Moving Toward Self-Forgiveness: Removing Barriers Related to Shame,Guilt, and Regret

When people believe that they have hurt or offended someone, one potentially adaptive response would be to forgive the self. In an ideal process of self-forgiveness, an offender would accept an appropriate amount of responsibility, experience enough guilt to prompt reparative behaviors and improvements in character, and then release excess guilty feelings that no longer serve a useful function. In real life, however, this process often goes awry. Sometimes people avoid guilty feelings altogether, taking emotional shortcuts to repair their moods and self-images without accepting responsibility or repairing relational damage. Others go to the opposite extreme, getting caught up in negative feelings such as shame, excessive guilt, and regret about their offenses. This article briefly reviews research on these potentially problematic responses and suggests ways that each one could be addressed in interventions to facilitate self-forgiveness.     

Too fatigued to care: Ego depletion,guilt, and prosocial behavior

Although guilt feels bad to the individual, it is good for society because guilty feelings can prompt people to perform good deeds. This study tests whether fatigue decreases guilty feelings and subsequent prosocial behavior. Participants were randomly assigned to a depletion condition in which they watched a movie about butchering animals for their meat or skin and were told to express no emotions, or to a no-depletion condition in which they watched the same movie, but could express their emotions. Having participants play a game in which another person was punished for their errors induced guilt. Finally, participants played a dictator game in which they could leave money for the next participant. After the experiment, participants could also anonymously donate money to an anti-AIDS charity. The results showed that depleted participants felt less guilty than did non-depleted participants, and the less guilty participants felt the less helpful they were.     

Can Collective Responsibility for Perpetrated Evil Persist over Generations?

In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity.     

Guilt and Child Soldiers

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child soldiers experience are not self-censure; rather their guilt arises from their attempts to come to terms with what they see as their own morally ambiguous motives. Their guilt is appropriate because it reaffirms their commitment to morality and facilitates their self-forgiveness.     

Effects of work‐related norm violations and general beliefs about the world on feelings of shame and guilt: A comparison between Turkey and the Netherlands

This paper aimed at investigating the effects of work‐related norm violations (i.e., violations of interpersonal and work regulation norms) and individuals' general beliefs about the world (i.e., social axioms: reward for application, social cynicism) on feelings of shame and guilt in Turkey and in the Netherlands. An experimental study involving 103 Turkish and 111 Dutch participants showed that work norm violations elicited feelings of guilt and shame differently in Turkey and the Netherlands. Specifically, interpersonal norm violation in Turkey elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly than did violation of a work regulation norm, whereas no differential effects were found in the Netherlands. As expected, violation of a work regulation norm elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly in the Netherlands than in Turkey, whereas violation of an interpersonal norm elicited feelings of shame and guilt more strongly in Turkey than in the Netherlands. The findings provide further evidence for the moderating effects of social axioms: in both countries, participants high in social cynicism felt less ashamed when they violated a work regulation norm than did those low in social cynicism. Our findings are relevant for understanding the underlying mechanisms of norm violations at work, thereby offering a new avenue for investigating cultural differences in the workplace. The latter may be of particular relevance in times of globalization and diversity in the workplace.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

How a “Reasonable Doubt” Instruction Affects Decisions of Guilt

Jurors are instructed to render a guilty verdict if they feel the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury is often told that this does not mean an absolute certainty of guilt and that even if it were possible to imagine a scenario in which the defendant is innocent, a guilty verdict may still be appropriate. Here, participants read a case summary. They were either told to say that the defendant was guilty if they believed in guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or were given more detailed instruction stressing that they did not have to be absolutely certain of guilt to give a guilty verdict. In Experiment 1, participants provided “think-aloud” protocols. Content analysis revealed that those who were given this instruction often used the phrase reasonable doubt to justify their guilty verdicts by saying that although they were not certain of the defendant's guilt, their belief exceeded the reasonable doubt threshold. None of the participants in the control group did this. Experiment 2 was designed to test if the instruction affected belief in guilt and the reasonable doubt threshold quantitatively. The instruction affected both people's belief in guilt and the threshold that they used to define reasonable doubt. The implied values for reasonable doubt were 63% for those who received the instruction and 77% for the control group. Implications for jury decision making are discussed.     

On Irrational Guilt

A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide a brief review of the explanations of irrational guilt that are compatible with the cognitive theories of emotions, that is, theories that presuppose that there is a causal or a constitutional connection between emotions and cognitive factors, such as judgments, beliefs or thoughts. Following many other reviewers, I found most of the explanations of irrational guilt unsatisfactory, although my reasons for critical conclusions will partly differ from the usual ones. After the review, I will defend a solution according to which it is possible to believe that an act does not have any moral costs and at the same time to have an impression that is has, which explains the guilty feelings.     

Blameless Guilt: The Case of Carer Guilt and Chronic and Terminal Illness

My ambition in this paper is to provide an account of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However, in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has the capacity to provide sufficient care; he has, in his view, done all he can. These carers cannot legitimately be blamed for failing to meet their own expectations. Yet despite acknowledging their blamelessness, they nonetheless feel guilty. My aims are threefold: first, to explicate the puzzling nature of the carer guilt phenomenon; second, to motivate the need to solve that puzzle; third, to give my own account of blameless guilt that can explain why carers feel guilty despite their blamelessness. In doing so I argue that the guilt experienced by carers is a legitimate case of guilt, and that with the right caveats it can be considered an appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of someone for whom we care.     

Guilt following transgression: an attribution of responsibility approach

People typically experience guilt when they violate sociomoral norms. Using Heider's (1958) attribution of responsibility model in the two experiments reported here, I examined the attributional mediators of posttransgression guilt. The basic design of both studies was a Level of Responsibility X Subject Role factorial. The first study used a role-playing methodology; in the second, subjects generated protocols describing their own past experiences. The second experiment also distinguished between attributions of responsibility, causality, and blame. In both studies, harmdoer guilt was higher following accidental as opposed to intentional transgressions. The discussion focuses on the dynamics of guilt development and reduction and on the importance of maintaining conceptual distinctions among the various attribution measures in future guilt research.     

Anger vs guilt: inference of responsibility attribution and interpersonal reactions

This study examined reactions toward an expression of anger or guilt. Participants' reactions were assessed after their partner for a collaborative task expressed anger or guilt due to failure on the task. Analysis indicated that participants inferred the attribution of responsibility made by the partner based on the expressed emotions; anger elicited an inference that the partner attributed the failure to the participant, while guilt led to an inference that the partner attributed the failure to the self. Further, expressers of anger were perceived as having more negative traits and were avoided more than those who expressed guilt. Discussion considered negative interpersonal effect of an expression of anger.     

Feeling guilty as a source of information about threat and performance

OCD patients experience increased feelings of guilt, threat and uncertainty about harm prevention. As to the relation between these phenomena, it was hypothesised that the experience of guilt acts as "information" that increases the sense of threat and decreases the sense that preventive action is effective. We tested whether state guilt is used as information about risk and prevention effects and whether people high in trait guilt do so more than others. Participants high and low in trait guilt were included. Three types of affect were experimentally induced: guilt, anxiety and a neutral affect. Then, participants estimated the likelihood and severity of a negative outcome, and the dissatisfaction with preventive performances in two OCD relevant scenarios. Relative to low-trait guilt participants, people high in trait guilt had higher ratings of risk after induction of state guilt. With regards to dissatisfaction with preventive performance, there was only a trend for high-trait guilt participants to respond stronger to state guilt. The results suggest that people with a general inclination to feel guilty use temporary feelings of guilt as information about the threat content of a situation and do so even if the source of state guilt is unrelated to the situation. Implications for the understanding of OCD are discussed.     

On the relationship between responsibility and guilt: antecedent appraisal or elaborated appraisal?

Three studies are reported in which we examined the relation between responsibility and guilt. Results from Study 1 suggested that responsibility increased as a function of guilt, but that the reverse relation did not emerge. In the second and third studies we primed either responsibility or guilt and examined how these primes influenced subsequent appraisals for novel events. We also used different manipulations of responsibility and guilt. In Study 2 guilt was operationalized as negative interpersonal consequences as evidenced by the reactions of others. Responsibility was varied by manipulating the controllability of negative outcomes. In Study 3 responsibility was manipulated in terms of the severity of negative consequences for oneself. Results of both studies showed that guilt primes gave rise to perceptions of responsibility but that responsibility primes did not affect perceptions of guilt. We conclude that responsibility is best regarded as an elaborated appraisal generated by guilt, rather than an antecedent of guilt. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

But I Still Feel Guilt: A Test of a Moral Disengagement Propensity Model

ABSTRACT

We explored the impact of moral disengagement on individual experiences of guilt. We modeled three forms of workplace deviance (withdrawal, interpersonal deviance, and work-family deviance) as mediators between the propensity to morally disengage and guilt, and also includes the moderating effects of perceived work hours culture. Data were collected from 226 employees matched with a colleague and spouse. Results demonstrated that moral disengagement released individuals who engaged in interpersonal and work-family deviance from subsequent feelings of guilt, but only reduced feelings of guilt for those who withdrew. We also found an interactive effect of perceived work hours culture on the relationships between moral disengagement propensity and all three forms of deviance. The indirect effect from moral disengagement propensity to guilt through withdrawal was stronger when perceived work hours was high.     

‘What Would You Say if You Were Guilty?’ Suspects' Strategies During a Hypothetical Behavior Analysis Interview Concerning a Serious Crime

Previous research has shown that the Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI) indicators of guilt or innocence are merely commonsense notions. In this study, we examined whether this would lead suspects of a serious crime to try to manipulate their behavior during a BAI in order to look innocent. A serious crime was described to 74 undergraduates who were asked to imagine that they were guilty or innocent. They then completed a questionnaire about the strategies that they would use during a BAI. Both guilty and innocent suspects were more willing to show the innocence rather than guilt indicators of the BAI. Innocent suspects had a blind faith in the power of innocence to demonstrate that they were not guilty. The general (non‐BAI) strategies coincided with those of previous studies; this indicates that prior findings on strategies can be generalized to serious crimes and that strategies can be examined with uncomplicated procedures such as the one used in this study. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interpersonal correlates of the guilt inventory

The interpersonal correlates of the Guilt Inventory (Kugler & Jones, 1992), which yields scores for state guilt, trait guilt, and moral standards, were assessed. Data collection addressed three issues including the relationships among Guilt Inventory scores and measures of: (a) interpersonal emotions and traits (e.g., shyness, self-consciousness, anger, etc.); (b) the social support network; and (c) ratings of trait guilt, moral standards, and relevant adjectives by friends and family members. Results indicated that trait and state guilt scores were significantly related to various interpersonal measures, most particularly, depression, anxiety, shyness, and loneliness, but only modestly related to satisfaction with social support. Moral standards were generally unrelated to these variables. Others tended to rate participants higher on trait guilt negatively (e.g., higher on contemptuous, angry, guilty, etc.), and participants higher on moral standards in socially acceptable terms (e.g., higher on prompt, self-reliant, moral, and religious). Results are interpreted in view of the frequently cited distinction between social and nonsocial emotions.     

Dimensionality of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and Its Relationships With the Three-and the Five-Factor Personality Models

The interpersonal correlates of the Guilt Inventory (Kugler &; Jones, 1992), which yields scores for state guilt, trait guilt, and moral standards, were assessed. Data collection addressed three issues including the relationships among Guilt Inventory scores and measures of: (a) interpersonal emotions and traits (e.g., shyness, self-consciousness, anger, etc.); (b) the social support network; and (c) ratings of trait guilt, moral standards, and relevant adjectives by friends and family members. Results indicated that trait and state guilt scores were significantly related to various interpersonal measures, most particularly, depression, anxiety, shyness, and loneliness, but only modestly related to satisfaction with social support. Moral standards were generally unrelated to these variables. Others tended to rate participants higher on trait guilt negatively (e.g., higher on contemptuous, angry, guilty, etc.), and participants higher on moral standards in socially acceptable terms (e.g., higher on prompt, self-reliant, moral, and religious). Results are interpreted in view of the frequently cited distinction between social and nonsocial emotions.     

The exemplary social emotion guilt: Not so relationship-oriented when another person repairs for you

Guilt is considered by many researchers to be the hallmark social emotion. Guilt theories perceive guilt to be a negative emotion with positive interpersonal consequences, and empirical research has shown guilt to motivate prosocial behaviours aimed at restoring the relationship with one's victims. The current research questions the relationship-oriented nature of this emotion. Five experiments reveal that when a person repairs the transgressor's damage caused to a victim, the transgressor's guilt feelings, reparative intentions, and prosocial behaviour decrease. These findings suggest that it is not the relationship with the victim that is important in the regulation of guilt feelings, but rather the reparative actions that have been undertaken. Implications for theory and behavioural research on guilt are discussed.     

Guilt, shame, and symptoms in children

The authors asked whether evidence could be found for adaptive or maladaptive aspects of guilt and shame in 5-12-year-old children (44 boys, 42 girls). Children completed semiprojective and scenario-based measures thought to assess shame, guilt, or both. Their parents (N = 83) completed the Child Behavior Checklist to assess child symptoms. Shame and projective guilt were related to symptoms; they also were associated with self-blame and attempts to minimize painful feelings. Scenario-based guilt was related to fewer symptoms in boys but to greater symptoms in girls. This measure of guilt reflected concerns with adhering to standards, expressing empathy, and taking appropriate responsibility. Discussion focuses on possible origins of differential symptom-emotion links in boys and girls as well as measurement implications.