Darwin and moral realism: survival of the iffiest

This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.     

Motives, values and moral judgments

This study examined McClelland's (1981) hypothesis that operant and respondent measures of personality are orthogonal and assess different dimensions of personality structure. An operant measure of motives, a sentence completion test, and two respondent measures of cognitive schema variables, the Rokeach Value Survey and the Defining issues Test, were administered to 311 subjects. As predicted and in support of McClelland's hypothesis, 69% of the correlations between the respondent measures were significant at the alpha .05 level of probability versus 14% of the correlations between the operant and respondent measures. Further, within the domain of cognitive schema variables, it was theoretically possible to predict which values would correlate with different levels of moral judgment. The findings were discussed in terms. of their implications for person x situation models of social interaction and the prediction of criterion variables from typologies of personality.     

Predicting cooperation in competitive conditions: The role of sportspersonship,moral competence,and emotional intelligence

ObjectivesThe purpose of the present study was to examine the predictive capabilities of sportspersonship, moral competence, and emotional intelligence on cooperation in varying competitive conditions.DesignAn experimental study was conducted, examining responses in a prisoner's dilemma game with manipulated conditions.MethodForty-three participants were randomly assigned to an accumulative or competitive condition, in which they contested 10 rounds of choosing to cooperate or defect.ResultsWhether the condition was accumulative or competitive did not significantly predict cooperation. In the final round of each contest however, cooperation was significantly reduced. Sportspersonship predicted a significant amount of cooperation percentage, while final round cooperation was predicted by emotional intelligence.ConclusionsCooperation is in part determined by individual levels of sportspersonship in all conditions except when actions are free of future consequence. In such conditions, emotional intelligence appears to be a stronger indicator of cooperation. The implications of the study are that researchers and practitioners should consider how to develop sportspersonship and emotional intelligence to boost cooperation in various domains.     

The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values

While individual differences in the willingness and ability to engage analytic processing have long informed research in reasoning and decision making, the implications of such differences have not yet had a strong influence in other domains of psychological research. We claim that analytic thinking is not limited to problems that have a normative basis and, as an extension of this, predict that individual differences in analytic thinking will be influential in determining beliefs and values. Along with assessments of cognitive ability and style, religious beliefs, and moral values, participants judged the wrongness of acts considered disgusting and conventionally immoral, but that do not violate care- or fairness-based moral principles. Differences in willingness to engage analytic thinking predicted reduced judgements of wrongness, independent of demographics, political ideology, religiosity, and moral values. Further, we show that those who were higher in cognitive ability were less likely to indicate that purity, patriotism, and respect for traditions and authority are important to their moral thinking. These findings are consistent with a “Reflectionist” view that assumes a role for analytic thought in determining substantive, deeply-held human beliefs and values.     

Moral prototypes and moral behavior: Specific effects on emotional precursors of moral behavior and on moral behavior by the activation of moral prototypes

The present studies investigated the extent to which three basic moral prototypes, “just,” “brave”, and “caring”, are related to moral, prosocial behavior. In five studies, we tested (a) whether people would associate three basic types of moral behavior (helping behavior, moral courage, and heroism) with three moral prototypes, and (b) whether specific emotional precursors of moral behavior and moral behavior itself could be promoted by activating the respective moral prototype. As expected, Studies 1–3 revealed that people associated helping behavior with the caring prototype, moral courage with the just prototype, and heroism with the brave prototype. Studies 4 and 5 showed that the activation of the three prototypes differentially influenced emotional precursors of the three types of moral behavior (Study 4) as well as actual moral behavior (Study 5). Thus, the five studies revealed that people associate different moral behaviors with different moral prototypes and that a certain moral behavior can be activated by the priming of the related prototype. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral perfectionism and moral values,virtues, and judgments: A preliminary investigation

Moral perfectionism has a long tradition in philosophical inquiry, but so far has been ignored in psychological research. This article presents a first psychological investigation of moral perfectionism exploring its relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments. In three studies, 539 university students responded to items of the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al., 1990) adapted to measure personal moral standards (PMS) and concern over moral mistakes (CMM) and completed measures of moral values, virtues, and forgiveness, gratitude, and wrong behavior judgments. When partial correlations were computed controlling for the overlap between PMS and CMM, PMS showed positive correlations with moral values, virtues, reciprocal helping, forgiveness, and condemnation of wrong behaviors. In contrast, CMM showed a positive correlation only with indebtedness and a negative correlation with self-reliance. The present findings, while preliminary, suggest that moral perfectionism is a personality characteristic that may help explain individual differences in moral values, virtues, and judgments.     

Herder's Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism,Sentimentalism and Theism

While the last several decades have seen a renaissance of scholarship on J. G. Herder (1744–1804), his moral philosophy has not been carefully examined. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap, and to point the way for further research, by reconstructing his original and systematically articulated views on morality. Three interrelated elements of his position are explored in detail: (1) his perfectionism, or theory of the human good; (2) his sentimentalism, which includes moral epistemology and a theory of moral education; and (3) his theism, which deepens and justifies these other elements.     

Dark and immoral: The links between pathological personality features and moral values

Recent research on morality has highlighted important individual differences in moral judgment and reasoning. The present study extends these findings by examining the connections between moral concerns and pathological personality features. This was accomplished by asking 447 community participants to complete self-report measures concerning their pathological personality features and moral concerns. The results showed that pathological personality features differ in their associations with moral concerns as measured by individualizing values (i.e., sensitivity to harm and fairness) and binding values (i.e., reflecting in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and sanctity). For example, negative affect was associated with stronger individualizing and binding values, whereas antagonism was associated with weaker individualizing values. Discussion focuses on the implications of these results for understanding the connections between pathological personality features and moral concerns.     

The argument from agreement: How universal values undermine moral realism

The most popular argument against moral realism is the argument from disagreement: if there are mind‐independent moral facts, then we would not expect to find as much moral disagreement as we in fact do; therefore, moral realism is false. In this paper, I develop the flipside of this argument. According to this argument from agreement, we would expect to find lots of moral disagreement if there were mind‐independent moral facts. But we do not, in fact, find much moral disagreement; therefore, moral realism is false. I defend the argument, explain the empirical evidence that supports it, and show what makes this challenge novel and powerful.     

Gaze and emotional expression: The effects of message positivity-negativity and emotional intensity

The effects of emotional positivity-negativity and emotional intensity on actor's gaze were examined by simulating emotional situations to a camera. Female subjects were first asked to act out a neutral message as if they were speaking to a person to obtain a baseline for direct gaze. Subjects were then asked to perform a positive or a negative message to the camera. Half the subjects attempted to express the message with strong emotion; half expressed it with weak, ambivalent emotion. As expected, it was found that more direct gaze was maintained when expressing strong emotion. Whether the message was positive or negative did not affect gaze direction. The results were discussed in relation to the dimensions of nonverbal communication.     

Attitudes,values and moral reasoning as predictors of delinquency

Attitudes to institutional authority, strength of support for moral values and maturity of socio‐moral reasoning have all been identified as potential predictors of adolescent delinquency. In a sample of 12–15‐year‐old boys (N = 789), after checking for effects of age, IQ, social background and ethnicity, self‐reported delinquency was significantly and independently predicted by attitudes to authority (r = ?.47) and moral values (r = ?.27), but not by a structural measure of moral reasoning level (r = ?.04). The findings argue for closer attention to the developmental determinants of attitudes to institutional authority and strength of moral value commitments than these have received hitherto. On the other hand, lack of an association between moral reasoning level and delinquent conduct does leave unanswered questions about the consequences of this kind of moral competence.     

Individual differences in harm-related moral values are associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation

Emotions affects moral judgements, and controlled cognitive processes regulate those emotional responses during moral decision making. However, the neurobiological basis of this interaction is unclear. We used a graph theory measurement called participation coefficient (‘PC’) to quantify the resting-state functional connectivity within and between four meta-analytic groupings (MAGs) associated with emotion generation and regulation, to test whether that measurement predicts individual differences in moral foundations-based values. We found that the PC of one of the MAGs (MAG2) was positively correlated with one of the five recognized moral foundations–the one based on harm avoidance. We also found that increased inter-module connectivity between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus with other nodes in the four MAGs was likewise associated with higher endorsement of the Harm foundation. These results suggest that individuals' sensitivity to harm is associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation. These findings add to our knowledge of how individual variations in our moral values could be reflected by intrinsic brain network organization and deepen our understanding of the relationship between emotion and cognition during evaluations of moral values.     

Sex differences in moral internalization and values.

The subjects were fifth- and seventh-grade white middle-class children and their parents. The major moral internalization indices pertain to internal moral judgment, guilt intensity, and fear of punishment. The findings support the prevalent view that consideration for others is more salient in females. They also suggest, with considerable consistency (especially in adults) that moral transgressions are more likely to be associated with guilt in females and fear in males. No sex differences in internal moral judgment were obtained. Evidence was presented suggesting that the differences in children may be due partly to different discipline and affection patterns. It was also suggested that the results for adults as well as children might be explained by differential sex-role socialization as well as by increasing pressures on males over the life cycle to achieve and succeed, which may often conflict with concerns about the welfare of others.     

Valuing myself over others: The Dark Triad traits and moral and social values

In samples from America and Germany (N = 1353), we examined how the Dark Triad traits related to different value systems as measured by Moral Foundations and Social Values. Psychopathy was linked to diminished concerns for all Moral Foundations, Machiavellianism was linked to a moral flexibility, and narcissism was linked to a socially desirable form of morality. Machiavellianism and psychopathy scores were associated with a devaluing of collective interests, whereas narcissism was associated with a valuing of individual interests through the value of Self-Enhancement. Individual differences in a variety of values mediated part of the sex differences in the Dark Triad traits. We contend that what makes the Dark Triad traits unique and interesting is that they share a unique complex of values that might run counter to societal expectations for selflessness.     

Children in clinical research: a conflict of moral values

This paper examines the culture, the dynamics and the financial underpinnings that determine how medical research is being conducted on children in the United States. Children have increasingly become the subject of experiments that offer them no potential direct benefit but expose them to risks of harm and pain. A wide range of such experiments will be examined, including a lethal heartburn drug test, the experimental insertion of a pacemaker, an invasive insulin infusion experiment, and a fenfluramine "violence prediction" experiment. Emphasis, however, is given to psychoactive drug tests because of the inherent ethical and diagnostic problems involved in the absence of any objective, verifiable diagnostic tool. Effort is made to provide readers comprehensive reference sources to evidence-based reports about the serious risks these drugs pose for adults and children so that the reader may judge whether the benefits (if any) outweigh the risks for children.     

Defending psychopathy: an argument from values and moral responsibility

How psychopaths and their capacity for moral action are viewed is not only philosophically interesting but is also important and relevant for policy. The philosophical discussion of psychopathy has focussed upon the psychological faculties that are prerequisites for moral responsibility and empirical findings regarding psychopathy that are relevant to philosophical accounts of moral understanding and motivation. However, there are legitimate worries about whether psychopathy is a robust scientific construct, and there are risks attached to reifying psychopathy or other psychiatric constructs. We defend the concept of psychopathy by pointing out the relevance of empirical studies about it for our ordinary practices of ascribing moral responsibility and folk psychological accounts of moral understanding and motivation.     

Change in values and moral reasoning during higher education

The aim of this study was to examine whether personal value priorities, measured by Schwartz et al.'s method, change during higher education, whether moral reasoning measured by the DIT develops and whether values predict gain in moral development. Moreover, we explored the simultaneous changes in value priorities and moral reasoning. Our sample consisted of 132 students from a university of applied sciences who filled out the value measure and the DIT both at the beginning and at the end of their studies. The results revealed that universalism and security values became more important whereas achievement decreased in importance during the three-year period. We also found significant gain in moral development and that universalism and hedonism values predicted this gain significantly. Significant correlated change was found between moral reasoning and stimulation, conformity and security values. The meaning of the results is discussed in terms of the theories of Schwartz and Kohlberg.