Fact and fantasy: the roles of accuracy and variability in confusing imaginations with perceptual experiences

In Experiment 1, pictures were presented to subjects two, five, or eight times, and subjects were asked to imagine each pciture two, five, or eight times. Subsequently, subjects estimated the number of times each picture had been presented. Their estimates of the frequency of these external events were influenced by imagination trials; this effect was greater for good imagers than for poor imagers. Experiment 2 involved a similar design in which subjects were asked either to imagine the same referent for a word or to imagine a different referent for a word on successive imagination trials. Consistency (same referent) did not increase the influence of imaginations on immediate judgments of external frequency. Thus, the results of Experiment 1 were attributed to the greater accuracy (as opposed to greater consistency) of good imagers' internal generations of the stimuli. Furthermore, variation (imagining different referents), like greater accuracy, increased the effects of imagination trials on immediate but not on delayed judgments of frequency. Possible mechanisms underlying these effects are discussed. In general, the two studies show that qualitative characteristics of completely covert generations influence their impact on estimates of the frequency of external events.     

The alienness of the unconscious: on Laplanche's theory of seduction

In this paper the author uses a clinical example as a focus for an exploration of his thesis that the parent is the 'other' who implants his or her unconscious message into the child by means of seduction. As the other is alien, the unconscious of the child cannot any longer be considered the centre of the person but is decentred by the implanted alienness. The author draws on Laplanche's seduction theory to argue that the unconscious message of seduction by the other is exclusively sexual and that it cannot be translated nor symbolized because an interpretative system shared by subject and object is lacking. The decentred alterity of the unconscious allows for comparison with a third object and hence a structural triangulation of the mind which is a prerequisite for symbolization. The role of the analyst in permitting a transference enactment and so facilitating the beginning of sexual symbolization is discussed in relation to the clinical example given at the start of the paper.     

Fact and fantasy: The effects of internally generated events on the apparent frequency of externally generated events

As John Locke pointed out, there are at least two sources of the contents of the mind: events that occur in the world and events that originate in the mind. Memory, as a record of experience, should contain information from both sources. The present studies investigated memory for the frequency of externally and internally generated events. Individual items were presented to subjects varying numbers of times and tested varying numbers of times. Later, subjects were asked to estimate the frequency of both types of events. Experiment 1 showed that internally generated events influenced the judged frequency of externally generated events and vice versa. The first of these was called the IFE effect and the second the IFI effect. Experiment 2 indicated that the IFE effect was greater when tests consisted of overt, as compared to covert, recall trials. The results were discussed in terms of a model for storing and using occurrence information which would account for both our ability to discriminate between and our tendency to confuse internally and externally generated memory representations.     

Comprehension disorders in aphasia: a historical review.

This paper reviews the clinical reports and theoretical inferences made by early scientists in regard to the impairment of auditory comprehension so often found in aphasics. It first presents an analysis of the literature on and the interpretation of comprehension disorders in aphasia up to the time of Pierre Marie and Arnold Pick. It then reviews early attempts to assess and quantify receptive impairment. Finally, it discusses the historical origin of some of the questions on comprehension currently under investigation by contemporary researchers.     

Abraham Lincoln and Harry Potter: Children’s differentiation between historical and fantasy characters

Based on the testimony of others, children learn about a variety of figures that they never meet. We ask when and how they are able to differentiate between the historical figures that they learn about (e.g., Abraham Lincoln) and fantasy characters (e.g., Harry Potter). Experiment 1 showed that both younger (3- and 4-year-olds) and older children (5-, 6-, and 7-year-olds) understand the status of familiar figures, correctly judging historical figures to be real and fictional figures to be pretend. However, when presented with information about novel figures embedded in either a realistic narrative or a narrative with obvious fantasy elements, only older children used the narrative to make an appropriate assessment of the status of the protagonist. In Experiment 2, 3-, and 4-year-olds were prompted to judge whether the story events were really possible or not. Those who did so accurately were able to deploy that judgment to correctly assess the status of the protagonist.     

Misconceptions about Freud's seduction theory: comment on Gleaves and Hernandez (1999)

D. H. Gleaves and E. Hernandez (1999) write in relation to the seduction theory that "recent writers now argue that ... Freud never made discoveries of sexual abuse" (p. 332) and that "the assertion that Freud did not make discoveries of abuse is unwarranted" (p. 324). In this article an outline of the case that Freud had no adequate grounds for his 1896 claims of having uncovered infantile "sexual scenes" is given. Some of the more important misconceptions and erroneous arguments in Gleaves and Hernandez's article are then examined.     

Unconscious fantasy: a reconsideration of the concept

Despite general agreement about the clinical importance of unconscious fantasy, the concept itself has remained unclear. After reviewing Freud's work on the subject, the conceptual dilemma is specified: where in current psychoanalytic theory do we place this important, dynamically repressed, structuralized mental content? Three conceptual paths have been followed in attempting to deal with this problem. The first emphasizes the structural, tripartite model, discarding topographic concepts. The second replaces the structural model with a schema model borrowed from academic psychology. The third combines the structural and topographic models. None of these approaches is entirely satisfactory and without problems. Because of their central role in mental life, unconscious fantasies deserve careful definition. They should be distinguished from conscious fantasies and daydreams as well as from the process of fantasizing. They are differentiated from other varieties of unconscious content by their enduring quality and their organized, storylike quality reflecting the distortions typical of the primary process. As dynamically unconscious templates from the childhood past, they shape subsequent compromise formations and are relatively impervious to new experience. The development of psychoanalytic theory from a macrostructural to a microstructural emphasis is discussed in relation to the unconscious fantasy concept.