Kasimir Twardowski on the content of presentations

In On the Content and Object of Presentations, Kasimir Twardowski presents an interesting line of thought concerning the content of a presentation and its relation to the object of that presentation. This way of thinking about content is valuable for understanding phenomenal intentionality, and it should also be important for the project of “naturalizing” the mental (or at least for discovering the neural correlates of the phenomenal). According to this view, content is that by virtue of which a presentation of an object presents a certain object and no other. In the cases in which an object is presented as simple, there is nothing more that can be said about the relation of content and object. It is sui generis: the relation of content to an object by virtue of which it presents that object. Further, the content of a presentation is never itself directly presented. The content can only be gotten at indirectly, as the content by which such and such object is presented. Where the presented object is complex—as is of course the normal case—a lot that is useful can be said about the structure of the content. In this paper, I lay out Twardowski's theory of the content of presentations. Since the business of content is to present its object, I briefly present the basics of Twardowski's mereology of objects.     

Unity,Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience

In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences if we are to self‐ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self‐ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity.     

Perception of object unity in young infants: The roles of motion,depth, and orientation

One hundred twenty-eight 4-month-old infants were habituated to one of several displays that depicted two rod pieces above and below a box. The effects of common motion, background texture, and orientation of the rod pieces on infants' perception of unity of the partially occluded rod were examined. Infants who viewed displays in which the rod pieces were aligned and presented in front of a textured background, subsequently looked longer at a broken rod (two rod pieces separated by a gap) than at a complete rod, implying that the infants experienced the rod pieces as connected behind the box in the first display. Infants who viewed displays with no background texture, or displays in which the rod pieces were nonaligned but relatable (i.e., connected if extended behind the occluder), looked equally at the two posthabituation displays. Infants who viewed displays containing nonrelatable rod pieces looked longer at the complete rod, implying that nonrelatable edges specify disjoint objects to 4-month-olds. A threshold model, stipulating that perception of object unity is supported by multiple visual cues, is proposed to account for these results. Veridical perception of motion of display elements, depth ordering, and edge orientation are necessary, but not individually sufficient, to support young infants' perception of object unity.     

Abelard,ens and unity

Although Abelard arrived at a view ofens nearer to Aristotle's than his sources would suggest, unlike thirteenth-century thinkers he did not work out a view of transcendentals in terms ofens, its attributes and their convertibility. He did, however, regard unity (though not goodness or truth) as an attribute of every thing. At first, Abelard suggested that unity, being inseparable, could not be an accident according to Porphyry's definition (that which can come and leave a subject without the subject being corrupted): either it is some type of form not classified by Porphyry, or not a form at all. In his later logical work, Abelard argued differently. Unity, he said, is an accidental form, but Porphyry's definition of an accident must be understood negatively, not as asserting something about what could happen in reality (since the form of unity could never leave its subject) but rather something about an absence of connection: were it,per impossible, to occur, the loss by a subject of its form of unity would not lead to the loss of its specific or generic status.     

Socrates,the primary question,and the unity of virtue

For Socrates, the virtues are a kind of knowledge, and the virtues form a unity. Sometimes, Socrates suggests that the virtues are all ‘one and the same’ thing. Other times, he suggests they are ‘parts of a single whole.’ I argue that (i) the ‘what is x?’ question is sophisticated, it gives rise to two distinct kinds of investigations into virtue, a conceptual investigation into the ousia and a psychological investigation into the dunamis, (ii) Plato recognized the difference between definitional accounts of the ousia and a psychological accounts of the dunamis, and (iii) the distinction between these two investigations can effectively resolve various interpretive puzzles regarding the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the virtues are ‘one and the same’ psychologically, while they are ‘parts of a single whole’ conceptually.     

Synchronous change and perception of object unity: evidence from adults and infants.

Adults and infants display a robust ability to perceive the unity of a center-occluded object when the visible ends of the object undergo common motion (e.g. Kellman, P.J., Spelke, E.S., 1983. Perception of partly occluded objects in infancy. Cognitive Psychology 15, 483-524). Ecologically oriented accounts of this ability focus on the primary of motion in the perception of segregated objects, but Gestalt theory suggests a broader possibility: observers may perceive object unity by detecting patterns of synchronous change, of which common motion is a special case. We investigated this possibility with observations of adults and 4-month-old infants. Participants viewed a center-occluded object whose visible surfaces were either misaligned or aligned, stationary or moving, and unchanging or synchronously changing in color or brightness in various temporal patterns (e.g. flashing). Both alignment and common motion contributed to adults' perception of object unity, but synchronous color changes did not. For infants, motion was an important determinant of object unity, but other synchronous changes and edge alignment were not. When a stationary object with aligned edges underwent synchronous changes in color or brightness, infants showed high levels of attention to the object, but their perception of its unity appeared to be indeterminate. An inherent preference for fast over slow flash rates, and a novelty preference elicited by a change in rate, both indicated that infants detected the synchronous changes, although they failed to use them as information for object unity. These findings favor ecologically oriented accounts of object perception in which surface motion plays a privileged role.     

The truth and nothing but the truth,yet never the whole truth: Frege,Russell and the analysis of unities

It is widely assumed that Russell's problems with the unity of the proposition were recurring and insoluble within the framework of the logical theory of his Principles of Mathematics. By contrast, Frege's functional analysis of thoughts (grounded in a type-theoretic distinction between concepts and objects) is commonly assumed to provide a solution to the problem or, at least, a means of avoiding the difficulty altogether. The Fregean solution is unavailable to Russell because of his commitment to the thesis that there is only one ultimate ontological category. This, combined with Russell's reification of propositions, ensures that he must hold concepts and objects to be of the same logical and ontological type. In this paper I argue that, while Frege's treatment of the unity of the proposition has immediate advantages over Russell's, a deeper consideration of the philosophical underpinnings and metaphysical consequences of the two approaches reveals that Frege's supposed solution is, in fact, far from satisfactory. Russell's repudiation of the Fregean position in the Principles is, I contend, convincing and Russell's own position, despite its problems, conforms to a greater extent than Frege's with common sense and, furthermore, with certain ideas which are central to our understanding of the origins of the analytical tradition.     

Psychology's search for unity

Arguments for unifying psychology's disparate elements are examined in relation to the actualities of scientific practice. These arguments are often based on such implicit unexamined assumptions as: (1) psychology resembles physics conceptually and historically; (2) there is an underlying rational order to knowledge which will define and justify the direction unification will take; (3) there is a knowable reality independent of our perceptions; (4) the outcome of unification will resemble a harmonious family working for the common good of “knowledge” and “truth.” While these assumptions have plausibility, it is argued that alternative views have equally legitimate claims and if we accept them, the possibility of unifying psychology becomes more problematic. Psychology's desire for unification appears parallel to a similar yearning within society that seeks to counteract the fragmentation of social life and consciousness that characterizes modernity.     

Motion and edge sensitivity in perception of object unity

Although much evidence indicates that young infants perceive unitary objects by analyzing patterns of motion, infants' abilities to perceive object unity by analyzing Gestalt properties and by integrating distinct views of an object over time are in dispute. To address these controversies, four experiments investigated adults' and infants' perception of the unity of a center-occluded, moving rod with misaligned visible edges. Both alignment information and depth information affected adults' and infants' perception of object unity in similar ways, and infants perceived object unity by integrating information about object features over time. However, infants perceived a moving, misaligned, three-dimensional object as indeterminate in its connectedness, whereas adults perceived it as connected behind the occluder. These findings indicate that the effectiveness of common motion in specifying unified surfaces across an occluder is reduced by misalignment of edges. Alignment information enhances perception of object unity either by serving directly as information for unity or by optimizing the detectability of motion-carried information for unity. In addition, young infants are able to retain information about edge orientation over short intervals in determining connectedness via a process of spatiotemporal integration.     

A Theory of Perceptual Objects

Objects are central in visual, auditory, and tactual perception. But what counts as a perceptual object? I address this question via a structural unity schema, which specifies how a collection of parts must be arranged to compose an object for perception. On the theory I propose, perceptual objects are composed of parts that participate in causally sustained regularities. I argue that this theory falls out of a compelling account of the function of object perception, and illustrate its applications to multisensory perception. I also argue that the account avoids problems faced by standard views of visual and auditory objects.     

Search for a category target in clutter

An airport security worker searching a suitcase for a weapon is engaging in an especially difficult search task: the target is not well-specified, it is not salient, and it is not predicted by its context. Under these conditions, search may proceed item-by-item. In the experiment reported here we tested whether the items for this form of search are whole familiar objects. Our displays were composed of color photographs of ordinary objects, that were either uniform in color and texture (simple), or had two or more parts with different colors or textures (compound). The observer's task was to detect the presence of a target belonging to a broad category (food). We found that when the objects were presented in a sparse array, search times to find the target were similar for displays composed of simple and compound objects. But when the same objects were presented as dense clutter, search functions were steeper for displays composed of compound objects. We attribute this difference to the difficulty of segmenting compound objects in clutter: compared with simple objects, compound objects are less likely to be organized into a single object by bottom--up grouping processes. Our results indicate that while search rates in a sparse display may be determined by the number of objects, search rates in clutter are also affected by the number of object parts.     

Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

Narrative unity and clinical judgment

Alasdair MacIntyre's recent thinking both about the concept of a practice and the existence of narrative unity in human life raises important questions about how we should view clinical medicine today. Is it possible for clinical medicine to pursue patient well-being in a society (allegedly) afflicted with what he calls ‘modernity’? Here it is argued that MacIntyre's pessimistic view of the individual in contemporary society makes his call for patient autonomy in the clinical setting pointless. Finally, recent work in gerontology is cited to make three points: first, MacIntyre's pessimism about us is too extreme; second, the concept of a ‘fictionalized’ personal history is closer to reality than either MacIntyre's notion of narrative unity or the ideas of his imagined opponent (Sartre); and finally, we should not expect clinical medicine to produce patient well-being, when this is understood narratively.     

Wittgenstein and the unity of good

This paper discusses the problem of the unity of moral good, concerning the kind of unity that moral good or the concept thereof constitutes. In particular, I am concerned with how Wittgenstein's identification of various complex modes of conceptual unity, and his introduction of a methodology of clarification for dealing with such complex concepts, can help with the problem of unity, as it rises from the moral philosophical tradition. Relating to this I also address the disputed question, whether Wittgenstein regards good as a family‐resemblance concept, and make an attempt to characterize family‐resemblance concepts generally by way of their similarities and differences from certain other complex modes of conceptual unity. I argue that whilst Wittgenstein does regard good as a family‐resemblance concept, in the Philosophical Investigations he seeks to make a more general methodological point. I conclude with a suggestion of how Wittgenstein's methodological points can help us to put into a broader perspective famous criticisms of the moral philosophical tradition by Michael Stocker and Bernard Williams, and how Wittgenstein's methods more generally can help to address the problem of the unity of good. This illustrates one way in which Wittgensteinian methods can help resolve disputes in moral philosophy, where the main approaches, Aristotelian, Kantian and utilitarian theories, seem to be locked in a stalemate. As I argue, this situation has to do with their assumptions about the unity of moral good. The response isn't to reject those theories, however, but to re‐interpret them in a way consistent with the Wittgensteinian methodology.     

From Metaphysics and Philosophical Theses to Grammar: Wittgenstein's Turn

The paper discusses the question ‘what does Wittgenstein mean by not having theses in philosophy?’ His conception of philosophy without theses, as this is articulated in his later work, is understood as a response to the problem of dogmatism in philosophy and a non‐metaphysical form of philosophy. I argue that although already the Tractatus aims at a philosophy devoid of theses, it involves a relapse back to such theses. Its conception of philosophical clarification involves a particular conception of the essence of propositions. This way the form of the activity of clarification is determined by a philosophical/metaphysical thesis. In his later philosophy Wittgenstein, however, manages to solve this problem. His solution, explained with the help of the metaphor of ‘turning our whole investigation around’, consists of a change in the comprehension of the status of philosophical statements. For instance rules (e.g. definitions) and examples are understood as what he calls ‘objects of comparison’. Such objects of comparison are something that cases of language use (to be investigated with the purpose of clarification) are to be compared with, but the philosopher is not to make the claim that such objects of comparison show what the cases of language use under examination must be. The modality (expressed by ‘must’) is a characteristic of the philosopher's mode of presentation. It should not be claimed to be a feature of his object of investigation (the uses of language to be clarified).     

Seeing women as objects: The sexual body part recognition bias

Objectification theory suggests that the bodies of women are sometimes reduced to their sexual body parts. As well, an extensive literature in cognitive psychology suggests that global processing underlies person recognition, whereas local processing underlies object recognition. Integrating these literatures, we introduced and tested the sexual body part recognition bias hypothesis that women's (versus men's) bodies would be reduced to their sexual body parts in the minds of perceivers. Specifically, we adopted the parts versus whole body recognition paradigm, which is a robust indicator of local versus global processing. The findings across two experiments showed that women's bodies were reduced to their sexual body parts in perceivers' minds. We also found that local processing contributed to the sexual body part recognition bias, whereas global processing tempered it. Implications for sexual objectification and its underlying processes and motives are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the Relation between Kanizsa's Bias Towards Convexity and the Gestaltists Prägnanz from the Perspective of Current in Shape Recognition

What is the relation between Kanizsa's bias towards convexity and the Gestaltists' demonstrations that perceptual organization obeys a principle of pragnänz, or simplicity? Why should either kind of bias exist? Textbook accounts assign no functional role for these biases. Geon theory (Biederman 1987) proposes that we can understand these biases in terms of fundamental processes by which complex objects are decomposed into convex (or singly concave) regions at points of matched cusps according to the transversality regularity (Hoffman and Richards 1985). Such decomposition yields simple, convex parts segmented between the concavities. A shape that contains concavities is generally regarded as complex insofar as it can be decomposed into the regions, or parts, between the concavities. It is these simple parts that are the stable elements of shape, not the whole object. In fact, geon theory leads to the expectation that shape recognition proceeds most efficiently when the parts are good (in the pragnänz sense) but the object is bad!     

Comparison Facilitates Children's Learning of Names for Parts

Learning names for parts of objects can be challenging for children, as it requires overcoming their tendency to name whole objects. We test whether comparing items can facilitate learning names for their parts. Applying the structure-mapping theory of comparison leads to two predictions: (a) young children will find it easier to identify a common part between two very similar items than between two dissimilar items (because the similar pair is easier to align); (b) close alignments potentiate far alignments: children will be better able to extend a novel part name to a dissimilar object after having extended it to a similar object. In three studies, 227 preschool children mapped novel part terms to new animals or objects. Both predictions were confirmed. Children more accurately extended novel part terms to objects that were similar to the standard than to objects that were dissimilar (Experiments 1 and 2), and children more accurately extended novel part names to dissimilar objects after having extended them to similar objects (Experiment 3). We conclude that structure-mapping processes can support part learning.     

Aesthetic consciousness of site-specific art

The aim of this article is to examine Edmund Husserl's theory of aesthetic consciousness and the possibility to apply it to site-specific art. The central focus will be on the idea of the limited synthetic unity of the aesthetic object that is introduced by Husserl in order to differentiate positional and aesthetic attitude towards the object. I claim that strongly site-specific art, which is a work of art about a place and in the place, challenges the view that the synthetic unity of the aesthetic object is limited. Moreover, following Husserl's theory, it becomes questionable whether strongly site-specific art is art at all. I try to answer these objections by explaining how the artist prescribes the appearances and boundaries of a strongly site-specific object of art, thereby satisfying the demand for the limited- ness of the synthetic unity of the aesthetic object.