according to their wishes or prejudices, or letting them be dictated by authorities or social traditions. In this sense, we are living in an unphilosophical, or even anti-philosophical, age, but this makes it all the more important for philosophy to continue to do its work.     

Resilience and Rationality

In this article, I consider the relationship between rationality and resilience. First, I outline six responses to life’s adversities: (a) a true disturbed response; (b) a feigned disturbed response; (c) a feigned indifferent response; (d) a true healthy response; (e) a feigned healthy response; and (f) a mixed response. These responses underpin two rational resilience credos, which will be then outlined: an ideal rational resilience credo and a realistic rational resilience credo. The implications of these credos for coaching will be explored.     

Femininity and Masculinity in City-Form: Philosophical Urbanism as a History of Consciousness

Mutual feedback between human-made environments and facets of thought throughout history has yielded two myths: the Garden and the Citadel. Both myths correspond to Jung’s feminine and masculine collective subconscious, as well as to Nietzsche’s premise of Apollonian and Dionysian impulses in art. Nietzsche’s premise suggests, furthermore, that the feminine myth of the Garden is time-bound whereas the masculine myth of the Citadel, or the Ideal City, constitutes a spatial deportment. Throughout history the two myths have continually molded the built environment and thought, but the myth of the Ideal City – from Plato to Descartes to modernity – came to dominate city-form and ensuing aspects of contemplation. This relationship seems to have shifted during the twentieth century. Intellectual dispositions have begun to be largely nurtured by an incongruous city-form emerging from the gap between the incessant promise for an automated, well-functioning city, on the one hand, and looming alienation, coupled with the factual, malfunctioning city, on the other hand. Urban decay, a persisting and time-bound urban event that is a byproduct of this configuration, suggests the ascent of the Garden myth in post-modern city-form.     

Is Socrates a Prophet? (In Light of the Views of His Contemporaries and the Main Commentators)

Everybody acknowledges the importance of Socrates’ role and influence on the history of philosophy, as well as on the culture of humanity. He is also considered to be the first martyr of virtue and wisdom in human history. In spite of this, even though most Western commentators recognize the elevated meanings and high level of Socratic wisdom, they refuse to consider it to have a supra-human source and to be divine prophecy. In this article and through the analysis of Socrates’ words and speeches, which can be found in authentic sources such as some of Plato’s writings, the author aims to prove the truth of Socrates’ claim according to which he had the gift of prophecy. By putting together rational proofs and historical clues from his life, we will underline the veracity of such a claim. A part of the article will be dedicated to underlining the fact that our reasoning is based on authentic and historical references of Socrates’ speeches, which are mainly mentioned in Plato’s Apology. By quoting the main and most important commentators’ views in this field, we will therefore endeavor to show that there is a sort of general consensus among most commentators to consider this treatise to be an historical document. The importance as well as main outcome of this article is that if we accept this theory, the general outlook of the history of philosophy will change radically. In addition, the claim that wisdom has a divine source, which is mentioned repeatedly in the content of divine wise men’s words and in some Islamic traditions, will be confirmed. Moreover, the link between spiritual truths and human reasoning will be corroborated and underlined.     

Susan Myers-Shirk’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Helping the Good Shepherd</Emphasis>: A Review Essay

In this essay, I review a recent book that deals with the history of pastoral counseling. I offer an overview of the book, some criticism of the book, and a discussion of how this book relates to my own work. I argue that what Susan Myers-Shirk has identified as a “liberal moral sensibility” among pastoral counselors seems to have certain affinities with Peter Homans’s “mourning religion” thesis. I suggest that this thesis can shed light on the divide between liberal and conservative pastoral counselors, a divide that Myers-Shirk identifies, and that this thesis can build on Myers-Shirk’s historical work by providing a rubric for understanding the relationship between private experience and public theory among liberal pastoral counselors. I also suggest that Myers-Shirk should write a sequel to this book.