Modeling dynamic inconsistency with a changing reference point

A rational principle of decision making called dynamic consistency was tested by presenting decision makers with a sequence of two gambles. The first gamble was obligatory. Before playing the first gamble, participants were asked to make a planned choice as to whether they would take the second gamble. After experiencing the actual results of the first gamble, decision makers were asked to make a final choice regarding the second gamble. Dynamic consistency requires agreement between the planned and final choices. Violations of dynamic consistency were observed, e.g. anticipating a gain in the first gamble, decision makers planned to take the second gamble; after experiencing the gain, they changed their minds and rejected the second gamble. Two models of dynamic inconsistency were compared. One assumes that experience shifts the reference point and changes the utility associated with the gamble; another assumes that experience changes the subjective probability associated with the gamble. The reference point model provided the best account for the findings. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eye Movements in Risky Choice

We asked participants to make simple risky choices while we recorded their eye movements. We built a complete statistical model of the eye movements and found very little systematic variation in eye movements over the time course of a choice or across the different choices. The only exceptions were finding more (of the same) eye movements when choice options were similar, and an emerging gaze bias in which people looked more at the gamble they ultimately chose. These findings are inconsistent with prospect theory, the priority heuristic, or decision field theory. However, the eye movements made during a choice have a large relationship with the final choice, and this is mostly independent from the contribution of the actual attribute values in the choice options. That is, eye movements tell us not just about the processing of attribute values but also are independently associated with choice. The pattern is simple—people choose the gamble they look at more often, independently of the actual numbers they see—and this pattern is simpler than predicted by decision field theory, decision by sampling, and the parallel constraint satisfaction model. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on Risky Decision Making

Previous research has considered the question of how anticipated regret affects risky decision making. Several studies have shown that anticipated regret forces participants towards the safe option, showing risk-aversion. We argue that these results are due to the previous confounding of the riskiness of the options with the feedback received. Our design unconfounds these factors, and we predict that participants will always tend to makeregret-minimizingchoices (rather than risk-minimizing choices). We present three experiments using a “choices between equally valued alternatives” paradigm. In these experiments we manipulate whether the risky or safe gamble is the regret-minimizing choice by manipulating which gamble(s) will be resolved. As predicted, participants tend to choose the regret-minimizing gamble in both gains and losses and in both relatively high risk and relatively low risk pairs of gambles. We consider the implications of these results for the role of regret in choice behavior.     

Consequences of Regret Aversion 2: Additional Evidence for Effects of Feedback on Decision Making

We discuss the effects of anticipated and experienced regret on decision making under uncertainty. In previous research, using the standard, context-free, gamble paradigm, we found that decision makers anticipate the regret they can experience as a result of post-decisional feedback on forgone outcomes (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996). In the present research we move away from the gamble paradigm, on to richer contexts. In Experiments 1 and 2, involving investment decision making and decision making in the ultimatum game, it is shown that the expectation of feedback on forgone outcomes influences decision making and can promote more risk seeking behavior. Experiment 3 focused on effects of retrospective regret and shows that actual feedback on foregone outcomes influences the experience of regret and subsequent decision making. The results of these studies support our earlier work on regret aversion.     

调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制：一个有中介的调节模型

当前,选择超载领域研究的焦点已从验证其是否存在,转向至其何时存在,即边界条件的探讨。本研究基于调节模式理论,分别以决策后悔和延迟选择作为选择超载的指标,开展两个实验探查选择超载存在的调节模式条件及所涉及的内在机制。实验1以决策后悔作指标,运用量表测试法操纵调节模式,初步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与决策后悔的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时体验到更强的后悔情绪,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的决策后悔无显著差异;实验2以延迟选择作指标,通过任务启动法操纵调节模式,进一步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与延迟选择的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时更倾向于延迟选择,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的延迟选择偏好无显著差异,进一步有中介的调节模型分析表明选择难度可以部分解释这种效应。总之,通过采用不同方法操纵调节模式,选取不同的选择超载指标,数据结果都一致支持：评估模式的个体比运动模式的个体更容易出现选择超载,选择难度在其中发挥着一定的中介作用。     

How Well Do We Know Our Inner Daredevil? Probing the Relationship Between Self‐Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk Taking

To measure a person's risk‐taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self‐report scales (e.g., “Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior”) and more direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., “Do you accept or reject the risky option?”). It is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined the relationship between self‐report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred participants (aged 19–85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal‐detection approach showed that people's likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings and choice. Further, older adults' likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly than younger adults'. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the study of risk‐taking propensity, which have often relied on self‐reported risk tendency for ambiguous activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's utilization of emotion expectancies in moral decision‐making

This study investigated the relevance of emotion expectancies for children's moral decision‐making. The sample included 131 participants from three different grade levels (M = 8.39 years, SD = 2.45, range 4.58–12.42). Participants were presented a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and asked to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonists' shoes. Overall, it was found that the anticipation of moral emotions predicted an increased likelihood of moral choices in antisocial and prosocial contexts. In younger children, anticipated moral emotions predicted moral choice for prosocial actions, but not for antisocial actions. Older children showed evidence for the utilization of anticipated emotions in both prosocial and antisocial behaviours. Moreover, for older children, the decision to act prosocially was less likely in the presence of non‐moral emotions. Findings suggest that the impact of emotion expectancies on children's moral decision‐making increases with age. Contrary to happy victimizer research, the study does not support the notion that young children use moral emotion expectancies for moral decision‐making in the context of antisocial actions.     

Reactance, Compliance, and Anticipated Regret

The current work explored the relations among reactance, regret, and behavioral choice. A possible mechanism for reactance in opposition to persuasion attempts involves people anticipating greater regret for negative outcomes after complying with an agent of persuasion than for negative outcomes after reacting against an agent of persuasion. Some participants were asked to anticipate regret prior to making a behavioral choice in the face of an influence attempt. These participants anticipated greater regret for negative outcomes that would be experienced after reacting against rather than complying with the influence attempt. Accordingly, these participants subsequently exhibited behavioral compliance. On the other hand, participants who made choices without explicitly being asked to anticipate possible future regret showed far greater reactance. Interestingly, in all cases compliance led to significantly greater regret than did reactance once a negative outcome actually occurred. These data indicate that people do not spontaneously anticipate the regret that they may experience in an influence situation. Furthermore, when asked to anticipate such regret, they misanticipate their future feelings. The implications of complying with and reacting against the demands of others are discussed.     

Modulating what is and what could have been: The effect of transcranial direct current stimulation on the evaluation of attained and unattained decision outcomes

The affective evaluation of decision outcomes, whether attained (e.g., disappointment) or based on the conscious realization that a decision made differently would have led to a better or worse outcome (e.g., regret), greatly influence future decisions. Prior research has demonstrated a role of the medial and orbitofrontal cortex (M/OFC) in decision valuation and the experience of regret and relief. Here we examined whether inhibitory transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) could dampen the experience of decision-induced affect, with a focus on regret and relief. Thirty-eight participants completed a previously used gambling task and were asked to rate their happiness with attained outcomes of a chosen gamble before and after being shown unattained, counterfactual outcomes (i.e., what would have happened had they selected the other gamble). The difference in happiness rating before and after revealing these unattained counterfactual outcomes was taken as a measure of regret (negative shift) or relief (positive shift). During this task, 20 participants received 2 mA cathodal tDCS over EEG coordinate Fp1 for 20 minutes, and 18 participants received sham stimulation over the same location. Linear mixed-model results showed that, compared to sham, participants who received cathodal tDCS reported less intense emotions in response to attained as well as counterfactual outcomes. These findings were not due to the groups differing in the gambles they selected or attained monetary outcomes, demonstrating that tDCS can modulate decision-induced (counterfactual) affect. This may have implications for the ability to modulate value-based decision-making using brain stimulation techniques more broadly.     

Dynamic and consequential consistency of choices between paths of decision trees

The generally prescribed procedure for choosing a decision strategy from a decision tree employs a backward induction analysis that entails 3 fundamental consistency principles: dynamic, consequential, and strategic. The first requires the decision maker to follow through on plans to the end, the second requires the decision maker to focus solely on future events and final consequences given the current state of events, and the third is the conjunction of the first 2. Five experiments were reported to test these principles using different subject populations, different procedures for estimating consistency, and different factors for manipulating the attractiveness of the gamble at the final stage of the tree. The main findings were that strategic and dynamic consistency principles were violated at rates that exceeded choice inconsistency.     

艾勒悖论再探——三结果决策的齐当别式表征:“好-坏”抑或“最好-最坏”?

艾勒悖论的第一项决策任务属于三结果决策任务,这对齐当别模型以及鉴别其不同判断任务间的优势都具有特殊意义。本研究通过3项子研究系统的探讨了不同表征方式("最好-最坏","好-坏")、不同判断任务(经典判断任务与联合判断任务)、不同数量级的结果值(万元级、百万元级以及亿元级)以及不同决策情境(迫选,非迫选)上,齐当别模型对艾勒悖论的解释力。结果显示:无论是迫选情境还是非迫选情境,经典的艾勒悖论均可被齐当别模型解释,但应基于"好-坏"而非"最好-最坏"表征维度;齐当别模型的联合判断任务在三结果决策任务上的预测力也再次被证明优于经典判断任务。     

结果评价中自我体验与替代体验的参照点效应:一项赌博游戏的ERPs研究

本研究采用"投注—反馈"的虚拟赌博游戏范式,通过2个实验分别检测个体在评价自己决策结果 (实验1)和观察他人决策结果 (实验2)过程中赌注大小(即参照点)对大脑活动的影响。结果发现:(1)体验自我决策结果时,输钱比赢钱诱发更负的FRN,仅有一个负反馈(-10元)表现出以赌注为界的分离,且相对效价一样的反馈值诱发的FRN差异不显著;(2)体验他人决策结果时,无论输赢,有赌注比无赌注诱发的FRN更负;而且相对效价相同的反馈值诱发的FRN差异不显著。据此可以认为,FRN一定程度上反映了以赌注为基准的主观标准对社会信息的评价判断:自我体验中的个体对损失的敏感度远高于收益;而替代体验中的个体更倾向于将"损失更多"看作一种负性结果。     

Conservatives Anticipate and Experience Stronger Emotional Reactions to Negative Outcomes

The present work examined whether conservatives and liberals differ in their anticipation of their own emotional reactions to negative events. In two studies, participants imagined experiencing positive or negative outcomes in domains that do not directly concern politics. In Study 1, 190 American participants recruited online (64 male, M_age = 32 years) anticipated their emotional responses to romantic relationship outcomes. In Study 2, 97 Canadian undergraduate students (26 male, M_age = 21 years) reported on their anticipated and experienced emotional responses to academic outcomes. In both studies, more conservative participants predicted they would feel stronger negative emotions following negative outcomes than did more liberal participants. Furthermore, a longitudinal follow‐up of Study 2 participants revealed that more conservative participants actually felt worse than more liberal participants after receiving a lower‐than‐desired exam grade. These effects remained even when controlling for the Big Five traits, prevention focus, and attachment style (Study 1), and optimism (Study 2). We discuss how the relationship between political orientation and anticipated affect likely contributes to differences between conservatives and liberals in styles of decision and policy choices.     

负折扣现象:跨期决策中的自我-他人决策差异

负折扣现象作为一种违背时间折扣假定的现象越来越多地引起研究者关注。本文通过两种指标考察了为自己决策和为他人决策在负折扣现象上的差异。实验1运用二择一选择范式考察人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时对于何时发生负性事件的时间偏好。结果发现,相比较于为他人决策,为自己决策时被试更倾向于选择早些发生负性事件,即更容易产生负折扣现象。实验2运用测量时间折扣率的经典范式考察了人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时的时间折扣率。结果发现,为自己决策时比为他人决策时的时间折扣率更小,更容易出现负折扣率。总体结果表明,为自己决策比为他人决策更容易出现负折扣现象。从情绪卷入的角度看,我们推测,为自己决策时由于更多的预期负性情绪卷入,从而导致更容易产生负折扣现象。     

Cultural, social, and emotional determinants of decisions under uncertainty

Two experiments examined the factors that influence Chinese and United States college students’ decisions in both a simulated investment situation and an academic situation. Participants in each experiment were confronted with a choice between (a) an alternative that could have either a very positive outcome or a very negative one and (b) an alternative that was relatively safe. The decision that others had typically made in the situation was also indicated. Participants’ decisions in both experiments were mediated by the emotional reactions they experienced in response to alternative decision outcomes. Others’ decisions had a direct impact on decisions in the investment situation, but their impact in the academic situation was mediated by their influence on participants’ anticipated emotional reactions. Cultural differences in the impact of anticipated feelings and others’ decisions were not evident in the investment situation. However, they were apparent in the academic situation, which was more similar to ones that participants were likely to encounter in daily life.