Math Anxiety: Personal, Educational, and Cognitive Consequences

Highly math-anxious individuals are characterized by a strong tendency to avoid math, which ultimately undercuts their math competence and forecloses important career paths. But timed, on-line tests reveal math-anxiety effects on whole-number arithmetic problems (e.g., 46 + 27), whereas achievement tests show no competence differences. Math anxiety disrupts cognitive processing by compromising ongoing activity in working memory. Although the causes of math anxiety are undetermined, some teaching styles are implicated as risk factors. We need research on the origins of math anxiety and on its "signature" in brain activity, to examine both its emotional and its cognitive components.     

Understanding Place-bound Students: Correlates and Consequences of Limited Educational Opportunities

This study explores the concept of the place-bound student, defined as perceived difficulty in leaving the immediate geographic area to attend school. Based on the literature, it was hypothesized that students who perceived greater difficulty would have fewer financial resources, higher external control orientation, greater attachment to family and romantic partners, and greater attachment to place. Finally, those who perceived greater difficulty were expected to be less successful academically, have lower adjustment to college scores, and have less satisfactory relationships with their parents. Availability of financial resources was not related to perceived difficulty in leaving the area. Attachment to persons and place were not related to being place-bound, except for women. For women, attachment to a romantic partner lead to greater perceived difficulty in leaving the area. However, another aspect of attachment to place, rootedness, had highly significant effects. Women who were higher on external control were also more likely to have a greater perception of difficulty in leaving the area. More place-bound students were not found to be at a disadvantage in terms of academic performance or adjustment to the university. The findings regarding students relationships with their parents were interesting and contrary to prediction. Men who perceived greater difficulty reported much more satisfactory relationships with their mothers and fathers. It is suggested that these men might have chosen to stay in the area to attend school in order to remain near their families.     

Spinoza on Causation and Power

The purpose of this paper is to argue that, for Spinoza, causation is a more fundamental relation than conceptual connection, and that, in fact, it explains conceptual connection. I will firstly offer a criticism of Michael Della Rocca's 2008 claims that, for Spinoza, causal relations are identical to relations of conceptual dependence and that existence is identical to conceivability. Secondly, I will argue that, for Spinoza, causation is more fundamental than conceptual dependence, offering textual evidence from both Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Ethics. In particular, I will offer an interpretation of the attributes as first and foremost causal activities, or powers: this interpretation has the advantage to clarify the role of 1D6 as a “genetic definition.”     

Spinoza on Lying and Suicide

Spinoza is often taken to claim that suicide is never a rational act, that a ‘free’ person acting by the guidance of reason will never terminate his/her own existence. Spinoza also defends the prima facie counterintuitive claim that the rational person will never act dishonestly. This second claim can, in fact, be justified when Spinoza's moral psychology and account of motivation are properly understood. Moreover, making sense of the free man's exception-less honesty in this way also helps to clarify how Spinoza should, and indeed does, recognize the possibility of rational suicide.     

Impossible Antecedents and Their Consequences: Some Thirteenth-Century Arabic Discussions

The principle that a necessarily false proposition implies any proposition, and that a necessarily true proposition is implied by any proposition, was apparently first propounded in twelfth century Latin logic, and came to be widely, though not universally, accepted in the fourteenth century. These principles seem never to have been accepted, or even seriously entertained, by Arabic logicians. In the present study, I explore some thirteenth century Arabic discussions of conditionals with impossible antecedents. The Persian-born scholar Afdal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d.1248) suggested the novel idea that two contradictory propositions may follow from the same impossible antecedent, and closely related to this point, he suggested that if an antecedent implies a consequent, then it will do so no matter how it is strengthened. These ideas led him, and those who followed him, to reject what has come to be known as ‘Aristotle's thesis’ that no proposition is implied by its own negation. Even these suggestions were widely resisted. Particularly influential were the counter-arguments of Naīr al-Dīn al-Tūī (d.1274).     

Spinoza on essence and ideal individuation

My project in this paper is to fill a gap in Spinoza's theory of metaphysical individuation. In a few brief passages of the Ethics, Spinoza manages to explain his views on the nature of composition and the part-whole relation, the metaphysical facts which ground the individuation of simple bodies and the extended individuals they compose, and the persistence of one and the same individual through time and mereological change. Yet Spinoza nowhere presents a corresponding account of the individuation of simple ideas, or the minds such ideas compose. While it is initially tempting to locate the details of such an account in Spinoza's views on the relation between the mental and physical domains, I argue here that such approaches fail, in conflicting with Spinoza's insistence that the mental and the physical are conceptually and explanatorily independent. By contrast, I show that for Spinoza, each idea essentially possesses the property of affirming the existence of its object, and that such properties are well-suited to serve as the principle of ideal individuation Spinoza never explicitly provided.     

Compelling Fictions: Spinoza and George Eliot on Imagination and Belief

Spinoza took it to be an important psychological fact that belief cannot be compelled. At the same time, he was well aware of the compelling power that religious and political fictions can have on the formation of our beliefs. I argue that Spinoza allows that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ fictions. His complex account of the imagination and fiction, and their disabling or enabling roles in gaining knowledge of Nature, is a site of disagreement among commentators. The novels of George Eliot (who translated Spinoza's works) represent a significant development for those who aim to resolve such disagreement in favour of the epistemic value of the imagination and fiction. Although Eliot agreed with Spinoza that belief cannot be compelled, she nevertheless affirmed the potential of certain kinds of fiction to be not only compelling but also edifying. The parallel reading of Eliot and Spinoza offered here raises the question of whether his philosophy can accommodate a theory of art in which the artist is seen to be capable of attaining and imparting dependable knowledge.     

Sartre and Spinoza on the nature of mind

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind.     

Error Detection, Task Characteristics, and Some Consequences for Software Design

On a étudié la détection des erreurs par les utilisateurs d'ordinateur à partir de la théorie de l'action. On a effectué, pour des raisons de validités externe et interne, à la fois une recherche sur le terrain et deux expériences de laboratoire exploitant un traitement de texte. La problématique portait sur le taux de détection de différents types d'erreurs, l'impact de la complexité de la tâche sur la détection des erreurs et la question de la détection programmée des erreurs. Les résultats débouchent sur un meilleur taux de détection (96,5%) dans la recherche de terrain (par rapport au taux obtenu dans les expériences). Les erreurs apparaissant dans les tâches complexes étaient plus difficiles à détecter. En outre, la moitié de la totalité des erreurs pouvaient être détectées par les seuls utilisateurs. Pas plus de 22% des erreurs étaient détectées avec l'aide du système informatique. Ce sont les erreurs dans les travaux complexes que la détection aidée par le système déjouait le plus difficilement. On propose, comme application pratique, une stratégie de gestion des erreurs qui ferait appel à un processus de traitement des erreurs relevant du software.