Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making

The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and controlled analytical processes (rule-based reasoning) put forward by dual-process approaches of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., K. E. Stanovich & R. F. West, 2000) has been primarily a matter of assumption with a scarcity of direct empirical findings supporting it. The present authors use the process dissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) to provide convergent evidence validating a dual-process perspective to judgment under uncertainty based on the independent contributions of heuristic and rule-based reasoning. Process dissociations based on experimental manipulation of variables were derived from the most relevant theoretical properties typically used to contrast the two forms of reasoning. These include processing goals (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), priming (Experiment 3), and formal training (Experiment 4); the results consistently support the author's perspective. They conclude that judgment under uncertainty is neither an automatic nor a controlled process but that it reflects both processes, with each making independent contributions.     

Routes through the face recognition system

Two experiments are reported which seek to examine the proposition first put forward by Hay and Young (1982), that recognition of a known person after seeing his or her face proceeds through a series of sequentially organized stages. In both experiments subjects were shown a selection of famous and unfamiliar faces and required to state whether each face was familiar. They were then asked to recall semantic information and the person's name. Of all the possible response types, only some are predicted by models derived from Hay and Young (1982), and only these responses were observed in Experiment 1. In order to give as complete an account as possible of the slips and errors made by subjects, they were interrogated some days after completing the testing phase in Experiment 2. As in the first experiment, the results supported the view that distinct but successive stages are involved in everyday face recognition. The method developed here provides an extension of the “diary” type of study of everyday recognition errors into laboratory conditions, which confirms the findings of studies of everyday errors and provides strong support for sequential models.     

Imitation,Inspiration, and Creation: Cognitive Process of Creative Drawing by Copying Others' Artworks

To investigate the cognitive processes underlying creative inspiration, we tested the extent to which viewing or copying prior examples impacted creative output in art. In Experiment 1, undergraduates made drawings under three conditions: (a) copying an artist's drawing, then producing an original drawing; (b) producing an original drawing without having seen another's work; and (c) copying another artist's work, then reproducing that artist's style independently. We discovered that through copying unfamiliar abstract drawings, participants were able to produce creative drawings qualitatively different from the model drawings. Process analyses suggested that participants' cognitive constraints became relaxed, and new perspectives were formed from copying another's artwork. Experiment 2 showed that exposure to styles of artwork considered unfamiliar facilitated creativity in drawing, while styles considered familiar did not do so. Experiment 3 showed that both copying and thoroughly viewing artwork executed using an unfamiliar style facilitated creativity in drawing, whereas merely thinking about alternative styles of artistic representation did not do so. These experiments revealed that deep encounters with unfamiliar artworks—whether through copying or prolonged observation—change people's cognitive representations of the act of drawing to produce novel artwork.     

The Nature and Origin of Rational Errors in Arithmetic Thinking: Induction from Examples and Prior Knowledge

Students systematically and deliberately apply rule-based but erroneous algorithms to solving unfamiliar arithmetic problems. These algorithms result in erroneous solutions termed rational errors. Computationally, students' erroneous algorithms can be represented by perturbations or bugs in otherwise correct arithmetic algorithms (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; Langley & Ohilson, 1984; VanLehn, 1983, 1986, 1990; Young S O'Sheo, 1981). Bugs are useful for describing how rational errors occur but bugs are not sufficient for explaining their origin. A possible explanation for this is that rational errors are the result of incorrect induction from examples. This prediction is termed the “induction hypothesis” (VanLehn, 1986). The purpose of the present study was to: (a) expand on post formulations of the induction hypothesis, and (b) use a new methodology to test the induction hypothesis more carefully than has been done previously. The first step involved teaching participants a new number system called NewAbacus, a written modification of the abacus system. The second step consisted of dividing them into different groups, where each individual received an example of only one port of the NewAbacus addition algorithm. During the third and final step, participants were instructed to solve both familiar and unfamiliar types of addition problems in NewAbacus. The induction hypothesis was supported by using both empirical and computational investigations.     

A process-dissociation examination of the cognitive processes underlying unconscious thought

Conscious and unconscious thought have been previously found to differentially impact decision-making quality. However, little research has directly measured the processes underlying these modes of thinking. We propose that both thinking modes are characterized by rule-based and intuitive processing. In two experiments, we used the Process Dissociation Procedure to independently measure these cognitive processes. We tested three competing hypotheses: (a) conscious thinking evokes both increased rule-based and decreased intuitive processing compared to unconscious thinking; (b) conscious and unconscious thinking evoke similar levels of intuitive processing but conscious thinking enhances rule-based processing; and (c) conscious and unconscious thinking evoke similar levels of rule-based processing but unconscious thinking enhances intuitive processing. Experiment 1 used base-rate and law-of-large-numbers decision-making problems, whereas Experiment 2 used decision-making problems similar to the “apartment” problem that is often used in unconscious thought studies. In both experiments we found support for hypothesis (b).     

Executive control of cognitive processes in task switching

In 4 experiments, participants alternated between different tasks or performed the same task repeatedly. The tasks for 2 of the experiments required responding to geometric objects in terms of alternative classification rules, and the tasks for the other 2 experiments required solving arithmetic problems in terms of alternative numerical operations. Performance was measured as a function of whether the tasks were familiar or unfamiliar, the rules were simple or complex, and visual cues were present or absent about which tasks should be performed. Task alternation yielded switching-time costs that increased with rule complexity but decreased with task cuing. These factor effects were additive, supporting a model of executive control that has goal-shifting and rule-activation stages for task switching. It appears that rule activation takes more time for switching from familiar to unfamiliar tasks than for switching in the opposite direction.     

Proofreading familiar text: Allocating resources to perceptual and conceptual processes

Levy (1983) demonstrated that more spelling errors were detected, within a limited time period, when familiar passages were proofread than when unfamiliar passages were proofread. In the present series, Experiment 1 eliminated a possible confound in the Levy (1983) studies and showed that errors were detected both faster and more accurately in familiar texts. Experiment 2 demonstrated higher order involvement in the proofreading transfer effect, suggesting that a strictly word-level account was insufficient. Experiment 3 explored the proofreader’s sensitivity to the semantic properties of the proofreading passage, showing that the familiarity effect resulted from more efficient processing, not from lack of either visual or semantic analyses. The results are more consistent with a resource-allocation explanation than with either a visual-scanning or a skilled-visual-processing account.     

Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics

We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed.     

Practice makes perfect: familiarity of task determines success in solvable tasks for free-ranging dogs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis lupus familiaris</Emphasis>)

Domestic dogs’ (Canis lupus familiaris) socio-cognitive faculties have made them highly sensitive to human social cues. While dogs often excel at understanding human communicative gestures, they perform comparatively poorly in problem-solving and physical reasoning tasks. This difference in their behaviour could be due to the lifestyle and intense socialization, where problem solving and physical cognition are less important than social cognition. Free-ranging dogs live in human-dominated environments, not under human supervision and are less socialized. Being scavengers, they often encounter challenges where problem solving is required in order to get access to food. We tested Indian street dogs in familiar and unfamiliar independent solvable tasks and quantified their persistence and dependence on a novel human experimenter, in addition to their success in solving a task. Our results indicate that free-ranging dogs succeeded and persisted more in the familiar task as compared to the unfamiliar one. They showed negligible amount of human dependence in the familiar task, but showed prolonged gazing and considerable begging behaviour to the human experimenter in the context of the unfamiliar task. Cognitive abilities of free-ranging dogs thus play a pivotal role in determining task-associated behaviours based on familiarity. In addition to that, these dogs inherently tend to socialize with and depend on humans, even if they are strangers. Our results also illustrate free-ranging dogs’ low competence at physical cognitive tasks.     

What's in a Forename? Cue Familiarity and Stereotypical Thinking

Recent research has characterized categorical thinking as an essential component of the person perception process. Yet relatively little is known about the myriad factors that moderate the accessibility of this mode of thought. With regard to this we hypothesized that the subjective familiarity of a person's forename may play an important role in triggering categorical thinking. Specifically, category-based knowledge may be more accessible when triggered by familiar than unfamiliar forenames. We report the results of three experiments that supported this prediction. Relative to unfamiliar names, participants required less time to verify the gender of familiar forenames (Experiment 1) and semantic priming was more pronounced when stereotype-related material followed the presentation of familiar than unfamiliar items (Experiment 2). Also, familiar forenames attracted more extreme gender-based evaluations than their unfamiliar counterparts (Experiment 3). We consider the theoretical and methodological implications of these findings for a variety of issues in person perception.     

How Experts Solve a Novel Problem in Experimental Design

Research on expert-novice differences has mainly focused on how experts solve familiar problems. We know far less about the skills and knowledge used by experts when they are confronted with novel problems within their area of expertise. This article discusses a study in which verbal protocols were taken from subjects of various expertise designing an experiment in an area with which they were unfamiliar. The results showed that even when domain knowledge is lacking, experts solve a novel problem within their area of expertise by dividing the problem into a number of subproblems that are solved in a specified order. The lack of domain knowledge is compensated for by using abstract knowledge structures and domain-specific heuristic strategies. However, the quality of their solutions is considerably lower than the quality attained by experts who were familiar with the type of problem to be solved. The results suggest that when experts are confronted with novel problems as compared with familiar problems, their form of reasoning remains intact, but the content of their reasoning suffers due to lack of domain knowledge.     

Flying to Neverland: How readers tacitly judge norms during comprehension

As readers gain experience with specific narrative worlds, they accumulate information that allows them to experience events as normal or unusual within those worlds. In this article, we contrast two accounts for how readers access information about specific narrative worlds to make tacit judgments of normalcy. We conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants read stories about an ordinary character (e.g., a police officer in Boston) or a familiar fantastic character (e.g., Superman). Each story described a realistic event (e.g., the character being killed by bullets) or a fantastic event (e.g., bullets bouncing off the character’s chest). Participants were faster to read events that were consistent with their prior knowledge about the story world. In Experiments 2a and 2b, participants read stories about familiar fantastic characters, unfamiliar fantastic characters (e.g., a Kryptonian named Dev-em), and unfamiliar ordinary characters. In Experiment 2a, participants were equally fast to read about the familiar and unfamiliar fantastic characters experiencing fantastic events, both of which were read faster than the unfamiliar ordinary characters sentences. In Experiment 2b, participants were fastest to read about unfamiliar ordinary characters experiencing realistic events and were equally slow for familiar and unfamiliar fantastic characters. Our experiments provide evidence that readers routinely use inductive reasoning to go beyond their prior knowledge when reading fictional narratives, affecting whether they experience events as normal or unusual.     

Recognition memory across the adult life span: The role of prior knowledge

Two experiments were performed to investigate the effects of prior knowledge on recognition memory in young adults, younger old adults, 76-year-olds, and 85-year-olds. In Experiment 1, we examined episodic recognition of dated and contemporary famous persons presented as faces, names, and faces plus names. In Experiment 2, four types of faces were presented for later recognition: dated familiar, contemporary familiar, old unfamiliar, and young unfamiliar. The results of both experiments showed that young adults performed better with contemporary than with dated famous persons, whereas the reverse was true for all groups of older adults. In addition, the data of Experiment 2 indicated that (1) young adults showed better recognition for young than for old unfamiliar faces, (2) younger old adults performed better with old than with young unfamiliar faces, and (3) the two oldest age groups showed no effect of age of face. These results suggest that the ability to utilize rich semantic knowledge to improve episodic memory is preserved in very old age, although the aging process may be associated with deficits in the ability to utilize prior knowledge to support memory when the underlying representation lacks semantic and contextual features. The overall data pattern was discussed in relation to the notion that, with increasing adult age, there is an increase in the level of cognitive support required to enhance episodic remembering.     

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3–5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.     

Unfamiliar faces are not faces: Evidence from a matching task

It is difficult to match two images of the same unfamiliar face, even under good conditions. Here, we show that there are large individual differences on unfamiliar face matching. Initially, we tried to predict these using tests of visual short-term memory, cognitive style, and perceptual speed. Moderate correlations were produced by various components of these tests. In three other experiments, we found very strong correlations between face matching and inverted face matching on the same test. Finally, we examined potential associations between familiar and unfamiliar face processing. Strong correlations were found between familiar and unfamiliar face processing, but only when the familiar faces were inverted. We conclude that unfamiliar faces are processed for identity in a qualitatively different way than are familiar faces.     

An attention account of neural priming

Repetition priming of familiar stimuli (e.g., objects) produces a decrease in visual cortical activity for repeated versus novel items, which has been attributed to more fluent processing for repeated items. By contrast, priming of unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., abstract shapes) produces an increase in visual cortical activity. The mechanism for priming-related increases in activity for repeated unfamiliar stimuli is unknown. We hypothesised that such increases in activity may reflect attentional allocation to these items. We tested this hypothesis using a priming-spatial attention paradigm. During Phase 1 of Experiment 1, participants viewed unfamiliar abstract shapes and familiar objects. During Phase 2, participants identified target letters (S or H). Each target letter was preceded by a non-informative shape or object cue that was repeated (from Phase 1) or novel in the same (valid) or opposite (invalid) hemifield. In Experiment 2, we manipulated shape familiarity by presenting shapes once or six times during Phase 1. For both experiments, at valid locations, target identification accuracy was higher following repeated versus novel unfamiliar item cues and lower following repeated versus novel familiar item cues. These findings support our hypothesis that priming-related increases in visual cortical activity for repeated unfamiliar items may, in part, reflect attentional allocation.     

干扰材料的熟悉性和认知方式对语篇阅读的影响

采用熟悉词和不熟悉词为干扰材料,考察了干扰材料的熟悉性对语篇阅读的影响.实验第一阶段要求不同认知方式被试朗读插入熟悉度不同干扰材料的短文,考查被试的阅读效率;第二阶段采用学习—自由回忆任务考查不同提示条件下在短文中使用过的干扰词和新词的学习效果.结果发现:(1)对场独立者而言,熟悉词的干扰作用明显大于不熟悉词,而对场依存者而言,熟悉词和不熟悉词的干扰作用无差异;(2)在提示条件下,被试对干扰词的回忆量大于对新词的回忆量.研究结果表明,在语篇阅读过程中,与场依存者相比,熟悉的干扰材料对场独立者的影响更大;熟悉词比不熟悉词产生更大干扰的原因可能是由于其激活了读者更多的经验,而非具有加工的优势.     

Feedback interference and dissociations of classification: Evidence against the multiple-learning-systems hypothesis

Researchers have argued that different categorization problems are learned by separate and distinct cognitive systems. They propose that an explicit system is responsible for learning rule-based categories and that a separate implicit system learns information-integration categories. One source of supporting evidence involves experiments in which observers perform a concurrent memory-scanning task that interferes with the processing of feedback. Researchers have reported a dissociation in which this manipulation impairs learning of a rule-based category but not an information-integration category. In the present research, we test the hypothesis that the dissociation was the result of lowered perceptual discriminability in the rule-based structure in comparison with the information-integration one. We demonstrate an example of an alternate rule-based category with easy-to-discriminate stimuli in which performance is unaffected by the interfering memory-scanning task. Furthermore, we demonstrate that learning of an information-integration category with low perceptual discriminability is impaired by the memory-scanning task. These demonstrations of the reverse dissociation challenge the interpretation that rule-based and information-integration category structures are learned by separate cognitive systems.     

Processing resources in timing and sequencing tasks

Subjects performed timing and sequencing tasks under separate (single-task) and concurrent (dual-task) conditions in two experiments. The timing task required the subjects to generate a series of 5-sec temporal productions. The sequencing task in Experiment 1 involved verifying reasoning statements that described the ordering of a pair of letters. The task in Experiment 2 involved monitoring a familiar event sequence and detecting omissions in that sequence. Comparisons of single-task and dual-task conditions showed a pattern of bidirectional interference. In each experiment, the concurrent sequencing task caused temporal productions to become more variable and longer. The concurrent timing task interfered with sequencing by lengthening response times to the reasoning statements (Experiment 1) and by lengthening response times to sequence omissions and reducing sensitivity at detecting the omissions (Experiment 2). The results suggest that time perception and sequence perception are related cognitive processes that rely on a common set of attentional resources.     

推理能力、认知方式和启发量对顿悟问题解决不同阶段的影响*

从《科学发明创造实验问题材料库》中选取实验材料,采用“学习多个原型-测试多个问题”的两阶段实验范式,探究推理能力、认知方式和启发量对顿悟问题解决中原型激活与关键启发信息提取这两个阶段的影响。结果发现:(1)高推理能力被试比低推理能力被试的顿悟问题解决水平更高,且高推理能力被试在原型激活和关键启发信息提取上都显著优于低推理能力被试;(2)认知方式对原型激活和关键启发信息提取均没有影响;(3)启发量对原型激活没有影响,但对关键启发信息的提取有影响,并且高启发量的原型比低启发量的原型更能促进关键启发信息的提取。