Politics,democratic action,and solidarity

I agree with the critique of rationalism proposed by Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus in ‘Disclosing New Worlds’. Today the defence of democracy requires us to understand that allegiance to democratic institutions can only rest on identification with the practices, the language‐games, and the discourses which are constitutive of the democratic ‘form of life’, and that it is not a question of providing them with a rational justification. My comments are developed in two directions. First, as a development of their thesis concerning the centrality of practices, I suggest that in order to grasp the present crisis of democratic forms of individuality we can learn a lot from Nietzsche's analysis of ‘nihilism’. Second, I point to a dimension which I consider to be missing in the perspective put forward in the article. It fails to take account of the fact that the constitution of a ‘we’ always requires the determination of a ‘them’. This, in my view, has important consequences for the relation between solidarity and politics. I conclude by arguing for the need to introduce an agonistic element in the view of solidarity, and for the crucial role of the category of the adversary in a pluralist democracy whose aim is to transform antagonism into agonism.     

Self-esteem, authoritarianism, and democratic values in the face of threat

This study investigated the associations among terrorist threat, right-wing authoritarianism, self-esteem, and their relations in support for democratic values. Students (n = 140) completed Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, Rosenberg's Self-esteem Scale, and the Democratic Values Scale. The participants also read an editorial regarding the events of 9/11/01 and completed two mortality-salience questions to induce a sense of threat. Results showed that self-esteem was a significant contributor to the prediction of scores on the Democratic Values Scale. Furthermore, the interaction between self-esteem and right-wing authoritarianism explained significant variance in the Democratic Values Scale scores. The results are interpreted in light of theories addressing authoritarianism and self-esteem.     

Truth and democratic education

The connection of education to democracy is an issue of central importance to communities committed to liberty and justice. In her influential book Democratic Education Amy Gutmann addresses this connection. In doing so she takes up a position regarding democracies and the teaching of truth which is indefensible, and which removes any ban on manipulating citizens. Also indefensible is Gutmann's position concerning publicly-funded community colleges and universities. These she deems nonselective institutions; a mistake that obscures the unequal distribution of opportunities for democratically-required education. The outcome is to reveal Gutmann's analysis of democratic education and democratic participation to be, in important respects, inadequate.     

Lenin on democratic theory

Lenin’s State and Revolution is not only a project for imminent revolutionary policy and not only a legitimization argument for a revolutionary dictatorship, but also a theory of state and theory of democracy. Lenin points at the reduplication of state organs that is inherent in a democratic state. While the Russian revolutionary thinks of this reduplication as something transitory, we today increasingly see it as a durable condition coterminous with the late-modern democratic state. I use Lenin’s treatise as a point of inspiration to briefly characterize my dialectical theory of state.     

Democracy & democratic education

A profound problem posed by education for any pluralistic society with democratic aspirations is how to reconcile individual freedom and civic virtue. Children cannot be educated to maximize both individual freedom and civic virtue. Yet reasonable people value and intermittently demand both. We value freedom of speech and press, for example, but want (other) people to refrain from false and socially harmful expression. The various tensions between individual freedom and civic virtue pose a challenge that is simultaneously philosophical and political. How can we resolve the tensions philosophically in light of reasonable political disagreements over the relative value of individual freedom and civic virtue? Instead of giving priority to one value or the other, this essay defends a democratic ideal ofconscious social reproduction, which consists of three principles:nonrepression, nondiscrimination, and democratic deliberation.     

Aesthetic freedom and democratic ethical life: A Hegelian account of the relationship between aesthetics and democratic politics

This paper presents a novel Hegelian view of the relationship between aesthetics and democratic politics. My account avoids the drawbacks associated with approaches, such as Rancière's, that reconceive all of the political in aesthetic terms or, like Rockhill's, reduce the aesthetic to art. Instead, I maintain that the aesthetic is best understood as a distinct recognition relationship of individual freedom. My argument proceeds by highlighting shortcomings of Honneth's account of democratic Sittlichkeit and then addressing these impasses by integrating aesthetic freedom into the picture. The first two steps of my argument concern the fact that the form of life outlined by Honneth aspires to be a form of free life, yet his account of democratic Sittlichkeit gives rise to two dimensions of unfreedom. The first problem of unfreedom pertains to the scope of freedom. The relationships of freedom incorporated into Honneth's account fail to turn given social roles into the subject matter of a sufficiently unrestricted practice of freedom. The second problem of freedom concerns conformism. In a final step, I complete my argument that Honneth's account is unsatisfactory and incomplete by showing that aesthetic freedom is socially valid and thus ought to form part of our accounts of democratic ethical life.     

Socialization for the democratic personality in modern society

A comprehensive analysis of socialization requires a complex model that both explicates and synthesizes the various subprocesses involved in this phenomenon. Traditional concerns with socialization that have focused almost exclusively on its objective functions, that is, on those which serve society and its institutions, need to be complemented by an equal emphasis on subjective functions in terms of the sociological and psychological development of the individual. Chiefly relevant in this latter respect is the production of basic human needs and the consequences that result from their inadequate gratification in unauthentic and/or unresponsive societies. One such outcome that is particularly crucial to both personal and societal function is that of alienation, which can be assessed specifically in terms of its significance for civic participation. Our model recognizes the limits of both human systems and social systems; and, in terms of the principles of authenticity and responsivity, it articulates the linkage among these systems constituting the essence of socialization. Our model also provides an implicit clarification of the nature and meaning of citizenship in a democracy, which by definition should be a responsive society, and delineates the required sociopsychological images for maximizing the role of political participation.     

the intentional democratic community in college residence halls

Residence halls have been one of those great unmined potentials in higher education. To a student personnel worker they have presented a captive community in which all the magic could be worked. But it rarely happened, mostly because we knew more about the process of in loco parentis than about the process of students in situ. Crookston has dangled the carrot once more in his conception of an “intentional democratic community.” Only this time we have an operational model based on Crookston's knowledge of social-psychological theory. In his model he tells us about 10 elements of the community that must be manipulated, 9 design considerations, and 7 stages of development. The complexity of designing and implementing such a community will—and should—frighten some, but the possible payoff will attract others to experiment and try. Heaven only knows, the events of the past decade have borne out too well his basic thesis that “unfortunately, the goal [effective democracy] continues to elude us.”     

Deliberation, cognitive diversity, and democratic inclusiveness: an epistemic argument for the random selection of representatives

This paper argues in favor of the epistemic properties of inclusiveness in the context of democratic deliberative assemblies and derives the implications of this argument in terms of the epistemically superior mode of selection of representatives. The paper makes the general case that, all other things being equal and under some reasonable assumptions, more is smarter. When applied to deliberative assemblies of representatives, where there is an upper limit to the number of people that can be included in the group, the argument translates into a defense of a specific selection mode of participants: random selection.