Myths, models, and metaphors: Religion as model and the philosophy of science

Clifford Geertz's widely-used paper ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, makes the claim that ‘the importance of religion lies in its capacity to serve … as a source of general, yet distinctive conceptions of the world, the self and the relations between them …—its model of aspect—and of rooted, no less distinctive “mental” dispositions—its model for aspect’. However, apart from a highly critical article by Nancy Frankenberry and Hans Penner (1999) little attempt has been made to investigate this understanding of religion as model. This paper briefly considers the validity of Frankenberry and Penner's criticism and investigates possible applications of the elaborate analysis of models and metaphors in the philosophy of science since the time of Mary Hesse to the analysis of religious phenomena.     

‘At home in the uncanny’: Freud's account of das Unheimliche in the context of his theory of religious belief

This paper serves as an exploration of Freud's comment that one of the functions of religious belief is to make humanity feel ‘at home in the uncanny’ (heimisch im Unheimlichen). The first section examines the context of Freud's comment within The Future of an Illusion. Attention is then shifted to Freud's essay on ‘The “Uncanny”’, and to his conclusion that the ‘uncanny’ is the name for everything that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light. A number of interpretations of the ‘at home’ remark are discussed, and it is suggested that religion might fruitfully be viewed as an attempt to come to terms with humanity's ‘transcendental homelessness’.     

“Experiences deemed religious”: Radical critique or temporary fix? Strategic ambiguity in Ann Taves’ Religious Experience Reconsidered

Ann Taves has written an interesting, lucid and informative book. In particular, the author’s suggested reformulation of religious studies as the study of “things deemed special” indicates a critical alternative to the dominant discourse. But such a reformulation implies that the ‘secular’ side of the mutually parasitic religion-secular binary also requires deconstruction. This in turn must surely lead to a critique of the representation of social psychology and related disciplines as ’natural science’, a representation which itself is already dependent on the wider, globalizing, ideological religion/secular binary, and its supernatural/natural correlate. The author’s ambiguous alternation between things deemed special and things deemed religious invites the discursive contours of ‘religion’ to re-enter through the back door, leaving the status quo substantially intact.     

The benefits of knowing what you know (and what you don’t): How calibration affects credibility

People tend to believe, and take advice from, informants who are highly confident. However, people use more than a mere “confidence heuristic.” We believe that confidence is influential because—in the absence of other information—people assume it is a valid cue to an informant’s likelihood of being correct. However, when people get evidence about an informant’s calibration (i.e., her confidence-accuracy relationship) they override reliance on confidence or accuracy alone. Two experiments in which participants choose between two opposing witnesses to a car accident show that neither confidence nor accuracy alone explains judgments of credibility; rather, whether a person is seen as credible ultimately depends on whether the person demonstrates good calibration. Credibility depends on whether sources were justified in believing what they believed.     

What makes a hypothetical construct “hypothetical”? Tracing the origins and uses of the ‘hypothetical construct’ concept in psychological science

The “hypothetical construct” has been an important concept in philosophy of science for the past half century. References to the concept date as far back as 1943 (Loomba, 1943). Inconsistencies in the use of the term and the related ‘intervening variable’ concept prompted MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) to distinguish the two concepts and propose conventions for their employment in psychological discourse. They recommended that ‘hypothetical construct’ designates theoretical concepts that “refer to processes or entities that are not directly observed” and, thus, fail to meet the requirements of intervening variables (p. 104). It is interesting to speculate what makes a hypothetical construct “hypothetical.” The motivation for attaching “hypothetical” to constructs is not always immediately apparent. The aim of this paper is to trace the origins of the expression ‘hypothetical construct’, delineate its employment in psychology, and explore the ontological and epistemological presuppositions that underlie conceptions of hypothetical constructs.     

What it takes: Ability,demographic, bright and dark side trait correlates of years to promotion

Over 6000 adult managers attending an assessment centre completed a battery of tests including a ‘bright side’ personality trait measure (NEO-PI-R); a ‘dark side’/disorders measure (HDS), an ability test (GMA) and also specified, in detail, how long it had been before they were promoted to a managerial role, and also, where appropriate to a senior managerial role. Correlation analyses showed shorter times to promotion were associated with low Neuroticism, high Extraversion, high Conscientiousness, and high Intelligence, as well as being high on Bold and Colourful, but low on Cautious, Reserved and Leisurely “dark side” traits. Regressions showed the higher-order, dark side factors named “Moving against” people positively, and “Away from” and “Moving toward” people negatively, were associated with promotions. Implications for the selection and management of people, as well as limitations of this study are considered.     

The meaning of “significance” for different types of research [translated and annotated by Eric-Jan Wagenmakers,Denny Borsboom,Josine Verhagen,Rogier Kievit,Marjan Bakker,Angelique Cramer,Dora Matzke,Don Mellenbergh,and Han L. J. van der Maas]

Adrianus Dingeman de Groot (1914–2006) was one of the most influential Dutch psychologists. He became famous for his work “Thought and Choice in Chess”, but his main contribution was methodological — De Groot co-founded the Department of Psychological Methods at the University of Amsterdam (together with R. F. van Naerssen), founded one of the leading testing and assessment companies (CITO), and wrote the monograph “Methodology” that centers on the empirical-scientific cycle: observation–induction–deduction–testing–evaluation. Here we translate one of De Groot's early articles, published in 1956 in the Dutch journal Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie en Haar Grensgebieden. This article is more topical now than it was almost 60 years ago. De Groot stresses the difference between exploratory and confirmatory (“hypothesis testing”) research and argues that statistical inference is only sensible for the latter: “One ‘is allowed’ to apply statistical tests in exploratory research, just as long as one realizes that they do not have evidential impact”. De Groot may have also been one of the first psychologists to argue explicitly for preregistration of experiments and the associated plan of statistical analysis. The appendix provides annotations that connect De Groot's arguments to the current-day debate on transparency and reproducibility in psychological science.     

Language can mediate eye movement control within 100 milliseconds, regardless of whether there is anything to move the eyes to

The delay between the signal to move the eyes, and the execution of the corresponding eye movement, is variable, and skewed; with an early peak followed by a considerable tail. This skewed distribution renders the answer to the question “What is the delay between language input and saccade execution?” problematic; for a given task, there is no single number, only a distribution of numbers. Here, two previously published studies are reanalysed, whose designs enable us to answer, instead, the question: How long does it take, as the language unfolds, for the oculomotor system to demonstrate sensitivity to the distinction between “signal” (eye movements due to the unfolding language) and “noise” (eye movements due to extraneous factors)? In two studies, participants heard either ‘the man…’ or ‘the girl…’, and the distribution of launch times towards the concurrently, or previously, depicted man in response to these two inputs was calculated. In both cases, the earliest discrimination between signal and noise occurred at around 100 ms. This rapid interplay between language and oculomotor control is most likely due to cancellation of about-to-be executed saccades towards objects (or their episodic trace) that mismatch the earliest phonological moments of the unfolding word.     

Atheism is only skin deep: Geertz and Markússon rely mistakenly on sociodemographic data as meaningful indicators of underlying cognition

Cognitive scientists of religion and evolutionary theorists alike have been increasingly arguing in recent years that religion is “natural” in the sense of being motivated by core, evolved psychological intuitions. Atheism, and irreligion more generally, appear to pose problems for the naturalness hypothesis, especially considering the significant proportion of people in contemporary societies who reject supernatural beliefs. Although Geertz and Markússon clarify why the naturalness hypothesis does not imply religious determinism, they fail to weigh adequately the more conservative prediction, that of religious probabilism. Furthermore, unlike cognitive scientific accounts favoring the naturalness hypothesis, the authors base their arguments for the cultural scaffolding of atheistic cognition on sociodemographic data alone—a source that is unlikely to be a meaningful reflection of “natural” underlying cognitive processes.     

“Symbol formation and the embodied self: A microgenetic case-study examination of the transition to symbolic communication in scribbling activities from 14 to 31 months of age”

In this article, a theoretical account for the early formation and production of graphic symbols is presented, along with an illustrative microgenetic case study that focuses on those key mechanisms related to the progressive formation of complex graphic schemata and on the underlying emerging transitions in the signifier-signified relation. This account proposes that the development of symbolic graphic functioning follows a series of recursive loops between action and production that gradually enable the fundamental distinction between instrumental action and perceived intentional production. Scribbling dynamics via mirroring processes push the child’s primary reactive space to be converted into the child’s interactive experiential space and in turn mapped on and gradually transformed to the “secondary-pictorial,” communicative/expressive space, which also controls its manifestation. Scribbling, then, may be the underlying basis for the emergence of the first “symbolic articulation” of an embodied action representation—“natural-symbol,” of the self and the world/other. These first undifferentiated “natural” symbols (i.e., image schemata), mostly seen as superfluous or motor devices to drawing, stand as the cornerstones of drawing symbolic development, since they function as the “missing” link between action, production, perception, visual representation, and symbol formation. In other words, scribbling, by its embodied anchor that substitutes the event/object, sustains the ability to coordinate action representations so as to become “schematized” reciprocally, initiating in turn conscious control and self-referential intentionality.     

Perspective et actualité de Pierre Janet sur les possessions et les extases mystiques

Pierre Janet (1859–1947), a professor of psychology at the collège de France (1901–1934) and the founder of the French Psychological Society in 1901, took interest in the psychology of religion very young and then all along his career. At age 15, a painful crisis of doubts changes him: he becomes atheistic and above all, gains a passion for the psychology of belief (Prévost, 1973). After his “aggregation” degree, he starts examining and curing people with mental diseases at the hospital in Le Havre. Within six years, his works would build the reference synthesis on the “dissociation of the personality”. But the dissociation process is tightly bounded to the properties of belief (L’automatisme psychologique, 1889). The presentation of his famous case “Achille” (1891–1898) possessed “by the devil” will stand for Janet as a textbook case about religious dissociation, and he will consider his successful treatment of this patient as a “modern exorcism” (Névroses et idées fixes, 1898). The famous mystic “Madeleine” who suffered from psychasthenia provided him the opportunity to precise the links between religious phenomena and the properties of belief. Madeleine's oscillations between torture, void and ecstasy, pertain to “tension” variations that directly impact her belief according to their stage – asseritive or reflected – on the Janetian hierarchy ( Janet, 1926–1928). In the second part of his life and career, where Janet takes time to think about his models and practice, he paints a large picture of the evolution of the “self” (L’Évolution psychologique de la personnalité, Janet, 1929) and extends his analysis to traditional cultures where the bounds of the self is more variable, the personality being able to include spirits within itself. The inclusion in the DSM III, of “dissociative troubles” in 1980, for its first atheoretic release, is visibly drawn upon Janet's English writings ( 0175, 0215 and 0070). Following this introduction, a great body of international studies took Janet's modelization and results into consideration (except in France). In 1994, the DSM-IV also adds the dissociative transe disorder category (DTD), which includes religious possession by demons or spirits: this leads to the development of international studies on the psychology of religion within a transcultural frame. After being forgotten for years, the experimental results of Pierre Janet currently undergo an important excavation thanks to recent psychological research, and prove their relevance to contribute to contemporary debates.     

Religion is natural, atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by-product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics.     

Playing on the typewriter, typing on the piano: manipulation knowledge of objects

Two experiments investigated sensory/motor-based functional knowledge of man-made objects: manipulation features associated with the actual usage of objects. In Experiment 1, a series of prime-target pairs was presented auditorily, and participants were asked to make a lexical decision on the target word. Participants made a significantly faster decision about the target word (e.g. ‘typewriter’) following a related prime that shared manipulation features with the target (e.g. ‘piano’) than an unrelated prime (e.g. ‘blanket’). In Experiment 2, participants' eye movements were monitored when they viewed a visual display on a computer screen while listening to a concurrent auditory input. Participants were instructed to simply identify the auditory input and touch the corresponding object on the computer display. Participants fixated an object picture (e.g. “typewriter”) related to a target word (e.g. ‘piano’) significantly more often than an unrelated object picture (e.g. “bucket”) as well as a visually matched control (e.g. “couch”). Results of the two experiments suggest that manipulation knowledge of words is retrieved without conscious effort and that manipulation knowledge constitutes a part of the lexical-semantic representation of objects.     

In conversation with J. Philippe Rushton

The interview covers Rushton’s background in England, South Africa, and Canada, his education at the University of London (B.Sc., 1970; Ph.D., 1973), and his early research (1970–1980) on the social learning of generosity in 7- to 11-year olds. In his first book, Altruism, socialization, and society (1980), Rushton solved two “anomalies” for his social learning perspective—altruism in animals and traits in people—causing a “paradigm shift” for him toward sociobiology. He spent January to June 1981 at the University of California, Berkeley, to study the longitudinal stability of personality traits like altruism. There, he was influenced by Jensen’s work on g and race differences in rate of maturation and two-egg twinning. Subsequently, Rushton found that across 60 variables, Europeans fall between East Asians and Africans, closer to East Asians. He extrapolated Wilson’s (fast–slow) r-K life history theory to explain the pattern. Also covered is Rushton’s research on the heritability of altruism, and Genetic Similarity Theory explaining assortative mating and ethnic nepotism. Spouses and best friends are as similar as half-siblings and people randomly chosen from the same ethnic group are as related as first cousins. Altruism follows lines of similarity to replicate genes effectively. Rushton’s research on creativity is described.     

Developments in Spiritual Care of the Dying

Care of the dying is likely to be a useful indicator of trends in Christianity, a religion which for centuries has been deeply concerned with the problem of death. The article identifies three approaches to the spiritual dimension in contemporary terminal care—a religious approach, an ecclesiastical approach and an approach that identifies the spiritual as the search for meaning. Though the ecclesiastical approach dominates practice, the ‘meaning’ approach is becoming fashionable and represents a highly individualized, postmodern variety of religion with similarities to the New Age—a surprising conjunction in those hospices with a Christian foundation.     

When global structure "Explains Away" local grammar: a Bayesian account of rule-induction in tone sequences

While many constraints on learning must be relatively experience-independent, past experience provides a rich source of guidance for subsequent learning. Discovering structure in some domain can inform a learner’s future hypotheses about that domain. If a general property accounts for particular sub-patterns, a rational learner should not stipulate separate explanations for each detail without additional evidence, as the general structure has “explained away” the original evidence. In a grammar-learning experiment using tone sequences, manipulating learners’ prior exposure to a tone environment affects their sensitivity to the grammar-defining feature, in this case consecutive repeated tones. Grammar-learning performance is worse if context melodies are “smooth” — when small intervals occur more than large ones — as Smoothness is a general property accounting for a high rate of repetition. We present an idealized Bayesian model as a “best case” benchmark for learning repetition grammars. When context melodies are Smooth, the model places greater weight on the small-interval constraint, and does not learn the repetition rule as well as when context melodies are not Smooth, paralleling the human learners. These findings support an account of abstract grammar-induction in which learners rationally assess the statistical evidence for underlying structure based on a generative model of the environment.     

Kuhn and the science of religion

Ever since the challenge to the ‘received’ view of the philosophy of science—a view epitomized by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel—the status of science has been questioned. If radical critics of the received view—critics including Kuhn, Laudan, Feyerabend, the Edinburgh Strong Programme, and Latour—are right, can science, which means natural science, still be considered objective? Can it still be deemed the model of objectivity to be emulated by the social sciences and even by the humanities? Because religious studies is commonly assumed to fall short of the standards of objectivity of the natural sciences and even of the social sciences, what bearing does criticism of conventional philosophy of science have on it? Specifically, can the religionist approach to religion, the approach that purports to be the sole appropriate one for religious studies, be defended? Does radical philosophy of science, by challenging the objectivity of scientific claims, make the world safe for religious ones? This article will focus on the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn and will seek to determine what use defenders of religious studies can make of it.     

Counter-stereotypic beliefs in math do not protect school girls from stereotype threat

The threat of being negatively stereotyped in math impairs performance of highly qualified females on difficult math tests, a phenomenon known as “stereotype threat”—ST. Perhaps more alarmingly, recent studies based on unselective samples of elementary-, middle-, and high-school students show that ST also operates in girls from the general population. Here we offer first evidence that ST does operate (with large effect sizes) even in middle-school girls who deny the negative gender stereotype. Children’s beliefs about the two genders math ability, therefore, do not necessarily moderate their susceptibility to ST, an important issue that remained unclear so far. This new finding is also of great practical significance: School girls’ counter-stereotypic beliefs cannot be taken as sufficient evidence for deciding whether the struggle against ST is or is not needed. Appropriate interventions should be the default option when aiming for true gender equality in math and science achievements.