Lexical-gustatory synaesthesia: linguistic and conceptual factors

This study documents an unusual case of developmental synaesthesia, in which speech sounds induce an involuntary sensation of taste that is subjectively located in the mouth. JIW shows a highly structured, non-random relationship between particular combinations of phonemes (rather than graphemes) and the resultant taste, and this is influenced by a number of fine-grained phonemic properties (e.g. allophony, phoneme ordering). The synaesthesia is not found for environmental sounds. The synaesthesia, in its current form, is likely to have originated during vocabulary acquisition, since it is guided by learned linguistic and conceptual knowledge. The phonemes that trigger a given taste tend to also appear in the name of the corresponding foodstuff (e.g. /I/, /n/ and /s/ can trigger a taste of mince /mIns/) and there is often a semantic association between the triggering word and taste (e.g. the word blue tastes "inky"). The results suggest that synaesthesia does not simply reflect innate connections from one perceptual system to another, but that it can be mediated and/or influenced by a symbolic/conceptual level of representation.     

The linguistic and embodied nature of conceptual processing

Recent theories of cognition have argued that embodied experience is important for conceptual processing. Embodiment can be contrasted with linguistic factors such as the typical order in which words appear in language. Here, we report four experiments that investigated the conditions under which embodiment and linguistic factors determine performance. Participants made speeded judgments about whether pairs of words or pictures were semantically related or had an iconic relationship. The embodiment factor was operationalized as the degree to which stimulus pairs were presented in the spatial configurations in which they usually occur (i.e., an iconic configuration, e.g., attic presented above basement). The linguistic factor was operationalized as the frequency of the stimulus pairs in language. The embodiment factor predicted error rates and response time better for pictures, whereas the linguistic factor predicted error rates and response time better for words. These findings were modified by task, with the embodiment factor being strongest in iconicity judgments for pictures and the linguistic factor being strongest in semantic judgments for words. Both factors predicted error rates and response time for both semantic and iconicity judgments. These findings support the view that conceptual processing is both linguistic and embodied, with a bias for the embodiment or the linguistic factor depending on the nature of the task and the stimuli.     

Early conceptual and linguistic processes operate in independent channels

Language and concepts are intimately linked, but how do they interact? In the study reported here, we probed the relation between conceptual and linguistic processing at the earliest processing stages. We presented observers with sequences of visual scenes lasting 200 or 250 ms per picture. Results showed that observers understood and remembered the scenes' abstract gist and, therefore, their conceptual meaning. However, observers remembered the scenes at least as well when they simultaneously performed a linguistic secondary task (i.e., reading and retaining sentences); in contrast, a nonlinguistic secondary task (equated for difficulty with the linguistic task) impaired scene recognition. Further, encoding scenes interfered with performance on the nonlinguistic task and vice versa, but scene processing and performing the linguistic task did not affect each other. At the earliest stages of conceptual processing, the extraction of meaning from visually presented linguistic stimuli and the extraction of conceptual information from the world take place in remarkably independent channels.     

Monster character profiling and Chinese classifier cognition: linguistic and conceptual perspectives

In this research, we explored the construal of mythical creatures created out of ordinary animals by approaching the selection of Chinese classifiers zhi and ge. Monster figures as such are viewed ambiguously as an animal or as a novel entity. From the lexico-semantic perspective, we surveyed the co-occurrences of these two classifiers with two Chinese labels commonly used for monsters: guaishou and guaiwu, which provide lexical cues for the finely nuanced difference in (non-)/animate readings respectively. From the conceptual perspective, we examined the acceptability as to the uses of these two classifiers for the monster figures, the structures of which incurred different effects of novelty. We found that the (non-)/animal-like interpretation is encoded by zhi and ge at both the linguistic and conceptual layers. The findings of our work have implications for the relation of language and thought, our understanding of fictional world entities, and our understanding of classifier cognition.     

Hybrid analogies in conceptual innovation in science

Analogies are ubiquitous in science, both in theory and experiments. Based on an ethnographic study of a research lab in neural engineering, we focus on a case of conceptual innovation where the cross-breeding of two types of analogies led to a breakthrough. In vivo phenomena were recreated in two analogical forms: one, as an in vitro physical model, and the other, as a computational model of the first physical model. The computational model also embodied constraints drawn from the neuroscience and engineering literature. Cross connections and linkages were then made between these two analogical models, over time, to solve problems. We describe how the development of the intermediary, hybrid computational model led to a conceptual innovation, and subsequent engineering innovations. Using this case study, we highlight some of the peculiar features of such hybrid analogies that are now used widely in the sciences and engineering sciences, and the significant questions they raise for current theories of analogy.     

Measurement invariance,factor analysis and factorial invariance

Several concepts are introduced and defined: measurement invariance, structural bias, weak measurement invariance, strong factorial invariance, and strict factorial invariance. It is shown that factorial invariance has implications for (weak) measurement invariance. Definitions of fairness in employment/admissions testing and salary equity are provided and it is argued that strict factorial invariance is required for fairness/equity to exist. Implications for item and test bias are developed and it is argued that item or test bias probably depends on the existence of latent variables that are irrelevant to the primary goal of test constructers.Presidential address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Psychometric Society in Berkeley, California, June 18–20, 1993.     

Modality,invariance, and logical truth

Conclusion Let us sum up. We began with the question, What is the interest of a model-theoretic definition of validity? Model theoretic validity consists in truth under all reinterpretations of non-logical constants. In this paper, we have described for each necessity concept a corresponding modal invariance property. Exemplification of that property by the logical constants of a language leads to an explanation of the necessity, in the corresponding sense, of its valid sentences. I have fixed upon the epistemic modalities in characterizing the logical constants: to be a logical constant in the language of a population is to be invariant over a modality describing complete possible epistemic states of that population (or an idealized analogue thereof). The grounds for this characterization are these: (1) It leads, I believe, to an extensionally reasonable demarcation of the logical constants, including clear cases and excluding clear non-cases. It gives a principled criterion for deciding unclear cases. (2) It provides an analysis of the topic-neutrality of logic. (3) It leads to an explanation of the epistemic necessity of the logical truths in terms of the topic-neutrality of the logical constants.All the same, it is reasonable to ask, even if the suggested demarcation of logic is extensionally correct, whether it can reasonably be expected to be fundamental. The epistemic invariance of an expression is a rather striking property, one which we should want to explain. What is missing, then, is an explanation of the distinguishing epistemic properties of the constants in terms of more fundamental properties involving their understanding and use. It would be these that properly define the nature, not just the extent, of logic.     

Factor structure, measurement invariance and structural invariance of the MSCEIT V2.0

This study explored factor structure and measurement and structural invariance of the MSCEIT V2.0 across two age groups: 258 young (18-31 years) and 262 older adults (32-79 years). Results supported a three-factor solution reflecting the Experiential Emotional Intelligence area, and Understanding Emotions and Managing Emotions branches. There was evidence of measurement invariance of factor structure and factor loadings, and partial support for invariance of the intercepts. Comparisons of latent factor means suggested that older adults have significantly higher mean scores on two of the three factors: Understanding and Managing Emotions. Implications of the invariance tests and latent means analyses are discussed.     

Rationality,autonomy, and obedience to linguistic norms

Synthese - Many philosophers working today on the normativity of language have concluded that linguistic activity is not a matter of rule following. These conversations have been framed by a...