The Homosexual Tendencies of King James: Should this Matter to Bible Readers Today?

The question whether King James, who commissioned the translation of the Bible into English in 1604, had homosexual tendencies has been under discussion in recent years. We review the arguments presented against this view and conclude that they are largely circular and ad hominem. We then consider the evidence presented by those who argue for this view, including the emotional distance between King James and his wife; his intense affection for three men in the course of his life; contemporary criticism of his public expressions of affection toward two of these men; and contemporary allegations that his reluctance to commit England to war was due to his “effeminate” nature. We discuss his family history and his relationship to one man in particular and conclude that the argument he had homosexual tendencies is compelling. We then take up the associations that his own contemporaries made between homosexual behavior, effeminacy, pacifism, and the scholar, and present our view that in authorizing the translation of the Bible into English, he provided a scholarly model for male cooperation that was inherently superior to the martial model of male enterprise advocated by his opponents. We also suggest that his authorization of a new translation of the Bible was psycho-dynamically related to his loss of his mother in infancy and to his guilt for having failed to come to her aid when she requested his help. Finally, we make a case in behalf of the King James Version of the Bible on the grounds that it functions as a cultural selfobject (Kohut), due mainly to its maternal associations; that King James’s favorite Bible verse was Matthew 5:9—“Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God”; and that James had homosexual tendencies.     

Self psychology and group therapy

This paper illustrates how the theories of Heinz Kohut elucidate the curative aspects of group treatment. Group therapy is an ideal milieu in which mirroring, idealizing and alterego transferences can be experienced and worked through. Transmuting internalizations, or psychic structure building, occur when optimal frustration of these needs can be provided by available selfobjects. In group therapy a patient can use the group-as-a-whole, the individual members as well as the leader as potential selfobjects. With the help of individual sessions to reflect on group encounters, a patient can gain a more fully integrated therapeutic experience.The author wishes to acknowledge Susan Sands, Ph.D., Jane Jordan, M.S.W., and Ruth White, Ph.D., for their help.     

Salaam Slumdog! Personal and cultural trauma and restitution in the Mumbai slums

The film “Slumdog Millionaire” when viewed together with the earlier “Salaam Bombay!” penetrates into the cultural psychology of urban India, revealing continuity with traditional Indian esthetic theories and commonality with psychoanalytic self psychologies. In films where plot is secondary and character is everything, we are led deep into the essence of the heroes’ feelings and learn to appreciate how being loyal to affect points the way to selfhood. Both films explore the psyches of boys struggling to hold on to fundamental “blueprints” of selfhood in the face of environments which seem to deny them any chance of fulfillment. While “Salaam Bombay!” presents a tragic and depressive response to the trauma and deprivation of slum life, “Slumdog Millionaire” appears grandiose and manic. Beneath the surface, both films sustain faith that these children can and will find the families they need to flourish. While hope is deferred in “Salaam!” it is ultimately achieved in “Slumdog.”     

Religious Experience and the Transformation of Narcissism: Kohutian Theory and the Life of St. Francis of Assisi

Kohut proposed that the narcissistic personality could be transformed in the therapeutic environment by an empathic approach on the part of the analyst. Within the analytic setting, specific transference phenomena arise spontaneously, allowing the analysand to confront infantile grandiose fantasies and unresolved narcissistic wounds. Using the story of the life of St. Francis of Assisi, this paper illustrates how religious experience––specifically the ongoing encounter with a transcendent other––can provide the “therapeutic” milieu in which the mirroring, idealizing, and twinship transferences described by Kohut can arise, and within which pathological narcissism can be transformed into the “cosmic narcissism” of the healthy personality.

The group as selfobject: brief psychotherapy with women

This article applies the theory of self psychology, which was developed by Heinz Kohut, to brief group psychotherapy. The article discusses the significance of the group as an expanded selfobject for individuals who do not have appropriate, available selfobjects in their environment. The article addresses the rationale for developing a 12-week women's group from a self-psychological perspective and illustrates key theoretical concepts in the beginning, middle, and end phases with group process. The role of the therapist in each phase of group development is emphasized.     

Bealer and the autonomy of philosophy

George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer’s theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the “autonomy” of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical reflection on our intuitions. Furthermore, I argue that Bealer’s account of determinate concept possession in fact faces serious problems. Accordingly, I conclude that Bealer does not succeed in vindicating the appeal to intuition in philosophy.     

Qeauty and the books: a response to Lewis’s quantum sleeping beauty problem

In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping beauty problem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical and epistemological differences between Lewis’s two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian’s solution in the variant case. These Dutch books, I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis’s two cases such that Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s assignment of credences.     

First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality

In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational.     

Reductive levels and multi-scale structure

I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based” properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be revised.     

A developed nature: a phenomenological account of the experience of home

Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home” is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving.     

Structural correspondence between theories and convergence to truth

While “scientism” is typically regarded as a position about the exclusive epistemic authority of science held by a certain class of “cultured despisers” of “religion”, we show that only on the assumption of this sort of view do purportedly “scientific” claims made by proponents of “intelligent design” appear to lend epistemic or apologetic support to claims affirmed about God and God’s action in “creation” by Christians in confessing their “faith”. On the other hand, the hermeneutical strategy that better describes the practice and method of Christian theologians, from the inception of theological reflection in the Christian tradition, acknowledges the epistemic authority of the best available tests for truth in areas of human inquiry such as science and history. But this strategy does not assume that such tests, whose authority must be regarded as provisional, provides authority for the warrant of affirming claims constituting the confessed “faith”. By attributing theological import to claims advanced by appeal to the best available tests for truth in the practice of science, supporters of ID not only confuse the epistemic authority of these tests with the normative authority of a faith community’s confessional identity, but impute to scientific tests for truth a sort of authority that even goes beyond the “methodological naturalism” against which they counterpose their claims.     

Fixing broken masculinity: Viagra asa technology for the production of gender and sexuality

In the twenty-first century, technology is not so easily divorced from the human body. Viagra, the blockbuster drug hailed as the “magic erection pill,” exemplifies the increasingly accepted technologically-enhanced body. After a history of medical experts applying technology to women’s bodies in times of weakness, male bodies are now deemed in need of treatment. As male bodies digress from “normal” (erect and penetrating) sexuality, techno-scientific advances promise to “fix” the problem, and thus the patriarchal “machine.” Thus, Viagra is both a material and cultural technology producing and reshaping gender and sexuality under the guise of techno-scientific progress. Drawing on my own ethnographic data, I explore the use and circulation of techno-scientific advancement and inevitability discourses and the ways in which masculinity and heterosexuality are reproduced, as well as contested, critiqued, and reshaped by those who prescribe, dispense, market, and/or use Viagra. Finally, I argue that Viagra is currently being understood and employed as a “tool” to avert or treat masculinity “in crisis” in the contemporary America. This research would not be possible without help from kind medical practitioners, consumers, and participants in the feminist writing group at UCSB.     

“Cannot” Implies “Not Ought”

I argue for a version of “ought” implies “can”. In particular, I argue that it is necessarily true that if an agent, S, ultima facie ought to do A at T’, then there is a time T* such that S can at T* do A at T’. In support of this principle, I have argued that without it, we cannot explain how it is that, in cases where agents cannot do the best thing, they often ought to do some alternative action – such as get help or do the promised action later; nor can we explain the phenomenon of necessary enablers or the phenomenon of more stringent prima facie obligations overriding less stringent ones in cases where the agent cannot fulfill both.     

Embracing the “Nation”

The idea of the “nation” has played only a small role in modern political philosophy because of its apparent irrationalism and amoralism. David Miller, however, sets out to show that these charges can be overcome: nationality is a rational element of one’s cultural identity, and nations are genuinely ethical communities. In this paper I argue that his project fails. The defence against the charge of irrationalism fails because Miller works within a framework of ethical particularism which leads to a position of metaethical relativism. A consequence of this relativism is that a community’s moral principles and boundaries of exclusion cannot be rationally justified to those constructed as “outsiders”. The defence against the charge of amoralism fails because Miller does not so much provide an argument to show that nations are ethical communities as assume they are; we are therefore left without resources to discriminate between ethical and unethical nations. I apply these problems to Miller’s treatment of the question of immigration, arguing that it shows that his version of “liberal” nationalism has a tendency to collapse towards a conservative position on such issues. This should not give us any great confidence that the nation, as Miller presents it, should be embraced by modern political philosophy. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

In this life: The impact of gender and tradition on sexuality and relationships for<Emphasis Type="Italic">Devadasi sex</Emphasis> workers in rural India

In the popular imagination and certain academic fields, sex workers’ experiences of sexuality and intimate relationships are often “naturalized,” to the point where they are assumed to be deviant or completely different than those of women in mainstream society. Researchers and sex worker organizations are challenging these reified constructions by examining more diverse and representative models of sexuality and relationships. However, the experiences of women selling sex in the “third world” are consistently portrayed as violent, non-pleasurable, and oppressive, characteristics often applied universally to “third world women.” Using data from ethnographic field work with girls and women who belong to theDevadasi (servant/slave of the God) tradition of sex work in rural Karnataka, India, this paper examines the cultural dynamics of sexuality and relationships. Gender and dominant models of feminine identity emerge as powerful factors in shaping these facets of life, producing experiences amongDevadasis that are similar to those of other Indian women. Yet,Devadasis also encounter additional constraints in their lives because of their participation in the morally and culturally contestedDevadasi system. These data contribute to emerging research that destabilizes images of sex workers as “different” from other women, while also highlighting the impact of tradition on sexual mores and relationship structure in this unique cultural context.     

Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations

Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as “S ought to believe that p”, or “S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p”. However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief, if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epistemic norms for assertion and action.     

The “Reversal of Generations” Phenomenon as Illustrated by the Lives of John Henry Newman and Abraham Lincoln

The psychoanalytic concept of the “reversal of generations,” in which one identifies with a grandparent as the primary parental authority in one’s life, is used to shed light on the role that John Henry Newman’s paternal grandmother played in his decision to become a priest in the Church of England and in his subsequent conversion to the Church of Rome; and on the role that Abraham Lincoln’s maternal grandfather played in his understanding of a husband’s obligation of faithfulness to his wife and of his presidential role in combating Southern secession but avoiding retribution. The writings of Erik H. Erikson are used to explore the role of the grandparent in legitimating critical acts of self-determination.     

Melia and Saatsi on structural realism

Newman’s objection is sometimes taken to be a fatal objection to structural realism (SR). However, ambiguity in the definition of “structure” allows for versions that do not succumb to Newman’s objection. In this paper, I consider some versions of SR that maintain an abstract notion of structure yet avoid Newman’s objection. In particular, I consider versions suggested by Melia and Saatsi. They reject a solution that restricts the domain of the second-order quantifiers, and argue in favor of buttressing the language with intensional operators such as “it is physically necessary that...”. I argue that their favored solution effectively requires the former suggestion that they reject. This argument suggests that a notion of natural properties may be indispensable to SR.     

Contra Cartwright: Structural Realism, Ontological Pluralism and Fundamentalism About Laws

In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable. I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses.     

Habermas on Understanding: Virtual Participation,Dialogue and the Universality of Truth

Although the success of Habermas’s theory of communicative action depends on his dialogical model of understanding in which a theorist is supposed to participate in the debate with the actors as a ‘virtual participant’ and seek context-transcendent truth through the exchange of speech acts, current literature on the theory of communicative action rarely touches on the difficulties it entails. In the first part of this paper, I will examine Habermas’s argument that understanding other cultural practices requires the interpreter to virtually participate in the “dialogue” with the actors as to the rationality of their cultural practice and discuss why, according to Habermas,such dialogue leads to the “context-transcendent truth”. In the second part, by using a concrete historical example, I will reconstruct a “virtual dialogue” between Habermas and Michael Polanyi as to the rationality of scientific practice and indicate why Habermas’s dialogical model of understanding based on the methodology of virtual participation cannot achieve what it professes to do.