Empathy and a Life of Moral Endeavor

Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey contributed many invaluable insights that help to make sense of both injustice and resistance. Specifically, she developed an account of what she called “civilized oppression,” which is pernicious in part because it can be difficult to perceive. One way that we ought to pursue what she calls a “life of moral endeavor” is by increasing our perceptual awareness of civilized oppression and ourselves as its agents. In this article I argue that one noxious form of civilized oppression is what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I then follow Harvey in arguing that one of the methods by which we should work to avoid perpetrating testimonial injustice is by empathizing with others. This is true for two reasons. The first is that in order to manifest what Fricker calls the virtue of testimonial justice, we must have a method by which we “correct” our prejudices or implicit biases, and empathy serves as such a corrective. The second is that there are cases where the virtue of testimonial justice wouldn't in fact correct for testimonial injustice in the way that Fricker suggests, but that actively working to empathize would.     

Socrates’ Aversion to Being a Victim of Injustice

In the Gorgias, Plato has Polus ask Socrates if he would rather suffer injustice than perform it. Socrates’ response is justly famous, affirming a view that Polus himself finds incredible, and one that even contemporary readers find difficult to credit: “for my part, I would prefer neither, but if it had to be one or the other, I would choose to suffer rather than do what is unjust” (Gorgias 469c1-2). In this paper, we take up the part of Socrates’ response that Polus never engages and that has also been completely neglected by contemporary scholars, namely, Socrates’ explicit aversion to being a victim of injustice. We show that this same aversion—though one not nearly as strong as his aversion to doing injustice—appears in several texts, and we argue that the best explanation of such an aversion derives from two important features of Socratic philosophy, both of which have only recently been recognized in Socratic scholarship: (i) his virtue intellectualism, which conceives of virtue as a kind of craft that can be achieved in different degrees, and (ii) his conception of moral psychology, which allows for non-rational influences on how we perform the cognitive functions required for proper deliberation.     

Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom.     

Do Disagreeable Political Discussion Networks Undermine Attitude Strength?

How attitudes change and affect behavior depends, in large part, on their strength. Strong attitudes are more resistant to persuasion and are more likely to produce attitude‐consistent behavior. But what influences attitude strength? In this article, we explore a widely discussed, but rarely investigated, factor: an individual's political discussion network. What prior work exists offers a somewhat mixed picture, finding sometimes that disagreeable networks weaken attitudes and other times that they strengthen attitudes. We use a novel national representative dataset to explore the relationship between disagreeable networks and attitude strength. We find, perhaps surprisingly, no evidence that disagreements in networks affect political attitude strength. We conclude by discussing likely reasons for our findings, which, in turn, provide a research agenda for the study of networks and attitude strength.     

The Guise of the Guise of the Bad

It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good (GG). This paper identifies several distinct arguments in favour of the possibility that one can act under the guise of the bad. GG seems to face more serious difficulties when trying to answer three different, but related, arguments for the possibility of acting under the guise of the bad. The main strategies available to answer these objections end up either undermining the motivation for GG or failing to do full justice to the nature of perverse motivation. However, these difficulties turn out to be generated by focusing on a particular version of GG, what I call the “content version”. But we have independent reasons to prefer a different version of GG; namely, the “attitude version”. The attitude version allows for a much richer understanding of the possibility of acting on what we conceive to be bad. Drawing on an analogy with theoretical akrasia and theoretical perversion, I try to show how the attitude version can provide a compelling account of perverse actions.     

Privileged Groups and Obligation: Engineering Bad Concepts

Assuming that there is an obligation to combat structural injustice, what does it look like? I suggest that discerning what this obligation is, and on whom it falls, first requires being sensitive to facts about social structure. Importantly, we need to know how social structure is constituted, and the ways in which it can be disrupted. I argue that since social structure is constituted, in part, by concepts that undergird social practices, then our critical attention should be focused on those concepts that undergird oppressive social practices. In the end, I suggest that the obligation to combat structural injustice falls on privileged social groups to significantly aid in the processes that give rise to conceptual change.     

Linguistic Justice and Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

This paper investigates whether analytic philosophers who are non-native English speakers are subject to linguistic injustice and, if yes, what kind of injustice that is and whether it is different from the general disadvantage that non-native English speakers meet in a world where English is rapidly becoming the lingua franca. The paper begins with a critical review of the debate on linguistic justice, with a particular focus on the emergence of a lingua franca and the related questions of justice, both in terms of the disadvantages suffered by those groups who bear the cost of learning another language and in terms of forms of discrimination due to accents and language improprieties. We argue that being at a relative disadvantage compared to others does not necessarily translate in a proper injustice if fundamental civil, political and social provisions are in place. We suggest that a circumstance of injustice arises when such disadvantage affects those who are not yet members of such academic community such as prospective students, thus contributing in keeping the non-native group a minority. We qualify this case of disadvantage as a matter of structural injustice.     

Conservatism. A defence

Conservatism has an essence, or so I argue. Typical of the conservative attitude is to take what is an established fact or order to be worthy of preservation, precisely because it is well established. The question what fact is established must be answered in a context, and people of different political bent answer it differently. This is why we have left‐wing as well as right‐wing conservatism, sharing a common rationale. In my Conservatism for Our Time I discuss various different aspects of this rationale, and my answer to certain strictures raised by Robert Grant concerns several of them. The most important concerns a conservative or traditionalist criticism of rationalism. This criticism has been developed by ‐ among others ‐Michael Oakeshott. In my book, and in my answer to Grant, I defend and elaborate on this criticism.     

Distinguished Lecture: Social structure,narrative and explanation

Recent work on social injustice has focused on implicit bias as an important factor in explaining persistent injustice in spite of achievements on civil rights. In this paper, I argue that because of its individualism, implicit bias explanation, taken alone, is inadequate to explain ongoing injustice; and, more importantly, it fails to call attention to what is morally at stake. An adequate account of how implicit bias functions must situate it within a broader theory of social structures and structural injustice; changing structures is often a precondition for changing patterns of thought and action and is certainly required for durable change.     

Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy

Suppose we have a persistent disagreement about a particular set of policy options, not because of an underlying moral disagreement, or a mere conflict of interest, but rather because we disagree about a crucial non-normative factual assumption underlying the justification of the policy choices. The main question in the paper is what political legitimacy requires in such cases, or indeed whether there are defensible answers to that question. The problem of political legitimacy in fact-dependent policy disagreements has received almost no attention in political philosophy, which has focused mostly on value disagreements and proposed theories of legitimate coercive legislation in valuedependent disagreements. The paper presents an argument showing that under certain plausible assumptions regarding legitimacy, there are serious difficulties in identifying legitimate choices in fact-dependent policy disagreements. This may be unsurprising to political philosophers preoccupied with value-based disagreements, perhaps because it has been assumed that legitimacy-related concerns are irrelevant (or do not apply) to fact-dependent policy disagreements. The paper argues that this response is premature. If we should care about legitimacy et al.l, then it is by no means clear why we should ignore issues of legitimacy in policy-disputes that depend on factual disagreements. The paper ends by defining a set of possibilities that merit further exploration in search of a theory of legitimacy in fact-dependent policy disagreements.     

Remembering as Necessary for Forgiving

As Japan marks the 75th anniversary of World War II in 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not offer a fresh apology and maintained that future generations should not have to keep apologizing for past mistakes. This paper uses the unresolved war issue of the military comfort women system as a context to discuss what it means for political apologies to be more than mere political gestures founded on political interests and discusses what it takes to facilitate forgiveness. It will examine the features of a repentant wrongdoer who deserves forgiveness based on how one relates to one’s past wrongdoing in order to distinguish political apologies that are genuine from those that are mere gestures aimed at hasty reconciliation. This will be discussed through the works of Jacques Derrida and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Next, through Jankélévitch’s and Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of forgiveness, it will be discussed how matters of justice and forgiveness should be understood as well as how the history of past wrongs and injustice is necessary for a genuine apology and makes forgiveness possible. It is also a moral responsibility for both perpetrators and victims to remember history in order to achieve personal forgiveness as well as begin social and political reconciliation.

     

Love,Value and Supervenience*

Abstract

People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non‐fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, the paper shows why it is difficult to combine with certain views on value. The main challenge comes from the idea that value judgments are universalizable. This view squares badly with the thought that the people whom we love are irreplaceable. Introducing the idea that properties may have different functions in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper determines what precisely it is about love that makes it hard to combine with universalizability. Moreover, it suggests two ways of meeting this challenge.     

What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model of Responsibility for Structural Injustice

What responsibility do individuals bear for structural injustice? Iris Marion Young has offered the most fully developed account to date, the Social Connections Model. She argues that we all bear responsibility because we each causally contribute to structural processes that produce injustice. My aim in this article is to motivate and defend an alternative account that improves on Young’s model by addressing five fundamental challenges faced by any such theory. The core idea of what I call the “Role-Ideal Model” is that we are each responsible for structural injustice through and in virtue of our social roles, i.e. our roles as parents, colleagues, employers, citizens, etc., because roles are the site where structure meets agency. In short, the Role-Ideal Model (1) explains how individual action contributes to structural change, (2) justifies demands for action from each particular agent, (3) specifies what kinds of acts should be undertaken, (4) moderates between demanding too much and too little of individual agents, and (5) provides an account of the critical responses appropriate for holding individuals accountable for structural injustice.     

I—Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge

This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge.     

Attitude Certainty: A Review of Past Findings and Emerging Perspectives

Attitude certainty, or the sense of conviction with which one holds one's attitude, has been the subject of considerable research attention. This article provides an overview of past, present, and future research on this topic. First, we review past work on attitude certainty, focusing on what has been learned about the antecedents and consequences of feeling certain or uncertain of one's attitude. Following this review, we examine emerging perspectives on attitude certainty. In particular, we describe recent work exploring the metacognitive appraisals that shape attitude certainty, the different meanings attitude certainty can have, and the dynamic effects of attitude certainty on attitude strength. Along the way, we also highlight important questions that have yet be answered about the certainty construct.     

Educational Leadership Reconsidered: Arendt,Agamben, and Bauman

In this paper we claim educational leadership as an autonomous discipline whose goals and strategies should not mirror those typical of business and political leadership. In order to define the aims proper to educational leadership we question three common assumptions of what it is supposed to carry out. First, we turn to Hannah Arendt and her contemporary critics to maintain that education aims at opening up exceptions within the normal course of events rather than simply preserving it. This way, education is not reduced to an instrument at the service of the reinforcement of a given social and economic system. This leads us to ask what should exactly educational leadership oppose by means of these exceptions. According to Tyson E. Lewis’s wise application to education of Giorgio Agamben’s ontology of impotentiality, the apparently reasonable idea that education must help the subject to develop his potentials is precisely an instrumentalization of education which brings about a desubjectification of the learner. Education should actually make the pupil aware of his right not to carry his potentiality to its actualization and dwell instead in a state of impotentiality. Third and last, we complicate this picture by alluding to Zygmunt Bauman’s critique of the rejection of Western individuals to realize certain possibilities, which they deem too costly. By analysing in conjunction Agamben’s encouragement to suspend one’s potential and Bauman’s insistence on the need of not suspending it, we conclude by defining what, in our opinion, defines the raison d’être of educational leadership.     

Health performance of individuals within the Campbell paradigm

In this paper, we developed a comprehensive health performance measure that formally links individual health attitudes with the likelihood of engaging in a wide variety of health‐related behaviours from various domains such as sustenance, hygiene, and physical exercise. Within what Kaiser, Byrka, and Hartig (2010) call the Campbell paradigm, we equated general health attitude with what a person does to retain or promote his or her health. Thus, health behaviours, on one hand, were expected to form a homogeneous, transitively ordered class of behaviours. On the other hand, the very behavioural class was in turn thought to be the basis from which an individual's health attitude could be directly assessed. A sample of 391 adults provided us with survey data containing different sets of health behaviours as well as variables and personality measures that had been corroborated as health‐behaviour relevant in previous research. We found that self‐reports of 50 behaviours and expressions of appreciation for 20 of these behaviours from various domains formed a transitively ordered class of activities. In contrast to the conventional view in health psychology, in which attitudes are regarded as a psychological cause behind individual behaviour, and in contrast to conventional findings in health psychology, where behaviours appear to fall into numerous sets of more or less distinct domains of health‐enhancing activities (e.g., exercising or avoiding risks), our findings speak of the psychological and formal unity of health behaviour. Inevitably, attitude measures grounded in the Campbell paradigm gauge individual attitudes, and just as much, they measure the health performance of individuals.     

分配不公正下的退缩行为：程序公正和互动公正的影响

以160名中学教师为被试,采用2×2的完全随机设计,以模拟故事（scenarios）的方法呈现刺激,研究了在职称评定中分配不公正的前提下,程序公正/不公正,互动公正/不公正对教师的退缩行为（消极怠工、拒绝帮助、离职、对校长的消极态度）的影响。结果表明,在分配不公正条件下：（1）程序公正、互动公正均影响教师的消极怠工程度;（2）程序公正、互动公正均影响教师的拒绝帮助行为程度,而且交互作用显著;（3）互动公正影响教师对上司的消极态度,程序公正无显著影响;（4）程序公正和互动公正对离职意愿影响均不显著     

Religiosity Reduces the Negative Influence of Injustice on Subjective Well-being: A Study in 121 Nations

National injustice has been linked to lower national happiness. We predict that national religiosity will mitigate this negative influence of injustice on happiness. We test this hypothesis analyzing national-level data from 121 nations, using a single-level moderated regression analysis. To capture various aspects of national injustice, we combine four national measures associated with injustice, namely: indexes of group grievances, political terror, rule of law, and corruption perceptions. The results show that national religiosity has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between injustice and happiness, such that higher levels of religiosity mitigate more of the negative effects of injustice on happiness than lower levels do. The results hold when religious affiliation and indexes of economic prosperity, education, and social support are controlled for. These results indicate that people in religious cultures may successfully utilize religious faith to deal with adverse conditions.