敦煌变文疑难俗语词考释

本文运用排比归纳、文献与方言互证等方法,考释了敦煌变文中"度意"、"度行坛"、"度我他人"、"傍行檀"、"旁箕"等五条疑难俗语词。这些俗语词有的始见于唐代,有的还活在现代方言中。本文或抉发其古义,或辨正其旧说,或探明其语源,对有关俗文学作品的解读、古籍整理以及大型辞书的编撰和修订都有所裨益。     

《真诰》词语补释

六朝道教典籍《真诰》使用了口语、俗语,其用语较有特点,学界多有讨论。但由于道教文献的特殊性,其中对某些语词的讨论尚欠深入,仍有可商之处,本文即对"不授"、"盛"、"建"三个语词的含义进行了考释。     

《太平经》语词释读献疑

《太平经》是中国道教的一部经籍,因文本的艰深晦涩,有些语词的训释各注本仍存在一定的分歧,有些词语的意义不为人所熟知,今择取数例略作阐发。     

Propositions, Sets, and Worlds

If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal. I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006.     

Incredible Worlds, Credible Results

Robert Sugden argues that robustness analysis cannot play an epistemic role in grounding model-world relationships because the procedure is only a matter of comparing models with each other. We posit that this argument is based on a view of models as being surrogate systems in too literal a sense. In contrast, the epistemic importance of robustness analysis is easy to explicate if modelling is viewed as extended cognition, as inference from assumptions to conclusions. Robustness analysis is about assessing the reliability of our extended inferences, and when our confidence in these inferences changes, so does our confidence in the results. Furthermore, we argue that Sugden’s inductive account relies tacitly on robustness considerations.

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Worlds,Capabilities and Well-Being

Critics suggest that without some “objective” account of well-being we cannot explain why satisfying some preferences is, as we believe, better than satisfying others, why satisfying some preferences may leave us on net worse off or why, in a range of cases, we should reject life-adjustment in favor of life-improvement. I defend a subjective welfarist understanding of well-being against such objections by reconstructing the Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a preferentist account of well-being. According to the proposed account preference satisfaction alone—possible as well as actual—is of value. States of affairs contribute to well-being because and to the extent that they satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences, and are fruitful, that is, compatible with a range states that satisfy further actual or nearby possible preferences. The proposed account solves the problem of adaptive preference. Individuals whose preferences are “deformed” are satisfied with fruitless states of affairs, which constrain their options so that they are incapable of satisfying a wide range of nearby possible preferences—preferences they “could easily have had.” Recognizing the value of capabilities as well as actual attainments allows us to explain why individuals who satisfy “deformed” or perverse preferences may not on net benefit from doing so. More fundamentally, it explains why some states are, as Sen suggests, bad, awful or gruesome while others are good, excellent or superb without appeal to any objective account of value.     

Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mechanisms

This paper asks how, in science in general and in economics in particular, theoretical models aid the understanding of real-world phenomena. Using specific models in economics and biology as test cases, it considers three alternative answers: that models are tools for isolating the ‘capacities’ of causal factors in the real world; that modelling is ‘conceptual exploration’ which ultimately contributes to the development of genuinely explanatory theories; and that models are credible counterfactual worlds from which inductive inferences can be made. The paper argues that the ‘credible worlds’ account captures significant aspects of scientific practice, even if many modellers see their work as conceptual exploration.

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Mind,Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds

The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation). On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different worlds. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Impossible Worlds

Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds‐based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds‐based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far from it. I'll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out, requires novel metaphysical resources.     

英文词、汉字词、早期文字和图画的认知加工比较

采用四种任务考察英文词、汉字词、甲骨文、东巴文和图画在知觉加工和语言加工中的特点, 揭示不同类型符号的认知机制。实验1采用知觉相似度判断和语义一致性判断考察符号在知觉加工和语义加工中的特点; 实验2考察符号在命名与分类中的表现。结果表明：(1)不同类型符号在知觉相似度判断和语义一致性判断中表现不同。符号相似的顺序与文字演化的顺序一致。(2)不同类型符号的命名与分类反应具有不对称性：英文词和汉字词的命名快于分类, 甲骨文、东巴文和图画的分类快于命名。(3)无论是命名还是分类, 对汉字词和图画的反应均快于对东巴文和甲骨文的反应。对英文词命名快于对甲骨文和东巴文命名, 对英文词分类慢于对东巴文分类。(4)英文词、汉字词和图画的命名与分类反应具有不对称性：对英文词、汉字词命名快于对图画命名, 对图画分类快于对英文词、汉字词分类。甲骨文和东巴文的命名与分类反应具有不对称性：对甲骨文命名快于对东巴文命名, 对东巴文分类快于对甲骨文分类。所以如此, 既与符号的外形特征和区别性特征有关, 又与符号记录语言的方式以及对符号的熟悉度有关。研究结果为确定文字发展和演变的规律及甲骨文与东巴文的性质提供了心理学依据。     

Assumptive Worlds,Self-Definition,and Striving Among Women

It is clear that we all have beliefs about the social world and how it works that we rely on as we make sense of and negotiate within that world. Although the importance of assumptions about ourselves and the world has been demonstrated in relation to crisis and trauma, their relevance to more proactive activities such as goal striving has not yet been established. To do this, I first present a conceptual framework and then offer (a) a profile of women's vulnerability-related assumptive worlds, (b) correlations of these assumptive worlds and identification with four societal reference groups (political orientation, religion, gender, cultural identity), and (c) regression data concerning the combined and unique ability of social referents and assumptive worlds to explain goal striving. I conclude by discussing implications for empowerment goals in work with women as well as future research.