亲组织不道德行为的解释机制与理论模型

亲组织不道德行为(Unethical Pro-organizational Behavior, UPB)界定的是组织员工出于维护组织的利益而做出的不道德行为。UPB在组织中难以被识别, 却可能给组织带来严重的负面影响。因兼具亲组织性和不道德性, UPB的研究引起了各界的广泛关注。因此, 有必要明确UPB的来源与界定; 亦有必要借鉴“不道德行为”的解释路径, 从理性决策和直觉判断两个解释机制对UPB前因研究取得的进展进行理论归纳梳理, 形成理论模型。在此基础上提出未来的研究方向:亲领导不道德行为和亲团队不道德行为的细分研究, 中国本土背景下企业所有制形式对UPB理论模型可能产生的调节作用, 以及角色压力对UPB的影响。     

解释性项目反应理论模型：理论与应用

解释性项目反应理论模型(Explanatory Item Response Theory Models, EIRTM)是指基于广义线性混合模型和非线性混合模型构建的项目反应理论(Item Response Theory, IRT)模型。EIRTM能在IRT模型的基础上直接加入预测变量, 从而解决各类测量问题。首先介绍EIRTM的相关概念和参数估计方法, 然后展示如何使用EIRTM处理题目位置效应、测验模式效应、题目功能差异、局部被试依赖和局部题目依赖, 接着提供实例对EIRTM的使用进行说明, 最后对EIRTM的不足之处和应用前景进行讨论。     

Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap

Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an explanatory problem - an explanatory gap - but does not imply the existence of immaterial mental properties. Levine introduced this notion of the explanatory gap almost two decades ago. Purple Haze allows Levine to situate the explanatory gap in a broader philosophical context. He engages with those who hold that the explanatory gap is best understood as implying anti-materialist metaphysical conclusions. But he also seeks to distance himself from contemporary naturalistic philosophical theorizing about consciousness by arguing that reductive and eliminative theories of consciousness all fail. Levine's work is best seen as an attempt to firmly establish a definite status for the mind-body problem, i.e. that the mind-body problem is a real, substantive epistemological problem but emphatically not a metaphysical one. Because Levine's work is tightly focused upon contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy of mind, there is little discussion of the broader conceptual background to the mind-body problem. My aim here is to place Levine's work in a broader conceptual context. In particular, I focus on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality in the belief that doing so will allow us better to understand and evaluate Levine's arguments and their place in contemporary theorizing about mentality and consciousness.     

The Explanatory Power of the Soul

Liberalism and naturalism are the reigning orthodoxies of most faculties today, while dualism is overwhelmingly rejected. The overarching claim defended in this paper is that liberals should consider dualism more seriously than what currently seems to be the case. This claim will be defended in two stages. First, I will argue that dualism provides better resources with which to defend foundational liberal commitments to human equality and human agency than those naturalism offers. Secondly, I will argue that dualism is plausible enough to be seriously considered by liberals granted that this view is friendlier to liberal commitments than naturalism is.     

On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content

Philosophical Studies -     

Explanatory disunities and the unity of science

According to John Dupré, the metaphysics underpinning modern science posits a deterministic, fully law‐governed and potentially fully intelligible structure that pervades the entire universe. To reject such a metaphysical framework for science is to subscribe to “the disorder of things”, and the latter, according to Dupré, entails the impossibility of a unified science. Dupré's argument rests crucially upon purported disunities evident in the explanatory practices of science. I critically examine the implied project of drawing metaphysical conclusions from epistemological premisses concerning the nature of our explanatory practices. I then argue that Dupré fails to answer a particular argument for the ontological unity of science that rests upon assumptions about the causal structure of the world. This “causal” argument for the unity of science might be countered by a more radical metaphysical revisionism. The latter, however, seems unable to account for features of our explanatory practices that testify to a measure of explanatory unity in science. I conclude by sketching a strategy that might enable the revisionist to overcome such difficulties.     

On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth

An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximately true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth-as-correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth.     

Explanatory power of extended cognition

I argue that examining the explanatory power of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) offers a fruitful approach to the problem of cognitive system demarcation. Although in the discussions on HEC it has become common to refer to considerations of explanatory power as a means for assessing the plausibility of the extended cognition approach, to date no satisfying account of explanatory power has been presented in the literature. I suggest that the currently most prominent theory of explanation in the special sciences, James Woodward's contrastive-counterfactual theory, and an account of explanatory virtues building on that theory can be used to develop a systematic picture of cognitive system demarcation in the psychological sciences. A major difference between my differential influence (DI) account and most other theories of cognitive extension is the cognitive systems pluralism implied by my approach. By examining the explanatory power of competing traditions in psychological memory research, I conclude that internalist and externalist classificatory strategies are characterized by different profiles of explanatory virtues and should often be considered as complementary rather than competing approaches. This suggests a deflationary interpretation of HEC.     

"第一届齐鲁文化国际学术研讨会"综述

2003年11月29日,来自韩国、澳大利亚、匈牙利、越南等国家及中国大陆的专家学者群贤毕聚泉城济南,参加由山东师范大学“齐鲁文化研究中心”主办的第一届齐鲁文化国际学术研讨会。有朋自远方来,不亦乐乎!在其后的4天会议过程中,专家学者们议论风发,畅所欲言,“和而不同”,在友好、热烈的气氛中拓宽拓深了齐鲁文化研究,可谓区域文化学术大聚会。     

Explicationist Epistemology and the Explanatory Role of Knowledge

Journal for General Philosophy of Science - It has been argued that much of contemporary epistemology can be unified under Carnap’s methodology of explication, which originated in the...     

Explanatory schema and the process of model building

Synthese - In this paper, we argue that rather than exclusively focusing on trying to determine if an idealized model fits a particular account of scientific explanation, philosophers of science...     

The Remarkable Explanatory Power of Neurobiology

Abstract

NEUROBIOLOGY FOR CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK: THEORY AND PRACTICE, by Jeffrey S. Applegate and Janet R. Shapiro. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005, $29.95, 248 pp. Reviewed by Linda A. Chernus, MSW, LISW, BCD