There is no special problem with metaphysics

I argue for the claim in the title. Along the way, I also address an independently interesting question: what is metaphysics, anyway? I think that the typical characterizations of metaphysics are inadequate, that a better one is available, and that the better one helps explain why metaphysics is no more problematic than the rest of philosophy.     

Self-location is no problem for conditionalization

How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and draw some general conclusions about their impact on eternal beliefs.     

There is a problem of change

Impostors are pseudo-problems masquerading as genuine problems. Impostors should be exposed. The problem of change appears genuine. But some, such as Hofweber (2009) and Rychter (2009), have recently denounced it as an impostor. They allege that it is mysterious how to answer the meta-problem of saying what problem it is: for even if any problem is genuinely about change per se, they argue, it is either empirical or trivially dissolved by conceptual analysis. There is indeed an impostor in our midst. But it is the meta-problem of change. I defend the appearance that the problem of change is a genuine metaphysical problem about change. This vindicates philosophers’ lasting interest in it. It also illuminates what makes a problem metaphysical, how metaphysics relates to other inquiries, and how best to respond to attempts to undermine metaphysical problems.     

There is no induced motion at near-threshold velocities

Duncker's classic experiments on induced motion at near-threshold velocities were based on the assumption that movement of one stimulus relative to the other (object-relative) is perfectly detected while it remains completely impossible to identify which of the two stimuli is moving (subject-relative). In the present experiments it is shown that the threshold areas of object-relative and subject-relative movement are largely overlapping. Consequently Dunker's assumption cannot be fulfilled: whenever object-relative movement is well detectable accuracy of detecting subject-relative motion will also be over 50%. In four additional experiments it is shown that the well-established effects of fixation, stimulus size and enclosure on induced motion are to be interpreted as effects of these variables on the detection of subject-relative movement: the so-called induction phenomena occured only when accuracy was over 50%.     

There is no such thing as environmental ethics

Engineers and scientists, whose professional responsibilities often influence the natural environment, have sought to develop an environmental ethic that will be in tune with their attitudes toward the non-human environment, and that will assist them in decision making regarding questions of environmental quality. In this paper the classical traditions in normative ethics are explored in an attempt to formulate such an environmental ethic. I conclude, however, that because the discipline of ethics is directed at person-person interactions, ethics as a scholarly discipline does not help us understand how we ought to treat non-human nature. We therefore cannot look to ethics as a source for understanding our attitudes and for providing guidance to our actions with regard to the environment. To do so is to ask too much of ethics. If we are to find an acceptable environmental morality, it must come from a new paradigm. One approach might be to understand our attitudes on the basis of spirituality, modeled after animistic religions.     

There is no coherent evidence for a bilingual advantage in executive processing

Three studies compared bilinguals to monolinguals on 15 indicators of executive processing (EP). Most of the indicators compare a neutral or congruent baseline to a condition that should require EP. For each of the measures there was no main effect of group and a highly significant main effect of condition. The critical marker for a bilingual advantage, the Group × Condition interaction, was significant for only one indicator, but in a pattern indicative of a bilingual disadvantage. Tasks include antisaccade (Study 1), Simon (Studies 1–3), flanker (Study 3), and color-shape switching (Studies 1–3). The two groups performed identically on the Raven’s Advanced Matrices test (Study 3). Analyses on the combined data selecting subsets that are precisely matched on parent’s educational level or that include only highly fluent bilinguals reveal exactly the same pattern of results. A problem reconfirmed by the present study is that effects assumed to be indicators of a specific executive process in one task (e.g., inhibitory control in the flanker task) frequently do not predict individual differences in that same indicator on a related task (e.g., inhibitory control in the Simon task). The absence of consistent cross-task correlations undermines the interpretation that these are valid indicators of domain-general abilities. In a final discussion the underlying rationale for hypothesizing bilingual advantages in executive processing based on the special linguistic demands placed on bilinguals is interrogated.     

There is no place like home: Poverty and the squatter house

The house is one of the most important possessions in individuals' lives and consumers perform several practices in order to turn this spatial product into a home. Building on the existing research on home and home possessions, the article challenges the western romantic notion of home by investigating poor migrant consumers' lived experiences with a spatial product that has material deficiencies and it is perceived as inferior by the members of the dominant host culture. Accordingly, this study explores how migrant and at the same time poor consumers turn the squatter house into a home. Through an ethnographic research, the research findings show how spatial, material, symbolic, social, and temporal dimensions shape the private sphere of home and how consumers individually and collectively negotiate all these of forces in order to turn the stigmatized dwelling into a home.     

要告诉孩子:世界上根本就没有鬼神

有一天,我六岁的儿子问了我一个问题:爸爸,世界上到底有没有鬼.我没有立即告诉他,反问了他一句:你说呢?儿子摇了摇头,说:不知道.我立刻觉得这是个十分严肃的问题,使我不得不说说这个话题.……     

There is no moral authority in medicine: response to Cowdin and Tuohey.

Central to the Cowdin-Tuohey paper is the concept of a moral authority proper to medical practitioners. Much as I agree with the authors in refusing to degrade doctors to the status of mere technicians, I argue that one does not succeed in retrieving the moral dimension of medical practice by investing doctors with moral authority. I show that none of the cases brought forth by Cowdin-Tuohey really amounts to a case of moral authority. Then I try to explain why no such cases can be found. Developing an insight that is common to all the major moral thinkers in the philosophia perennis, I show that doctors are professionally competent with respect only to a part of the human good; morally wise persons are competent with respect to that which makes man good as man. I try to show why it follows that a) professional expertise has no natural tendency to pass over into moral understanding, and that b) doctor and non-doctor alike start from the same point in developing their understanding of medical morality. It follows that the authors fail in their attempt to de-center the moral magisterium of the Church by setting up centers of moral authority outside of the Church.     

风水并不神秘

风水,顾名思义,就是说某地做某事位置的好坏。无非有物质的、精神的两方面内容。风水实际上是古代的勘测、设计学问。其中包括利用自然地形、人工设计,再加上一个心理上的良性意识作用,使人感到意识上的好坏。当然,良性意识总是带给人希望的。古代的科技不发达,风水先生就是利用这一点来赚钱甚至行骗的。     

There are no Degrees in a Bodhisattva's Compassion

This paper is to argue that there are no degrees in a Bodhisattva's compassion and also to explore the Western account of compassion, which suggests that there are degrees in our compassion. After analyzing and comparing both positions, I affirm that they are opposite views.     

There is no clam with coats in the calm coast: Delimiting the transposed-letter priming effect

In this article, we explore the transposed-letter priming effect (e.g., jugde–JUDGE vs. jupte–JUDGE), a phenomenon that taps into some key issues on how the brain encodes letter positions and has favoured the creation of new input coding schemes. However, almost all the empirical evidence from transposed-letter priming experiments comes from nonword primes (e.g., jugde–JUDGE). Indeed, previous evidence when using word–word pairs (e.g., causal–CASUAL) is not conclusive. Here, we conducted five masked priming lexical decision experiments that examined the relationship between pairs of real words that differed only in the transposition of two of their letters (e.g., CASUAL vs. CAUSAL). Results showed that, unlike transposed-letter nonwords, transposed-letter words do not seem to affect the identification time of their transposed-letter mates. Thus, prime lexicality is a key factor that modulates the magnitude of transposed-letter priming effects. These results are interpreted under the assumption of the existence of lateral inhibition processes occurring within the lexical level—which cancels out any orthographic facilitation due to the overlapping letters. We examine the implications of these findings for models of visual-word recognition.     

There is no 'truth' outside a context: implications for the teaching of analytical psychology in the 21st century

Humans are from birth embedded in a historical and contemporary context of meanings. This always constrains their theoretical and practical activities. In this paper, I will be suggesting that there are no guiding 'truths' outside such contexts. In order to understand the foundations of any concept or new idea, it is important to comprehend the context in which it is embedded. Candidates and some of their teachers have very little knowledge of the intellectual context in which Jung or any other analytic theorist wrote. As a result, the analytic 'founders' are often believed to have discovered 'truths' transcending the context of history and of everyday life. They were, however, as much creative synthesizers as pure originators. I propose that the components of all analytic theories emerge from their embeddedness. I contend, therefore, that the understandings of these components such as psychic causality, epistemology and identity formation were quite differently conceived at the time the analytic founders were working than they are today. I will give examples to show how the acceptance of this attitude is useful in inculcating a discerning approach in candidates towards traditionally accepted analytic theories and practices. This can provide them with a method to promote their individual creative development.     

There is no central stimulus encoding during saccadic eye shifts: A case against general parallel processing notions

Three experiments are reported about the question whether perceptual processing of a signal viewed during a fixation, can continue during a subsequent saccadic eye shift to another signal. In the first experiment it was found that the size of the effect of degraded signal quality, measured in a traditional choice reaction task, was fully reflected in the duration of the fixation. The results of the second experiment showed that presentation time of the signal had no effect on fixation duration. In a final study the signal was preceded by a tone. Subjects were instructed to start the saccade upon hearing the tone, which had the effect that the signal was only briefly viewed. The results showed, first, that this instruction was hard to obey and, second, that, when obeyed, processing only continued when fixating the next signal and not during the saccade. Together, the results are most consistent with a serial sequence and difficult to reconcile with a parallel notion of perceptual encoding and saccadic shift.     

"There is no evidence to suggest...": changing the way we judge information for disclosure in the informed consent process

Feminist health activists and medical researchers frequently disagree on the adequacy of the informed consent processes in clinical trials. I argue for an informed consent process that reflects the central importance of patient-participant autonomy. Such a standard may raise concerns for medical researchers about their capacity to control the quantity and quality of the information they disclose to potential participants. These difficulties might be addressed by presenting potential participants with differently sized disclosure packages.