佛教之中国化与全球化略说——写于中国佛教两千年之际

释尊一代时教，发源于印度，大盛于中国。二千五百年前，释尊于印度菩提伽耶菩提树下睹明星而悟道、起教说法，所悟者乃宇宙人生缘起性空之实相，所说者乃四谛、八正道、十二因缘之诸法。宇宙人生之实相乃通乎法界之真实，四谛、八正道、十二因缘诸法乃一切生命之谛理。故...     

佛学空性思想的哲学意蕴及社会价值

佛教是我国传统文化的一个有机组成部分,它的基本思想是：“空性是诸法（宇宙的一切事物和现象）实相,缘起法则起,缘散法则散”,不同事物的实相在空性系统中是有区别的。修行者在空除一切执著的实践中体认了诸法的实相,就有了“空慧”的思想和“无我慧”的世界观。这是一种对世间人生观的超越,他慈悲喜舍,营建人间充满仁爱的言、行、精神,是建设和谐社会的促进力量。     

呼唤圆教的时代

一、前言天台宗的根本思想就是圆教思想。因此,天台宗的伟大,也就在于圆教思想的伟大!而圆教思想的核心,则是"诸法实相论",这个"诸法实相"的提出,见于《妙法莲华经》(简称《法华经》)卷一的〈方便品〉第二,所以《法华经》也就成为天台宗建立宗派的根本依据。天台宗的圆教思想就是从《法华经》的"诸法实相"而来的,在整部《法华经》中,对于开示悟入诸法实相(佛之知见)的思想理论和实践方法,又作了明确的指示。     

诸法实相与无性法性:从《大乘大义章》看鸠摩罗什对庐山慧远本体论思路的批判

前辈学者的研究已经指出庐山慧远对大乘般若实相的理解是一种实在的法性论。本文通过对《大乘大义章》中庐山慧远本体论思路的梳理,以及鸠摩罗什对其思想的批评,展示了本体论思路与实相论思路的各种歧异,指出两者根本的区别在于本体论执着诸法有一个实在的体性,从实在论的角度做出或有或无的独断。般若实相论否定有任何实在法性,实相是远离有无两边的中道。但是罗什的这个重要思想在当时和后世却都很少得到理解。     

老子之道与佛教空性的比较研究

对于物质世界的根本实相:老子认为是存在于天地之先的道,佛教认为是具有复杂结构的空性。老子之道与佛教的空性,客观上存在融通及相似之处,这对于促进现代科学及哲学的发展是具有积极意义的。     

佛教实相真理的哲学

实相真理是佛教的根本教理、佛法的根本契印,它形成了佛教同一切世间哲学、宗教及外道的根本区别。以“一切法皆佛法”故,我们现在所学的佛学(显教教理)都是释迦牟尼佛为随顺众生之机,巧善地以当时古印度哲学的文化背景而方便言示“离言”之佛法。末法时代,随着众生的根性渐浅而世间哲学(世智)的渐盛,多于甚深佛法上不生信解,反出疑谤,以是因缘,笔者力图随顺现代哲学之学识知见而方便浅释“实相真理”。     

智顗“三谛圆融”的学术分析

三谛圆融,是天台宗实相论的根本原理。本文追溯了南北朝的二谛义之争,从中抽绎三谛思想的理论源起,论证法华圆教里的三谛就是二谛,揭示三谛圆融的实质就是“圆融相即”,说明智顗的实相论调和了“言教”和“境理”的矛盾,达到了本体论与真理论的统一。     

印度“梵我不二”视域下的如来藏思想解析

"梵我不二"是印度宗教文化的主旨,意思是个体生命与宇宙存在的同一,佛教与婆罗门教的理论与实践都以此为方向。如来藏是最接近婆罗门教梵我论的佛教思想,但二者还是有着明显的不同。本文从如来藏思想出发,从其与宇宙万象的关系、与众生身心的关系和其所展示的修行路径三方面给予了分析对比。最后认为,或许双方对于语言能否表达实相的不同态度是造成差异的原因。A     

《金刚般若波罗蜜经》新讲(三)

(25) 世尊,若复有人得闻是经,信心清净,则生实相,当知是人成就第一希有功德。世尊,是实相者则是非相,是故如来说名实相。此段表出般若空宗的一个最重要的概念,即般若实相。一切有为法相千差万殊,但都是不真实的,最真实的是实相。实相一相,无分别相,也可以说它是无相的。它不能用语言论证,不能藉理性推求。但若奉持《金刚经》信心清净,从清净心中可以生出实相,心生实相亦即证菩提而成佛果。     

怎样突破凡圣关(二)

二、实相观心——真如观实相观心,即是对真如本心的参悟,应即真如观。它是宗门灯灯相传,代代沿用的禅法。因为它是识自本心的善巧方便,所以欲见性成佛者,必须依此法参修。然复当知实相观心,实际上就是不断深入悟解实相,从悟解实相的名义开始,进而深入到它的实质,再进而从体、相、用各方面去悟解其全     

The scientific turn in metaphysics: a factualist approach

In a recent paper, Cumpa (Am Philos Q 51(4): 319–324, 2014) argues that a scientific turn in metaphysics requires the acceptance of a materialist criterion of fundamentality, according to which the most fundamental metaphysical category is the one that provides us with a reconciliation of the ordinary world and the physical universe. He concludes that the dominant category of substance cannot be the most fundamental category, for it does not satisfy this criterion of fundamentality. The most fundamental category is instead the category of fact. Although convincing, the defense of factualism over substantialism offered by Cumpa takes into account the case of classical physics without considering the physical universe of quantum mechanics. My aim in this paper is to offer a completion to Cumpa’s factualist approach. To achieve my aim, I show that substances cannot provide a satisfactory account of the relationship between the ordinary world and the physical universe even in the case of quantum mechanics, whereas a factualist approach does.

     

Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

The inference from determinism to predictability, though intuitively plausible, needs to be qualified in an important respect. We need to distinguish between two different kinds of predictability. On the one hand, determinism implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe. Yet, on the other hand, embedded predictability as the possibility for an embedded subsystem in the universe to make such predictions, does not obtain in a deterministic universe. By revitalizing an older result—the paradox of predictability—we demonstrate that, even in a deterministic universe, there are fundamental, non-epistemic limitations on the ability of one subsystem embedded in the universe to predict the future behaviour of other subsystems embedded in the same universe. As an explanation, we put forward the hypothesis that these limitations arise because the predictions themselves are physical events which are part of the law-like causal chain of events in the deterministic universe. While the limitations on embedded predictability cannot in any direct way show evidence of free human agency, we conjecture that, even in a deterministic universe, human agents have a take-it-or-leave-it control over revealed predictions of their future behaviour.     

Evil,fine-tuning and the creation of the universe

Could God have created a better universe? Well, the fundamental scientific laws and parameters of the universe have to be within a certain miniscule range, for a life-sustaining universe to develop: the universe must be ‘Fine Tuned’. Therefore the ‘embryonic universe’ that came into existence with the ‘big bang’ had to be either exactly as it was or within a certain tiny range, for there to develop a life-sustaining universe. If it is better that there exist a life-sustaining universe than not, then it was better that the embryonic universe was one of this small set of very similar embryonic universes than that it was not. Furthermore, there are no firm grounds for claiming that of this small set of very similar embryonic universes, there is one which would have developed into a universe better than ours. Therefore there are no firm grounds for claiming that God could have created a better universe than ours.     

Universal Regularities And Initial Conditions In Newtonian Physics

The Newtonian universe is usually understood to contain two classes of causal factors: universal regularitiesand initial conditions. I demonstrate that,in fact, the Newtonian universe contains no causal factors other thanuniversal regularities: the initial conditions ofany physical system are merely theconsequence of universal regularities acting on previoussystems. It follows that aNewtonian universe lacks the degree of contingency that is usually attributed to it. This is a necessary precondition for maintaining that the Newtonian universe is a block universe that exhibits no temporal development. It follows also that Newtonian physics is inconsistent, since a Newtonian universe as a whole exhibits some properties – such as the total mass of the universe – that are not determined by the laws of Newtonian physics, and that must therefore be considered contingent.     

Laws of Nature Don't Have Ceteris Paribus Clauses,They Are Ceteris Paribus Clauses

Laws of nature are properly (if controversially) conceived as abstract entities playing a governing role in the physical universe. Dispositionalists typically hold that laws of nature are not real, or at least are not fundamental, and that regularities in the physical universe are grounded in the causal powers of objects. By contrast, I argue that dispositionalism implies nomic realism: since at least some dispositions have ceteris paribus clauses incorporating uninstantiated universals, and these ceteris paribus clauses help to determine their dispositions' ranges of manifestation, there are indeed abstracta which play a governing role in the physical universe. After addressing several objections (including the objection that such ‘laws’ lack sufficient independence/externality from the dispositions to count as genuinely governing), I go on to consider some broader implications of this conclusion for other debates in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. ¹      

Explaining and Explaining Away in Cosmology and Theology

Modern cosmology raises two significant questions that potentially relate to theology: does the universe have a beginning, and why is the universe so apparently fine tuned for life? In a significant paper, Mark McCartney and David Glass ask whether science can explain away, or at least explain away in part, such features of the universe in cosmology and other sciences that may alternatively invite a theological explanation. In this paper I argue that two proposals made by cosmologists fail to explain away the universe's beginning, and that science is powerless to explain away the more fundamental question as to why there is a universe at all. I argue similarly that scientific, or quasi-scientific, proposals such as the multiverse fail to explain away the fine tuning.     

Problems With the Argument From Fine Tuning

The argument from fine tuning is supposed to establish the existence of God from the fact that the evolution of carbon-based life requires the laws of physics and the boundary conditions of the universe to be more or less as they are. We demonstrate that this argument fails. In particular, we focus on problems associated with the role probabilities play in the argument. We show that, even granting the fine tuning of the universe, it does not follow that the universe is improbable, thus no explanation of the fine tuning, theistic or otherwise, is required.     

A MODERN LOOK AT THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE

Abstract. In what follows, I review the modern theory of the origin of the universe as astronomers and physicists are coming to understand it during the last decades of the twentieth century. An unexpected discovery of this study is that the story of "cosmogenesis" cannot be completely told unless we understand the fundamental nature of matter, space, and time. In the context of modern cosmology space has become not only the bedrock (so to speak) of our physical existence, it may yield a fuller understanding of the universe itself.     

Evolutionary Biology and Classical Teleological Arguments for God's Existence

Much has been made of how Darwinian thinking destroyed proofs for the existence of God from ‘design’ in the universe. I challenge that prevailing view by looking closely at classical ‘teleological’ arguments for the existence of God. One version championed by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas stems from how chance is not a sufficient kind of ultimate explanation of the universe. In the course of constructing this argument, I argue that the classical understanding of teleology is no less necessary in modern Darwinian biology than it was in Aristotle's time. In fact, modern biology strengthens the claims that teleological arguments make by vindicating many of their key features. As a consequence, I show how Aristotle and Aquinas' teleological argument for an intelligent First Cause remains valid.