The "frozen in time" effect in evaluations of the dead

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that evaluations of the dead are more resistant to change than are evaluations of the living. In Experiment 1, perceivers formed an impression of a target person who performed either a moral or an immoral action and then either died or remained alive. Perceivers were later given new inconsistent information about the target's morality. The results revealed that perceivers' original impressions of the target were significantly less likely to change in response to the inconsistent information when the target was believed to be dead than when she was believed to be alive. Experiment 2 replicated the effect in impressions of real-world targets. The implications of these findings for research on posthumous impression processes are discussed.     

The how and why of disagreement among perceivers: An exploration of person models

Impression formation has been conceptualized as a process whereby perceivers form person models of others, describing what the person is like and why (Park, DeKay, & Kraus, 1994). If they exist, person models could help explain why there appears to be little consensus in personality judgments; perceivers forming different models of a person would also view them differently on trait and affect ratings. Two experiments were conducted to test assumptions of the person-model paradigm using naturalistic targets. The structure of person models was examined, along with their content. Results demonstrated that three distinct person models emerge for each target and that the majority of perceivers can easily identify with one of the three models. We found that person models were valid across different groups of perceivers, and that the models differed in terms of masculinity-femininity and affect. Implications for the person model formulation process are discussed.     

Perceiving individuals and groups: expectancies, dispositional inferences, and causal attributions

Two experiments investigated differences in forming impressions of individual and group targets. Experiment 1 showed that when forming an impression of an individual, perceivers made more extreme trait judgments, made those judgments more quickly and with greater confidence, and recalled more information than when the impression target was a group. Experiment 2 showed that when participants were forming an impression of an individual, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors spontaneously triggered causal attributions to resolve the inconsistency; this was not the case when the impression target was a group. Results are interpreted as reflecting perceivers' a priori assumptions of unity and coherence in individual versus group targets.     

Action Generalization Across Group Members: Action Efficiency Matters

Actions are usually generalized among social group members. Importantly, the efficiency of an action with respect to achieving an external target determines action understanding, and it may have different degrees of social relevance to social groups. Thus, this study explored the role of action efficiency in action generalization. We used computer animations to simulate actions in social groups initiated by visual action cues or category labels, and we measured differences in response times between identifying actions that were and were not consistent with group members, without explicit requirements regarding generalization. It was found that in both visually introduced and explicitly labeled social groups, when the group members acted inefficiently toward the external object, perceivers identified group-consistent actions faster than group-inconsistent actions, indicating that the exemplars' common inefficient actions are generalized to the unknown ingroup member, accordingly facilitating the identification of expected consistent inefficient action (Experiment 1). As this effect was not present when removing social group cues, it was determined to be specific to social groups (Experiment 2). Importantly, such generalization was not observed when the identical action was deemed efficient toward the external object (Experiment 3) and was specific to the demonstration of the action being completed by multiple group members rather than being repeated twice by one group member, supporting the group-based inference and ruling out the possibility of the increased memorability of inefficient actions leading to more generalization relative to efficient actions (Experiment 4). Therefore, the efficiency of an action bounds the generalization of the action across social group members through a process that is spontaneous and implicit. This constrained action generalization may be due to inefficient actions being represented as culture-specific conventional forms.     

Social Identity Orientation and the Generation of Compensatory Expectations: Schema Maintenance Through Compensation

This research explored the role that motives to confirm or maintain group stereotypes play in forming expectations about the future behaviors of ingroups. Participants who were high and low in social identity orientation (SIO) were presented with inconsistent information about the behavior of a member of their cohort group (i.e., college students). They then made predictions about the future behavior of either the deviant student (same target) or another student who was unrelated to the deviant (different target). High SIO participants, who should be especially motivated to confirm or maintain their group concept, generated compensatory expectations about the future behavior of a different group member who was unrelated to the deviant. Participants who were low in SIO did not demonstrate these effects. These results extend previous work (Seta & Seta, 1993) by demonstrating the moderating role of individuals' motivation to maintain group concepts. Results were also discussed in relation to Steele's research on self-affirmation (e.g., Steele & Lui, 1983) and our analysis of schema maintenance through compensation.     

The Effects of Team Context on Peer Ratings of Task and Citizenship Performance

Recent trends indicate that organizations will continue their strategic pursuit of teamwork for the foreseeable future, which will create a need for accurate assessments of individuals’ performance in teams. Although individual behaviors can be perceived and assessed by fellow team members (i.e., peers), the extent to which the team shapes perceivers’ judgments versus the target’s behavior is unclear. We conducted two studies to understand how and why team context influences peer ratings of individual performance. In study 1, we conducted cross-classified modeling on a sample of 7160 performance observations of 568 targets made by 567 perceivers, who were each members of four separate teams. Results indicated that team membership accounted for a substantially higher proportion of perceiver, relative to target, variance. In study 2, we conducted social relations modeling with a sample of 679 performance observations collected from 217 individuals nested in 46 teams to test the effects of psychological safety on perceiver, target, and team variance components. Perceptions of psychological safety accounted for proportionally larger perceiver, relative to target, variance in OCB, and task performance ratings. Altogether, team context appears to affect perceivers’ judgments of behavior more than the target’s behavior itself, implying that peer ratings sourced from different teams may not be comparable. We consider the implications for the collection and interpretation of peer performance ratings in teams and the potential implications for social cognitive theory, such that certain aspects of the team context, including psychological safety, may act as a cognitive heuristic by molding perceiver judgments of targets.

     

Inferences about the morality of an aggressor: the role of perceived motive

The research investigated perceivers' inferences about the morality of target persons who engaged in aggressive behavior. Across several experiments, inferences about the morality of an aggressor were based more on the perceived motives of the target than on the presence of facilitating situational forces. For example, when a target's aggression was facilitated by personal rewards for aggression (instrumental aggression), perceivers inferred more negative motives and attributed lower morality to the target than when the target's aggression was facilitated by situational provocation (reactive aggression). The results suggest that perceived motives play an important role in dispositional inference and pose a problem for models that focus primarily on perceived causality, assumptions about base rates (consensus), or diagnosticity.     

Ain't misbehavin': the effects of age and intentionality on judgments about misconduct

In 2 person perception experiments, young and older perceivers read a scenario about a young or old female target who leaves a store without paying for a hat. In Experiment 1, the target claims she forgot she was wearing the hat when questioned by the manager. Perceivers thought the manager would have greater sympathy, less anger, and would recommend less punishment when the target was old. In Experiment 2, the target clearly forgot to pay for the hat, clearly stole it, or had ambiguous intentions. In the ambiguous condition, perceivers attributed the young target's behavior more to stealing and the old target's behavior more to forgetting. In the forget condition, young perceivers had equal sympathy for the young and old targets and held them similarly responsible, but older perceivers had greater sympathy for the forgetful old target and held her less responsible than they did the forgetful young target.     

Inferring the popularity of an opinion from its familiarity: a repetitive voice can sound like a chorus

Despite the importance of doing so, people do not always correctly estimate the distribution of opinions within their group. One important mechanism underlying such misjudgments is people's tendency to infer that a familiar opinion is a prevalent one, even when its familiarity derives solely from the repeated expression of 1 group member. Six experiments demonstrate this effect and show that it holds even when perceivers are consciously aware that the opinions come from 1 speaker. The results also indicate that the effect is due to opinion accessibility rather than a conscious inference about the meaning of opinion repetition in a group. Implications for social consensus estimation and social influence are discussed.     

Parallel,exhaustive processing underlies logarithmic search functions: Visual search with cortical magnification

Our lab recently found evidence that efficient visual search (with a fixed target) is characterized by logarithmic Reaction Time (RT) × Set Size functions whose steepness is modulated by the similarity between target and distractors. To determine whether this pattern of results was based on low-level visual factors uncontrolled by previous experiments, we minimized the possibility of crowding effects in the display, compensated for the cortical magnification factor by magnifying search items based on their eccentricity, and compared search performance on such displays to performance on displays without magnification compensation. In both cases, the RT × Set Size functions were found to be logarithmic, and the modulation of the log slopes by target–distractor similarity was replicated. Consistent with previous results in the literature, cortical magnification compensation eliminated most target eccentricity effects. We conclude that the log functions and their modulation by target–distractor similarity relations reflect a parallel exhaustive processing architecture for early vision.     

Correspondence bias and attitude toward abortion: Effects of information from others

This study investigated the influence of information from others on the correspondence bias in the attribution of attitudes. Participants were presented with an essay either for or against the legalization of abortion. They also received either no information, an argument mentioning the target person’s constraint, or behavior-inconsistent prior information about the target from a “fellow classmate.” Participants then estimated the constrained target person’s actual attitude. Results showed that the correspondence bias (CB) was substantially attenuated by the constraint argument and was reversed by the prior information. These findings demonstrate that arguments from others may prompt perceivers to make an inferential adjustment to take into account the target’s situational constraint, and that behavior-inconsistent prior information from others may lead perceivers to assign greater inferential weight to that information relative to the behavior. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association conference in Chicago, Illinois, May 1995.     

Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy

Insights from appraisal theories of emotion are used to integrate elements of theories on collective action. Three experiments with disadvantaged groups systematically manipulated procedural fairness (Study 1), emotional social support (Study 2), and instrumental social support (Study 3) to examine their effects on collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. Results of structural equation modeling showed that procedural fairness and emotional social support affected the group-based anger pathway (reflecting emotion-focused coping), whereas instrumental social support affected the group efficacy pathway (reflecting problem-focused coping), constituting 2 distinct pathways to collective action tendencies. Analyses of the means suggest that collective action tendencies become stronger the more fellow group members "put their money where their mouth is." The authors discuss how their dual pathway model integrates and extends elements of current approaches to collective action.     

On disregarding deviants: Exemplar typicality and person perception

A pervasive problem in mental life is that of exemplar selectivity or how one isolates specific category members from other instances of a class. This problem is particupared pronounced in person perception, where perceivers may routinely want to personalize selected individuals while continuing to respond towards other members of the category in a stereotype-based manner. To realize these flexible effects, we hypothesized that, when perceivers encounter a group member, they inevitably encode an exemplar-based representation of the individual in mind. Part of this representation, moreover, is information signaling the person's goodness-of-Fit with respect to his or her salient group memberships. When the representation is activated on a subsequent occasion, these inferences of category fit moderate the extent of stereotypical thinking. The results of two studies provided converging evidence for this analysis of stereotype function. Exemplar typicality moderated both the accessibility of Stereotypic knowledge (Study 1) anxd the extent to which perceivers used a stereotype to organize information about a target (Study 2). We consider the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for our understanding of the role of stereotypes in person perception.     

On disregarding deviants: Exemplar typicality and person perception

A pervasive problem in mental life is that of exemplar selectivity or how one isolates specific category members from other instances of a class. This problem is particupared pronounced in person perception, where perceivers may routinely want to personalize selected individuals while continuing to respond towards other members of the category in a stereotype-based manner. To realize these flexible effects, we hypothesized that, when perceivers encounter a group member, they inevitably encode an exemplar-based representation of the individual in mind. Part of this representation, moreover, is information signaling the person's goodness-of-Fit with respect to his or her salient group memberships. When the representation is activated on a subsequent occasion, these inferences of category fit moderate the extent of stereotypical thinking. The results of two studies provided converging evidence for this analysis of stereotype function. Exemplar typicality moderated both the accessibility of Stereotypic knowledge (Study 1) anxd the extent to which perceivers used a stereotype to organize information about a target (Study 2). We consider the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for our understanding of the role of stereotypes in person perception.     

Further explorations with a process model for water jug problems

Subjects performed a water jug task in which the object was to find a sequence of pouring operations that would produce a specified amount of water in each jug. A model for this task is presented and evaluated. The model makes strong assumptions concerning lack of planning in the water jug task. In addition, alternative models incorporating planning assumptions were considered. Alternative models were evaluated in two experiments. All experimental conditions were successfully simulated by making reasonable and well-motivated parameter changes in our model, which assumes no planning. Further, several classes of models incorporating planning assumptions were shown to be inconsistent with the observed results.     

Attributions of intergroup bias and outgroup homogeneity to ingroup and outgroup others

The research in this article explores the structure and content of attributed intergroup beliefs: to what extent do perceivers think others of their ingroup and their outgroup display intergroup evaluative bias and outgroup homogeneity? We report studies that address this question in ethnicity, gender, and nationality intergroup contexts. In all of these, we show that perceivers attribute to others more biased intergroup beliefs than they themselves espouse. Even when perceivers themselves do not show intergroup bias or outgroup homogeneity, they attribute such biases to others, both others from their ingroup and others from their outgroup. We argue that such attributed intergroup beliefs are fundamentally important to expectations concerning intergroup interaction. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The game is afoot: A response to three insightful commentaries

This is an author response to commentaries on our original article (Wu, Sheppard & Mitchell, 2016). We abstract two main themes from the commentaries, and they are as follows: (1) What kind of clues in target behaviour allow perceivers to infer target EQ? And related with this, by what process do perceivers infer the target's EQ? (2) Do features of the target group naturally lead to a U‐shaped function, whereby it is easy for perceivers to identify those at the extremes but not those in the middle of the continuum?     

REFLECTIONS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GOALS IN PSYCHOLOGY ADMISSIONS

Four goals of affirmative action in higher education are described as they relate to psychology admissions. Broadly conceived, these goals are compensating for past injustice, correcting present inequity, promoting intellectual diversity, and enhancing the presence of role models. It is argued that the four goats differ in their underlying assumptions about the purposes of affirmative action and that these differences can result in disparate admission decisions. Data from three experiments on decision making in graduate psychology admissions are presented to illustrate the analysis. In these studies, academic psychologists rated the admissibility of hypothetical graduate student applicants who varied on a number of characteristics (e g., ethnicity, social class, interest in minority research) pertinent to affirmative action. A consistent pattern of ethnic group differences in admissibility ratings was documented, illustrating that compensation for past injustice can be interpreted as a salient affirmative action goal in graduate admissions decisions. Implications of the analysis for clarifying admissions decisions guided by affirmative action goals are discussed.     

Affective divergence: automatic responses to others' emotions depend on group membership

Extant research suggests that targets' emotion expressions automatically evoke similar affect in perceivers. The authors hypothesized that the automatic impact of emotion expressions depends on group membership. In Experiments 1 and 2, an affective priming paradigm was used to measure immediate and preconscious affective responses to same-race or other-race emotion expressions. In Experiment 3, spontaneous vocal affect was measured as participants described the emotions of an ingroup or outgroup sports team fan. In these experiments, immediate and spontaneous affective responses depended on whether the emotional target was ingroup or outgroup. Positive responses to fear expressions and negative responses to joy expressions were observed in outgroup perceivers, relative to ingroup perceivers. In Experiments 4 and 5, discrete emotional responses were examined. In a lexical decision task (Experiment 4), facial expressions of joy elicited fear in outgroup perceivers, relative to ingroup perceivers. In contrast, facial expressions of fear elicited less fear in outgroup than in ingroup perceivers. In Experiment 5, felt dominance mediated emotional responses to ingroup and outgroup vocal emotion. These data support a signal-value model in which emotion expressions signal environmental conditions.