Independence and Property in Kant's Rechtslehre

I argue that the freedom which is to coexist with the freedom of choice of others in accordance with a universal law mentioned in Kant's Rechtslehre is not itself freedom of choice. Rather, it is the independence which is a condition of being able to exercise genuine free choice by not having to act in accordance with the choices of others. Kant's distinction between active and passive citizenship appears, however, to undermine this idea of independence, because the possession of a certain type of property right on the part of some citizens makes it possible for them to dominate others. Kant's account of property in this way turns out to be central to the question as to whether his Rechtslehre represents an internally consistent account of how freedom can be guaranteed within a legal and political community. I go on to argue that Kant's attempt to justify a pre-political right of property cannot be viewed as a successful justification of private property, and that he should have abandoned the notion of such a right together with any presumption in favour of private property.     

Evidence against Rank-Dependent Utility Theories: Tests of Cumulative Independence,Interval Independence,Stochastic Dominance,and Transitivity

This study tests between two modern theories of decision making. Rank- and sign-dependent utility (RSDU) models, including cumulative prospect theory (CPT), imply stochastic dominance and two cumulative independence conditions. Configural weight models, with parameters estimated in previous research, predict systematic violations of these properties for certain choices. Experimental data systematically violate all three properties, contrary to RSDU but consistent with configural weight models. This study also tests whether violations of stochastic dominance can be explained by violations of transitivity. Violations of transitivity may be evidence of a dominance detecting mechanism. Although some transitivity violations were observed, most choice triads violated stochastic dominance without violating transitivity. Judged differences between gambles were not consistent with the CPT model. Data were not consistent with the editing principles of cancellation and combination. The main findings are interpreted in terms of coalescing, the principle that equal outcomes can be combined in a gamble by adding their probabilities. RSDU models imply coalescing but configural weight models violate it, allowing configural weighting to explain violations of stochastic dominance and cumulative independence.     

Working with Sandler's Theories

My contribution to this issue of Psychoanalytic Inquiry highlights not only Sandler's prodigious successes but also those aspects of his work that remain ambiguous. These uncertainties derive in part from his effort to integrate different frames of reference in his conceptualizations. The bits of theory that clinicians actually use in the consulting room tend to simplify, revise, and even contradict the more complex theories Sandler developed. Some of Sandler's proposals may be seen as retrainings of earlier theory at different levels of abstraction, and hence more compatible with them than generally acknowledged. I note the inclusion of Kleinian strains, which Sandler legitimized for non-Kleinian analysts, and conclude with a consideration of the “identity of perception” as a fundamental aspect of cognition and a territory yet to be fully explored.     

Effector Independence

Although effector independence is predicted in a number of theoretical perspectives, it has received only moderate empirical support. The authors conducted 3 experiments to determine the extent to which simple motor sequences are effector independent. A measurement scheme that partitioned response errors into independent error measures attributable to the relative structure of the response and the force-time scaling of that structure was used in the analysis of the present experiments. The results indicated that the relative structure of the response could be effectively transferred from one limb to the contralateral limb (Experiment 1), to a different muscle group on the same limb (Experiment 2), and from a static to a dynamic version of the task (Experiment 3). The ability to scale force was effector dependent, however, and the force scaling was relatively ineffective when an unpracticed limb was used. Although participants (Ns = 20, 24, and 20, respectively, in Experiments 1, 2, and 3) were effective in transferring the movement structure from a static to a dynamic version of the task, they were not very effective in transferring from a dynamic to a static version of the task. The transfer difference appeared to be related to the information that was available to support performance of the dynamic version of the task, which was not available in producing the static version.     

Dependence and Independence

We introduce an atomic formula ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ intuitively saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are independent from the variables ${\vec{z}}$ if the variables ${\vec{x}}$ are kept constant. We contrast this with dependence logic ${\mathcal{D}}$ based on the atomic formula = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ , actually equivalent to ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{y}}$ , saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are totally determined by the variables ${\vec{x}}$ . We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ gives rise to a natural logic capable of formalizing basic intuitions about independence and dependence. We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ can be used to give partially ordered quantifiers and IF-logic an alternative interpretation without some of the shortcomings related to so called signaling that interpretations using = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ have.     

Explicating Logical Independence

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Accounts of (complete) logical independence which coincide when applied in the case of classical logic diverge elsewhere, raising the question of what a...     

Independence in Information Spaces

Three different types of interdependence between pieces of information, or ??secrets??, are discussed and compared. Two of them, functional dependence and nondeducibility, have been studied and axiomatized before. This article introduces a third type of interdependence and provides a complete and decidable axiomatization of this new relation.     

Feature Independence and the Recovery of Feature Conjunctions

Recent neurophysiological and behavioral evidence suggests that in both perception and memory the differing attributes of multidimensional stimuli are retained independently of one another in the visual system. The phenomenal unity of visual cognition seems to be dependent on the recovery of feature conjunctions. A major objective for research in this area is to identify the mechanism(s) responsible for re-establishing appropriate feature combinations. Recent findings indicate that spatial location may play a mediative role in the feature integration associated with perceptual processing; however, whether location continues to provide the basis for the recovery of feature conjunctions from memory is unknown. This article provides an overview and critique of current research and offers a theoretical model of memorial feature processing.     

Re-Reading the Declaration of Independence as Perlocutionary Performative

This paper addresses the question of the constitution of ‘the people’. It argues that J.L. Austin’s concept of the ‘perlocutionary’ speech act gives us a framework for understanding the constitutive force of a specific constitutional document: the American Declaration of Independence. It does so through responding to Derrida’s analysis of the Declaration, which itself draws on Austin’s work. Derrida argues that the Declaration’s constitutive force lies in the fact that it cannot be simply understood as either ‘performative’ or ‘constative’, in Austin’s terminology. According to Derrida, ‘the people’ do not pre-exist the Declaration, but are constituted in the act of declaration itself. In response, I argue that while Derrida’s insight regarding the constitution of ‘the people’ is sound, his analysis misses two key aspects of the Declaration. These two lacunae point the way to an understanding of the constitutive force of the Declaration in terms of Austin’s ‘perlocutionary’ speech act.     

The Independence of Practical Ethics

After criticizing three common conceptions of therelationship between practical ethics and ethical theory, analternative modeled on Aristotle's conception of the relationshipbetween rhetoric and philosophical ethics is explored. Thisaccount is unique in that it neither denigrates the project ofsearching for an adequate comprehensive ethical theory norsubordinates practical ethics to that project. Because the purpose of practical ethics, on this view, is tosecure the cooperation of other persons in a way that respectstheir status as free and equal, it seeks to influence thejudgments of others by providing them with reasons that areaccessible to their own understanding. On this account, theindependence of practical ethics is rooted in an appreciation ofthe constraints that non-ideal circumstances place on the rolethat the philosophically refined premises of moral theory canplay in such public deliberations. Practical and philosophicalethics are united, not by shared theoretical frameworks orprinciples, but by the need to exercise intelligently the sameintellectual and affective capacities. They are separated, notby the particularity or generality of their starting points, butby their responsiveness to the practical problem of facilitatingsound normative deliberations among persons as we find them,under non-ideal circumstances.