“WHY BE MORAL?” The Cheng Brothers' Neo‐Confucian Answer

In this article, I present a neo‐Confucian answer, by Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, to the question, “Why should I be moral?” I argue that this answer is better than some representative answers in the Western philosophical tradition. According to the Chengs, one should be moral because it is a joy to perform moral actions. Sometimes one finds it a pain, instead of a joy, to perform moral actions only because one lacks the necessary genuine moral knowledge—knowledge that is accessible to every common person as long as one makes the effort to learn. One should make the effort to learn such knowledge—to seek joy in performing moral actions—because to be moral is a distinguishing mark of being human. This neo‐Confucian answer seems to be egoistic, as its conception of motivation for morality is based on self‐interest: to seek one's own joy. However, since it emphasizes that one's true self‐interest is to seek joy in things uniquely human, which is to be moral, self‐interest and morality become identical; the more a person seeks one's self‐interest, the more moral the person is, and vice versa.     

Playing the Odds: A New Response to Lucretius's Symmetry Argument

Abstract: Most commentators have assumed that Lucretius's symmetry argument against the fear of death is flawed. There remains, however, dispute as to what the flaw is. After establishing what I understand the target of Lucretius's argument to be (a desire for a longer life as such), I argue for a novel interpretation of what the flaw is, namely, that extending one's life into the time before one was actually born would be an uncertain bet for one who wanted to extend his life, whereas extending one's life beyond the time one actually dies is a sure bet. This account of what the flaw is has the particular merit of relying only on simple concepts used in everyday reasoning and thus can explain why Lucretius's argument gains no traction even in the absence of sophisticated philosophical analysis.     

Moral knowledge and self control in Mengzi: rectitude,courage, and Qi

In this paper, I reveal systematic aspects of the moral epistemology of the Warring States Confucian, Mengzi. Mengzi thinks moral knowledge is ‘internally’ available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart–mind (xin). Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent's normative categorizations. Such dictates are linked to Mengzi's conception of human nature (ren xing) as good. I then interpret Mengzi's difficult discussion of courage and qi in Mengzi 2A: 2 as illuminating the idea of ‘internal’ justification. The epistemology of courage is intimately related in 2A: 2 to its practice. Finally, I indicate at the end in outline the ways in which Mengzi and Gaozi are engaged in a dispute about moral epistemology that pits each of them against Xunzi and also against Zhuangzi.     

RESPONSIBILITY AND RATIONAL ABILITIES: DEFENDING AN ASYMMETRICAL VIEW*

Abstract: In this paper, I defend a view according to which one is responsible for one's actions to the extent that one has the ability to do the right thing for the right reasons. The view is asymmetrical in requiring the ability to do otherwise when one acts badly or for bad reasons, but no such ability in cases in which one acts well for good ones. Despite its intuitive appeal, the view's asymmetry makes it a target of both of the main camps in the debate over responsibility. In addressing objections, I explore the relationship between fairness and responsibility, and the nature of the ability to do otherwise.     

FOREKNOWLEDGE, FREEDOM, AND OBLIGATION

Abstract: A vital presupposition of an influential argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian free action is that free action requires alternative possibilities. A recent, noteworthy challenge to this presupposition invokes a “Divine Frankfurt‐type example”: God's foreknowledge of one's future actions prevents one from doing otherwise without having any responsibility‐undermining effect on one's actions. First, I explain why features of God's omniscience cast doubt on this Frankfurtian response. Second, even if this appraisal is mistaken, I argue that divine foreknowledge is irreconcilable with moral obligation if such foreknowledge eliminates alternatives.     

Reflecting on acts of kindness toward the self: Emotions,generosity, and the role of social norms

How do people respond, in terms of emotion and behavior, when prompted to recall an act of kindness from another person? As shown in two studies of undergraduates, responses differ based on whether the kindness is seen as normative – that is, whether it follows social norms related to the relational context and one's past behavior. On the whole, normative kindnesses were linked with more positive emotion and less negative emotion than non-normative kindnesses. Those asked to recall normative kindnesses also donated more money to charity than those who recalled non-normative kindnesses, an effect partly mediated by the greater positivity of the normative stories (Study 2). These results suggest that if the goal is to increase mood or generosity, recalling normative kindnesses is a safer strategy than recalling non-normative kindnesses. Yet, some results also supported an outgroup salience hypothesis, in which recalling non-normative kindnesses increased generous motives toward strangers and enemies.     

Remaking the She-Devil: A Critical Look at Feminist Approaches to Beauty

Cosmetic surgery provides a problematic case for feminist theorizing about femininity and women's relationship with their bodies. Feminist accounts of femininity and beauty are unable to explain cosmetic surgery without undermining the women who opt for it. I argue that cosmetic surgery may have less to do with beauty and more to do with being ordinary, taking one's life into one's own hands, and determining how much suffering is fair.     

Evil and God's Toxin Puzzle

I show that Kavka's toxin puzzle raises a problem for the “Responsibility Theodicy,” which holds that the reason God typically does not intervene to stop the evil effects of our actions is that such intervention would undermine the possibility of our being significantly responsible for overcoming and averting evil. This prominent theodicy seems to require that God be able to do what the agent in Kavka's toxin story cannot do: stick by a plan to do some action at a future time even though when that time comes, there will be no good reason for performing that action (and very good reason not to). I assess various approaches to solving this problem. Along the way, I develop an iterated variant of Kavka's toxin case and argue that the case is not adequately handled by standard causal decision theory.     

The Virtue of Being Supportive

I develop an account of the nature and value of being supportive in interpersonal relationships. In particular, I argue that the virtue of being supportive, construed as a modally demanding value, facilitates the autonomy of one's intimate and promotes a sense of unity in one's relationship. Moreover, the practice of being supportive plays an important role with regard to the familiar need to reconcile the normative demands of one's own projects with one's responsibilities to intimates.     

Fallibility and Trust

I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far‐reaching consequences for our account of rational belief and epistemic rationality. My arguments inter alia rely on the idea that in basing one's beliefs on one's evidence, one trusts both that one's evidence has the right pedigree and that one gets its probative force right, where such trust can rationally be invested without the need of any further evidence.     

Phenomenal characteristics of memories of daily actions in checking‐prone individuals

The purpose of this study was to investigate memories of daily actions in checking‐prone participants. A sample of 419 non‐clinical participants completed a questionnaire evaluating Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and a questionnaire evaluating sensory details, emotions, vividness, confidence and memory perspective of seven everyday actions such as ‘brushing one's teeth’. The main results indicated that checking was related to low levels of visual, kinaesthetic and spatial details in memories for actions, more negative emotions and anxiety when performing actions and low confidence in memory quality. In addition, checking‐prone individuals more frequently reported their memories from the perspective of an external observer than non‐checking‐prone individuals. In general, these results seem to indicate that checking is associated with impersonal memories for everyday actions, as well as low confidence in these memories. The role of anxiety is also evoked, as it was significantly related to poor memory characteristics. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Death and the Meaning of Life

Abstract

Thoughts of mortality sometimes bring on a crisis in confidence in the meaning in one's life. One expression of this collapse is the midlife crisis. In a recent article, Kieran Setiya argues that if one can value activities as opposed to accomplishments as the primary goods in one's life then one might avoid the midlife crisis. I argue that Setiya's advice, rather than safeguarding the meaning in one's life, substitutes for it something else, a kind of happiness. I use Susan Wolf's concept of meaning in order to make this case. Wolf has not written much about the importance of death, but I argue that her account of meaning shares essential features with the theories developed by Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger. Sartre argues that death is an unqualified harm, while Heidegger argues that there is meaning in life only because we are mortal. I conclude by showing how Heidegger's theory of mortality underwrites accounts of meaning like those found in Wolf.     

What are we frightened of?

I am concerned to understand that relation to a situation which we call fearing it. Some say this cannot be done: it is a brute fact about us that we fear certain things and we understand another's fear when we see that he confronts a situation of this sort (a basic fear object) or one which he understandably associates with this sort. In Section I, I argue that being associated with a basic fear object will not usefully explain a current fear. In Section II, I argue that the obvious candidates for being basic fears will not do the required work. The notion should be rejected. I then argue that to fear an object is to take it as exhibiting one's lack of control and I proceed to describe the nature and content of this notion.     

A PROBLEM ABOUT THE MORALITY OF SOME COMMON FORMS OF PRAYER

At a time of acute danger, people commonly petition God for help for themselves or their loved ones; such as praying that an avalanche heading in one's direction be diverted, or that an organ donor be found for one's dying child. Such prayer seems natural and, indeed, for believers, reasonable and acceptable. It seems perverse to condemn such typical prayer, as wrong. But once we closely examine what is actually happening in such situations, we shall see that frequently prayer of this sort is morally problematic. I argue that such prayer ought to be seen as a form of action (rather than, say, mere hope), thereby needing to meet the higher moral standards that apply to actions; and that the assumption of the benevolence of the deity does not suffice to make such prayer legitimate.     

On psychoanalytic figures as transference objects

One of the tasks that analysts and therapists face at a certain stage in their career is how to develop a way of psychoanalytic thinking and practising of their own. To do this involves modifying or overcoming the transferences established during their training or early career. These transferences are to one's teachers or training analyst, investing them with authority and infallibility, and to received theory, which is treated as though it were dogma. The need to free oneself from such transferences has been discussed in the literature. There is, however, another kind of transference that the developing therapist also needs to resolve, which has received little attention. This is the transference made on to a key figure in the psychoanalytic tradition. Such a psychoanalytic figure will be seen as the originator of or embodiment of those theoretical ideas to which one becomes attached, and/or as standing behind one's training analyst or seminal teachers who become a representative of that figure. The value of an investigation of one's relationship to a psychoanalytic figure is that it is an excellent medium for revealing one's transference, as the figure in question is not a real person but only exists through his/her writings. The body of the paper consists of an extended example of such an analysis, that of my own transference on to the figure of Winnicott. In this example I illustrate how my evaluation of Winnicott's ideas changed from seeing them as providing answers to all my clinical questions to no longer satisfying me in some areas of my work. This change in my relationship to Winnicott's theory went hand in hand with a modification in my transference on to the figure of Winnicott, from seeing him as endowed with authority and goodness to an appreciation of him as a still sustaining figure but now with limits and flaws. In the final part of the paper several questions arising out of my analysis are posed. Can the pull of writing such an account in terms of dramatic rupture rather than gradual and partial change be avoided? Should my account be regarded purely as a form of self‐analysis or does it have anything to say about Winnicott himself and his theory? And do some psychoanalytic figures attract more intense or sticky transferences than others?     

Respect in Mengzi as a Concern-based Construal: How It Is Different from Desire and Behavioral Disposition

Previous scholars seem to assume that Mengzi’s 孟子 four sprouts are more or less homogeneous in nature, and the four sprouts are often viewed as some sort of desires for or instinctive inclinations toward virtues or virtuous acts. For example, Angus Graham interprets sìduān 四端 as “incipient moral impulses” to do what is morally good or right, or “spontaneous inclinations” toward virtues or moral good. However, this view is incompatible with the recently proposed more sound views that regard Mengzi’s four sprouts as a particular type of emotions or feelings having some “cognitive” or “rational” aspects. In this essay I develop this new approach to Mengzi’s four sprouts, and specifically argue that respect in Mengzi should be considered neither as a moral desire nor as a behavioral tendency to do deferential acts but as some sort of ethical sensibility that is responsive to the relevant features of a worthy person.     

Whose idea is it anyway? The importance of reputation in acknowledgement

Six‐year‐old children negatively evaluate plagiarizers just as adults do (Olson & Shaw, 2011), but why do they dislike plagiarizers? Children may think plagiarism is wrong because plagiarizing negatively impacts other people's reputations. We investigated this possibility by having 6‐ to 9‐year‐old children evaluate people who shared their own or other people's ideas (stories). In Experiment 1, we found that children consider it acceptable to retell someone else's story if the source is given credit for their story (improving the source's reputation), but not if the reteller claims credit for the story (steals credit away from someone else). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that children do not consider it bad to lie by giving someone else credit for one's own good story (improving someone else's reputation), but do consider it bad to give someone else credit for one's own bad story (improving one's own reputation at the expense of someone else's). Experiment 4 demonstrated that children think it is equally bad to take credit for someone else's idea for oneself as it is to take someone else's idea and give credit to someone else, suggesting that children dislike when others take credit away from someone else, regardless of whether or not it improves the plagiarizer's reputation. Our results suggest that children dislike plagiarism because it negatively affects others' reputations by taking credit away from them.