Perceptions of an old female eyewitness: is the older eyewitness believable?

Young adults rated an old female witness (82 years) to be less competent but more honest than a young female witness (28 years). The effect of age stereotyping on believability was assessed indirectly by using a variant of Loftus' misinformation paradigm. Regression analysis showed that the more competent a witness was perceived as being, the more influential was the misinformation she provided. This was true, however, only when the witness was young because the relatively lower competence of the old witness was associated with nonsignificant misinformation effects. These data suggest that negative beliefs associating incompetence with old age may compromise the believability of older eyewitnesses.     

Differences in performance in CAMCOG-R domains between old and oldest old patients with Alzheimer’s disease

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the neuropsychological performance in a ≥90-year-old population with Alzheimer disease (AD) in comparison with younger elderly patients. We retrospectively studied all patients with AD attended in a specialized clinic between 1999 and 2011. Age, sex, educational level, and sensory loss data were collected. Neuropsychological evaluation included Mini-Mental State Examination and Global Deterioration Scale. We used the eight Cambridge Cognitive Assessment (CAMCOG-R) domains to evaluate and compare the neuropsychological performance in the younger than 90 years old (<90) and older than 90 years old (≥90) groups. We selected 2931 patients, 2897 <90 (98.83%) and 34 ≥90 years old (1.17%). The ≥90 group had significant lower punctuations in memory, praxis, and abstract thinking CAMOCG-R domains with 1.49, 0.75, and 0.58 less points, respectively, (p < 0.05). Neuropsychological characteristics of cognitive decline seem to be different in ≥90 compared to <90 years old patients. According to age, the biggest differences in the CAMCOG-R performance are in the memory, praxis, and abstract thinking domains.     

A New–old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge

We seek means of distinguishing logical knowledge from other kinds of knowledge, especially mathematics. The attempt is restricted to classical two-valued logic and assumes that the basic notion in logic is the proposition. First, we explain the distinction between the parts and the moments of a whole, and theories of ‘sortal terms’, two theories that will feature prominently. Second, we propose that logic comprises four ‘momental sectors’: the propositional and the functional calculi, the calculus of asserted propositions, and rules for (in)valid deduction, inference or substitution. Third, we elaborate on two neglected features of logic: the various modes of negating some part(s) of a proposition R, not only its ‘external’ negation not-R; and the assertion of R in the pair of propositions ‘it is (un)true that R’ belonging to the neglected logic of asserted propositions, which is usually left unstated. We also address the overlooked task of testing the asserted truth-value of R. Fourth, we locate logic among other foundational studies: set theory and other theories of collections, metamathematics, axiomatisation, definitions, model theory, and abstract and operator algebras. Fifth, we test this characterisation in two important contexts: the formulation of some logical paradoxes, especially the propositional ones; and indirect proof-methods, especially that by contradiction. The outcomes differ for asserted propositions from those for unasserted ones. Finally, we reflect upon self-referring self-reference, and on the relationships between logical and mathematical knowledge. A subject index is appended.     

Control is good; prediction is better?

Franz Mechsner (2004) suggests that movements are exclusively controlled with respect to the effects that they cause in the external world and that motor control can be reduced to prediction of movement effects. Although predictive mechanisms certainly deserve a lot more attention than they have received in the past, the author argues here that prediction and control must necessarily work together to build a flexible and effective motor system.     

What is spiritual? What is spiritual suffering?

The author offers definitions for "spiritual" and for "spiritual suffering," suggesting that human spiritual needs include Love, Faith, Hope, Virtue, and Beauty. Spiritual suffering is experienced when these needs are unfulfilled. Spiritual care involves assisting in the fulfillment of these needs. He considers the constant movement between spiritual needs and fulfillments, encouraging use of fluid (not static) assessment methods using "spiritual spectra." As a model, this outline of basic spiritual needs may serve as the foundation for many current spiritual assessment tools.     

Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.     

Why did the new physics force out the old?

The aim of my paper is to demonstrate that Special Relativity and the early quantum theory were created within the same programme of statistical mechanics, thermodynamics and Maxwellian electrodynamics. I shall try to explain why classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics were “refuted” almost simultaneously or, in other words, why the quantum revolution and the relativistic one both took place at the beginning of the 20th century. I shall argue that the quantum and relativistic revolutions were simultaneous since they had a common origin—the clash between the fundamental theories of the second half of the 19th century that constituted the “body” of classical physics. The revolution's most dramatic point was Einstein's 1905 photon paper that laid the foundations of both special relativity and the old quantum theory. Hence the dialectic of the old theories is crucial for theory change. Later, classical physics was forced out by the joint development of quantum and relativistic sub‐programmes. The title of my paper can be reformulated in Bruno Latour's terms: The Einstein Revolution or Drawing Models Together.     

When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

Who is exaggerating cognitive impairment and who is not?

This chart review examined the effects of effort on neuropsychological assessment and test performance patterns among genuine and exaggerating patients, with and without neurological findings, as aids to diagnosing symptom exaggeration. The sample consisted of 561 consecutive patients involved in compensation claims. With a flexible neuropsychological test (NPT) battery, the claims were assessed over 2 days. The sample included 303 patients evaluated for traumatic brain injury, 55 patients with neurological disease, and 203 patients assessed for other conditions (eg, depression or chronic pain). An average of 38 ability measures per patient were used to generate an overall NPT domain score. Composite scores were also computed for symptom validity tests, self-report measures of psychiatric symptoms, and memory complaint inventory. Seven NPT cognitive subdomain scores were multiply regressed onto the symptom validity test composite, accounting for 45% of its total variance. Patients were also assigned to Genuine or Exaggerator groups based on symptom validity test performance. The NPT for Exaggerating patients averaged 1.43 standard deviations below that of Genuine patients, suggesting that NPT scores for most Exaggerating patients are underestimates of their true ability. Factor analysis results differed between these groups. As a result, clinicians might avoid falsely identifying genuine patients as exaggerating by incorporating their self-reports of psychiatric symptoms and memory complaints into the diagnostic process.     

What is my evidence that here is a cup?

This paper is about Susanna Schellenberg's view on the explanatory role of perceptual experience. I raise a basic question about what the argument for her view might be. Then I develop two new problem cases: one involving “seamless transitions” between perception and hallucination and another involving the graded character of perceptual evidence and justification.     

What is iso and what is morphic in isomorphism?

Summary Isomorphism is not a simple concept. As a rule, the term applies to geometrical sameness. However, mathematicians use the term to denote algebriac linear, invertible relationships. Substantively there is also a problem: isomorphism may refer to the brain-experience relation, to the brain-environment relation, or to a three-way relationship of all of these. This commentary summarizes work done and discussions by the author with Wolfgang Köhler regarding these meanings of isomorphism.     

Do clever old people have earlier and richer first memories?

In a study of 377 people, from 54 to 83 years old, it was shown that the age of earliest memories was unrelated to current age but was related to intelligence. People with high IQ test scores remembered first and second memories at an earlier age than did those with lower IQ test scores. Intervals between first and second memories were briefer for those with high scores. The content of early memories was unrelated to age or intelligence.     

What is Apple-Psych?

Apple Psych, a system of software subroutines written in Apple Pascal and 6502 assembly language, was designed to run real-time psychological experiments on the Apple II, II+, and IIe microcomputers. This paper describes the minimum system requirements necessary to run Apple-Psych, the capabilities of the basic system, and the advantages and disadvantages of using Apple-Psych. Because the utility of a system to a researcher is often linked to its flexibility and expandability, this paper includes a brief discussion of hardware expansions already supported by the Apple Psych software and hardware expansions that would require additional software support.     

What is Sound?

Our standard view about sound is incoherent. On the one hand, we suppose that sound is a quality, not of the object that makes the sound, but of the surrounding medium. This is the supposition of our ordinary language, modern science and a long philosophical tradition. On the other hand, we suppose that sound is the object of hearing. This too is the assumption of ordinary language, modern science and a long philosophical tradition. Yet these two assumptions cannot both be right – not unless we wish to concede that hearing is illusory and that we do not listen to the objects that make sounds. To avoid these consequences we must recognize and repair the inconsistencies contained in our standard view of what sound is. I offer an account that describes sound as a quality belonging, not to the medium, but to the object that makes the sound.
email : pasnau@sju.edu     

What is psychoanalysis?

Although we are now less inclined to argue about whose treatment is entitled to be called psychoanalysis, we will understand current debates better if we revisualize what originally made psychoanalysis different from other treatments. At its birth, psychoanalysis twisted the common-sense treatments it grew out of into very peculiar shapes. In reaction to that extreme peculiarity, a process of normalizing began almost immediately and continues to this day. This process is illustrated by tracing the rise and fall of peculiarities in four aspects: medical procedure, the analyst's vision, the analyst's role, and the sense of time.