不同指导语对成本-收益结构条件推理的影响

该研究以社会契约问题为研究材料,对217名在校大学生进行了调查研究,旨在考查不同指导语对成本-收益结构条件推理作业成绩的影响,结果表明:(1)社会契约主效应显著,标准社会契约作业成绩好于转换社会契约;(2)不同指导语的主效应显著,证伪指导语更易于激活"辨别欺骗者程序";(3)成本-收益结构条件推理任务能有效激活"辨别欺骗者程序",以找出潜在的欺骗者。     

因果信息和提示指导语对大学生贝叶斯推理的影响

基于三重加工心智模型,以大学生为被试,采用经典贝叶斯推理的文本范式,通过操纵自变量：因果信息（有或无）与提示指导语（提供或不提供）,试图探讨激发反省心智,消解理性障碍的情况下,因果贝叶斯框架的作用机制。估计正确率和准确性的结果都表明因果信息显著提高了贝叶斯推理成绩,准确性的结果也说明指导语可以提示被试放下既有观念,以无偏见的方式进行推理,从而有效促进了贝叶斯推理表现。而在提示条件下增加因果信息并没有促进作用,表明对于较高元认知的被试因果信息作用是有限的。     

因果信息和提示指导语对大学生贝叶斯推理的影响

基于三重加工心智模型，以大学生为被试，采用经典贝叶斯推理的文本范式，通过操纵自变量：因果信息（有或无）与提示指导语（提供或不提供），试图探讨激发反省心智，消解理性障碍的情况下，因果贝叶斯框架的作用机制。估计正确率和准确性的结果都表明因果信息显著提高了贝叶斯推理成绩，准确性的结果也说明指导语可以提示被试放下既有观念，以无偏见的方式进行推理，从而有效促进了贝叶斯推理表现。而在提示条件下增加因果信息并没有促进作用，表明对于较高元认知的被试因果信息作用是有限的。     

中外两种主要推理模型的实验再比较研究

本研究采用2X2两因素(自变量分别为“心理模型数量”和不同“内容性质”)重复测量拉丁方实验方法,在范畴三段论推理题的内在结构为“形式正确”,且“推理者已经掌握相应的形式逻辑推理规则”的前提条件下,对西方学者提出的“心理模型”与中国学者提出的“推理题和推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”这两种理论模型再次进行了实验比较研究。结果表明,对于“正确形式—正确内容”和“正确形式—错误内容”两种不同结构的推理题,若按照形式逻辑规则来判定推理者“对各推理题的结论能否从两个前提中推论出来的推论结果”是否正确,则有:(1)当推理题含有错误内容的情况下,即使该推理题只是由“一个心理模型”所构成,也会使推理者降低对其结论判定为“正确”的可能性;(2)当推理题是由正确内容所构成时,即使该推理题是由三个心理模型所构成,对其结论判定为“正确”的可能性也要比“单模型——错误内容”构成的推理题的可能性更高。由此得到的比较结论是:在本实验条件下,“推理题和推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”对实验结果所做的解释要比“心理模型”理论所做的解释更为贴切。     

人类推理的“推理题与推理知识双重结构模型”

本文将"知识和试题双重结构模型"重构成"推理题与推理知识双重结构模型",其主要观点包括:(1)"双重结构"是指在人类的推理加工过程中存在着两种结构,即"推理题的内在结构"和"推理者的推理知识结构";(2)推理者对完成推理任务所需要的"推理知识"的理解水平决定其推理性质是属于"理性加工"还是"非理性加工";(3)判定推理结论的过程中存在"形式"和"内容"两种判定标准,并由此决定其推理性质是属于"逻辑加工"还是"非逻辑加工"。     

推理结论正确性判定标准再探

本文试图探求人们在进行三段论推理加工时是否存在形式和内容双重标准。由既掌握形式逻辑推理规则又知道构成推理题的两个前提是否正确的被试所进行的推理结果支持下述观点：人们在进行三段论推理过程中,在判定推理结论的正误时,存在着与试题结构相应的两种内在的判定标准,即“形式标准”和“内容标准”。     

内容和形式对毒品成瘾者条件推理的影响

本研究通过比较推理内容与推理形式对毒品成瘾者推理成绩的影响,以探究影响毒品成瘾者能力成绩的主要内在机制。实验采用了2(四卡片形式vs选择项形式)×2(描述性规则vs社会契约规则)混合设计,以240名男性戒毒人员为研究对象,考察他们在不同推理内容与不同推理形式下的条件推理作业成绩。结果发现:(1)就规则内容来看,描述性规则内容在选择项形式上的得分好于四卡片形式,社会契约规则内容在两种呈现形式下的成绩没有显著差异;(2)就规则呈现形式来看,四卡片形式下的描述性规则得分显著地低于社会契约规则得分; 选择项形式下两类规则内容得分无显著差异。结果表明:毒品成瘾者的条件推理行为既受到推理内容的影响,也受到逻辑规则呈现形式的影响。     

逻辑－信念冲突与推理难度对逻辑和信念判断的影响

双加工理论框架下的平行竞争模型和默认干涉模型对推理过程中启发式和分析式加工的启动次序和相互作用的性质提出了不同假设。本研究通过考察被试在信念判断和逻辑判断两种指导语下解决不同难度和不同类型推理问题的正确率和反应时,对两个模型的预测进行了检验。实验结果表明,解决简单问题时,问题类型对信念判断有显著影响,对逻辑判断无显著影响;解决复杂问题时,问题类型对逻辑判断的影响显著大于对信念判断的影响。实验结果支持平行竞争模型的假设,即两类加工在推理过程中同时启动,共同竞争最终的推理反应。     

再探外显学习指导语的作用

本研究采用加工分离程序,对外显学习指导语的作用重新加以探讨.结果发现在外显学习指导语条件下,被试的作业成绩虽然较差,但并非由于外显指导语干扰了被试对规则的掌握.事实上,外显指导语促进了被试对规则的掌握.以往有关研究之所以出现不一致的结果,是由于它们采用任务分离范式,未能有效分离外显与内隐加工,以及记忆等因素的影响.     

论三段论推理过程中结论正确性的两种判断标准

人们进行三段论推理加工时是根据什么标准来判定推理结论的正确性的？实验结果支持下述观点：人们在进行三段论推理过程中,在判定推理结论的正误时,存在两种判定标准：一种是“形式标准”,另一种是“内容标准”;两种判定标准对于人们判定结论的正确性都有影响,哪个判定标准的影响力更大依赖于人们已掌握的知识结构。     

Effects of belief and logic on syllogistic reasoning: Eye-movement evidence for selective processing models

Studies of syllogistic reasoning have demonstrated a nonlogical tendency for people to endorse more believable conclusions than unbelievable ones. This belief bias effect is more dominant on invalid syllogisms than valid ones, giving rise to a logic by belief interaction. We report an experiment in which participants' eye movements were recorded in order to provide insights into the nature and time course of the reasoning processes associated with manipulations of conclusion validity and believability. Our main dependent measure was people's inspection times for syllogistic premises, and we tested predictions deriving from three contemporary mental-models accounts of the logic by belief interaction. Results supported recent "selective processing" theories of belief bias (e.g., Evans, 2000; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000), which assume that the believability of a conclusion biases model construction processes, rather than biasing the search for falsifying models (e.g., Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985) or a response stage of reasoning arising from subjective uncertainty (e.g., Quayle & Ball, 2000). We conclude by suggesting that the eye-movement analyses in reasoning research may provide a useful adjunct to other process-tracing techniques such as verbal protocol analysis.     

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief.     

On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning

Three experiments are reported that investigate the weighting attached to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Substantial belief biases were observed despite controls for possible conversions of the premises. Equally substantial effects of logic were observed despite controls for two possible response biases. A consistent interaction between belief and logic was also recorded; belief bias was more marked on invalid than on valid syllogisms. In all experiments, verbal protocols were recorded and analyzed. These protocols are interpreted in some cases as providing rationalizations for prejudiced decisions and, in other cases, as reflecting a genuine process of premise to conclusion reasoning. In the latter cases, belief bias was minimal but still present. Similarly, even subjects who focus primarily on the conclusion are influenced to an extent by the logic. Thus a conflict between logic and belief is observed throughout, but at several levels of extent.     

推理心理研究中的逻辑加工与非逻辑加工评析

本文对西方心理学研究中有关推理心理学争论的两个热点问题之一：逻辑推理与非逻辑推理之争的发展线索和相互关系等问题进行了评述,指出了这两种理论争论中未能注意到的三个问题,并对试图解决这三个问题的“知识和试题双重结构模型”作了简要介绍。     

信息的充分性和情绪性对推理的影响：时间压力的调节作用

主要探讨推理中信息相关因素对分析系统与启发式系统的影响。通过两个实验考察信息的充分性和情绪性对突发事件情境下推理的影响。实验1任务无时间压力,结果发现：信息充分性对推理的影响显著,表现为信息越充分,被试推理的逻辑指数越高,更多使用了分析系统;且信息充分时,接受积极信息的被试的信念指数显著增高。实验2任务有时间压力,结果发现：信息的情绪性对推理的影响显著,表现为接受积极信息的被试推理的逻辑指数显著大于接受消极信息组,更多使用了分析系统。两个实验结果表明,信息的充分性主要通过分析系统对推理产生影响,而信息的情绪性可通过双系统影响推理过程,即积极信息在推理时间充裕时促进启发式系统,但在有时间压力下促进分析系统。     

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts’ (2005) “negations paradigm” was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic “conflict problems”. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals’ response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic.     

Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty

Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying premise integration time (Experiment 1), premise presentation order (Experiment 2), and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises (Experiment 3). In all the conditions, reasoning accuracy and rated confidence were lower on conflict problems, where belief-based and analytic processes yielded different responses. Participants relied more on analytic processing and less on belief-based processing in conditions in which premise integration was easier. Fluid intelligence and premise integration ability predicted analytical reasoning on conflict problems after reasoning on the no-conflict problems was controlled for. The findings were related to three dual-process models of belief bias. They provide the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference.     

Cognitive control in belief‐laden reasoning during conclusion processing: An ERP study

Belief bias is the tendency to accept conclusions that are compatible with existing beliefs more frequently than those that contradict beliefs. It is one of the most replicated behavioral findings in the reasoning literature. Recently, neuroimaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event‐related potentials (ERPs) have provided a new perspective and have demonstrated neural correlates of belief bias that have been viewed as supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias. However, fMRI studies have tended to focus on conclusion processing, while ERPs studies have been concerned with the processing of premises. In the present research, the electrophysiological correlates of cognitive control were studied among 12 subjects using high‐density ERPs. The analysis was focused on the conclusion presentation phase and was limited to normatively sanctioned responses to valid–believable and valid–unbelievable problems. Results showed that when participants gave normatively sanctioned responses to problems where belief and logic conflicted, a more positive ERP deflection was elicited than for normatively sanctioned responses to nonconflict problems. This was observed from ?400 to ?200 ms prior to the correct response being given. The positive component is argued to be analogous to the late positive component (LPC) involved in cognitive control processes. This is consistent with the inhibition of empirically anomalous information when conclusions are unbelievable. These data are important in elucidating the neural correlates of belief bias by providing evidence for electrophysiological correlates of conflict resolution during conclusion processing. Moreover, they are supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias that propose conflict detection and resolution processes as central to the explanation of belief bias.     

Debiasing by instruction: The case of belief bias

Abstract

The study is concerned with the question of whether robust biases in reasoning can be reduced or eliminated by verbal instruction in principles of reasoning. Three experiments are reported in which the effect of instructions upon the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning is investigated. Belief bias is most clearly marked by a tendency for subjects to accept invalid conclusions which are a priori believable. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate and extend an experiment reported by Newstead, Pollard, Evans and Allen (1992). In contrast with their experiment, it was found that belief bias was maintained despite the use of augmented instructions which emphasised the principle of logical necessity. Experiment 2 provided an exact replication of the augmented instructions condition of Newstead et al., including the presence of problems with belief-neutral conclusions. Once again, significant effects of conclusion believability were found. A third experiment examined the use of elaborated instructions which lacked specific reference to the notion of logical necessity. The use of these instructions significantly reduced the effects of belief on the reasoning observed.

Taking the current findings together with the experiment of Newstead et al., the overall conclusion is that elaborated instructions can reduce the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, but not eliminate it. This conclusion is discussed with reference to (1) the practical implications for improving thinking and reasoning via verbal instruction and (2) the nature of the belief bias phenomenon.