Automated preference testing apparatus for rating palatability of foods

An electronic preference testing apparatus is described for measuring taste preference of rodents and other small animals with solid or liquid foods. The apparatus is designed on the principle of the two-choice, preference technique. It operates photoelectrically with a sequence of presentations so that whenever a subject eats from a compartmentalized food tray, a standard and a test food are each briefly sampled alone before both foods are presented together (in alternate positions) for preference determination. Preferences are automatically recorded on digital counters. The apparatus is built in two modules (a preference tester and the master control) connected by multiconductor cable. The modular design provides portability and isolation of the animals from the major noise-producing components. Diagrams of the apparatus are given, and test results from a trial that evaluated positional bias and a sucrose-concentration preference experiment are presented to demonstrate its application in research.     

An automated odor test for rats

The odor-testing apparatus described consists of a circular open-field area opening into four glass tubes, each with an odor source at the far end. When a rat is introduced, each tube is blocked by a grid; when the rat has touched each grid (sampled each odor), the tubes automatically open and recording of preference behavior starts. Two measures of preference are recorded by a photocell outside each tube, the number of visits and the time spent near the odor source. A uniformity test with food odor in all tubes showed that the apparatus did not promote position bias. In two separate sensitivity tests, one with food odor and one with estrous female urine odor, male rats significantly preferred an attractive odor in one tube to odorless controls. The apparatus yields relatively sensitive and reliable odor preference determinations by ensuring sampling of each odor before data are recorded and by eliminating visual, auditory and gustatory cues.     

Incentive properties of sucrose and saccharin under different deprivation conditions

In Expt 1 it was found that hungry rats developed a 100% preference for 8% sucrose over water in a maze-choice situation, whereas thirsty rats developed no preference. When deprivation conditions for the two groups were reversed the pattern of preference relations also reversed. In a 2nd experiment nondeprived rats developed a preference for either 8% sucrose or 0.2% saccharin over water while thirsty Ss did not develop a preference for either of these over water. The results are discussed in terms of incentive theory.     

Hand preference status and reach kinematics in infants

Infants show age-related improvements in reach straightness and smoothness over the first years of life as well as a decrease in average movement speed. This period of changing kinematics overlaps the emergence of handedness. We examined whether infant hand preference status is related to the development of motor control in 53 infants ranging from 11 to 14 months old. Hand preference status was assessed from reaching to a set of 5 objects presented individually at the infant's midline; infants were classified into ‘right preference’ or ‘no preference’ groups. Three-dimensional (3-D) recordings were made of each arm for reaches under two distinct conditions: pick up a ball and fit it into the opening of a toy (grasp-to-place task) or pick up a Cheerio^® and consume it (grasp-to-eat task). Contrary to expectations, there was no effect of hand preference status on reach smoothness or straightness for either task. On the grasp-to-eat task only, average speed of the left hand differed as a function of hand preference status. Infants in the no preference group exhibited higher left hand average speeds than infants in the right preference group. Our results suggest that while behavioral differences in the use of the two hands may be present in some infants, these differences do not appear to be systematically linked to biases in motor control of the arms early in development.     

The effects of perceptual pretraining on concept identification and preference

The effects of perceptual pretraining on preferences and concept identification performance in five- and eight-year-old Ss were investigated. The results indicated that perceptual pretraining facilitated performance on a concept identification task with a non-preferred relevant cue for the five-year-olds, but not for the eight-year-olds. However, perceptual pretraining did not affect preference in either age group and Ss were as consistent in their preference responding before and after perceptual pretraining as was a control group that had not received perceptual pretraining. Preferences were highly consistent in both age groups over a one week period. Perceptual pretraining was interpreted to increase the usability of the less preferred dimensions for the younger Ss, and to leave the affective preference response unaltered in both groups.     

Evidence of observer reliability for the Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence (FTII)

To obtain estimates of observer reliability, the Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence (FTII) apparatus was modified to allow the infants' performance to be videotaped. Based upon results of 25 infants scored once during time of testing and again 2 years later using the videotape version, interobserver and intraobserver reliabilities obtained for percent novelty preference (test rounds), total number of looks (familiarization and test rounds), and mean fixation (familiarization and test rounds) were mostly very high for each round (M r = .92, SD = .04). The videotaped infants' scores did not differ significantly from those of a comparable sample of infants who were tested using an unmodified apparatus.     

Eye-tracking the cancellation and focus model for preference judgments

By means of a relatively new eye-tracking method that allows for a test situation much closer to reality, we recorded and examined gaze time and fixation number within the cancellation and focus paradigm, a feature-matching model for preference judgments between two alternatives. In line with the cancellation and focus model we found that when subjects encountered the second option in each pair, shared features were canceled out and thus given less consideration whereas unique features were focused on more. We also investigated the role of feature attractiveness as a second important factor in preference judgments and found a U-shaped relationship between attractiveness and visual consideration intensity; that is, attractive and unattractive features received more attention than did those of intermediate attractiveness. Finally, we tested the ability of two models, Franklin’s rule and the WReSt (Weighted Recalled Stepwise Comparing) heuristic, to predict the preference ratings.     

Interdependent preferences on finite sets

The degree of interdependence of a preference relation ? on a finite subset X of a product set X₁ × X₂ × … × X_n is defined in terms of the highest order of preference interaction among the X_i that must be taken into account in a real-valued, interdependent additive representation for ?. The degree is zero when indifference holds throughout X, and zero or one in the additive conjoint measurement case. A degree of n signifies complete preference interdependence among the X_i.     

Informational and motivational components of social reinforcement

Thirty-six four-year-old children of each sex were tested in a two-choice marble dropping task. There were three Ss in each cell of a 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. The factors investigated were: reinforcement condition (Contingent, Yoked, Nonreinforcement), sex, base preference level (strong vs weak), Base Rate Level (high vs low). The dependent variables were: base preference ratio, base rate, preference ratio change, rate change. The contingently reinforced Ss had significantly higher preference change scores than Ss in the other two reinforcement conditions but only at the high base preference level. The Ss in both the contingent and yoked groups had higher rate change scores than Ss in the nonreinforcement group. The results were interpreted as indicating social reinforcement may have two effects, one a cue function and the other an effect on S's motivational system. The results indicate that regression effects do not operate in the two-choice task and that crossing baseline levels of performance is an effective way to control baseline differences in analyses of change in the two-choice task.     

Tuning of diatonic scales by violinists,pianists, and nonmusicians

The present study shows that playing a particular musical instrument influences tuning preference. Violinists (n=7), pianists (n=7), and nonmusicians (n=10) were required to adjust three notes (E, A, and B) in computer-generated, eight-tone ascending and descending diatonic scales of C major. The results indicated that (1) violinists set the three tones closer to Pythagorean intonation than do pianists (p< .01), (2) pianists fit closest to equal-tempered intonation (p< .01), and (3) nonmusicians do not show any preference for a specific intonation model. These findings are consistent with the view that tuning preference is determined by musical experience more than by characteristics of the auditory system. The relevance of these results to theories of cultural conditioning and assessment of tonal perception is discussed.     

Joint independent random utility models where one of the choice structures satisfies the strict utility model

It is known that one cannot construct an independent joint random utility model for which both the preference and aversion probabilities satisfy the strict utility model. Given this result, it is natural to ask what kind of relations are possible in such contexts. Here, for instance, we demonstrate that if a structure of preference and aversion probabilities are generated by a common independent random utility model, and if the preference probabilities satisfy the strict utility model, then the preference and aversion probabilities are related by what is known as the strong acceptance condition. We also prove an appropriate converse of this result. Finally, an example is given of a process (other than the random utility model) that is compatible with the assumption that a structure of preference and aversion probabilities satisfies a common strict utility model.     

Significance of visual cues in choice behavior in the female zebra finch (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Taeniopygia guttata</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">castanotis</Emphasis>)

Female zebra finches show a preference for male zebra finches over heterospecific males based solely on the auditory cues of males, such as songs. The present study was designed to investigate whether females show a similar preference for male zebra finches based solely on visual cues. Using a Y-maze apparatus, social preference of female zebra finches was studied between male zebra finches and male Bengalese finches in three experiments. In experiment 1, where female zebra finches could see and hear live male zebra finches and male Bengalese finches, the females preferred to associate with the male zebra finches. In experiment 2, using a sound-attenuated experimental apparatus, subjects could see, but not hear, male zebra finches and male Bengalese finches. The subjects did not show a significant preference for associating with zebra finches. In experiment 3, as in experiment 2, females could see live male zebra finches and male Bengalese finches in the sound-attenuated chambers. However, in experiment 3, the subjects also heard prerecorded auditory cues (i.e., songs and calls) of male zebra finches, which were presented simultaneously in both arms of the maze. Although the females could not use the auditory cues to identify the location of the male zebra finches, they preferred to associate with the male zebra finches rather than the male Bengalese finches. These results suggest that visual cues alone were effective in initiating choice behaviors by females and that auditory cues facilitate such visually based choice behaviors. Electronic Publication     

Concurrent schedule assessment of food preference in cows

Six dairy cows (Bos taurus) were trained on several pairs of concurrent variable-interval schedules with different types of food available on each alternative. The required response was a plate press made by the animal's muzzle. Performance generally replicated that found with other species. The generalized matching law accounted for the preference data, showing that food preference could be quantitatively analyzed as a special case of response bias. The preference functions showed that the response- and time-allocation ratios were not as extreme as obtained reinforcement rate ratios (undermatching).     

Mirror,mirror, on the wall,who is the most masculine of them all? The Dark Triad,masculinity, and women’s mate choice

Although the Dark Triad of personality (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) has been researched widely, few studies have looked at women’s preferences for men who are high and low in Dark Triad. Further, it is not clear what the relationships between the Dark Triad and facial masculinity are. We investigated female preference for computer manipulated Dark Triad male faces in two on-line studies (Study 1: n = 125; Study 2: n = 1633). We found that women rated the high psychopathy and narcissistic faces the most masculine (Study 1). We also found that women showed a low preference for the high morphs in both long and short term relationships, and that preference for masculinity was correlated with a preference for narcissism (Study 2). We discuss the results in terms of male and female mating strategies.     

An experimental analysis of impulsivity and impulse control in humans

In choosing between small, immediate and large, delayed reward, an organism behaves impulsively if it chooses the small reward and shows impulse control if it chooses the large reward. Work with nonhumans suggests that impulsivity and impulse control may be derived from gradients of delayed reinforcement. A model developed by Ainslie and by Rachlin suggests that preference for the rewards should be a function of when the choice is made: small reward with no delay may be preferred to large reward with delay X, but adding delay T to both alternatives should shift preference to the large reward. Three experiments investigated this preference reversal in humans, using termination of 90 dba white noise as the reinforcing event. Experiment 1 showed that under some instructional conditions 90-sec noise off with no delay was preferred over 120-sec noise off after a 60-sec delay, but that preference shifted to the large reward when a 15-sec delay (T) was added to both alternatives. Experiment 2 replicated this preference reversal under two conditions of large, delayed reward, and with three rather than two values of T. Experiment 3 confirmed this effect of T and showed that some humans committed themselves to the large reward when commitment could be made some time before presentation of the reward alternatives. These data support the Ainslie-Rachlin model and extend it to human choice behavior.     

Precedent Autonomy and Subsequent Consent

Honoring a living will typically involves treating an incompetent patient in accord with preferences she once had, but whose objects she can no longer understand. How do we respect her “precedent autonomy” by giving her what she used to want? There is a similar problem with “subsequent consent”: How can we justify interfering with someone's autonomy on the grounds that she will later consent to the interference, if she refuses now? Both problems arise on the assumption that, to respect someone's autonomy, any preferences we respect must be among that person's current preferences. I argue that this is not always true. Just as we can celebrate an event long after it happens, so can we respect someone's wishes long before or after she has that wish. In the contexts of precedent autonomy and subsequent consent, the wishes are often preferences about which of two other, conflicting preferences to satisfy. When someone has two conflicting preferences, and a third preference on how to resolve that conflict, to respect his autonomy we must respect that third preference. People with declining competence may have a resolution preference earlier, favoring the earlier conflicting preference (precedent autonomy), whereas those with rising competence may have it later, favoring the later conflicting preference (subsequent consent). To respect autonomy in such cases we must respect not a current, but a former or later preference.     

An apparatus for studying operant activity of captive coyotes

We describe a portable apparatus designed to examine the free-operant food preferences of captive coyotes in their home kennels. Because leverpressing for food access was the dependent variable, we measured food preference independently of food ingestion. Using successive approximation, we trained 8 out of 19 coyotes (42%) to use the apparatus. This percentage is similar to training rates for dogs. We used fixed and variable ratio schedules of reinforcement to further test 4 of the trained coyotes. All 4 produced response curves similar to those of other species on similar schedules of reinforcement.     

The Interplay of Implicit Causality,Structural Heuristics,and Anaphor Type in Ambiguous Pronoun Resolution

Two visual-world eye-tracking experiments investigating pronoun resolution in Finnish examined the time course of implicit causality information relative to both grammatical role and order-of-mention information. Experiment 1 showed an effect of implicit causality that appeared at the same time as the first-mention preference. Furthermore, when we counterbalanced the semantic roles of the verbs, we found no effect of grammatical role, suggesting the standard observed subject preference has a large semantic component. Experiment 2 showed that both the personal pronoun hän and the demonstrative tämä preferred the antecedent consistent with the implicit causality bias; tämä was not interpreted as referring to the semantically non-prominent entity. In contrast, structural prominence affected hän and tämä differently: we found a first-mention preference for hän, but a second-mention preference for tämä. The results suggest that semantic implicit causality information has an immediate effect on pronoun resolution and its use is not delayed relative to order-of-mention information. Furthermore, they show that order-of-mention differentially affects different types of anaphoric expressions, but semantic information has the same effect.     

Freedom of Preference: A Defense of Compatiblism

Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a case of a counterfactual intervener CI with knowledge and power to control an agent so he will do A. He concludes that if the agent prefers to do A and there is no intervention by CI, the agent has acted of his own free will and is morally responsible for doing A, though he lacked an alternative possibility. I consider the consequences for freedom and moral responsibility of CI having a complete plan P for all actions of an agent, Lucky, who luckily has preferences that accord with P, and I extend the argument to all citizens of a land, Luckyland, who are like Lucky. I argue the citizens of Luckyland have free will but lack moral responsibility because of the connection between moral responsibility, reactive attitudes and future action. Furthermore, the presence of CI and his plan P may allow free will but is incompatible with freedom of preference. Preference concerns alternatives excluded by CI. I argue that a special higher order preference for the preference structure, a power preference, ends the regress of higher order preference and explains the first order preference. Causal determinism is compatible with freedom of preference explained by a power preference when a power preference would also explain an alternative preference. The remoteness argument for incompatibility fails because of a lack of transitivity causal explanation. The power preference is the self-explained source of freedom of preference. That basic freedom may be limited by government knowledge of our preferences, even if, like Lucky, our preferences do not provoke intervention and we conform of our own free will.     

Personality and self-reported preference for music genres and attributes in a German-speaking sample

Research of music preferences yielded consistent results about the relationship of music preference, biographic variables, and personality. This study replicates some of these findings in a German-speaking sample (N = 1329). We conducted an online study using self-report assessments. We confirmed the five-factor structure of music genre preference and the three-factor structure of music attribute preference using EFA and CFA. In addition to previous research, we showed that the three-factor structure of music attribute preference is also replicated in self-reported assessments. We examined the relationships of personality and music preferences using SEM. This study contributes to the overall picture of music preference research and provides additional insights into the little-examined field of the relationship of music attribute preference and personality.