"Blaming the victim" under memory load

When presented with negative outcomes, people often engage in counterfactual thinking, imagining various ways that events might have been different. This appears to be a spontaneous behavior, with considerable adaptive value. Nevertheless, counterfactual thinking may also engender systematic biases in various judgment tasks, such as allocating blame for a mishap, or deciding on the appropriate compensation to a victim. Thus, counterfactuals sometimes require thought suppression or discounting, potentially resource-demanding tasks. In this study, participants made mock-jury decisions about control and counterfactual versions of simple stories. The judgments of two groups of participants, differing in their respective levels of working memory capacity, were compared. In addition, all participants held memory loads during various stages of the primary task. Lower-span individuals were especially susceptible to bias associated with the counterfactual manipulation, but only when holding memory loads during judgment. The results suggest that counterfactual thoughts arise automatically, and may later require effortful, capacity-demanding suppression.     

False belief understanding: The influence of person,grammatical mood,counterfactual reasoning and working memory

The present study had two major goals. The first goal was to assess the relative difficulty among different versions of the unexpected contents task by systematically varying the dimensions of grammatical mood (indicative vs. subjunctive) and person (self vs. other), and to examine the correlational pattern between these different versions of the unexpected contents task and the unexpected locations task. The second goal was to examine the specificity of the relation between false belief understanding and counterfactual reasoning after controlling for age and working memory ability. One hundred, 3‐ to 6‐year‐old, children were administered two measures of false belief understanding (two versions of the unexpected contents task and two versions of the unexpected locations task), two measures of counterfactual reasoning and a working memory measure. Results showed that performance on the unexpected contents task did not significantly differ across conditions. However, only the conditions of the unexpected contents task that concerned another person's false belief correlated significantly with the unexpected locations task. Moreover, counterfactual reasoning was found to explain a significant amount of variance in the unexpected locations task, even after controlling for age and working memory performance. Findings are discussed in the context of different accounts of the development of theory of mind, and in the context of different interpretations of the relation between false belief understanding and counterfactual reasoning.     

Mechanistic explanation at the limit

Resurgent interest in both mechanistic and counterfactual theories of explanation has led to a fair amount of discussion regarding the relative merits of these two approaches. James Woodward is currently the pre-eminent counterfactual theorist, and he criticizes the mechanists on the following grounds: Unless mechanists about explanation invoke counterfactuals, they cannot make sense of claims about causal interactions between mechanism parts or of causal explanations put forward absent knowledge of productive mechanisms. He claims that these shortfalls can be offset if mechanists will just borrow key tenets of his counterfactual theory of causal claims. What mechanists must bear in mind, however, is that by pursuing this course they risk both the assimilation of the mechanistic theories of explanation into Woodward’s own favored counterfactual theory, and they risk the marginalization of mechanistic explanations to a proper subset of all explanations. An outcome more favorable to mechanists might be had by pursuing an actualist-mechanist theory of the contents of causal claims. While it may not seem obvious at first blush that such an approach is workable, even in principle, recent empirical research into causal perception, causal belief, and mechanical reasoning provides some grounds for optimism.     

Normische Gesetzeshypothesen und die wissenschaftsphilosophische Bedeutung des nichtmonotonen Schliessens

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual case is so important here. After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Conditional Reasoning and Emotional Experience: A Review of the Development of Counterfactual Thinking

What do human beings use conditional reasoning for? A psychological consequence of counterfactual conditional reasoning is emotional experience, in particular, regret and relief. Adults’ thoughts about what might have been influence their evaluations of reality. We discuss recent psychological experiments that chart the relationship between children’s ability to engage in conditional reasoning and their experience of counterfactual emotions. Relative to conditional reasoning, counterfactual emotions are late developing. This suggests that children need not only competence in conditional reasoning, but also to engage in this thinking spontaneously. Developments in domain general cognitive processing (the executive functions) allow children to develop from conditional reasoning to reasoning with counterfactual content and, eventually, to experiencing counterfactual emotions.     

Counterfactual reasoning and moral emotion attribution

Studies in the happy victimizer paradigm have shown that preschool children attribute positive emotions to a norm violator whereas older elementary-school children tend to attribute negative emotions. The current research explored the possibility that children's counterfactual reasoning ability (i.e., their capacity to imagine alternatives to reality) can explain this age difference in moral emotion attribution. In Study 1, 100 4- and 8-year-old children attributed significantly more negative emotions to victimizers in a counterfactual-prime condition, in which an alternative course of action was presented before the emotion attribution, than in a no-prime condition, where no counterfactual prompt was given. Counterfactual reasoning ability significantly predicted negative emotion attribution in the no-prime condition. In Study 2, the counterfactual reasoning of 143 4- and 8-year-old children significantly predicted negative emotion attribution to the victimizer. When controlling for counterfactual reasoning, focusing on the victim of a violation did not affect emotion attribution to the violator.     

Children’s causal reasoning: Counterfactual thinking occurs for ‘negative’ outcomes only

Harris, German and Mills (Children’s use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning. Cognition, 61 (1996), 223–259), following Mackie, argue that children make explicit use of counterfactual thinking in arriving at causal judgments. They showed that children as young as 3, in explaining simple mishap events, made reference to courses of action that a protagonist had rejected, when that course of action would have prevented the observed outcome. It is hypothesized here that such counterfactual thinking might have been invoked by the ‘negative’ mishaps rather than as part of the causal reasoning process. Although the generation of counterfactuals in explanation was replicated using mishap outcomes such as those used by Harris et al., counterfactual thinking was not evident in children’s explanations of ‘positive’ outcomes. These results undermine the view that a counterfactual thinking process, as indexed by reference to possible actions rejected by a protagonist, is necessary for causal reasoning. Alternative characterizations of the relationship between causals and counterfactuals are discussed.     

动机冲突下2~4岁幼儿反事实思维理解的发展

采用故事法, 考察在3种动机冲突下幼儿反事实思维理解的发展。结果表明：(1) 2岁幼儿的加法、减法反事实思维得分显著高于替代反事实思维。(2)在加法反事实任务中, 2岁幼儿显著低于4岁幼儿;在减法反事实任务中, 3个年龄组得分有显著性差异。(3)在趋避冲突下, 加法与减法反事实得分都显著高于替代反事实。(4)在结果反事实理解任务中, 随着年龄增长, 幼儿结果反事实思维理解能力有显著提高。     

Comparative syllogism and counterfactual knowledge

Comparative syllogism is a type of scientific reasoning widely used, explicitly or implicitly, for inferences from observations to conclusions about effectiveness, but its philosophical significance has not been fully elaborated or appreciated. In its simplest form, the comparative syllogism derives a conclusion about the effectiveness of a factor (e.g. a treatment or an exposure) on a certain property via an experiment design using a test (experimental) group and a comparison (control) group. Our objective is to show that the comparative syllogism can be understood as encoding a simulation view of counterfactuals, in that counterfactual situations are conceptual constructs that can be correctly simulated by homogeneous comparison groups. In this simulation view, the empirical data from the comparison groups play an evidential role in the evaluation of counterfactuals and in obtaining counterfactual knowledge. We further indicate how successful experimental designs can help us to obtain correct simulations, and thus to bring us to scientifically-empirically based counterfactual knowledge.     

Associations among false belief understanding,counterfactual reasoning,and executive function

The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (1) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3‐, 4‐, and 5‐year‐olds completed false belief, counterfactual, working memory, representational flexibility, and language measures. Counterfactual reasoning accounted for limited unique variance in false belief. Both working memory and representational flexibility partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual and false belief. Children, like adults, also generated various types of counterfactual statements to differing degrees. Results demonstrated the importance of language and executive function for both counterfactual and false belief. Implications are discussed.     

Basic Conditional Reasoning: How Children Mimic Counterfactual Reasoning

Children approach counterfactual questions about stories with a reasoning strategy that falls short of adults’ Counterfactual Reasoning (CFR). It was dubbed “Basic Conditional Reasoning” (BCR) in Rafetseder et al. (Child Dev 81(1):376–389, 2010). In this paper we provide a characterisation of the differences between BCR and CFR using a distinction between permanent and nonpermanent features of stories and Lewis/Stalnaker counterfactual logic. The critical difference pertains to how consistency between a story and a conditional antecedent incompatible with a nonpermanent feature of the story is achieved. Basic conditional reasoners simply drop all nonpermanent features of the story. Counterfactual reasoners preserve as much of the story as possible while accommodating the antecedent.     

How Stories in Memory Perpetuate the Continued Influence of False Information

People often encounter information that they subsequently learn is false. Past research has shown that people sometimes continue to use this misinformation in their reasoning, even if they remember that the information is false, which researchers refer to as the continued influence effect. The current work shows that the continued influence effect depends on the stories people have in memory: corrected misinformation was found to have a stronger effect on people's beliefs than information that was topically related to the story if it helped to provide a causal explanation of a story they had read previously. We argue this effect occurs because information that can fill a causal “gap” in a story enhances comprehension of the story event, which allows people to build a complete (if inaccurate) event model that they prefer over an accurate but incomplete event model. This effect is less likely to occur for stories in memory that end in a negative way, presumably because people are more motivated to accurately understand negative outcome events.     

幼儿反事实推理的错误源分析

本研究选取57名3~5岁幼儿,考察了在两种选择和三种选择的反事实推理任务中儿童的表现以及是否出现现实错误。结果如下:无论在两种还是三种选择的反事实任务中,3岁组儿童的得分显著低于4岁和5岁组儿童,而4岁和5岁组儿童之间不存在显著差异;幼儿在反事实推理中的确会出现现实错误,但除此之外,幼儿在三种选择任务中也会选择现实和正确答案之外的第三个选项。由此可见,年幼儿童可能在抑制现实和建构反事实替代情境方面都存在困难,这尚需我们进一步探究。     

Children's understanding of motives for deception

This study examines the problem of why some motives are understood at an earlier age than others. Currently, the accepted explanation for this is that general cognitive level constrains children's reasoning in the social domain. An alternative explanation is that an important process in understanding others is projection. To investigate this young boys and girls from two age groups were presented with cartoon stories depicting situations involving altruistic deception and self-centred deception. Pairs of matched cartoon stories, each of which came in two versions, differing only in motive type were constructed. As predicted, self-centred deception was understood earlier than altruistic deception. These results are congruent with the idea that the underlying process in understanding others is projection.     

反事实思维两大理论：范例说和目标－指向说

反事实思维是个体对不真实的条件或可能性进行替换的一种思维过程。该文通过综合国外许多研究者的研究成果,探讨了反事实思维的定义、分类以及反事实思维的两大理论：范例说和目标－指向说。范例说认为反事实思维的激发是自动化过程,影响反事实思维产生的因素包括：正常性、结果的效价、与替代结果的接近性、前提的突变性和前提的突出性。目标－指向说则认为反事实思维的激发过程同样受目标、情绪控制、态度等认知因素的影响     

The Problem of Counterfactuals in Substituted Judgement Decision‐Making

The standard by which we apply decision‐making for those unable to do so for themselves is an important practical ethical issue with substantial implications for the treatment and welfare of such individuals. The approach to proxy or surrogate decision‐making based upon substituted judgement is often seen as the ideal standard to aim for but suffers from a need to provide a clear account of how to determine the validity of the proxy's judgements. Proponents have responded to this demand by providing the truth‐conditions for the substituted judgement in terms of counterfactual reasoning using a possible worlds semantics. In this paper, I show how these underpinnings fail to support the substituted judgement approach as a reasonable standard for decision‐making. Firstly, I show how this counterfactual element has been poorly interpreted. I then explain how various accounts have failed to reflect problems and limitations associated with providing an interpretation of their truth‐conditions using counterfactuals. Finally, I argue that, even when we attend to the initial problems of providing a counterfactual analysis, it still deeply problematic as a means of determining the validity of substituted judgements for two main reasons. Firstly, making determinate judgements as to the truth‐value of these judgements will often not be possible and, secondly, there is a strong requirement when interpreting many counterfactual claims to charitably accede to their being true. I conclude that substituted judgements, as interpreted through counterfactual reasoning and possible worlds semantics, do not therefore provide an adequate standard for surrogate decision‐making.     

Counterfactual thinking and false belief: the role of executive function

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (Cognitive Development, 19 (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB. Participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 76). Counterfactual thinking statements generated accounted for significant variance in FB performance beyond age and language. Working memory and inhibitory control each partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB performance. The maturation of executive functioning skills is important in children’s developing understanding of counterfactual reasoning and FB.     

3～5岁幼儿反事实思维的发展研究

该研究采用结果和前提反事实推理任务,选取58名3-5岁幼儿为被试,考察了其反事实思维能力的发展。结果表明:1.3岁儿童在结果反事实推理中的得分显著低于4岁和5岁儿童,而4岁和5岁儿童的得分并不存在显著差异;2.幼儿的前提反事实推理因结构和方向不同而表现出不同的年龄变化趋势;3.幼儿产生的上行和下行反事实论断之间不存在显著差异。如成人一样,幼儿较少产生减法反事实。     

Counterfactual reasoning and the problem of selecting antecedent scenarios

A recent group of social scientists have argued that counterfactual questions play an essential role in their disciplines, and that it is possible to have rigorous methods to investigate them. Unfortunately, there has been little (if any) interaction between these social scientists and the philosophers who have long held that rigorous counterfactual reasoning is possible. In this paper, I hope to encourage some fresh thinking on both sides by creating new connections between them. I describe what I term “problem of selecting antecedent scenarios,” and show that this is an essential challenge in real-life counterfactual reasoning. Then, I demonstrate that the major extant theories of counterfactuals (especially the Lewis/Stalnaker theory and Igal Kvart’s rival account) are unable to solve this problem. I show that there are instances of real-life counterfactual reasoning in the social sciences that are counterexamples to both of these accounts. And finally, I develop a new theory of how to select antecedent scenarios that overcomes these difficulties, and so would be part of a more adequate theory of counterfactuals (and counterfactual reasoning).     

Pretense,Counterfactuals, and Bayesian Causal Models: Why What Is Not Real Really Matters

Young children spend a large portion of their time pretending about non‐real situations. Why? We answer this question by using the framework of Bayesian causal models to argue that pretending and counterfactual reasoning engage the same component cognitive abilities: disengaging with current reality, making inferences about an alternative representation of reality, and keeping this representation separate from reality. In turn, according to causal models accounts, counterfactual reasoning is a crucial tool that children need to plan for the future and learn about the world. Both planning with causal models and learning about them require the ability to create false premises and generate conclusions from these premises. We argue that pretending allows children to practice these important cognitive skills. We also consider the prevalence of unrealistic scenarios in children's play and explain how they can be useful in learning, despite appearances to the contrary.