Soviet patriotism in a comparative perspective: a passion for oxymora

The official patriotic narrative that emerged in the USSR during the Stalin period shows the continuity of imperial models that served to constitute “love of the fatherland”. This article presents several concepts about the formation of imperial patriotism prevalent in the course of history; it identifies tendencies of interaction between cultural tradition and foreign models. It also shows the principal possibility of combining patriotism with other forms of unifying and mobilizing discourses. The official patriotic discourse of the Stalin era is analyzed as an eclectic ideological construct that, to a large extent, relied on the tradition of imperial patriotic education. The constants distinguishing Russian-Soviet patriotism include the representation of Russia’s imperial past, viewing the question of a multi-national state through the paradigm of the empire’s “civilizing mission”, and patriotism as an integral part of public political education. Some of the elements fundamental for Soviet “love of the fatherland” are preserved in modern Russian patriotism as for instance in the form of “Soviet” nostalgia or representations of militant “statehood”.     

The Religious Right and Russia: Christian Nationalism and Americans’ Views on Russia and Vladimir Putin Before and After the Ukrainian Invasion

Since 2016, Americans’ attitudes toward Russia and Vladimir Putin have shifted, with Republicans becoming far more supportive of both. And though condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 remains bipartisan, many Christian-right leaders still support Putin and Russia. What undergirds this support? Drawing on three national data sets, we theorize Americans’ warmth toward Putin and Russia is reinforced by an ideology that seeks to institutionalize America's mythical Anglo Protestant ethno-culture—Christian nationalism. Though we propose Christian nationalism's relationship with Russia is more contingent on Russia's geopolitical activity vis-à-vis the United States, we theorize that Christian nationalism consistently predicts Putin support due to his authoritarian ethno-nationalism. April 2018 data show those who affirm America's Christian heritage in the past and/or present are more likely to view Putin and Russia favorably and Russia as our ally. March 2021 data also reveal a linear positive association between Christian nationalism and favorability toward Putin. And March 2022 data reveal a linear positive association between Christian nationalism and admiring Putin's leadership. They also show a U-shaped curvilinear relationship with viewing Russia as a threat. Paradoxically, Christian nationalism may warm Americans toward foreign authoritarians like Putin even when it compels Americans to perceive their nations as threats.     

What Makes Politicians “Religious”? How Identity Congruence Shapes Religious Evaluations

How do Americans evaluate politicians’ religiosity? We theorize extra-religious “identity congruence,” the perceived correspondence between others’ group identities and our own, will powerfully shape evaluations. We test this expectation using data from two large, nationally representative surveys that ask Americans to rate the religiosity of prominent politicians. Consistent with our theory, the strongest predictors of how Americans rate politicians’ religiosity are their congruence on party identification and ideological identity as well as expected alignments with racial identity and Christian nationalism. Respondents’ religious characteristics are relatively weak predictors. And these trends hold regardless of Americans’ knowledge of leaders’ professed religious identity. Patterns are consistent with our theory even when we split samples by party. When we compare ratings between politicians who are widely regarded as irreligious to those who are regarded as conventionally religious, partisan congruence and racial identity largely mitigate the religious advantage of the latter. Racial identity also moderates congruence on key factors. Finally, identity congruence on party, ideology, and Christian nationalism follows expected patterns even among secular Americans for whom “religious” less intuitively implies “my group.” In a time of growing identity-alignment along partisan, ideological, racial, and religious lines, extra-religious “identity congruence” powerfully shapes how Americans evaluate politicians’ religiosity.     

Enforcing Christian Nationalism: Examining the Link Between Group Identity and Punitive Attitudes in the United States

This article examines whether the convergence of an individual's religious and national identities promotes authoritarian attitudes towards crime and deviance. Drawing on theories of social control and group conformity, as well as Christian nationalism's influence on intolerance toward out‐groups, I argue that the inability to distinguish between religious and national identities increases desire for group homogeneity and therefore increases willingness to utilize formalized measures of social control. Analysis of 2007 Baylor Religion Survey data demonstrates that adherence to Christian nationalism predicts three indicators of authoritarian views toward controlling crime and deviance: support for capital punishment, stricter punishment for federal crime, and for society to “crackdown on troublemakers.” These effects are robust to the inclusion of a comprehensive battery of 20 socioeconomic, political, and religious controls, and are consistent with previous research on Christian nationalism showing it is not religious commitment or traditionalism per se that leads to intolerant attitudes, but rather the conflation of one's religious identity with other social identities, in this case national. These findings indicate that, beyond sociopolitical and religious influences, the belief that the United States is, and should be, a “Christian nation” increases desires for group conformity and strict control for both criminals and “troublemakers.”     

Is this America? Unfinished business with the U.S. national imaginary,religion and violence

This article first proposes definitions and raises questions about what it means to be a nation. I then analyze the national imaginary of the United States, and suggest that at its deepest core we find “substitute ultimates” regarding America's sacrificial war‐culture. This cultural violence perpetuates destructive consequences, including the phenomena of “U.S. war‐culture,” and “moral injury” among military servicemembers and veterans. But widespread legitimation of the imaginary largely inhibits citizens from awareness about their own reality. Lastly, I inquire about the role of prophetic public theology to address nationalism, and engage in a thought experiment with an imagined community of diverse partners.     

Legitimizing the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official‐Level Rhetoric

This paper argues that mythical discourse affects political practice by imbuing language with power, shaping what people consider to be legitimate, and driving the determination to act. Drawing on Bottici's (2007 ) philosophical understanding of political myth as a process of work on a common narrative that answers the human need to ground events in significance, it contributes to the study of legitimization in political discourse by examining the role of political myth in official‐level U.S. war rhetoric. It explores how two ubiquitous yet largely invisible political myths, American Exceptionalism and Civilization vs. Barbarism, which have long defined America's ideal image of itself and its place in the world, have become staples in the language of the “War on Terror.” Through a qualitative analysis of the content of over 50 official texts containing lexical triggers of the two myths, this paper shows that senior officials of the Bush Administration have rhetorically accessed these mythical representations of the world in ways that legitimize and normalize the practices of the “War on Terror.”     

U.S. Patriotism and Ideologies of Group Dominance: A Tale of Asymmetry

Abstract

Using a random sample (N = 405) of White and Latino Americans from Los Angeles County, the authors explored whether there is an asymmetrical relationship between U.S. patriotism and two different dimensions of social dominance orientation: group antiegalitarianism and group dominance. Although there was no evidence of asymmetry in the relationship between U.S. patriotism and group antiegalitarianism, there was evidence of consistent asymmetry in the relationship between U.S. patriotism and group dominance. Among Whites (the dominant North American ethnic group) and depending on demographic variables such as age, education, income, and gender, the greater the respondents' tendency to subordinate “inferior groups,” the greater their level of U.S. patriotism. In contrast, among Latino Americans (the major subordinate group in Southern California), the opposite trend was found. Here, higher levels of group dominance orientation were associated with lower levels of U.S. patriotism. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

“Ubi Patria – Ibi Bene”: The Scope and Limits of Rousseau's Patriotic Education

Does the inculcation of patriotic sentiments in the hearts of patriotsrender them invulnerable to the malady of self-alienation experiencedotherwise by citizens of the “atomist” state? Rousseau, as will be shownin this paper, provided a positive answer to this question. Accordingly,he accorded utmost importance in his political and educational writingto the education for patriotism. The purpose of this paper is to offer acritical assessment of Rousseau's education for patriotism. I suggestthat when successfully implemented, this education leads to theestrangement and effacement of the self, giving rise to a malady similarto the one Rousseau wanted to cure. If Rousseau's patriotic educationcan really prevent the experience of self-alienation arising due to alack of a community one can call one's own, this very education givesalso rise to the experience of self-alienation arising upon theemergence of a tight-knit patriotic community. Such a community leavesno room for the development of the individual's (or the patriot's)unique talents and the pursuit of his or her self-regarding goals andencourages the emergence, over again, of the experience ofself-alienation.     

Culture Wars and COVID-19 Conduct: Christian Nationalism,Religiosity, and Americans’ Behavior During the Coronavirus Pandemic

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Americans’ behavioral responses were quickly politicized. Those on the left stressed precautionary behaviors, while those on the (religious) right were more likely to disregard recommended precautions. We propose the far right response was driven less by partisanship or religiosity per se, but rather by an ideology that connects disregard for scientific expertise; a conception of Americans as God's chosen and protected people; distrust for news media; and allegiance to Trump―Christian nationalism. Analyzing panel data collected in the thick of the COVID-19 crisis, we find Christian nationalism was the leading predictor that Americans engaged in incautious behavior like eating in restaurants, visiting family/friends, or gathering with 10+ persons (though not attending church), and was the second strongest predictor that Americans took fewer precautions like wearing a mask or sanitizing/washing one's hands. Religiosity, in contrast, was the leading predictor that Americans engaged in more frequent precautionary behaviors. Findings document that Christian nationalism, not religious commitment per se, undergirded the far-right response to COVID-19 that disregarded precautionary recommendations, thus potentially worsening the pandemic.     

The Roots of Patriotism Across Political Contexts

Why do some Americans feel more patriotic than others? We argue that feelings of national pride are reinforced by cues from people's political and social environments. When Americans reside in contexts that align with their values, traits, and civic orientations, they are more likely to express pride in their country. We consider both civic and ethnic pathways to patriotism. We expect that minorities and those who particularly value political equality will feel increasingly patriotic as the racial and ethnic diversity of their state climbs. For those who see politics through a partisan lens, we expect that environments defined by political competition will enhance feelings of national pride. We test our theory using data from the 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES). We find that Americans are more likely to say that they feel love for their country when they reside in political contexts congruent with their values and approach to citizenship.     

The Racialization of International Trade

Despite their less vulnerable economic status, white individuals' attitudes toward overseas trade in the United States may have become more protectionist than those of economically disadvantaged minorities. We present results from five different studies examining two different ways in which trade may have become racialized. First, we examine the extent to which a person's racial identity is associated with levels of trade support. Second, we examine whether the predominant racial identity of a potential trading-partner country influences people's willingness to trade with that country. Using various surveys and multiple survey experiments conducted over the past 12 years, we find that white individuals have become less supportive of trade than minorities and that whites are more likely than minorities to favor trade with highly similar countries. We suggest that minority support for trade is due to four well-documented differences in the psychological predispositions of whites and minorities in the United States. Minorities have lower levels of racial prejudice, are lower in social dominance, and express less nationalism than whites. At the same time, there is evidence of rising ingroup racial consciousness among whites. Each of these characteristics has been independently linked to trade support in a direction encouraging greater support for trade among minorities. As the United States grows ever closer to becoming a “majority minority” nation, the racialization of trade attitudes may stimulate shifts in the likely future of America's trade relationships.     

Sowing Patriotism,But Reaping Nationalism? Consequences of Exposure to the American Flag

The American flag is a frequently displayed national symbol in the United States. Given its high visibility and importance, the present research examines the consequences of exposure to the flag on Americans' sense of national attachment. We hypothesized that the flag would increase patriotism, defined as love and commitment to one's country, and nationalism, defined as a sense of superiority over others. Two experimental studies supported the idea that the American flag increased nationalism, but not necessarily patriotism. The discussion focuses on the practices surrounding the American flag and its implications for the reproduction of American national identity.     

CHRISTIAN REALISM AND AUGUSTINIAN (?) LIBERALISM

Augustine's ontology, ecclesiology, and soteriology have recently been mined to help Christian realists and liberals respond to the problems that pluralism and conflict create for democratic societies. The results challenge those secularists who object to the late antique prelate's “moralizing” as well as others who insist that “public reason”—not religious traditions—makes for more meaningful political conversations and for collaboration “across differences.” But the results also raise the question whether Augustine would have gone along with the realists and liberals he has inspired and outfitted.     

Psychological disaster myths in the perception and management of mass emergencies

Disaster myths are said to be widespread and consequential. However, there has been little research on whether those involved in public safety and emergency response believe them. A survey examined how far police officers, civilian safety professionals, sports event stewards and comparison samples from the public believe the myths “mass panic,” “civil disorder,” and “helplessness.” Respondents endorsed the first two myths. However, they rejected the myth of helplessness and endorsed the view that emergency crowds display resilience. Despite these contradictions in stated beliefs, there was also evidence of ideological coherence: each model of mass emergency behavior (maladaptive vs. resilient) was linked to a model of crowd management (coercive and paternalistic vs. mass‐democratic). The practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Race and Nation: How Racial Hierarchy Shapes National Attachments

We contend that the boundaries and nature of national attachments are shaped by the position of one's group within America's racial order, with higher status yielding more racially exclusive forms of identity. We test our claims in the realm of xenophobia. Using an original survey of African Americans (n = 1,000) and Whites (n = 1,000), we assess national pride, nationalism, nativism, and racial identity, plus affect toward various immigrant groups. We establish that national attachments have racially varied meanings, thereby producing sharp differences in each racial group's response to foreigners. Although national pride is unrelated to White antipathy toward outsiders, nationalism and nativism increase White hostility to immigrants—except when they are White. In contrast, national pride diminishes African American hostility to Black and non‐Black immigrants, while nativism is generally unrelated to Black antipathy to outsiders. Finally, while nationalism heightens xenophobia among Blacks, this sentiment envelops all foreigners—including African immigrants. We discuss our results' implications for theories of national attachment in intergroup settings.     

Go With the Flow or Fight the Power? The Interactive Effects of Social Dominance Orientation and Perceived Injustice on Support for the Status Quo

Previous research in social dominance theory has found an asymmetry in the relationship between social dominance orientation (SDO) and various hierarchy-enhancing ideologies, such that the relationship between the two variables is significantly more positive among high-status group members than among low-status group members (Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994; Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 1996). Perceptions of systemic injustice toward one's ingroup may help to explain this ideological asymmetry. The hypothesis of a three-way interaction among group status, SDO, and perceived injustice was tested by using survey responses from American university students to predict opposition to hierarchy-attenuating policies as well as levels of patriotism. Analyses revealed the presence of a three-way interaction (ps < .05). Ethnic minority students who scored high on SDO did not always maintain conservative policy stances or strong patriotic attachments—it depends on their level of perceived injustice. Implications for social dominance theory and system-justification theory are discussed.     

Robert Owen in the History of the Social Sciences: Three Presentist Views

This paper argues that the present‐day disagreements over the right course for sociology and its public role are reflected and paralleled in contemporary historiography of Robert Owen, British social reformer and a self‐described social scientist. Historical accounts, written from the perspectives of public sociology, “pure science” sociology, and anti‐Marxism, interpret Owen's historical role in mutually antithetical and self‐serving ways. Contrasting the three presentist accounts, I engage in an analysis of “techniques of presentism”—history‐structuring concepts, such as “disciplinary founder” and “disciplinary prehistory,” that allow presentist authors to get their effects. Along the way, I elaborate Peter Baehr's classification of sociology's founders.     

The Rise and Decline of the American Asylum Movement in the 19th Century

This paper traces the history of the American public asylum from the 1840s through the late 19th century. The focus is on social factors that contributed to the establishment of public institutions at the urging of reformers, the attempts to model them on the architecture and “moral treatment” offered by the best private institutions, the crowding of the asylums, the growing criticism aimed at the asylums and their superintendents, and the effects of calls for other approaches and for scientific management. Knowledge of the asylum's history may be useful today, as we stand at the crossroads in the treatment of the mentally ill.     

Renaissance Catholicism and Contemporary Liberalism

Contemporary (post‐1945) liberalism functions analogously to Roman Catholicism in the decades after 1443. Both ideologies, in their respective periods, represent the hegemonic ideology of Western civilization, despite the fact that both comprise a miscellany of competing belief systems. Both ideologies are dominated by a single hegemonic power—the United States and the Renaissance papacy, respectively—which strives for doctrinal stability. All who reject official “doctrine,” however, are rendered liable to violent suppression. In this, papal Catholicism and American liberalism display an ultra‐conservative outlook; but they also evince a powerfully millenarian streak, as evidenced by their dual proclamations of the “end of history” and their zealous missionary responses to macro‐historical events in the final decades of the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. For ideologues of both regimes, those events speak to an ultimate harmony of truth and value that only serves to entrench their own dogmatism. This, however, has dire consequences when it comes to war, as can be seen in the “crusading” character of contemporary liberal warfare. Ultimately, the Renaissance papacy proves unable to maintain its monopoly on Christian doctrine; and one has to wonder if a similar fate may befall America's perceived role as the champion of liberalism.