Regression effect in psychophysical judgment

Psychophysical judgment, like all other kinds of judgment, involves a matching or equating of two different domains. When the judgment involves the mate hing of values on two perceptual continua, the observer tends, on the average, to constrict the range of his adjustments on whichever variable is placed under his control. When the observer adjusts each variable in turn, two different regression lines are produced. This regression effect presumably occurs whenever the results of the matching judgments yield less than a perfect correlation. Illustrative examples are given for the continua, loudness, vibration, brightness, and duration.     

The need for process research on psychophysical judgment: comments on "Ratio and subtractive processes in psychophysical judgment" by Veit

This article is a commentary on Veit's article "Ratio and Subtractive Processes in Psychophysical Judgment." Veit's article makes an important contribution to the area of psychophysical judgment by providing a systematic approach that combines measurement and psychological theory. Using multi-factor designs and a cross-task scale-invariance criterion, Veit shows how to concurrently examine the integration rule, response-transformation function, and psychophysical function for judgment tasks. The need to expand this methodology to further understand the operations and processes underlying psychophysical judgment is stressed in the present article, and an illustration involving feedback mechanisms is provided.     

Two models for psychophysical judgment: Scale invariance with changes in stimulus range

Two scaling models are investigated, each of which includes parameters which reflect variation in the use of judgmental categories. In one model, response categories are represented as successive intervals on an underlying sensory continuum. In the other, they are represented as points. Psychophysical scales based upon either of these models are invariant up to a linear transformation when the range of stimulus magnitudes is manipulated. Successive intervals scale values obtained from magnitude estimates are also linearly invariant with changes in stimulus range. Similarities in the proximity functions for the two judgment models are examined.     

Metacognition in psychophysical judgment: An unfolding view of comparative judgments of mental workload

An experiment is reported in which it was found that when subjects were required to indicate which of two visual extents was more difficult to categorize as “long” or “short,” they executed these categorizations and then measured the distance of the representation of each stimulus from the long-short category boundary; the stimulus nearer the boundary was judged to be the more difficult. When they were requested to indicate which was easier to categorize, they selected the alternative that was farther. Coombs’s theory of data (1952, 1964) and his unfolding theory of preferential choice (1950, 1964) provided the conceptualization of metacognition in this psychophysical task context. Strong support for the probabilisitic version of unfolding theory was obtained from the observed selective effects of laterality on the levels of stochastic transitivity attained for various classes of triples and the reliably longer times for comparisons with bilateral pairs than with unilateral pairs. The semantic congruity effects obtained, together with the changes in the form of the relationship between probability and response time as a function of practice, can be best accounted for by an evidence accrual theory in which the distances from the active reference point are measured and compared with a criterion on each evidence accrual. No support is provided for the view that propositionally based semantic “ease”- “difficulty” codes serve as the basis for these metacognitive comparative judgments of ease and difficulty.     

Metacognition in psychophysical judgment: an unfolding view of comparative judgments of mental workload.

An experiment is reported in which it was found that when subjects were required to indicate which of two visual extents was more difficult to categorize as "long" or "short," they executed these categorizations and then measured the distance of the representation of each stimulus from the long-short category boundary; the stimulus nearer the boundary was judged to be the more difficult. When they were requested to indicate which was easier to categorize, they selected the alternative that was farther. Coombs's theory of data (1952, 1964) and his unfolding theory of preferential choice (1950, 1964) provided the conceptualization of metacognition in this psychophysical task context. Strong support for the probabilistic version of unfolding theory was obtained from the observed selective effects of laterality on the levels of stochastic transitivity attained for various classes of triples and the reliably longer times for comparisons with bilateral pairs than with unilateral pairs. The semantic congruity effects obtained, together with the changes in the form of the relationship between probability and response time as a function of practice, can be best accounted for by an evidence accrual theory in which the distances from the active reference point are measured and compared with a criterion on each evidence accrual. No support is provided for the view that propositionally based semantic "ease"-"difficulty" codes serve as the basis for these metacognitive comparative judgments of ease and difficulty.     

The revelation effect in frequency judgment

In three experiments, we explored the revelation effect in a frequency judgment task. Participants estimated the frequency of words that had been presented one, two, four, or eight times. At test, half the words were revealed by completing word fragments, and half were presented intact. Estimated frequencies were reliably higher for revealed than for intact words, and in two of the three experiments, the revelation effect became larger as actual frequency increased. A revelation effect was obtained whether the revealed word was the same as (Experiment 1) or different from (Experiment 2) the word judged for frequency. Frequency estimates were higher for more distorted test items (Experiment 3).     

The dud-alternative effect in likelihood judgment

The judged likelihood of a focal outcome should generally decrease as the list of alternative possibilities increases. For example, the likelihood that a runner will win a race goes down when 2 new entries are added to the field. However, 6 experiments demonstrate that the presence of implausible alternatives (duds) often increases the judged likelihood of a focal outcome. This dud-alternative effect was detected for judgments involving uncertainty about trivia facts and stochastic events. Nonnumeric likelihood measures and betting measures reliably detected the effect, but numeric likelihood measures did not. Time pressure increased the magnitude of the effect. The results were consistent with a contrast-effect account: The inclusion of duds increases the perceived strength of the evidence for the focal outcome, thereby affecting its judged likelihood.     

决策与判断中的分解效应

分解效应是人类主观判断中的一种较稳固的行为偏差,并且判断结果会对随后的决策产生重要影响,因此,对该领域研究成果的全面梳理具有重要的理论意义和实际价值。本文主要介绍了支持理论中的分解效应,总结梳理了概率判断与时间判断中分解效应的研究,综述了其他社会判断中的分解效应研究成果,展望了决策与判断中的分解效应的未来研究方向。通过上述内容的阐述,希望能为该领域研究者提供新的思路,推动国内相关领域研究的发展。     

On the psychophysical law and estimation procedures in psychophysical scaling

A general formulation of the power law is presented which has two special features: (1) negative exponents are admissible; and (2) the log law is a special limiting case. Estimation procedures, which provide joint estimates of the exponent and the absolute threshold, are derived for the direct ratio scaling methods. A solution is provided for theaveraging problem for ratio production and bisection scaling, two methods generating observations on the physical scale, and Monte Carlo methods are used to evaluate the resulting estimators.     

The effect of the induction of involvement on psychophysical judgments

The present investigation was based on the concept of invariance, which holds that identical principles govern the judgment of stimuli arrayed on both physically and socially defined scales. Two experiments were conducted in which involvement was manipulated through the use of instructions presented in conjunction with category judgments obtained in a training session. This was followed by an anchor session. Experiment 1 employed a series of weights as stimuli, while Experiment 2 used random pattern dot slides. The experiments were similar, except for the inclusion of two additional features in the weight study. These were: (1) positive feedback, introduced as an independent variable between the judgment sessions and tested for its effect as an enhancer of involvement; and (2) two stimuli in the anchor session not part of the original stimulus series. These weights provided a test for the generality of involvement set. Among various hypotheses tested in both studies was the expectancy that the introduction of involvement associated with the formation of a judgment scale would lessen the impact of an anchor on judgment. This expectancy was based on the observed effects of involvement in social judgment contexts. Results of both experiments supported the judgment maintenance hypothesis.     

Applicability increases the effect of misattribution on judgment

Feelings and cognitions influence judgment through attribution. For instance, the attribution of positive feelings and cognitions to a stimulus leads to a positive judgment of that stimulus. We examined whether misattribution is moderated by the applicability of a distractor to the judgment question. For instance, when are people more likely to attribute to a target person the affective and cognitive experiences triggered by a kitten – when trying to judge the person’s cuteness or trustworthiness? The kitten triggers experiences specifically relevant to cuteness, but people might more easily suspect the kitten’s potential influence when judging cuteness rather than trustworthiness. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure, we found that applicability increases the effect of misattribution on valenced judgments. The results emphasise the importance of specific information (rather than only general valence) in attribution and suggest that high applicability of distractors to the judgment question does not elicit effective correction.     

On psychophysical parallelism

O paralelizmie psychofizycznym,Kwartalnik Filozoficzny [Philosophical Quarterly] 14, 1937, 3–20.     

The effect of attribute order on judgment in Chinese and English

The authors found that the order of attribute presentation had a stronger effect on judgment in English than in Chinese. In Experiment 1, with a sample of 102 female and 63 male bilingual Singaporeans, the authors found that participants' memory-based judgments showed a stronger primacy effect in English than in Chinese that was mediated by recall from long-term memory. In contrast, participants' online (immediate) judgments showed a primacy effect in both languages that was unmediated by recall from short-term memory. In Experiment 2, with a sample of 67 female and 53 male bilingual Singaporeans, the authors found that participants' online judgments were more influenced by the attribute order of a previously seen competitive advertisement in English than in Chinese. A cross-cultural field study in Mainland China and the United Kingdom provided external validity for the experimental results.