Hegel’s political philosophy and the social imaginary of early Russian realism

This article considers aspects of the social imaginary underlying early Russian realist thought and narrative by exploring two canonical novels from the 1840s, Ivan Gon?arov’s Obyknovennaja istorija and Aleksandr Gercen’s Kto vinovat?, in light of Vissarion Belinskij’s activist reception of Hegel’s political philosophy. The Russian texts are read symptomatically against their western counterparts as illustrating the intriguing transformations that dominant European models of narrative and sociality undergo as they migrate to Russia.     

Skolem and the löwenheim-skolem theorem: a case study of the philosophical significance of mathematical results

The dream of a community of philosophers engaged in inquiry with shared standards of evidence and justification has long been with us. It has led some thinkers puzzled by our mathematical experience to look to mathematics for adjudication between competing views. I am skeptical of this approach and consider Skolem's philosophical uses of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem to exemplify it. I argue that these uses invariably beg the questions at issue. I say ‘uses’, because I claim further that Skolem shifted his position on the philosophical significance of the theorem as a result of a shift in his background beliefs. The nature of this shift and possible explanations for it are investigated. Ironically, Skolem's own case provides a historical example of the philosophical flexibility of his theorem.

Our suspicion ought always to be aroused when a proof proves more than its means allow it. Something of this sort might be called ‘a puffed-up proof’.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the foundations of mathematics (revised edition), vol. 2, 21.     

The philosophical–anthropological foundations of Bennett and Hacker’s critique of neuroscience

Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors’ view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker’s diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical–anthropological foundation.     

From Buddha's speech to Buddha's essence: philosophical discussions of Buddha‐vacana in India and China1

This is a comparative study of the discourses on the nature of sacred language found in Indian Abhidharma texts and those written by 7th century Chinese Buddhist scholars who, unlike the Indian Buddhists, questioned ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching'. This issue labeled fo‐chiao t'i lun, the theory of ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching', was one of the topics on which Chinese Yogācāra scholars have shown a keen interest and served as the inspiration for extensive intellectual dialogues in their texts. It is in Hsüan‐tsang's massive and organized translation works, begun in 648, that various previous translations of the term buddhavacana from Indian Abhidharma texts were given the unified translation of fo‐chiao. (Fo‐chiao literally means “the Buddha's teachings,” and is the term used in the modern period for “Buddhism.”) By combining fo‐chiao with the term t'i, meaning ‘essence’ or ‘substance’ throughout his translations, Hsüan‐tsang attempted to define ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching'. In Indian Abhidharma texts, the nature of the Buddha's word was either ‘sound’ (?abdha), the oral component of speech, or ‘name’ (nāma), the component of language that conveys meaning, or some combination of the two. From the time of Hsüan‐tsang's translation, however, discourse on the nature of sacred language was no longer relegated to the category of language or of epistemological investigation, but became grounded in the Chinese discussion investigating the ‘essence’ or ‘substance’ of the Buddha's teaching, and even of ‘Buddhism’ itself. As such, it sought to transcend the distinction between language and meaning. This gradual but explicit process of inquiry into the nature of ‘the Buddha’s word' was a necessary antecedent to the transition to a ‘Chinese’ Buddhism.     

Łukasiewicz logic and the foundations of measurement

The logic of inexactness, presented in this paper, is a version of the Łukasiewicz logic with predicates valued in [0, ∞). We axiomatize multi-valued models of equality and ordering in this logic guaranteeing their imbeddibility in the real line. Our axioms of equality and ordering, when interpreted as axioms of proximity and dominance, can be applied to the foundations of measurement (especially in the social sciences). In two-valued logic they provide theories of ratio scale measurement. In multivalued logic they enable us to treat formally errors arising in nominal and ordinal measurements.     

Extending the the behavioral immune system to political psychology: Are political conservatism and disgust sensitivity really related?

Previous research suggests that several individual and cultural level attitudes, cognitions, and societal structures may have evolved to mitigate the pathogen threats posed by intergroup interactions. It has been suggested that these anti-pathogen defenses are at the root of conservative political ideology. Here, we test a hypothesis that political conservatism functions as a pathogen-avoidance strategy. Across three studies, we consistently find no relationship between sensitivity to pathogen disgust and multiple measures of political conservatism. These results are contrasted with theoretical perspectives suggesting a relationship between conservatism and pathogen avoidance, and with previous findings of a relationship between conservatism and disgust sensitivity.     

Bergson’s philosophical method: At the edge of phenomenology and mathematics

Continental Philosophy Review - This article highlights the mathematical structure of Henri Bergson’s method. While Bergson has been historically interpreted as an anti-scientific and...     

Despair and the determinate negation of Brandom’s Hegel

In this paper, I contend that Brandom’s interpretive oversights leave his inferentialist program vulnerable to Hegelian critique. My target is Brandom’s notion of “conceptual realism,” or the thesis that the structure of mind-independent reality mimics the structure of thought. I show, first, that the conceptual realism at the heart of Brandom’s empiricism finds root in his interpretation of Hegel. I then argue that conceptual realism is incompatible with Hegel’s thought, since the Jena Phenomenology, understood as a “way of despair,” includes a critique of the philosophical framework upon which conceptual realism relies. Finally, I offer the Hegelian critique of Brandom that results from these textual infidelities.     

From Semantic Games to Provability: The Case of Gödel Logic

Studia Logica - We present a semantic game for Gödel logic and its extensions, where the players’ interaction stepwise reduces arbitrary claims about the relative order of truth degrees...     

Time in philosophy and in physics: From Kant and Einstein to Gödel

The essay centers on Gödel's views on the place of our intuitive concept of time in philosophy and in physics. It presents my interpretation of his work on the theory of relativity, his observations on the relationship between Einstein's theory and Kantian philosophy, as well as some of the scattered remarks in his conversations with me in the seventies — namely, those on the philosophies of Leibniz, Hegel and Husserl — as a successor of Kant — in relation to their conceptions of time.For the physical world, the four dimensions are natural. But for the mind, there is no such natural coordinate system; time is the only natural frame of reference.Gödel, conversation on 15.3.72     

Samson,Antigone, and the charismatic agonistes: From a “pro-power” to a “pro-existence” political engagement

In this essay, I argue that the agonistic approach toward political engagement places too much emphasis on the task of winning the social game and overlooks the dimension of what has been called ever since Greek Antiquity by the name charis. Charis is the quality of life, denoting ideals of reciprocal invitations to feel joy and satisfaction. Under the influence of the Weberian model of charismatic leadership, collective charisma has faded away from the attention of political theorists. This essay offers arguments for the integration of the collective charis into agonistic political theory but calls for several revisions of this theory. Counterbalancing the overemphasis on winning involves listening and witnessing in the sense of transforming the miracle of charis into the plain words of the logos and the sounds of the phonê that everybody can perceive.     

Reading the Second Sex: Influence of Hegel’s Master and Slave Dialectic

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The present paper aims to bring out the influence of Hegel's work in Beauvoir's philosophy. It tries to understand the philosophical...     

Bernays,Dooyeweerd and Gödel – the remarkable convergence in their reflections on the foundations of mathematics

Abstract

In spite of differences the thought of Bernays, Dooyeweerd and Gödel evinces a remarkable convergence. This is particularly the case in respect of the acknowledgment of the difference between the discrete and the continuous, the foundational position of number and the fact that the idea of continuity is derived from space (geometry–Bernays). What is furthermore similar is the recognition of what is primitive (and indefinable) as well as the account of the coherence of what is unique, such as when Gödel observes something quasi-spatial in the character of sets. It is shown that Dooye-weerd’s theory of modal aspects provides a philosophical framework that exceeds his own restrictive understanding of infinity (to the potential infinite) and at the same time makes it possible to account for key insights found in the thought of Bernays and Gödel. When Laugwitz says that discreteness rules within the sphere of the numerical, he says nothing more than what Dooyeweerd had in mind with his idea that discrete quantity, as the meaning-nucleus of the arithmetical aspect, qualifies every element within the structure of the quantitative aspect. And when Bernays says that analysis expresses the idea of the continuum in arithmetical language his mode of speech is equivalent to saying that mathematical analysis could seen as being founded upon the spatial anticipation within the modal structure of the arithmetical aspect. The view of the actual infinite (the at once infinite) in terms of an “as if” approach (Bernays), that is, as appreciated as a regulative hypothesis through which every successively infinite multiplicity of numbers could be envisaged as being giving all at once as an infinite totality, provides a sound understanding of the at once infinite and makes it plain why every form of arithmeticism fails. Such attempts have to call upon Cantor’s proof of the non-denumerability of the real numbers–and this proof pre-supposes the use of the at once infinite which, in turn, pre-supposes the (irreducibile) spatial order of simultaneity and the spatial whole-parts relation.     

From rocks to graphs — the shaping of phenomena

Assuming an essential difference between scientific data and phenomena, this paper argues for the view that we have to understand how empirical findings get transformed into scientific phenomena. The work of scientists is seen as largely consisting in constructing these phenomena which are then utilized in more abstract theories. It is claimed that these matters are of importance for discussions of theory choice and progress in science. A case study is presented as a starting point: paleomagnetism and the use of paleomagnetic data in early discussions of continental drift. Some general features of this study are presented in formalized language. It is suggested that the presentation given is particularly suited for a semantic conception of theories. Even though the construction of scientific phenomena is the main topic of this paper, the view presented here is more adapted to realism than social constructivism.     

From Parent to Child to Parent…: Paths In and Out of Problem Behavior

This study used data from the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development to examine relations between parenting, self-control and externalizing behavior from early childhood to mid-adolescence (N?=?956; 49.9 % male). Results indicated that maternal sensitivity, parental harshness and productive activity are related to externalizing problems but that patterns of relations change from early childhood to middle childhood to adolescence, with evidence suggesting that externalizing behavior influences parenting more than the reverse from middle childhood onward. Self-control measured during early adolescence partially mediated relations between maternal sensitivity and adolescent-reported externalizing behavior. Parental monitoring during adolescence was also related to externalizing behavior at age 15. Monitoring partially mediated the relation between externalizing behavior in early adolescence and externalizing at age 15.     

Post-struggle art: Its vicissitudes and atavisms Reconsidering the political value of Brett Murray’s Hail to the Thief works

This article revisits some of the controversies and debates that arose in 2012 over works by South African artist Brett Murray and his painting The Spear in particular. It aims to offer a more sober, profound and instructive evaluation of the painting and the larger body of works it was part of, displayed in the two-part exhibition titled Hail to the Thief. It undertakes an immanent critique of these works, assessing their appropriateness with regard to the liberatory aims and horizon of Murray’s art practice, as well as staking out the level of analysis most fundamental to such an evaluation. It does so, first, by taking issue with two dominant readings and critiques of Murray’s works in terms of unintended and unconscious messages that are found to be counterrevolutionary and racist respectively. Over and against such content analyses and criticisms, the article closes in on a more properly aesthetic form of politics embedded in the communicative mode, subject position and scenario of interaction performed by Murray’s Hail to the Thief works. Although such aspects were mostly overlooked, the article argues that they are key to determining the liberatory potential of Murray’s political art. In the end, the latter is criticised for still adhering to a rather conventional vanguardist model of art’s political role— postmodern tendencies notwithstanding. The article argues that this is untenable from a liberational perspective mainly because of the maintenance of an epistemic hierarchy between critical art and its publics and the ensuing debilitating agential effects.