Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga

We (2013, 2014) argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr(H | O & E) = Pr(H | O). We defended this screening-off thesis (SOT) by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga (Philos Sci, forthcoming) argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”.     

Consequence Mining

The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation \(\Rightarrow_X\). We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, and (b) is an inverse to—more precisely, forms a Galois connection with—the Bolzano–Tarski function.     

Contextual-Hierarchical Reconstructions of the Strengthened Liar Problem

In this paper we shall introduce two types of contextual-hierarchical (from now on abbreviated by ‘ch’) approaches to the strengthened liar problem. These approaches, which we call the ‘standard’ and the ‘alternative’ ch-reconstructions of the strengthened liar problem, differ in their philosophical view regarding the nature of truth and the relation between the truth predicates T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ of different hierarchy-levels. The basic idea of the standard ch-reconstruction is that the T r ⁿ⁺¹-schema should hold for all sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\). In contrast, the alternative ch-reconstruction, for which we shall argue in section four, is motivated by the idea that T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹ are coherent in the sense that the same sentences of \(\mathcal {L}^{n}\) should be true according to T r ⁿ and T r ⁿ⁺¹. We show that instances of the standard ch-reconstruction can be obtained by iterating Kripke’s strong Kleene jump operator. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how instances of the alternative ch-reconstruction can be obtained by a slight modification of the iterated axiom system KF and of the iterated strong Kleene jump operator.     

Obligation as Optimal Goal Satisfaction

Formalising deontic concepts, such as obligation, prohibition and permission, is normally carried out in a modal logic with a possible world semantics, in which some worlds are better than others. The main focus in these logics is on inferring logical consequences, for example inferring that the obligation O q is a logical consequence of the obligations O p and O (p → q). In this paper we propose a non-modal approach in which obligations are preferred ways of satisfying goals expressed in first-order logic. To say that p is obligatory, but may be violated, resulting in a less than ideal situation s, means that the task is to satisfy the goal p ∨ s, and that models in which p is true are preferred to models in which s is true. Whereas, in modal logic, the preference relation between possible worlds is part of the semantics of the logic, in this non-modal approach, the preference relation between first-order models is external to the logic. Although our main focus is on satisfying goals, we also formulate a notion of logical consequence, which is comparable to the notion of logical consequence in modal deontic logic. In this formalisation, an obligation O p is a logical consequence of goals G, when p is true in all best models of G. We show how this non-modal approach to the treatment of deontic concepts deals with problems of contrary-to-duty obligations and normative conflicts, and argue that the approach is useful for many other applications, including abductive explanations, defeasible reasoning, combinatorial optimisation, and reactive systems of the production system variety.     

Spatial term apprehension with a reference object’s rotation in three-dimensional space

It has been reported that the overall shapes of spatial categorical patterns of projective spatial terms such as above and below are not influenced by the rotation of a reference object on a two-dimensional (2D) upright plane. However, is this also true in three-dimensional (3D) space? This study shows the dynamic aspects of the apprehension of projective spatial terms in 3D space by detailing how the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front influences the apprehension of projective spatial terms on a level plane by mapping their spatial categorical patterns. The experiment was designed to examine how spatial categorical patterns on a level plane changed with the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front in 3D computer graphics space. We manipulated the rotation of a reference object with an inherent front at three levels (0°, 90°, and 180° rotations) and examined how such manipulation changed the overall spatial categorical patterns of four basic Japanese projective spatial terms: mae, ushiro, hidari, and migi (similar to in front of, behind, to the left of, and to the right of in English, respectively). The results show that spatial term apprehension was affected by the rotation of the reference object in 3D space. In particular, rotation influenced the mae–ushiro and hidari–migi systems differently. The results also imply that our understanding of projective spatial terms on a level plane in 3D space is affected dynamically by visual information from 3D cues.     

Determination of the number of independent parameters of a score matrix from the examination of rank orders

Two ordinal consequences are drawn from the linear multiple-factor analysis model. First, the numberR(s, d) of distinct ways in whichs subjects can be ranked by linear functions ofd factors is limited by the recursive expressionR(s, d)=R(s?1,d)+(s?1)R(s?1,d?1). Second, every setS ofd+2 subjects can be separated into two subsetsS* andS ? S* such that no linear function ofd variables can rank allS* over allS ? S*, and vice versa. When these results are applied to the hypothetical data of Thurstone's “box problem,” three independent parameters are found. Relations to Thurstone's suggestion for a non-correlational factor analysis are discussed.     

An aftereffect in judgment of auditory duration

Two experiments were designed to investigate the occurrence of atemporal aftereffect following auditory spatial stimulation. The task required Ss to compare by means of a motorresponse the duration of a test tone presented at a variable interval after stimulation with a standard tone. In both experiments the posttest duration was underestimated relative to the pretest duration, i.e., there was a temporal aftereffect(TAE). A control experiment which involved Ss making estimates of the duration of the test tones, without the presentation of interpolated standard tones, did not show this effect. The temporal aftereffect followed a function analogous to the “distance paradox” forspatial aftereffects.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

Measuring discriminability when there are multiple sources of bias

Performance measures such as log d and d′?aim to measure stimulus discriminability independently of response bias in conditional discrimination tasks, including the yes/no signal-detection procedure. However, they assume only one dimension of bias (e.g., response color) and do not account for bias on additional dimensions (e.g., response side). Such bias reduces log d, thus violating the statistical independence of discriminability and bias measurements. We modified log d to account for side bias and reanalyzed previous side-biased data. With strong side bias, the modified log d differed enough from the standard log d to potentially alter the conclusions of an experiment. Simulations showed that the modified log d produces discriminability estimates that are more accurate and bias-independent than the standard log d calculation.     

Individual Differences in Mood Changes

The study explores the influence of individual tendencies toward mood improvement/deterioration and the Big Five personality traits on mood changes. Participants (218 students) completed NEO-FFI and The Mood Regulation Scales. Based on the within-person structure of individual tendencies toward mood improvement/deterioration four mood regulative types were distinguished (increasing, decreasing, hot and cool type). In the experimental stage participants were randomly assigned to one of four group conditions created by experimental factors: (1) induced mood (positive/negative), and (2) the level of cognitive loading (easy/hard condition). Direct (Mood Adjective Check List) and indirect (emotional version of Lexical Decision Task) measurements were used to assess mood changes. The results showed different patterns of mood changes for increasing and decreasing regulative types. Those differences were visible especially in the positive mood regulation. While the decreasing type decreased the induced positive mood, the increasing type was characterized by mood changes manifested in energetic arousal increase and tense reduction. Moreover, high Neuroticism and low Extraversion in the decreasing type contributed to a negative mood increment manifested in reduction of energetic arousal. The same effect was revealed for high Conscientiousness for the increasing type. The results are discussed in the context of psychological status of mood regulation strategies (automatic/controlled) and with reference to previous research in this area.     

Mixed Feelings About Mixed Solutions

The numbers problem concerns the question of what is the right thing to do in trade-off cases where one can save different non-overlapping groups of persons, but not everyone. Proponents of mixed solutions argue that both saving the many and holding a lottery to determine whom to save can each be morally right in such cases, depending on the relative sizes of the groups involved. In his book The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson presents an ingenious version of such an approach that avoids a commitment to interpersonal value aggregation, which is highly controversial and rejected by many philosophers for a number of reasons. I criticise Peterson’s proposal by first arguing that it cannot account for the idea that holding a lottery is morally wrong if differences in numbers are very large, and by second pointing out that it relies on implausible assumptions about what is good for an individual. Given the shortcomings of Peterson’s non-aggregationist version of a mixed solution, I next address the issue of how problematic a commitment to interpersonal aggregation really is. To this end, I present an aggregationist version of a mixed solution that is reason-based and bypasses most standard objections to interpersonal value aggregation. I conclude that although there is reason to be optimistic, it remains to be seen whether a mixed solution can be worked out in a fully satisfying way.     

The location-, word-, and arrow-based Simon effects: An ex-Gaussian analysis

Task-irrelevant spatial information, conveyed by stimulus location, location word, or arrow direction, can influence the response to task-relevant attributes, generating the location-, word-, and arrow-based Simon effects. We examined whether different mechanisms are involved in the generation of these Simon effects by fitting a mathematical ex-Gaussian function to empirical response time (RT) distributions. Specifically, we tested whether which ex-Gaussian parameters (μ, σ, and τ) show Simon effects and whether the location-, word, and arrow-based effects are on different parameters. Results show that the location-based Simon effect occurred on mean RT and μ but not on τ, and a reverse Simon effect occurred on σ. In contrast, a positive word-based Simon effect was obtained on all these measures (including σ), and a positive arrow-based Simon effect was evident on mean RT, σ, and τ but not μ. The arrow-based Simon effect was not different from the word-based Simon effect on τ or σ but was on μ and mean RT. These distinct results on mean RT and ex-Gaussian parameters provide evidence that spatial information conveyed by the various location modes are different in the time-course of activation.     

Childhood and Adulthood Socioeconomic Statuses in Relation to Union Interest: Exploratory Surface Relationships

Using response surface methodology for exploratory data, we examined the linear and nonlinear surface relationships between no mobility and mobility in reference to union interest defined by willingness to join a labor union. Analyses were conducted on survey data collected from U.S. nonunion employees (N?=?1,010) who indicated their socioeconomic status (SES) in childhood and adulthood in reference to social class, education, and English language/literacy (e.g., language/literacy during childhood, language/literacy now). Surface relationships were mostly linear. For example, among status indicators, a linear surface was found for employees whose childhood and adulthood language/literacy were the same (no mobility): Lower status nonmobile employees showed more union interest than higher status nonmobile employees. In contrast, a nonlinear surface was found for employees whose childhood and adulthood language/literacy were not the same (mobility): Upwardly mobile employees showed less union interest than downwardly mobile employees showed more interest. Details of the surface relationships and future modeling of the relationships in terms of mediational processes are discussed.     

Efficient estimation of Weber’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">W</Emphasis>

Many studies rely on estimation of Weber ratios (W) in order to quantify the acuity an individual’s approximate number system. This paper discusses several problems encountered in estimating W using the standard methods, most notably low power and inefficiency. Through simulation, this work shows that W can best be estimated in a Bayesian framework that uses an inverse (1/W) prior. This beneficially balances a bias/variance trade-off and, when used with MAP estimation is extremely simple to implement. Use of this scheme substantially improves statistical power in examining correlates of W.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Wh</Emphasis>-Questions,Universal Statements and Free Choice Inferences in Child Mandarin

This study investigated 5-year-old Mandarin-speaking children’s comprehension of wh-questions, universal statements and free choice inferences. Previous research has found that Mandarin-speaking children assign a universal interpretation to sentences with a wh-word (e.g., shei ‘who’) followed by the adverbial quantifier dou ‘all’ (Zhou in Appl Psycholinguist 36:411–435, 2013). Children also compute free choice inferences in sentences that contain a modal verb in addition to a wh-word and dou (Zhou, in: Nakayama, Su, Huang (eds.) Studies in Chinese and Japanese language acquisition: in honour of Stephen Crain. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp 223–235, 2017). The present study used a Question-Statement Task to assess children’s interpretation of sentences containing shei + dou, both with and without the modal verb beiyunxu ‘was allowed to’, as well as the contrast between sentences with shei + dou, which are statements for adults, versus ones with dou + shei, which are wh-questions for adults. The 5-year-old Mandarin-speaking child participants exhibited adult-like linguistic knowledge of the semantics and pragmatics of wh-words, the adverbial quantifier dou, and the deontic modal verb beiyunxu.     

Subjunctive Conditional Probability

There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P(B//A) be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P(B//A) equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. On the other hand, I argue that even if we can equate P(B//A) with P(A □→B), we still need an account of how subjunctive conditional probabilities are related to unconditional probabilities. The triviality arguments reveal that the connection is not as straightforward as one might have hoped.     

Grounding and the explanatory role of generalizations

According to Hempel’s (Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays. The Free Press, New York, 1965) influential theory of explanation, explaining why some a is G consists in showing that the truth that a is G follows from a law-like generalization to the effect that all Fs are G together with the initial condition that a is F. While Hempel’s overall account is now widely considered to be deeply flawed, the idea that some generalizations play the explanatory role that the account predicts is still often endorsed by contemporary philosophers of science. This idea, however, conflicts with widely shared views in metaphysics according to which the generalization that all Fs are G is partially explained by the fact that a is G. I discuss two solutions to this conflict that have been proposed recently, argue that they are unsatisfactory, and offer an alternative.     

Intentionalism,defeasibility, and justification

According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).     

The Foot-Reading Cult of Japan

Ho-no-Hana-Sanpogyo was a Japanese new religious movement referred to as the “foot-reading cult” in the media. Its founder, Fukunaga Hogen, claimed to have divine authority and the ability to diagnose physical illness by studying the soles of an individual’s feet. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the history of Ho-no-Hana-Sanpogyo and Fukunaga’s practice of foot reading.     

Gesture as representational action: A paper about function

A great deal of attention has recently been paid to gesture and its effects on thinking and learning. It is well established that the hand movements that accompany speech are an integral part of communication, ubiquitous across cultures, and a unique feature of human behavior. In an attempt to understand this intriguing phenomenon, researchers have focused on pinpointing the mechanisms that underlie gesture production. One proposal––that gesture arises from simulated action (Hostetter & Alibali Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 495–514, 2008)––has opened up discussions about action, gesture, and the relation between the two. However, there is another side to understanding a phenomenon and that is to understand its function. A phenomenon’s function is its purpose rather than its precipitating cause––the why rather than the how. This paper sets forth a theoretical framework for exploring why gesture serves the functions that it does, and reviews where the current literature fits, and fails to fit, this proposal. Our framework proposes that whether or not gesture is simulated action in terms of its mechanism––it is clearly not reducible to action in terms of its function. Most notably, because gestures are abstracted representations and are not actions tied to particular events and objects, they can play a powerful role in thinking and learning beyond the particular, specifically, in supporting generalization and transfer of knowledge.