AFTER CHALCEDON: THE ONENESS OF CHRIST AND THE DYOTHELITE MEDIATION OF HIS THEANDRIC UNITY

This article explores the differentiated unity of divinity and humanity in Christ through the dyothelitism of Maximus the Confessor and Constantinople III (680–681). The essay argues that the dyothelite doctrine makes concrete the communicatio idiomatum of difference in the unity of the Son's theandric prayer. Further, it suggests dyothelitism is the condition of the possibility of ecclesial participation in the unity of the Son's personhood, and therefore the means by which Christ continues his presence and work of salvation in the Church, which is his body.     

Contemplating the Monad Who Saves Us: Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on Divine Simplicity

Daley explores divine simplicity according to Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus, grounding his account in their classical philosophical antecedents. He notes that often we think of the sixth and seventh centuries as devoted to questions about Jesus Christ, not about God per se. Admittedly, the aftermath of the Council of Chalcedon produced ongoing controversy in the East regarding the unity of the two natures of Christ, for example, whether Christ had one operation or two. Maximus, a follower of Patriarch Sophronius of Jerusalem, became embroiled in controversy through his firm rejection of the effort by Emperor Heraclius and Patriarch Sergius of Constantinople to unite the churches in the East by holding solely to a single activity and a single will in Christ. Maximus’s position won out at the Third Council of Constantinople (680‐1). Daley draws attention here, however, to the relationship of these Christological debates to the understanding of God, and especially what it means to speak of the “divine nature” and the “divine will.” This topic required of Christian thinkers not merely philosophical reflection but also Trinitarian reflection. Daley’s point is that it well behooves us to look closely into what Maximus and John of Damascus have to say about divine simplicity, in light of the more central controversies in which these Church Fathers were engaged.     

ETERNITY IS A PRESENT,TIME IS ITS UNWRAPPING

There is debate in the philosophy of religion about whether the being of God is timelessly eternal or is instead temporal but unbounded. In this paper, I seek to defend the first view by motivating and deriving it from the Christian doctrines of the trinity and salvation. My goal is to present the notion of eternity in a way that makes clear that it belongs to God by nature and to man by grace, with the condition of time being part of the medium of grace. To this end, I also employ the doctrine of theosis, as found in Maximus the Confessor and Dumitru Staniloae, and the Augustinean theory of time.     

Maximus the Confessor and the Problem of Participation

In defining the theological problem of participation as the question of how created beings, namely human beings, can participate (μ?θεξι?) in the transcendent Uncreated God towards deification (θ?ωσι?) without a pantheistic blurring of essences, this article examines the Christologically intuitive way in which Maximus the Confessor (580–662) would have responded. Specifically, Maximus’ Cyrilline Chalcednonianism, featuring an unconfused perichoretic union between Christ's two natures in his hypostatic union, serves directly as an apologetic and hermeneutic for humanity's and creation's participation in God. In addition, taking into account the scholarly debate over Maximus’ understanding of the relationship between the Logos and the logoi, it is argued that this indirectly provides a second Christological way forward to resolve the problem at hand, particularly when the two types of logoi (that ‘of being’ and that ‘of virtue’) are correctly distinguished. Insofar as the Logos and the logoi, not to mention the notions of participation and deification, were viewed by Maximus through his Cyrilline Chalcedonian lens, his Cyrilline Chalcednonian Christology was ultimately his answer to the theological problem of participation.     

Crossing Tables and Queering Deification

Abstract

To respond to the dominating force of religio-cultural salvation in the U.S., this article analyzes two disparate tables and the bodies associated with them: the Unsung Founders memorial at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Eucharistic table in the work of seventh century Christian monk Maximus the Confessor. Drawing on Sara Ahmed's methodological exploration of how tables orient bodies, I constructively "cross" the racial, gendered, and economically marginalized bodies represented by the monument and the body of Christ on the Eucharistic table. The product of this crossing queers Maximus's doctrine of deification, or union with God, which opens a site of resistance to contemporary notions of this specific privatized and personally responsible salvation. Further, this combination betrays Maximus's theological assumptions that only normative bodies have access to God.     

Bocheński on divine providence and human freedom

Prior to his ‘naturalistic turn’, Bocheński was a Thomist and defended the Thomist doctrine as a logically consistent and attractive philosophical system. Some opponents of Thomism interpreted this doctrine, Aquinas’s conception of divine providence included, as a kind of theological fatalism (or theological determinism) incompatible with human freedom. Bocheński dismissed such interpretations as based on “a superficial misunderstanding.” I will try to demonstrate that his criticism of deterministic interpretations of Thomism was not quite justified. The article will present, first, Bocheński’s account of the Thomist doctrine of divine providence, next, the arguments for theological fatalism leading to the conclusion that there is no freedom if Aquinas’s conception of divine nature is assumed. Finally, I will try to show how the dispute between Thomism and its opponents is rooted in some fundamental differences concerning the very concept of human freedom.     

Creation is Incarnation: The Metaphysical Peculiarity of the Logoi in Maximus Confessor

Maximian logoi or the “principles” of created being are often virtually identified with Platonic ideas or forms. This assumption obscures what is distinctive about Maximus's concept of the logoi. I first note two metaphysical peculiarities of his doctrine, and then propose that these only make sense if we follow Maximus's own directive to read the logoi through Christology proper – that is, as describing creation as the Word's cosmic Incarnation. This suggests, in creative tension with a good deal of twentieth‐century philosophical theology, that the God‐world relation is not fully exhausted by the analogia entis: Maximus divines a still deeper hypostatic (not natural) identity between Word and world that actually generates natural difference – for perhaps the first and only time in the history of Christian thought. Here I assay a first step toward retrieving that relation.     

论儒学基本原理与民主政治的兼容与接轨

早期儒家思想中的一些基本原理与现代民主政治的理念是可以兼容和接轨的。儒家以代表“天意”的“民意”作为政权合法性的依据 ,符合民主政治的权力观 ;儒家的“性善论”可以用来论证民主制度的合理性 ;儒家的“中庸”从政治决策的意义上来说往往是民主程序的自然结果 ;儒家提倡的“特立独行”精神所体现的负责任的个人主义是民主政治所需要的前提。     

A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience

Many neuroscientists and philosophers endorse a view about the explanatory reach of neuroscience (which we will call the neuron doctrine) to the effect that the framework for understanding the mind will be developed by neuroscience; or, as we will put it, that a successful theory of the mind will be solely neuroscientific. It is a consequence of this view that the sciences of the mind that cannot be expressed by means of neuroscientific concepts alone count as indirect sciences that will be discarded as neuroscience matures. This consequence is what makes the doctrine substantive, indeed, radical. We ask, first, what the neuron doctrine means and, second, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we distinguish two versions of the doctrine. One version, the trivial neuron doctrine, turns out to be uncontroversial but unsubstantive because it fails to have the consequence that the nonneuroscientific sciences of the mind will eventually be discarded. A second version, the radical neuron doctrine, does have this consequence, but, unlike the first doctrine, is highly controversial. We argue that the neuron doctrine appears to be both substantive and uncontroversial only as a result of a conflation of these two versions. We then consider whether the radical doctrine is true. We present and evaluate three arguments for it, based either on general scientific and philosophical considerations or on the details of neuroscience itself, arguing that all three fail. We conclude that the evidence fails to support the radical neuron doctrine.     

On Original Sin

This article sets out a constructive account of original sin that attempts to take seriously the Christian tradition (particularly, the Reformed tradition), and that avoids the serious theological drawback of the doctrine of original guilt. I dub this account the moderate Reformed doctrine of original sin. I also argue that an adequate understanding of original sin must be open‐textured enough to accommodate some version of the story of evolutionary human development. Although I do not offer an account of how original sin is consistent with evolutionary human development, the doctrine set out here is commensurate with several live options on this controversial theological topic, which I take to be a strength, rather than a weakness, of the view.     

The Authority of Competence and Quality as Extrinsic

John Stuart Mill's hedonism is notoriously ambiguous. The most important ambiguity concerns his reliance on an axiologically significant notion of quality of pleasure. In this paper, I seek to explore one corner of the higher pleasures doctrine, in particular, what sort of property quality is. I argue that the only acceptable interpretation of the higher pleasures doctrine treats quality as a property that is (a) independent of the preferences of competent judges, (b) non-phenomenal and (c) extrinsic to individual higher quality pleasures. My argument for this view will focus on an interpretation of Mill's competent judges test: only such an interpretation of pleasurable quality can explain the peculiar trust Mill imparts in these judges when it comes to the nature of human well-being.     

Non-Penal Substitution

Abstract:  McLeod Campbell is synonymous with the doctrine of atonement known as vicarious penitence, according to which Christ atones for human sin by repenting on behalf of fallen human beings. This understanding of Christ's work has been very influential, but not always clearly understood. In this article I set out a version of this doctrine, called non-penal substitution, drawing on the work of Jonathan Edwards, the original inspiration for Campbell's work. This version of non-penal substitution is able to overcome several difficulties for the Campbellian version of the doctrine and offers an intriguing and original way of conceiving the work of Christ that, unlike Campbell's account, does not require revisions to the doctrine of God.     

清代中期“以礼代理”说刍议

清代中期,以凌廷堪、焦循、阮元为代表的汉学家提出了“以礼代理”说,即主张用礼学代替理学。他们认为,儒学的中心是“礼”而不是“理”,脱离了“礼”而言“理”,只能导致师心自用以及对人的具体情感的漠视。这一学说是清初顾炎武所倡导的学术方向的继续,它把人们的目光由内在精神变革转向对外在制度的关注;同时,这一学说明确反对以抽象化的“理”来约束人们的行为,它在一定程度上减轻了理学所带来的消极影响。     

‘Implanted in us by Nature’: The Cognitive Science of Religion and its Importance for Theology

Abstract: The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) holds that religion emerges from human cognition and its intuitions. Hence, it describes religion as a ‘natural’ belief in ‘supernatural agents’. Traditional theology also maintained that there is an ‘innate’ or ‘implanted’ knowledge of God or gods. It will be argued that CSR and theology can be related, yet not in a straightforward manner. After sketching out in what sense CSR calls religion ‘natural’ and how it describes ‘supernatural agents’, this article explores some examples of the traditional theological doctrine of an ‘implanted’ knowledge of God. It shows that the reliability of such an ‘implanted’ knowledge of God was disputed among theologians and, even if it was affirmed, had an ambiguous position in theology. This also applies to CSR if it is to be related to the traditional theological doctrine. There are illuminating convergences between CSR and theology but also considerable divergences. Both, however, prove significant for theology.     

冯友兰人生境界论的审美维度

冯友兰特别重视心的觉解功能 ,并依据心灵觉解的程度将人生区分为自然、功利、道德、天地四种境界 ,其天地境界有着深厚的审美意蕴。达到这一境界必须运用有别于逻辑分析的直觉方法 ,即冯友兰所说的讲形而上学时的“负的方法” ,而“近于道的诗”正是形而上学“负的方法”之一。所以 ,冯友兰新理学中的人生境界论与审美理论非常接近。这一理论显示出从思维方式上融合中西的学术努力 ,对于 2 0世纪中国文艺境界论有着一定的影响。     

RESPONSE TO “STEPS TOWARD A SCIENCE OF FREE WILL”: The Enduring Power of Agency and Control in Theoretical and Applied Psychology

This commentary addresses the origins and trajectory of the concepts of fate, will, agency, and determinism in Asian and Greco-Roman cultures, provides an analysis of the role of these concepts in the evolution of theological doctrine, and discusses the so-called “modern” and “post-modern” trends of both glorifying and gutting the “generic” human being as an agent of existential choice.     

Christology and duplex hominis beatitudo: Re‐sketching the Supernatural Again

Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of duplex beatitudo is problematic for theologians who want to read his conception of human nature as integrally ordered to the visio divina. The doctrine seems rather to support a duplex ordo– a tidy parallelism of existent human ‘ends’, one discretely ‘natural’ and the other discretely ‘supernatural’. Is this in fact the case? Does the doctrine of duplex beatitudo commit the theologian to a bifurcated anthropology? Or is it possible to reconcile the doctrine with a more paradoxical anthropology which understands the human being as naturally ordered to a supernatural end that nevertheless exceeds the attainable power of human nature? This article offers a christological reading of the doctrine of duplex beatitudo. The article proposes a tensive distinction in unity of the twofold beatitude according to the Chalcedon paradox: inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter.     

How to Make Sense of the Claim “True Knowledge is What Constitutes Action”: A New Interpretation of Wang Yangming’s Doctrine of Unity of Knowledge and Action

No one denies the importance of applying knowledge to actions. But claiming identity (unity) of knowledge and action is quite another thing. There seem to be two problems with the claim: (1) the identity claim implies that the sole cause for one to fail to act on what one judges to be right is ignorance, but it is obviously false that the sole cause of failure in moral actions is ignorance. (2) The identity statement implies non-separation of knowledge and action. But knowledge does not necessarily lead to action. However, the identity of knowledge and action is what a famous Ming Confucian scholar, Wang Yang-ming, proposed and the concept became the central doctrine of his teaching. Though there are several major interpretations of Wang’s doctrine in contemporary literature, it is not clear to me how they deal with the above mentioned difficulties. In this article, I will discuss these interpretations of the doctrine and propose a new interpretation. My purpose is to give an interpretation of Wang’s doctrine that has the capacity of dealing with these challenges to the doctrine and also captures the essence of his teaching.     

Can the doctrine of just military intervention survive Iraq?

The disastrous consequences of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 appear to discredit just war theories that justify military intervention in sovereign states in the name of human rights. It is possible, however, to identify factors that distinguish a defensible military intervention from the kind pursued in Iraq, and to incorporate these into a doctrine of humanitarian military intervention that would not have permitted the Iraq invasion. This improved doctrine stands in contrast to the militant interventionist doctrine that endorsed the invasion – a variant referred to here as the doctrine of just anti-totalitarian war (JAW). In order to critique the JAW doctrine and distinguish it from the improved doctrine, I examine critically the JAW-supporters' attempt to make sense of what went wrong in Iraq, and propose an alternative diagnosis. It is this alternative diagnosis that grounds a defense of moderate versions of the doctrine of just military intervention, which I seek in turn to render ‘Iraq-proof’. My Iraq-proof refinement is expressed in a list of injunctions. These require, among other things, critical interrogation of the moral standing of intervening powers and greater attention to the legitimate grievances of adversaries in regions targeted for intervention. They would also permit military intervention only in moral emergencies, and usually only to establish safe havens and protect relief supplies.