Evaluating the unequal-variance and dual-process explanations of zROC slopes with response time data and the diffusion model

We tested two explanations for why the slope of the z-transformed receiver operating characteristic (zROC) is less than 1 in recognition memory: the unequal-variance account (target evidence is more variable than lure evidence) and the dual-process account (responding reflects both a continuous familiarity process and a threshold recollection process). These accounts are typically implemented in signal detection models that do not make predictions for response time (RT) data. We tested them using RT data and the diffusion model. Participants completed multiple study/test blocks of an "old"/"new" recognition task with the proportion of targets and the test varying from block to block (.21, .32, .50, .68, or .79 targets). The same participants completed sessions with both speed-emphasis and accuracy-emphasis instructions. zROC slopes were below one for both speed and accuracy sessions, and they were slightly lower for speed. The extremely fast pace of the speed sessions (mean RT=526) should have severely limited the role of the slower recollection process relative to the fast familiarity process. Thus, the slope results are not consistent with the idea that recollection is responsible for slopes below 1. The diffusion model was able to match the empirical zROC slopes and RT distributions when between-trial variability in memory evidence was greater for targets than for lures, but missed the zROC slopes when target and lure variability were constrained to be equal. Therefore, unequal variability in continuous evidence is supported by RT modeling in addition to signal detection modeling. Finally, we found that a two-choice version of the RTCON model could not accommodate the RT distributions as successfully as the diffusion model.     

Do changes in the subjective experience of recognition over time suggest independent processes?

Two experiments examined the nature of recognition memory by asking how subjective reports of remembering change over time. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to report their experience of remembering using the well‐known remember–know–guess procedure. Estimates of recollection declined over a 14‐day period, but estimates of familiarity remained constant, suggesting that the processes are independent. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to report their confidence in their recognition decisions. Subjective reports of confidence were analysed via receiver operating characteristics and also indicated different rates of decline for recollection and familiarity. Superficially, the data appear to support a dual‐process account of recognition, but close inspection shows the data to be consistent with a simple signal detection model. The conclusion is that although the phenomenal experience of remembering changes over time this is most likely to be predicated on a single process.     

Effects of retention intervals on receiver operating characteristics in artificial grammar learning

Current theories of memory suggest that recognition is composed of separate processes of familiarity and recollection (e.g. [Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The nature of recollection and familiarity: a review of 30 years of research. Journal of Memory and Language, 46, 441-517]). A key feature of these two processes is that they decay, or are forgotten at different rates. The dual-process model has also been useful in understanding artificial grammar learning. We obtained evidence for recollection and familiarity in artificial grammar learning by analyses of receiver operating characteristics (ROC). Furthermore we found that these were dissociated by retention intervals of 14 days. The slope of the zROC curves deviated reliably from 1 immediately after study and increased towards 1 suggesting that recollection contributed to recognition decisions but declined over the 14-day period leaving familiarity as the only basis for recognition. These data show similar patterns to those observed in word-recognition [Gardiner, J. M., & Java, R. I. (1991). Forgetting in recognition memory with and without recollective experience. Memory &Cognition, 19, 617-623; Tunney, R. J. (submitted for publication). Changes in the subjective experience of recognition over time suggest independent processes] and confirm the view that recollection and familiarity are implicated in artificial grammar learning. Moreover, the data confirm the finding that recollection and familiarity-based memory show different patterns of forgetting.     

Retrieval dynamics in recognition and list discrimination: Further evidence of separate processes of familiarity and recall

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that the time course of retrieval from memory is different for familiarity and recall. The response-signal method was used to compare memory retrieval dynamics in yes-no recognition memory, as a measure of familiarity, with those of list discrimination, as a measure of contextual recall. Responses were always made with regard to membership in two previous study lists. In Experiment 1 an exclusion task requiring positive responses to words from one list and negative responses to new words and words from the nontarget list was used. In Experiment 2, recognition and list discrimination were separate tasks. Retrieval curves from both experiments were consistent, showing that the minimal retrieval time for recognition was about 100 msec faster than that for list discrimination. Repetition affected asymptotic performance but had no reliable effects on retrieval dynamics in either the recognition or the list-discrimination task.     

Differential effects of list strength on recollection and familiarity

Numerous studies have found a null list strength effect (LSE) for recognition sensitivity: Strengthening memory traces associated with some studied items does not impair recognition of nonstrengthened studied items. In Experiment 1, the author found a LSE using receiver operating characteristic-based measures of recognition sensitivity. To account for the discrepancy between this and prior research, the author (a) argues that a LSE occurs for recollection but not for discrimination based on familiarity, and (b) presents self-report data consistent with this hypothesis. Experiment 2 tested the dual-process hypothesis more directly, using switched-plurality (SP) lures to isolate the contribution of recollection. There was a significant LSE for comparisons involving SP lures; the LSE for discrimination of studied items and nominally unrelated lures (which can be supported by familiarity) was not significant.     

The subjective experience of retrieval-induced forgetting

The objective was to examine whether the lower accessibility of studied items (Rp?) that follows retrieval practice with studied items from the same category (Rp+; retrieval-induced forgetting) is correctly monitored by our cognitive system. If monitored, lower confidence for Rp? items would be expected which, in turn, would allow the control of the retrieval-induced forgetting through the report option. In Experiment 1 the standard retrieval-practice paradigm with categorised word lists was followed by a recognition test with confidence rating and the option to report or withhold the answer. Accuracy showed retrieval-induced forgetting, but there were no differences in confidence. The report option did not affect retrieval-induced forgetting. The confidence–accuracy dissociation could be due to a correct monitoring of the retrieval-induced forgetting joined with a factor that incorrectly increases confidence for Rp? items. Familiarity with the practised category was proposed as this factor and tested in Experiment 2. Despite presenting the categories more times during the retrieval-practice phase to increase their familiarity, confidence ratings were unaffected. In conclusion, this research suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting was not monitored, giving rise to a confidence–accuracy dissociation.     

Old processes,new perspectives: Familiarity is correlated with (not independent of) recollection and is more (not equally) variable for targets than for lures

According to dual-process models of memory, recognition is subserved by two processes: recollection and familiarity. Many variants of these models assume that recollection and familiarity make stochastically independent contributions to performance in recognition tasks and that the variance of the familiarity signal is equal for targets and for lures. Here, we challenge these ‘common-currency’ assumptions. Using a model-comparison approach, featuring the Continuous Dual Process (CDP; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) model as the protagonist, we show that when these assumptions are relaxed, the model’s fits to individual participants’ data improve. Furthermore, our analyses reveal that across items, recollection and familiarity show a positive correlation. Interestingly, this across-items correlation was dissociated from an across-participants correlation between the sensitivities of these processes. We also find that the familiarity signal is significantly more variable for targets than for lures. One striking theoretical implication of these findings is that familiarity—rather than recollection, as most models assume—may be the main contributor responsible for one of the most influential findings of recognition memory, that of subunit zROC slopes. Additionally, we show that erroneously adopting the common-currency assumptions, introduces severe biases to estimates of recollection and familiarity.     

Familiarity is related to conceptual implicit memory: An examination of individual differences

Explicit memory is thought to be distinct from implicit memory. However, growing evidence has indicated that explicit familiarity-based recognition memory judgments rely on the same process that supports conceptual implicit memory. We tested this hypothesis by examining individual differences using a paradigm wherein we measured both familiarity and conceptual implicit memory within the same participants. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we examined recognition memory confidence ROCs and remember/know responses, respectively, to estimate recollection and familiarity, and used a free association task to measure conceptual implicit memory. The results demonstrated that, across participants, familiarity, but not recollection, was significantly correlated with conceptual priming. In contrast, in Experiment 2, utilizing a similar paradigm, a comparison of recognition memory ROCs and explicit associative cued-recall performance indicated that cued recall was related to both recollection and familiarity. These results are consistent with models assuming that familiarity-based recognition and conceptual implicit memory rely on similar underlying processes.     

Recognition and position information in working memory for visual textures

In three experiments, we examined connections between item-recognition memory and memory for item-position information. With sequences of compound gratings as study and probe items, subjects made either item-position judgments (Experiments 1 and 2), by identifying the serial position of the study item that matched the probe, or recognition judgments (Experiment 3), by judging whether the probe had or had not been presented in the study series. Integrating a summed-similarity account of recognition into a signal detection framework shows that the variance of summed similarities on lure trials (probe not present in the study series) exceeds the variance on target trials (probe present in the study series). This prediction is borne out by the empirical zROC functions, all of which had slopes that were greater than 1. Additionally, about 25% of correct recognitions were accompanied by incorrect item position identification. Misidentifications of item position arose from two sources--structural similarity and positional similarity-which combined in an approximately additive fashion.     

How similar is false recognition to veridical recognition objectively and subjectively?

Three recognition memory experiments were conducted using modified Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) and DRM paradigms. In Experiment 1, the reaction time (RT) of the false alarms to critical nonpresented words (false memory) was compared with the RT of hits to the critical presented words and with the RT of hits to the studied list words (true memory). The RT of the false alarms to the critical nonpresented words was significantly longer than that of the hits to the critical words and than that of the studied list words. In Experiment 2, in addition to RT, participants' confidence level was measured on a 4-point scale for a yes or no response. Confidence rating was significantly higher for the hits to the critical presented words and to the list words than for the false alarms to the critical non-presented words. Experiment 3 further showed that how similar false memory experience was to that of true memory was a function of retention size (number of lists of words retained in memory). In all three experiments, the participants' recognition RTs distinguished false memory from veridical memory, and in Experiments 2 and 3, so did their confidence ratings. Therefore, false memory and veridical memory differ at both the objective and the subjective levels. The results are consistent with a single familiarity dimension model of recognition memory.     

The ability of familiarity, disruption, and the relative strength of nonenvironmental context cues to explain unreliable environmental-context-dependent memory effects in free recall

The ability of environmental-context (EC) familiarity, movement disruption, and the relative strength of memory cues to explain unreliable EC-dependent free-recall memory effects was examined in two experiments. Experiment 1 replicated Smith's (1979, Experiment 1) results confirming that familiarity and disruption cannot account for free-recall EC-reinstatement effects. In Experiment 2, a level of processing manipulation varied stimulus item memory cue strengths, and memory was again assessed by free recall. Contrary to Murnane and Phelps's (1995) and Dougal and Rotello's (1999) recognition findings, an EC-reinstatement effect was observed with low, but not high, levels of processing. However, comparisons across the two experiments revealed inconsistencies with the relative cue strength hypothesis. Consequently, a variant of the relative cue strength hypothesis that highlights the role of retrieval processes was proposed to explain the interaction between the levels of processing and the EC-reinstatement effect.     

The impact of aging on associative memory for preexisting unitized associations

Aging is accompanied by a decline in associative memory that can, however, be attenuated when associations are unitized at encoding, that is, when they form an integrated entity. Unitization is thought to promote familiarity-based recognition memory, which is preserved in aging. We examined whether preexperimentally unitized associations (compound words (CWs)) do indeed reduce age differences in memory, and whether preexperimental unitization promotes familiarity. In Experiment 1, we assessed the memory of 20 young and 20 older participants for compound versus unrelated word pairs using a yes/no recognition test with Remember/Know/Guess judgments. In Experiment 2, we tested 20 young and 20 older participants using the same procedure, except for the use of a two-alternative forced-choice recognition paradigm, which is thought to enhance the contribution of familiarity. The results of both experiments corroborated the greater contribution of familiarity to recognition of unitized associations. In Experiment 1, however, the use of CWs did not attenuate the age-related associative decline. We suggest that preexisting knowledge associated with recombined compounds induced high absolute familiarity and illusory recollection, leading to high false-recognition rates for the older adults. By contrast, the two groups performed similarly across both conditions in Experiment 2. Thus, the forced-choice procedure facilitates the use of familiarity in such a way that it improves older adults’ associative memory to the level of young participants. These results suggest that the modulation of associative memory in aging by preexisting unitization varies according to methodological parameters, such as the nature of the lures and the test format.     

Apparent reversals of a rotating mask: a new demonstration of cognition in perception.

A mask of a face rotated about its vertical axis of symmetry can appear to oscillate rather than rotate. Do stimulus features (e.g., shape) or cognitive factors (e.g., differential familiarity with convex and concave views of faces) explain this new illusion? In Experiment 1, differential familiarity was varied across stimuli by using familiar and unfamiliar objects rotating at 4 rpm and within stimuli by showing the objects upright and inverted. True motion was seen more with unfamiliar objects than with familiar objects and more with an inverted mask than with an upright mask. The results of Experiment 2, which was done with static views, suggest that the upright and inverted masks present similar structure to the visual system. In Experiment 3, the objects were shown rotating at 8 rpm; the results are similar to those of Experiment 1. These experiments favor a differential familiarity account of this illusory motion. Cognitive constraints on perceived motion and perceived rigidity are discussed.     

Apparent reversals of a rotating mask: A new demonstration of cognition in perception

A mask of a face rotated about its vertical axis of symmetry can appear to oscillate rather than rotate. Do stimulus features (e.g., shape) or cognitive factors (e.g., differential familiarity with convex and concave views of faces) explain this new illusion? In Experiment 1, differential familiarity was varied across stimuli by using familiar and unfamiliar objects rotating at 4 rpm and within stimuli by showing the objects upright and inverted. True motion was seen more with unfamiliar objects than with familiar objects and more with an inverted mask than with an upright mask. The results of Experiment 2, which was done with static views, suggest that the upright and inverted masks present similar structure to the visual system. In Experiment 3, the objects were shown rotating at 8 rpm; the results are similar to those of Experiment 1. These experiments favor a differential familiarity account of this illusory motion. Cognitive constraints on perceived motion and perceived rigidity are discussed.     

从整合的角度看联结记忆中的项目再认

联结记忆由三种成分构成：项目1, 项目2以及项目1-项目2之间的联结, 其中, 对项目1和项目2的再认称之为项目再认, 而对项目1-项目2之间联结的再认称之为联结再认。双加工理论认为项目再认可以由熟悉性和回想加工来完成, 而联结再认只能由回想加工来完成。但近期有大量的研究发现：当要学习的项目对被整合为一个新的整体表征时, 熟悉性也能够支持联结再认。而关于整合对联结记忆中项目再认的研究较少, 总结已有研究提出两种观点：一种是“只有受益”观点(benefits-only)认为整合在增加联结再认的同时不影响项目再认; 另一种是“收支平衡”观点(costs and benefits)认为整合增加联结再认是以牺牲项目再认为代价的。未来研究应该关注整合对联结记忆中项目再认的影响及其神经机制, 了解整合对联结再认和项目再认的具体作用, 有助于针对具体记忆任务选择合适的编码方式来提高记忆表现。     

Recollection can be weak and familiarity can be strong

The remember-know procedure is widely used to investigate recollection and familiarity in recognition memory, but almost all of the results obtained with that procedure can be readily accommodated by a unidimensional model based on signal-detection theory. The unidimensional model holds that remember judgments reflect strong memories (associated with high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction times), whereas know judgments reflect weaker memories (associated with lower confidence, lower accuracy, and slower reaction times). Although this is invariably true on average, a new 2-dimensional account (the continuous dual-process model) suggests that remember judgments made with low confidence should be associated with lower old-new accuracy but higher source accuracy than know judgments made with high confidence. We tested this prediction--and found evidence to support it--using a modified remember-know procedure in which participants were first asked to indicate a degree of recollection-based or familiarity-based confidence for each word presented on a recognition test and were then asked to recollect the color (red or blue) and screen location (top or bottom) associated with the word at study. For familiarity-based decisions, old-new accuracy increased with old-new confidence, but source accuracy did not (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of familiarity). For recollection-based decisions, both old-new accuracy and source accuracy increased with old-new confidence (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of recollection). These findings suggest that recollection and familiarity are continuous processes and that participants can indicate which process mainly contributed to their recognition decisions.     

Haven't we met before? The effect of facial familiarity on repetition priming

Within the word recognition literature, word‐frequency and hence familiarity has been shown to affect the degree of repetition priming. The current paper reports two experiments which examine whether familiarity also affects the degree of repetition priming for faces. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed that familiarity did moderate the degree of priming in a face recognition task. Low familiarity faces were primed to a significantly greater degree than high familiarity faces in terms of accuracy, speed, and efficiency of processing. Experiment 2 replicated these results but additionally, demonstrated that familiarity moderates priming for name recognition as well as face recognition. These results can be accommodated within both a structural account of repetition priming ( Burton, Bruce & Johnston, 1990 ) and an Episodic Memory account of repetition priming (see Roediger, 1990 ), and are discussed in terms of a common mechanism for priming, learning and the representation of familiarity.     

The Role of Memory in the Relationship between Affect and Familiarity

Abstract

Two previous studies have demonstrated that stimuli which elicit affect are seen as more familiar than stimuli that elicit little or no affect, but it is not clear why this effect occurs. To begin to understand the effect, the question of whether it is due to improved memory for affect-eliciting stimuli was examined. Recognition judgements were obtained for faces that varied in the strength and valence of affect elicited. Improved memory for affect-eliciting faces was not observed. Instead, the results show a bias to claim recognition for faces that are especially likely to elicit affect, whether or not those faces have been seen before, suggesting that affect can induce a sense of familiarity. The finding of a previous study indicating that both positive and negative affect increase perceived familiarity was replicated. The relevance of the results to an understanding of basic affective processes and processes involved in the assessment of familiarity is discussed. An explanation which can account for the data is proposed.     

Positivity can cue familiarity

Given that familiarity is closely associated with positivity, the authors sought evidence for the idea that positivity would increase perceived familiarity. In Experiment 1, smiling and thus positively perceived novel faces were significantly more likely to be incorrectly judged as familiar than novel faces with neutral expressions. In Experiment 2, subliminal association with positive affect (a positively valenced prime) led to false recognition of novel words as familiar. In Experiment 3, validity judgments, known to be influenced by familiarity, were more likely to occur if participants were in happy mood states than neutral mood states. Despite their different paradigms and approaches, the results of these three studies converge on the idea that, at least under certain circumstances, the experience of positivity itself can signal familiarity, perhaps because the experience of familiarity is typically positive.