Magidor on anomaly and truth-value gaps

In Category Mistakes, Ofra Magidor provides two arguments against the view that category mistakes express propositions that are not truth-evaluable at some world. I argue that her first, Williamsonian argument against this view begs the question, and that her second argument rests on a misleading conception of how semantic defect results in infelicity judgments. I conclude by conceding that she is still correct to stress that the view she opposes face noteworthy foundational and empirical challenges.     

MARGARET THATCHER'S CHRISTIAN FAITH: A Case Study in Political Theology

Throughout the 1980s Margaret Thatcher dominated British and global politics. At the same time she maintained an active Christian faith, which she understood as shaping and informing her political choices and policies. In this article I argue that we can construct from Thatcher's key speeches, her memoirs, and her book on public policy a cultural “theo‐political” identity which guided her political decisions. Thatcher's identity was as an Anglo‐Saxon Nonconformist. This consisted of her belief in values such as thrift and hard work, care for the family and local neighbor, and charitable generosity; her belief in the renewal of the national British Christian spirit; and her notion of morality as the opportunity for free choice. Without a recognition of the centrality of her theo‐political identity, it is difficult to understand the values and beliefs which were central to her political life. The methodological issues raised by the construction of this theo‐political identity are examined in this article. The aim of the proposed methodology is to develop theological insights into a political phenomenon like Thatcher rather than make policy judgments or recommendations.     

SUBJECTIVITY, JUDGMENT, AND THE BASING RELATIONSHIP

Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a judgment can be based on the considerations the subject claims as justification even when it depends on personal traits.     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

Women's perceptions of female contraceptive behavior: experimental evidence of the sexual double standard

A social perception study was conducted to examine the effect of the sexual double standard on impressions of a female target. As part of a "social memory" study, 57 female undergraduates read a fictitious woman's diary describing a sexual encounter where the woman provided a condom, the man provided a condom, or the couple had unprotected intercourse. Participants made behavioral judgments and interpersonal judgments about the couple, and rated the female target on several personality traits. Women rated the target's behavior more negatively, and as more inappropriate, when she provided a condom, than when her partner provided a condom. Participants also assumed that the target's partner would feel less positive about her when she provided a condom than if he provided a condom or if they had unprotected intercourse. These results are discussed with respect to the continued existence of the sexual double standard, and its impact on women's contraceptive behavior.     

The ontogeny of intent‐based normative judgments

When evaluating norm transgressions, children begin to show some sensitivity to the agent's intentionality around preschool age. However, the specific developmental trajectories of different forms of such intent‐based judgments and their cognitive underpinnings are still largely unclear. The current studies, therefore, systematically investigated the development of intent‐based normative judgments as a function of two crucial factors: (a) the type of the agent's mental state underlying a normative transgression, and (b) the type of norm transgressed (moral versus conventional). In Study 1, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children as well as adults were presented with vignettes in which an agent transgressed either a moral or a conventional norm. Crucially, she did so either intentionally, accidentally (not intentionally at all) or unknowingly (intentionally, yet based on a false belief regarding the outcome). The results revealed two asymmetries in children's intent‐based judgments. First, all age groups showed greater sensitivity to mental state information for moral compared to conventional transgressions. Second, children's (but not adults') normative judgments were more sensitive to the agent's intention than to her belief. Two subsequent studies investigated this asymmetry in children more closely and found evidence that it is based on performance factors: children are able in principle to take into account an agent's false belief in much the same way as her intentions, yet do not make belief‐based judgments in many existing tasks (like that of Study 1) due to their inferential complexity. Taken together, these findings contribute to a more systematic understanding of the development of intent‐based normative judgment.     

Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue

Contemporary virtue ethicists widely accept thethesis that a virtuous agent's feelings shouldbe in harmony with her judgments about what sheshould do and that she should find virtuousaction easy and pleasant. Conflict between anagent's feelings and her actions, by contrast,is thought to indicate mere continence – amoral deficiency. This ``harmony thesis' isgenerally taken to be a fundamental element ofAristotelian virtue ethics.I argue that the harmony thesis, understoodthis way, is mistaken, because there areoccasions where a virtuous agent will findright action painful and difficult. What thismeans is that the generally accepteddistinction between continence and virtue isunsupportable. This conclusion affects severalwell-known accounts of virtuous action,including those of Philippa Foot and JohnMcDowell. A closer look at Aristotle, however, providesanother way of distinguishing betweencontinence and virtue, based in hiscategorization of goods as noble or base. Iargue that virtue is exhibited when anagent's feelings harmonize with his correctjudgments of value, while discrepancies betweenfeelings and correct judgments of valueindicate continence. This understanding ofcontinence and virtue enables us to accommodatethe problem cases I raise.     

On Nancy Fraser's “Women,Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation”

In “Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation,” Nancy Fraser pursues a “meaning-oriented” inquiry intended to illuminate the gender bias of the American welfare system in order to aid feminists and their allies in the continuing political struggles over the welfare system. For Fraser the fundamental issues are over judgments about what women need—“need interpretation.” I argue that although her analysis of the system is vivid and provocative, it is inadequate as a contribution either to political theory or practical strategy. Fraser substitutes a search for patterns and meanings for careful clarification and defense of political values. She leaves needs without foundation and does not explore the capacities for change in modem liberal states. The meanings she reveals provide us neither with a sound basis for judgments on political values nor with a strategy for improvement.     

The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation

One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is that our conception of the relation between moral language and motivation provides strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue that this supposition is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view to the extent they are assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view according to which there is a pragmatic and standardized connection between moral utterances and motivation. The pragmatic account I propose states that a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to ϕ conveys two things: the sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that she ought to ϕ, and her utterance carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ. This view also makes it possible to defend cognitivism against a well-known internalist argument.     

Weigh(t)ing for Awareness

We wished to learn if weight perception can be extinguished by studying two patients with right hemisphere brain damage. When lifting weights simultaneously, a patient with right frontal damage was not biased in her judgments of which weight was heavier. By contrast, a patient with right parietal damage reported left-sided weights as being lighter than those on the right. Psychophysical power functions revealed that her awareness of increasing weights on the left was dampened compared to the right when lifting weights individually on each side. Strikingly, her awareness of weight changes on the left was completely abolished when she lifted weights in both hands simultaneously. She demonstrated an unusual split in awareness, being motorically aware of and actively engaged with left-sided weights while being unaware of their incremental changes.     

Assessment of Supervisee Developmental Level and Supervision Environment Across Supervisor Experience

Supervisors representing different levels of experience viewed videotape vignettes of counselors demonstrating the first three developmental levels of Stoltenberg's (1981) Counselor Complexity Model. Supervisors assessed each counselor on his or her developmental level and on the supervision environment he or she would provide for the trainee. Results indicated that supervisor experience did not influence the assessment of developmental level or the ability to make accurate environmental matches. Nevertheless, supervisors had the most difficulty accurately assessing counselors representing Level 2 in Stoltenberg's model and tended to make relative judgments about counselor developmental level. Implications for training and further research are discussed.     

Change,Vulnerability, Fear,and Taking Risks–An Interview with Virginia Satir

SUMMARY

The author addresses the mythic characters of Ulysses and Penelope as archetypes for herself. She reviews divergent attitudes, beliefs and aspirations of her life by detailing an internal conflict between her identification with Ulysses1 adventuresomeness and her reluctant realization that Penelope can also represent her, however much she rejected her for seeming dull and repetitve

In this process the author notes how she constricted her own creativity when she took on uncritically the patriarchal beliefs about the roles of wives and mothers. Nevertheless she wonders whether present-day women's liberation from archaic notions about women inadvertently sacrifices the optimal development of children because of the rigid demands of the work-place.

Finally she experiences the symbolic reunion of Penelope's and Ulysses' different images within herself, and considers how what each represents can have renewed meaning for her as she moves towards the end of her life.     

Navajo Morals and Myths,Ethics and Ethicists

Over a century ago a Western observer recognized an effective morality among Navajo Indians in the American Southwest, yet could not locate its expression, except in mythology recounting contradictory behaviors. Through the 1900s scholars delineated contours of Navajo moral values, myths, and taxonomies upon which moral traditions were based, and situations in which Navajos have engaged in ethical decision‐making. Recently individual Navajos have manifested their role as ethical agents, not merely as recipients of moral lore. A contemporary Navajo storyteller, Sunny Dooley, enunciates narrative ethical judgments, grounded in traditional Navajo mythology and its religious milieu, as she addresses the present conditions of her people. Thus she probes the contradictions that are inherent to life. Her stories testify to the insoluble conflicts within the human condition, ultimate and immediate conundrums that must be faced, even though they surely will not be resolved.     

Kristallnacht: Experiencing Nazi Germany

Lore Zeller, long-time friend and proofreader of Psychological Perspectives, is a first-time contributor to our journal—or any journal. Lore is also something of an icon at the bookstore of the C.G. Jung Institute of Los Angeles, where she has worked, dispensing books and wisdom, for over twenty years. She is eighty-seven years old. Over the past few years she has translated all of the correspondence from her German-Jewish parents and in-laws after she, her husband, and their two-year-old son fled their hometown of Berlin to seek safety in the United States via England. Within a few years of their escape, both sets of parents had perished in death camps. As survivors in Los Angeles, her husband and she helped found the Jung Institute here.

When she mentioned that she had been working on this paper, it was suggested she send it to us for review. After giving the idea some consideration, she eventually overcame her innate shyness — the results of which can be seen in the riveting story that follows.

Lore Haber Zeller is honoring the memory of her parents by using her maiden name with her married name for this publication. —Gilda Frantz     

On mirroring in group psychotherapy

“A woman has two images. There is a magical person seen or remembered by those who love her, her finest qualities are flesh and spirit illuminated. She herself knows this ideal self; she projects it, if she is confident; or she daydreams her ideal self; or she recognizes it with gratitude in the admiring eye of others. There is at the same time a second image; the woman as seen by those who dislike or fear her. This cruel picture has an all too powerful mirror in her own negative idea of herself. She sees with fear her own ravaging impulses and most painful of all, a graceless, freakish, and unlovable physical self, this was the mirror her parents held before Edith. Her brothers saw her with love. She herself knew both images. Her life, and her poetry, constituted a flight from the second one.”     

Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity

I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of “perceptual normativity”. Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object as falling under a corresponding concept. I motivate the proposal through a criticism of Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition, which, I argue, rests on a confusion between the notion of a way something is perceived, and that of a way it is perceived as being. Whereas Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition depends on an illicit slide between these two notions, the notion of perceptual normativity allows a legitimate transition between them: if someone's perceiving something a certain way involves her taking it that she ought to perceive it that way, then she perceives the thing as being a certain way, so that the corresponding concept is available to her in perceptual experience.     

male self-control and sexual aggression

This study examines judgments of male self-control regarding sexual aggression in dating situations. A survey was conducted using vignettes that described situations where a hypothetical man attempts to have intercourse with his female date, she resists, and he considers various ways of overcoming her resistance. Survey respondents judged these vignettes. The goals of the study were to estimate the prevalence of beliefs about low male self-control, and to examine how contextual information affects these assessments. Contrary to expectations derived from the literature, the large majority of respondents attributed high levels of self-control to men across a wide range of scenarios. As expected, the man's alcohol intoxication reduced perceived control. Against expectations, consensual foreplay and prior sex did not affect ratings. Implications for social learning and rational choice theories of sexual aggression are discussed, with particular emphasis on Ajzen's (1988) theory of planned behavior.     

Sylvia Plath and the failure of emotional self-repair through poetry

Creativity serves not only an aesthetic function but also psychological self-repair for the creative artist. The authors examine the failure of Sylvia Plath's efforts to control her suicidal violence and to bridge her isolation from others via the shared affective experience of poetry. At first, she used traditional forms and mediated images, but when she abandoned them for a more personal expressive art, she lost the shaping, controlling devices she had been using for self-containment and self-repair. They were no longer available to her when she underwent a sweeping narcissistic regression following some very stressful life events. Her emotional deterioration ultimately cost her her life.     

Simone de Beauvoir and the Ambiguous Ethics of Political Violence

In this essay, Hutchings contends that Simone de Beauvoir's argument in The Ethics of Ambiguity provides a valuable resource for feminists currently addressing the question of the legitimacy of political violence, whether of the state or otherwise. The reason is not that Beauvoir provides a definitive answer to this question, but rather because of the ways in which she deconstructs it. In enabling her reader to appreciate ate what is presupposed by a resistant politics that adopts violence as its instrument, Beauvoir illuminates the problems encountered by the kinds of “realistic and positive” and “idealistic and moral” arguments through which the use of violence in politics is routinely justified. At the same time, Beauvoir demonstrates that to deconstruct the question of the legitimacy of violence is neither to banish nor resolve it. She does not offer a recipe for determining the legitimacy or otherwise of the use of violence in politics in general; instead, she illuminates the irremediable difficulty and inescapability of such judgments in a violent and intransigent world.