Is there a neighborhood frequency effect in English? Evidence from reading and lexical decision

What is the effect of a word's higher frequency neighbors on its identification time? According to activation-based models of word identification (J. Grainger & A. M. Jacobs, 1996; J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart, 1981), words with higher frequency neighbors will be processed more slowly than words without higher frequency neighbors because of the lexical competition mechanism embodied in these models. Although a critical prediction of these models, this inhibitory neighborhood frequency effect has been elusive in studies that have used English stimuli. In the present experiments, the effect of higher frequency neighbors was examined in the lexical decision task and when participants were reading sentences while their eye movements were monitored. Results suggest that higher frequency neighbors have little, if any, effect on the identification of English words. The implications for activation-based models of word identification are discussed.     

Is there a magnitude effect in tipping?

The present study examined nearly 1,000 tips recorded for two taxicabs, two hair salons, and two restaurants. In each of the six cases, amount of tip increased linearly as a function of the amount of the bill. Contrary to standard microeconomic theory, there was a magnitude effect in that as the amount of the bill increased, the percent tip tended to decrease. The present results extend the findings of Chapman and Winquist (1998), obtained using hypothetical scenarios, to real-world tipping behavior. Chapman and Winquist argued that a magnitude effect in tipping reflects the shape of the utility function for money. We suggest, however, that the magnitude effect may be the mathematical consequence of replotting the fundamental relationship between tip and bill amounts in terms of percent tip, given that the observed linear relation between tip and bill amounts has a positive intercept. We suggest further that the positive intercept arises because a tip represents a judgment as to what constitutes a fair or equitable wage, and part of what constitutes a fair wage is independent of the amount of the bill, reflecting compensation for simply being there when needed. The present account implies that different explanations may be needed for magnitude effects observed in different domains.     

Is there a "special relationship" between unconscious emotions and visual imagery? Evidence from a mental rotation test

There is an increasing interest in the relationship between imagery and emotion (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 2005). The present research examined whether unconscious emotions affect visual imagery. In particular, participants were invited to perform a mental rotation test following subliminal presentation of happy, sad and neutral expressions. This study revealed an increase in mental rotation abilities after unconscious visual processing of emotional expressions. Altogether, these findings support the hypothesis of a bidirectional relationship between imagery and emotions.     

Is there a memory for sentences?

A critical discussion of the model of sentence memory which enjoyed greatest popularity in the psycholinguistic research of the sixties, namely the model based on the deep-structure-plus-tag hypothesis of sentence memory, is presented together with the results of an experiment on prompted recall for sentences with various intervals after presentation and with two types of instructions. This experiment contributed to show that immediate memory for sentences can be affected by appropriate instructions, and that after a short time after presentation only the main semantic information of the sentences is recalled. An alternative model is presented, based on the notion of storage of the meaningful elements of the sentences in a rather abstract form, and of recall as a reconstructive process to produce new sentences. The results of two new experiments on sentence memory, the first a free and prompted recall experiment with children, the second a recognition memory study with adolescents, are then presented and discussed in relation to the model.     

Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism?

The “problem of forgotten evidence” is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue that these critics are mistaken.     

Is there a spillover effect of a right turn on red permission for bicyclists?

A number of countries allow bicyclists to perform a right turn on red (RTOR) at some specific intersections to promote cycling by reducing the required physical effort and trip time. Implementation of a rule that allows a RTOR for bicyclists at some intersections could lead not only to local effects at those intersections where the rule actually applies, but also to supralocal effects. Using an experimental survey approach, this study explores whether a so-called ‘spillover effect’ of the rule can be expected. This effect would imply that allowing bicyclists to turn right on red at some intersections causes them to also turn right on red more often at intersections where RTOR for bicyclists is not allowed.The answers from 768 respondents indicate that respondents with a high awareness of the existence of a RTOR rule for bicyclists (experimental group) turn right on red significantly more often at intersections where RTOR for bicyclists is not permitted than respondents with a low awareness of the rule (control group). This indicates that implementation of the RTOR rule for bicyclists can indeed lead to an increase in red light running at other intersections. This might lead to safety issues at intersections where RTOR for bicyclists is not permitted, since road authorities could have decided not to allow RTOR for bicyclists at these intersections for safety reasons.The study also finds that men, young people and people who generally perform more risky cycling behaviours have a higher tendency to perform non-permitted RTOR. These findings are in line with existing literature.     

Is there "feedback" during visual imagery? Evidence from a specificity of practice paradigm.

The specificity of practice hypothesis predicts the development of a sensorimotor representation specific to the afferent feedback available during skill acquisition (Proteau, 1992; Proteau, Marteniuk, Girouard, & Dugas, 1987). In the present investigation, we used the specificity of practice hypothesis to test whether skill acquisition through visual imagery would lead to the development of a sensory-specific movement representation similar to one resulting from actual practice. To accomplish this objective, participants practiced walking a 12-m linear path in one of three practice conditions, full-vision (FV), no-vision (NV), or visual imagery (VI), for either 10 or 100 trials. Knowledge of spatial and/or temporal results (KR) was provided to participants following each trial during this phase. Following acquisition, participants completed 10 NV trials without KR. An analysis of root-mean-squared-error (RMSE) indicated NV participants were more accurate than both FV and VI participants in the transfer condition. We believe the equivalence in transfer RMSE between FV and VI suggests that there are similarities between the movement representations attained by FV and VI practice.     

Can the irrelevant speech effect turn into a stimulus suffix effect?

The irrelevant sound effect (ISE) and the stimulus suffix effect (SSE) are two qualitatively different phenomena, although in both paradigms irrelevant auditory material is played while a verbal serial recall task is being performed. Jones, Macken, and Nicholls (2004) Jones, D. M., Macken, W. J. and Nicholls, A. P. 2004. The phonological store of working memory: Is it phonological and is it a store?. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30: 656–674. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] have proposed the effect of irrelevant speech on auditory serial recall to switch from an ISE to an SSE mechanism, if the auditory-perceptive similarity of relevant and irrelevant material is maximized. The experiment reported here (n = 36) tested this hypothesis by exploring auditory serial recall performance both under irrelevant speech and under speech suffix conditions. These speech materials were spoken either by the same voice as the auditory items to be recalled or by a different voice. The experimental conditions were such that the likelihood of obtaining an SSE was maximized. The results, however, show that irrelevant speech—in contrast to speech suffixes—affects auditory serial recall independently of its perceptive similarity to the items to be recalled and thus in terms of an ISE mechanism that crucially extends to recency. The ISE thus cannot turn into an SSE.     

Can the irrelevant speech effect turn into a stimulus suffix effect?

The irrelevant sound effect (ISE) and the stimulus suffix effect (SSE) are two qualitatively different phenomena, although in both paradigms irrelevant auditory material is played while a verbal serial recall task is being performed. Jones, Macken, and Nicholls (2004) have proposed the effect of irrelevant speech on auditory serial recall to switch from an ISE to an SSE mechanism, if the auditory-perceptive similarity of relevant and irrelevant material is maximized. The experiment reported here (n = 36) tested this hypothesis by exploring auditory serial recall performance both under irrelevant speech and under speech suffix conditions. These speech materials were spoken either by the same voice as the auditory items to be recalled or by a different voice. The experimental conditions were such that the likelihood of obtaining an SSE was maximized. The results, however, show that irrelevant speech—in contrast to speech suffixes—affects auditory serial recall independently of its perceptive similarity to the items to be recalled and thus in terms of an ISE mechanism that crucially extends to recency. The ISE thus cannot turn into an SSE.     

Is there a universal need for positive self-regard?

It is assumed that people seek positive self-regard; that is, they are motivated to possess, enhance, and maintain positive self-views. The cross-cultural generalizability of such motivations was addressed by examining Japanese culture. Anthropological, sociological, and psychological analyses revealed that many elements of Japanese culture are incongruent with such motivations. Moreover, the empirical literature provides scant evidence for a need for positive self-regard among Japanese and indicates that a self-critical focus is more characteristic of Japanese. It is argued that the need for self-regard must be culturally variant because the constructions of self and regard themselves differ across cultures. The need for positive self-regard, as it is currently conceptualized, is not a universal, but rather is rooted in significant aspects of North American culture. Conventional interpretations of positive self-regard are too narrow to encompass the Japanese experience.     

Is there a Rawlsian Argument for Animal Rights?

Mark Rowlands defends a Rawlsian argument for animal rights, according to which animals have rights because we would assign them rights when deciding on the principles of morality from behind a veil of ignorance. Rowlands’s argument depends on a non-standard interpretation of the veil of ignorance, according to which we cannot know whether we are human or non-human on the other side of the veil. Rowlands claims that his interpretation of the veil is more consistent with a core commitment of Rawlsian justice—the intuitive equality principle—than either Rawls or his critics realize. Here I argue that Rawls is not committed to the intuitive equality principle, as Rowlands articulates it, and hence Rowlands’s argument is in fact only superficially Rawlsian. Furthermore, Rowlands’s intuitive equality principle is dubious on its own terms, and thus a poor principle on which to base a case for animal rights.     

Is there a dual system for regular inflections?

A central question in morphological research is whether there are whole-word representations for regularly inflected forms. A series of four lexical decision experiments addressed this question by looking at whole-word frequency effects across a range of frequency values with constant stem-cluster frequencies. Frequency effects were only found for inflected forms above a threshold of about 6 per million, whereas such effects were found for morphologically simple controls in all frequency ranges. We discuss these data in the context of two kinds of dual models and in relation to competition models proposed within the connectionist literature.     

Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist?

Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it allows one to avoid positing strange ‘negative’ entities without adopting a non-standard account of the necessary features of ordinary things. In this paper, I sketch out and defend two plausible non-maximalist proposals that evade Jago’s dilemma.     

Is there really an omission effect?

The omission effect, first described by Spranca and colleagues (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991), has since been extensively studied and repeatedly confirmed (Cushman, Murray, Gordon-McKeon, Wharton, & Greene, 2012). All else being equal, most people judge it to be morally worse to actively bring about a negative event than to passively allow that event to happen. In this paper, we provide new experimental data that challenges previous studies of the omission effect both methodologically and philosophically. We argue that previous studies have failed to control for the equivalence of rules that are violated by actions and omissions. Once equivalent norms are introduced, our results show that the omission effect is eliminated, even if the negative outcome of the behavior is foreseen and intended by the agent. We show that the omission effect does not constitute a basic, moral disposition but occurs exclusively in complex moral situations. Building on these empirical results, we cast doubt onto two influential explanations of the omission effect, the Causal Relevance Hypothesis and the Overgeneralization Hypothesis, and provide a novel explanation of the phenomenon. Furthermore, we discuss various ramifications of the interplay between our understanding of omissions and legal systems.     

Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?

In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences to the claim that all experiences are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences. This inference is inadequately defended, for the explanandum may also be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation. Second, contra Kriegel, I argue that phenomenological investigation does not support the thesis that we are always peripherally aware of our experiences. Instead, it delivers no verdict on this thesis. Kriegel’s phenomenological mistake may be explained via a highly diluted version of the famous transparency thesis about experience.