Is there a neighborhood frequency effect in English? Evidence from reading and lexical decision

What is the effect of a word's higher frequency neighbors on its identification time? According to activation-based models of word identification (J. Grainger & A. M. Jacobs, 1996; J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart, 1981), words with higher frequency neighbors will be processed more slowly than words without higher frequency neighbors because of the lexical competition mechanism embodied in these models. Although a critical prediction of these models, this inhibitory neighborhood frequency effect has been elusive in studies that have used English stimuli. In the present experiments, the effect of higher frequency neighbors was examined in the lexical decision task and when participants were reading sentences while their eye movements were monitored. Results suggest that higher frequency neighbors have little, if any, effect on the identification of English words. The implications for activation-based models of word identification are discussed.     

Is there a magnitude effect in tipping?

The present study examined nearly 1,000 tips recorded for two taxicabs, two hair salons, and two restaurants. In each of the six cases, amount of tip increased linearly as a function of the amount of the bill. Contrary to standard microeconomic theory, there was a magnitude effect in that as the amount of the bill increased, the percent tip tended to decrease. The present results extend the findings of Chapman and Winquist (1998), obtained using hypothetical scenarios, to real-world tipping behavior. Chapman and Winquist argued that a magnitude effect in tipping reflects the shape of the utility function for money. We suggest, however, that the magnitude effect may be the mathematical consequence of replotting the fundamental relationship between tip and bill amounts in terms of percent tip, given that the observed linear relation between tip and bill amounts has a positive intercept. We suggest further that the positive intercept arises because a tip represents a judgment as to what constitutes a fair or equitable wage, and part of what constitutes a fair wage is independent of the amount of the bill, reflecting compensation for simply being there when needed. The present account implies that different explanations may be needed for magnitude effects observed in different domains.     

Is there a \"special relationship\" between unconscious emotions and visual imagery? Evidence from a mental rotation test

There is an increasing interest in the relationship between imagery and emotion (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 2005). The present research examined whether unconscious emotions affect visual imagery. In particular, participants were invited to perform a mental rotation test following subliminal presentation of happy, sad and neutral expressions. This study revealed an increase in mental rotation abilities after unconscious visual processing of emotional expressions. Altogether, these findings support the hypothesis of a bidirectional relationship between imagery and emotions.     

Is there a memory for sentences?

A critical discussion of the model of sentence memory which enjoyed greatest popularity in the psycholinguistic research of the sixties, namely the model based on the deep-structure-plus-tag hypothesis of sentence memory, is presented together with the results of an experiment on prompted recall for sentences with various intervals after presentation and with two types of instructions. This experiment contributed to show that immediate memory for sentences can be affected by appropriate instructions, and that after a short time after presentation only the main semantic information of the sentences is recalled. An alternative model is presented, based on the notion of storage of the meaningful elements of the sentences in a rather abstract form, and of recall as a reconstructive process to produce new sentences. The results of two new experiments on sentence memory, the first a free and prompted recall experiment with children, the second a recognition memory study with adolescents, are then presented and discussed in relation to the model.     

Is there a spillover effect of a right turn on red permission for bicyclists?

A number of countries allow bicyclists to perform a right turn on red (RTOR) at some specific intersections to promote cycling by reducing the required physical effort and trip time. Implementation of a rule that allows a RTOR for bicyclists at some intersections could lead not only to local effects at those intersections where the rule actually applies, but also to supralocal effects. Using an experimental survey approach, this study explores whether a so-called ‘spillover effect’ of the rule can be expected. This effect would imply that allowing bicyclists to turn right on red at some intersections causes them to also turn right on red more often at intersections where RTOR for bicyclists is not allowed.The answers from 768 respondents indicate that respondents with a high awareness of the existence of a RTOR rule for bicyclists (experimental group) turn right on red significantly more often at intersections where RTOR for bicyclists is not permitted than respondents with a low awareness of the rule (control group). This indicates that implementation of the RTOR rule for bicyclists can indeed lead to an increase in red light running at other intersections. This might lead to safety issues at intersections where RTOR for bicyclists is not permitted, since road authorities could have decided not to allow RTOR for bicyclists at these intersections for safety reasons.The study also finds that men, young people and people who generally perform more risky cycling behaviours have a higher tendency to perform non-permitted RTOR. These findings are in line with existing literature.     

Is there "feedback" during visual imagery? Evidence from a specificity of practice paradigm.

The specificity of practice hypothesis predicts the development of a sensorimotor representation specific to the afferent feedback available during skill acquisition (Proteau, 1992; Proteau, Marteniuk, Girouard, & Dugas, 1987). In the present investigation, we used the specificity of practice hypothesis to test whether skill acquisition through visual imagery would lead to the development of a sensory-specific movement representation similar to one resulting from actual practice. To accomplish this objective, participants practiced walking a 12-m linear path in one of three practice conditions, full-vision (FV), no-vision (NV), or visual imagery (VI), for either 10 or 100 trials. Knowledge of spatial and/or temporal results (KR) was provided to participants following each trial during this phase. Following acquisition, participants completed 10 NV trials without KR. An analysis of root-mean-squared-error (RMSE) indicated NV participants were more accurate than both FV and VI participants in the transfer condition. We believe the equivalence in transfer RMSE between FV and VI suggests that there are similarities between the movement representations attained by FV and VI practice.     

Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism?

The “problem of forgotten evidence” is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue that these critics are mistaken.     

Is there a Moral Case for Nationalism?

ABSTRACT Recent writings by philosophers such as David Miller and Yael Tamir have undertaken to provide nationalism with a normative foundation, a task which has been all but ignored by post-War English-language political philosophy. I identify and criticise three lines of argument which have been deployed in their writings. First, it is argued by Miller that the universalism and abstraction of rationalist moral theories have made them suspicious of 'particularisms' such as nationalism, but that they stem from a faulty metaethics. Against this I argue that abstraction and universality need not be grounded in a universalist metaethics, but can be derived pragmatically from the ethical needs of multicultural societies. Second, it is argued that liberal policies such as taxation and material redistribution, restrictions on immigration, as well as liberal concepts such as political obligation, presuppose the validity of the nationalist point of view. Against this I hold that nationalism never provides the strongest moral grounds for these policies and concepts, and that, in the specific case of distributive justice, it can even undermine them. And third, I examine the argument that the historical excesses of which nationalists have been guilty are actually the product of a narrow, 'ethnic'nationalism, in contrast to which we can articulate a categorically distinct, open, 'civic'nationalism, which would be broadly compatible with liberal political morality. I argue that the concept of civic nationalism is unstable, and that under fairly plausible and widespread empirical conditions, it either collapses back into a form of ethnic nationalism, or else becomes devoid of any recognisably nationalist content.     

Is there a future for investigative hypnosis?

Since its heyday in the 1970s and 1980s, hypnosis as an investigative procedure has declined in popularity such that many experts now consider it to be more a liability than a useful forensic tool. Indeed, in the US, a majority of the states follow a per se exclusion rule, prohibiting any memories retrieved during or after hypnosis from being introduced into evidence. In this paper, factors contributing to the demise of investigative hypnosis are re-examined. It is concluded that a per se exclusion rule is overly inclusive, but it is advisable for investigators to avoid using hypnosis when other, less contentious alternatives, such as the cognitive interview, are available. Nevertheless, it often goes unrecognised that a more positive legacy of investigative hypnosis is very present in modern investigative interviewing best practice; moreover, there may still be procedures employed in hypnotic interviewing that have yet to be exploited. For example, recent research indicates that, when divorced from the context of hypnosis, brief techniques such as focused breathing, and eye closure, can enhance memory. As memory enhancement with these techniques is achieved without the increase in false positive errors familiar to more traditional hypnosis techniques, evidence from such procedures should be acceptable to the courts. The potential role of hypnosis as a tool to reverse the effects of misinformation is also considered. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can the irrelevant speech effect turn into a stimulus suffix effect?

The irrelevant sound effect (ISE) and the stimulus suffix effect (SSE) are two qualitatively different phenomena, although in both paradigms irrelevant auditory material is played while a verbal serial recall task is being performed. Jones, Macken, and Nicholls (2004) Jones, D. M., Macken, W. J. and Nicholls, A. P. 2004. The phonological store of working memory: Is it phonological and is it a store?. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30: 656–674. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] have proposed the effect of irrelevant speech on auditory serial recall to switch from an ISE to an SSE mechanism, if the auditory-perceptive similarity of relevant and irrelevant material is maximized. The experiment reported here (n = 36) tested this hypothesis by exploring auditory serial recall performance both under irrelevant speech and under speech suffix conditions. These speech materials were spoken either by the same voice as the auditory items to be recalled or by a different voice. The experimental conditions were such that the likelihood of obtaining an SSE was maximized. The results, however, show that irrelevant speech—in contrast to speech suffixes—affects auditory serial recall independently of its perceptive similarity to the items to be recalled and thus in terms of an ISE mechanism that crucially extends to recency. The ISE thus cannot turn into an SSE.     

Can the irrelevant speech effect turn into a stimulus suffix effect?

The irrelevant sound effect (ISE) and the stimulus suffix effect (SSE) are two qualitatively different phenomena, although in both paradigms irrelevant auditory material is played while a verbal serial recall task is being performed. Jones, Macken, and Nicholls (2004) have proposed the effect of irrelevant speech on auditory serial recall to switch from an ISE to an SSE mechanism, if the auditory-perceptive similarity of relevant and irrelevant material is maximized. The experiment reported here (n = 36) tested this hypothesis by exploring auditory serial recall performance both under irrelevant speech and under speech suffix conditions. These speech materials were spoken either by the same voice as the auditory items to be recalled or by a different voice. The experimental conditions were such that the likelihood of obtaining an SSE was maximized. The results, however, show that irrelevant speech—in contrast to speech suffixes—affects auditory serial recall independently of its perceptive similarity to the items to be recalled and thus in terms of an ISE mechanism that crucially extends to recency. The ISE thus cannot turn into an SSE.     

Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist?

Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it allows one to avoid positing strange ‘negative’ entities without adopting a non-standard account of the necessary features of ordinary things. In this paper, I sketch out and defend two plausible non-maximalist proposals that evade Jago’s dilemma.     

Is there a universal need for positive self-regard?

It is assumed that people seek positive self-regard; that is, they are motivated to possess, enhance, and maintain positive self-views. The cross-cultural generalizability of such motivations was addressed by examining Japanese culture. Anthropological, sociological, and psychological analyses revealed that many elements of Japanese culture are incongruent with such motivations. Moreover, the empirical literature provides scant evidence for a need for positive self-regard among Japanese and indicates that a self-critical focus is more characteristic of Japanese. It is argued that the need for self-regard must be culturally variant because the constructions of self and regard themselves differ across cultures. The need for positive self-regard, as it is currently conceptualized, is not a universal, but rather is rooted in significant aspects of North American culture. Conventional interpretations of positive self-regard are too narrow to encompass the Japanese experience.     

Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?

In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences to the claim that all experiences are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences. This inference is inadequately defended, for the explanandum may also be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation. Second, contra Kriegel, I argue that phenomenological investigation does not support the thesis that we are always peripherally aware of our experiences. Instead, it delivers no verdict on this thesis. Kriegel’s phenomenological mistake may be explained via a highly diluted version of the famous transparency thesis about experience.     

Why are there eccentricity effects in visual search? Visual and attentional hypotheses

In standard visual search experiments, observers search for a target item among distracting items. The locations of target items are generally random within the display and ignored as a factor in data analysis. Previous work has shown that targets presented near fixation are, in fact, found more efficiently than are targets presented at more peripheral locations. This paper proposes that the primary cause of this “eccentricity effect” (Carrasco, Evert, Chang, & Katz, 1995) is an attentional bias that allocates attention preferentially to central items. The first four experiments dealt with the possibility that visual, and not attentional, factors underlie the eccentricity effect. They showed that the eccentricity effect cannot be accounted for by the peripheral reduction in visual sensitivity, peripheral crowding, or cortical magnification. Experiment 5 tested the attention allocation model and also showed that RT X set size effects can be independent of eccentricity effects. Experiment 6 showed that the effective set size in a search task depends, in part, on the eccentricity of the target because observers search from fixation outward.