The Moral Status of Nonresponsible Threats

Most people believe that it is permissible to kill a nonresponsible threat, or someone who threatens one's life without exercising agency. Defenders of this view must show that there is a morally relevant difference between nonresponsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some philosophers, including Jonathan Quong and Helen Frowe, have attempted to do this by arguing that one who kills a bystander takes advantage of another person, while one who kills a threat does not. In this paper, I show that the proposals offered by Quong and Frowe have unacceptable implications. I then argue that those who claim that nonresponsible threats may be killed face a dilemma generated by the possibility of a stationary threat, or someone who endangers another person's life without moving. Unless we arbitrarily distinguish between stationary and moving nonresponsible threats, it is unclear how the permission to kill nonresponsible threats is to be explicated. I conclude that nonresponsible threats are not legitimate targets of self‐defence.     

Necessity and Triviality

In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of the demands the truth of a sentence makes, lest we be blinded to certain conceptual possibilities. I defend the claim that the truths of pure mathematics and set theory are trivially true, and hence accepting their truth brings no ontological commitment; I further defend the claim that the truths of applied mathematics and set theory do not demand the existence of numbers or sets. While the notion of a demand must not be reduced to anything modal, I nonetheless argue that sentences that are trivially true must also be necessary, lest we violate a very weak version of the principle that truth depends on the world. I further argue that all necessary truths are trivially true, lest we admit unexplained necessities. I end by showing one important consequence of this: I argue that if there are truthmakers for intrinsic predications, they must be states of affairs rather than tropes.     

Complicity and the Rwandan Genocide

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 occurred due to widespread complicity. I will argue that complicity can be the basis for legal liability, even for criminal liability, if two conditions are met. First, the person’s actions or inactions must be causally efficacious at least in the sense that had the person not committed these actions or inactions the harm would have been made significantly less likely to occur. Second, the person must know that her actions or inactions risk contributing to a harmful enterprise, and must intend that these actions or inactions risk making this contribution. But it is not part of this analysis that the defendant must intend the harmful result. I explore the boundaries between legal and moral complicity and end with a discussion of how the analysis defended in the paper affects such questions as how many people in Rwanda should be prosecuted for the genocide which occurred due to widespread complicity.     

The Moral Status of Deprogramming

ABSTRACT  In this paper I examine some of the issues surrounding the moral status of the therapy known as 'deprogramming'. I argue against the extreme view that all deprogrammings are morally impermissible. In certain instances deprogramming is morally justified because it is quite capable of restoring the conditions needed for the exercise of autonomy. The view of autonomy I am following is that constructed by Gerald Dworkin, wherein two conditions must be met in describing a person as autonomous—authenticity and procedural independence. Autonomy of another type, described by Dworkin as authenticity plus substantive independence, may be lost by persons involved in cults but in those instances deprogramming as reconstructed in this paper is not a morally justified measure.     

Consent Under Pressure: The Puzzle of Third Party Coercion

Coercion by the recipient of consent renders that consent invalid. But what about when the coercive force comes from a third party, not from the person to whom consent would be proffered? In this paper I analyze how threats from a third party affect consent. I argue that, as with other cases of coercion, we should distinguish threats that render consent invalid from threats whose force is too weak to invalidate consent and threats that are legitimate. Illegitimate controlling third party threats render consent invalid just as they do in two party cases. However, knowing that the consent is invalid is not sufficient to tell the recipient of consent what she may or should do. I argue that when presented with a token of consent from someone whom she thinks is experiencing an illegitimate controlling threat, the recipient may act on that token if and only if doing so represents a reasonable joint decision for her and the victim of coercion. The appropriate action for someone faced with third party coercion therefore depends on the other options open to her and those open to the victim of coercion.     

What can functional neuroimaging tell the experimental psychologist?

I argue here that functional neuroimaging data—which I restrict to the haemodynamic techniques of fMRI and PET—can inform psychological theorizing, provided one assumes a “systematic” function-structure mapping in the brain. In this case, imaging data simply comprise another dependent variable, along with behavioural data, that can be used to test competing theories. In particular, I distinguish two types of inference: function-to-structure deduction and structure-to-function induction. With the former inference, a qualitatively different pattern of activity over the brain under two experimental conditions implies at least one different function associated with changes in the independent variable. With the second type of inference, activity of the same brain region(s) under two conditions implies a common function, possibly not predicted a priori. I illustrate these inferences with imaging studies of recognition memory, short-term memory, and repetition priming. I then consider in greater detail what is meant by a “systematic” function-structure mapping and argue that, particularly for structure-to-function induction, this entails a one-to-one mapping between functional and structural units, although the structural unit may be a network of interacting regions and care must be taken over the appropriate level of functional/structural abstraction. Nonetheless, the assumption of a systematic function-structure mapping is a “working hypothesis” that, in common with other scientific fields, cannot be proved on independent grounds and is probably best evaluated by the success of the enterprise as a whole. I also consider statistical issues such as the definition of a qualitative difference and methodological issues such as the relationship between imaging and behavioural data. I finish by reviewing various objections to neuroimaging, including neophrenology, functionalism, and equipotentiality, and by observing some criticisms of current practice in the imaging literature.     

Extrapolating from Laboratory Behavioral Research on Nonhuman Primates Is Unjustified

Conducting research on animals is supposed to be valuable because it provides information on how human mechanisms work. But for the use of animal models to be ethically justified, it must be epistemically justified. The inference from an observation about an animal model to a conclusion about humans must be warranted for the use of animals to be moral. When researchers infer from animals to humans, it’s an extrapolation. Often nonhuman primates are used as animal models in laboratory behavioural research. The target populations are humans and other nonhuman primates. I argue that the epistemology of extrapolation renders the use of nonhuman primates in laboratory behavioural research unreliable. If the model is relevantly similar to the target, then the experimental conditions introduce confounding variables. If the model is not relevantly similar to the target, then the observations of the model cannot be extrapolated to the target. Since using nonhuman primates as animal models in laboratory behavioural research is not epistemically justified, using them as animal models in laboratory behavioural research is not ethically justified.     

“It Can Happen to You”: Rape Prevention in the Age of Risk Management

This essay provides a critical analysis of rape prevention since the 1980s. I argue that we must challenge rape prevention's habitual reinforcement of the notion that fear is a woman's best line of defense. 1 suggest changes that must be made in the anti‐rape movement if we are to move past fear. Ultimately, I raise the question of what, if not vague threats and scare tactics, constitutes prevention.     

When to think like an epistemicist

Epistemicism is the view that seemingly vague predicates are not in fact vague. Consequently, there must be a sharp boundary between a man who is bald and one who is not bald. Although such a view is often met with incredulity, my aim is to provide a defense of epistemicism in this essay. My defense, however, is backhanded: I argue that the formal commitments of epistemicism are the result of good practical reasoning, not metaphysical necessity. To get to that conclusion, I spend most of the essay arguing that using a formal system like classical logic to manage seemingly vague situations requires practical principles to mediate between the formalism and what it aims to represent.     

Nature vs. nurture is nonsense: On the necessity of an integrated genetic,social, developmental,and personality psychology

The field of behavioural genetics unambiguously demonstrates that heritable individual differences exist and are important in explaining human behaviour. Despite this, some psychological perspectives ignore this research. If we wish to comprehensively understand the impact of parenting, the environment, or any social factor, however, we must engage with genetics. In this article, I review research that reveals that genes affect not only our personalities, but the way that we understand and react to the social world. Studies further reveal that notable life events are in part explained by genetic variance. I detail how this could be the case through active, evocative, and passive genetic correlations, and go on to argue that all complex psychological traits are likely the result of multifaceted gene by environment interactions. A mistaken belief that genetic influence implies genetic essentialism, and is therefore tantamount to prejudice, is raised as possible reason why heritability is often ignored in the social sciences. The article concludes with practical suggestions for how we can embrace behavioural genetics as our methods struggle to match the divine complexity of human existence.     

A needs-based model of reconciliation: satisfying the differential emotional needs of victim and perpetrator as a key to promoting reconciliation

The authors propose that conflict threatens different psychological resources of victims and perpetrators and that these threats contribute to the maintenance of conflict (A. Nadler, 2002; A. Nadler & I. Liviatan, 2004; A. Nadler & N. Shnabel, in press). On the basis of this general proposition, the authors developed a needs-based model of reconciliation that posits that being a victim is associated with a threat to one's status and power, whereas being a perpetrator threatens one's image as moral and socially acceptable. To counter these threats, victims must restore their sense of power, whereas perpetrators must restore their public moral image. A social exchange interaction in which these threats are removed should enhance the parties' willingness to reconcile. The results of 4 studies on interpersonal reconciliation support these hypotheses. Applied and theoretical implications of this model are discussed.     

Four Keys to Success (Theory, Implementation, Evaluation, and Resource/System Support): High Hopes and Challenges in Participation

In this article, I attempt to merge two themes. First, there is often a large gap between high hopes about impacts of policies or programs and the demonstrated results. I describe four keys/threats to success in any social problem area: theory, implementation, evaluation, and resource/system support. Second, I present theory and research from over 30 years of work on participation, conducted by my colleagues and myself that can illuminate and be illuminated by theory, implementation, evaluation, and resource/system support. I offer ideas for solutions that increase the probability of success. I conclude with the need to have high hopes tempered by theory and research to develop realistically ambitious solutions to social problems.     

Virtue Ethics

I discuss a puzzle that shows there is a need to develop a new metaphysical interpretation of mathematical theories, because all well-known interpretations conflict with important aspects of mathematical activities. The new interpretation, I argue, must authenticate the ontological commitments of mathematical theories without curtailing mathematicians' freedom and authority to creatively introduce mathematical ontology during mathematical problem-solving. Further, I argue that these two constraints are best met by a metaphysical interpretation of mathematics that takes mathematical entities to be constitutively constructed by human activity in a manner similar to the constitutive construction of the US Supreme Court by certain legal and political activities. Finally, I outline some of the philosophical merits of metaphysical interpretations of mathematical theories of this type.     

Serial reversal learning in bumblebees (Bombus impatiens)

Bumblebees are capable of rapidly learning discriminations, but flexibility in bumblebee learning is less well understood. We tested bumblebees (Bombus impatiens) on a serial reversal learning task. A serial reversal task requires learning of an initial discrimination between two differentially rewarded stimuli, followed by multiple reversals of the reward contingency between stimuli. A reduction in errors with repeated reversals in a serial reversal task is an indicator of behavioural flexibility. Bees were housed in a large indoor environment and tested during foraging flights. Testing free-flying bees allowed for large numbers of trials and reversals. All bees were trained to perform a simultaneous discrimination between two colours for a nectar reward, followed by nine reversals of this discrimination. Results showed that bumblebees reduced errors and improved their performance across successive reversals. A reduction in perseverative errors was the major cause of the improvement in performance. Bees showed a slight increase in error rate in their final trials, perhaps as a consequence of increasing proactive interference, but proactive interference may also have contributed to the overall improvement in performance across reversals. Bumblebees are thus capable of behavioural flexibility comparable to that of other animals and may use proactive interference as a mechanism of behavioural flexibility in varying environments.     

Self-protection and growth as the motivational force behind majority group members' cultural adaptation and discrimination: A parallel mediation model via intergroup contact and threat

What motivates majority group members to adapt to or reject cultural diversity? Considering the relevance of personal values on our attitudes and behaviours, we inspected how self-protection and growth predict levels of discriminatory behavioural and cultural adaptation intentions towards migrants via intergroup contact and perceived intergroup threats, simultaneously (i.e., parallel mediation). Specifically, positive contact between groups is known for reducing prejudice through diminishing perceived intergroup threats. Yet current research emphasises the role of individual differences in this interplay while proposing a parallel relationship between perceived intergroup threats and contact. Also by inspecting cultural adaptation and discriminatory behavioural intentions, the present study examined more proximal indicators of real-world intergroup behaviours than explored in past research. Using data from 304 US Americans, structural equation modelling indicated a good fit for a parallel mediation model with growth relating positively to cultural adaptation intentions and negatively to discriminatory behavioural intentions through being positively associated with intergroup contact and negatively with perceived intergroup threats, simultaneously. The reverse was found for self-protection. These findings stress that personal values constitute a relevant individual difference in the contact/threats-outcome relationship, providing a motivational explanation for majority group members' experience of cultural diversity in their own country.     

Understanding conditional promises and threats

Conditional promises and threats are speech acts that are used to manipulate other people's behaviour. Studies on human reasoning typically use propositional logic to analyse what people infer from such inducements. While this approach is sufficient to uncover conceptual features of inducements, it fails to explain them. To overcome this limitation, we propose a multilevel analysis integrating motivational, linguistic, deontic, behavioural, and emotional aspects. Commonalities and differences between conditional promises and threats on various levels were examined in two experiments. The first shows that both types of inducements are understood as being complementary on the linguistic level, but not reversible, due to the specific temporal order of their actions. In addition, it gives a first assessment of emotional reactions. The second experiment investigated the novel question of whether complementary promises and threats, despite semantic differences, both imply an obligation to cooperate on the deontic level. The data corroborate this hypothesis, and they support various appraisal-theoretical assumptions on the elicitation of emotions. They also reveal that content affects not only the attribution of emotions, but also the deontic interpretation.     

Coping with a changing soundscape: avoidance,adjustments and adaptations

Since the industrial age, background anthropogenic noise has become a pervasive feature of many habitable environments. This relatively recent environmental feature can be particularly challenging for organisms that use acoustic forms of communication due to its propensity for masking and decreasing the potential acoustic space of signals. Furthermore, anthropogenic noise may affect biological processes including animal interactions, physiological and behavioural responses to stimuli and cognitive development. However, animals’ cognitive abilities may enable them to cope with high levels of anthropogenic noise through learning, the employment of acoustic and behavioural flexibility as well as the use of multi-modal sensory systems. We are only just beginning to understand how neural structures, endocrine systems and behaviour are mechanistically linked in these scenarios, providing us with information we can use to mitigate deleterious effects of pervasive noise on wildlife, along with highlighting the remarkable adaptability of animals to an increasingly anthropogenic world. In this review, I will focus mainly on birds, due to the amount of literature on the topic, and survey recent advancements made in two main spheres: (1) how anthropogenic noise affects cognitive processes and (2) how cognition enables animals to cope with increasingly noisy environments. I will be highlighting current gaps in our knowledge, such as how noise might impact behavioural traits such as predation, as well as how noise causes physical damage to neurotransmitters and affects stress levels, in order to direct future studies on this topic.     

Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition

Recent debate in metaethics over evolutionary debunking arguments against morality has shown a tendency to abstract away from relevant empirical detail. Here, I engage the debate about Darwinian debunking of morality with relevant empirical issues. I present four conditions that must be met in order for it to be reasonable to expect an evolved cognitive faculty to be reliable: the environment, information, error, and tracking conditions. I then argue that these conditions are not met in the case of our evolved faculty for moral judgement.     

Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: the concept of a retributive policy

ABSTRACT The primary aim of the paper is to apply the concept of retribution to nuclear defence policy. Nuclear defence policy, as I conceive it, is concerned with addressing the threat Soviet nuclear weapons pose for Western security. I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, MAD is not a retributive doctrine—that in fact it violates two constitutive principles of retribution: culpability and proportionality. After explicating these constitutive principles, I apply them to retaliatory strategy—showing that the culpability criterion restricts retaliation to the agents of aggression while the proportionality criterion requires a just measure of retaliation. The result is a defence policy continuous with the just war tradition—one which rules out deterrence based on threats against the civilian population. I show why a retributive policy requires non-nuclear forces and discuss the feasiblity of replacing all nuclear forces with conventional weapons. I anticipate and answer major objections to the denuclearization of U.S. and NATO forces. Finally, I conclude that an advocate of a retributive policy—specifically, a policy calling for a proportional or measured response against combatants only—must be willing, in the name of justice, to accept the risk of making war more thinkable by making it less horrible.