Util-izing animals

ABSTRACT Biomedical experimentation on animals is justified, researchers say, because of its enormous benefits to human beings. Sure, animals suffer and die, but that is morally insignificant since the benefits of research incalculably outweigh the evils. Although this utilitarian claim appears straightforward and relatively uncontroversial, it is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. This defence of animal experimentation is likely to succeed only by rejecting three widely held moral presumptions. We identify these assumptions and explain their relevance to the justification of animal experimentation. We argue that, even if non-human animals have considerably less moral worth than humans, experimentation is justified only if the benefits are overwhelming. By building on and expanding on arguments offered in earlier papers, we show that researchers cannot substantiate their claims on behalf of animal research. We conclude that there is currently no acceptable utilitarian defence of animal experimentation. Moreover, it is unlikely that there could be one. Since most apologists of animal experimentation rely on utilitarian justifications of their practice, it appears that biomedical experimentation on animals is not morally justified .     

Sexual Difference,Animal Difference: Derrida and Difference “Worthy of Its Name”

I challenge the age‐old binary opposition between human and animal, not as philosophers sometimes do by claiming that humans are also animals, or that animals are capable of suffering or intelligence, but rather by questioning the very category of “the animal” itself. This category groups a nearly infinite variety of living beings into one concept measured in terms of humans—animals are those creatures that are not human. In addition, I argue that the binary opposition between human and animal is intimately linked to the binary opposition between man and woman. Furthermore, I suggest that thinking through animal differences or differences among various living creatures opens up the possibility of thinking beyond the dualist notion of sexual difference and enables thinking toward a multiplicity of sexual differences.     

To do no harm: A Buddhist view on animal use in research

The issue of using animals for research raises many concerns for Buddhists. Buddhism recognizes that all sentient life shares the same fundamental consciousness but also recognizes a difference in the ability of a species to express that basic, underlying consciousness.Ahimsa or no-harm has been a guiding principle of Buddhist ethics which applies to nonhuman species as well as humans. Conflict arises when available methods for removing some forms of human suffering are dependent upon inflicting suffering on animals. This paper explores several resolutions to the conflict, with the resulting opinion that Buddhism will condone some forms of animal research.     

Harm in the Wild: Facing Non-Human Suffering in Nature

The paper is concerned with whether the reductio of the natural-harm-argument can be avoided by disvaluing non-human suffering and death. According to the natural-harm-argument, alleviating the suffering of non-human animals is not a moral obligation for human beings because such an obligation would also morally prescribe human intervention in nature for the protection of non-human animal interests which, it claims, is absurd. It is possible to avoid the reductio by formulating the moral obligation to alleviate non-human suffering and death with two constraints: The first concerns the practicability of intervention and establishes a moral obligation to intervene only in cases where this is humanly possible. The other constraint acknowledges that lack of competence in humans can risk producing more harm than good by intervening. A third way of avoiding the problematic version of the natural-harm-argument considers whether human and non-human suffering and death are sufficiently different to allow different types of responses. I argue that the attempt to avoid the reductio of the natural-harm-argument by disvaluing non-human death can only work with an anthropocentric bias, which accords to non-human suffering and death a fundamentally different value and that it fails to dismiss the moral obligation created by the harm that non-human animals face in the wild.     

Other-Consciousness and the Use of Animals as Illustrated in Medical Experiments

abstract  Ethicists such as Peter Singer argue that consciousness and self-consciousness are the principal considerations in discussing the use of animals by humans, such as in medical experiments. This paper raises an additional consideration to factor into this ethical discussion. Ethics deal with the intentional impact of subjects on each other. This assumes a meta-representational ability of subjects to represent states of mind of others, which may be termed other-consciousness. The moral weight of other-consciousness is manifest in the notion of responsibility, where humans lacking in other-consciousness (such as individuals with autism) may not be held responsible for their harmful actions towards others. As responsibility implies not only duties but also rights and more generally high moral status, it follows that other-consciousness grants high moral status, other things being equal — recognizing that other factors grant moral status too. Other-consciousness also increases the capacity for suffering, both due to increased freedom (and consequently increased possibility of restriction of freedom) and to increased empathy (with suffering of others). Hence, the more an animal is other-conscious, the more it deserves high moral status and the more it can suffer, other things being equal, and consequently, the less it should be used for human purposes. Further study is required to elucidate to what extent animals used by humans, such as in medical experiments, particularly primates and other highly evolved mammals, are other-conscious.     

Humans as professional interactants with elephants in a global commons

All current versions of ethics for human interaction with animals are based on theories originally developed for relationships between humans or for human understanding of the environment. The perceived analogies between relationships among humans those theories were designed for and the relationships between human and animals have led to specifically revised and adapted theories for ethical interaction between humans and animals. In this essay I propose two further analogies that I develop into one core argument to cover specific issues in human–animal relationships not yet adequately addressed. First I adapt the ethical theory designed for use between human professionals and their clients for analogous use in the power relationship between humans and animals; second I similarly adapt the ethical theory designed for interactions between humans and the global environment. I use elephants as example of an animal species and they stand as proxy for all similar animal species. The overall argument justifies moral duties for humanity to protect both species and the global biosphere as home for all living organisms.     

Killing Humans and killing Animals

It is one thing to say that the suffering of non‐human animals ought to be considered equally with the like suffering of humans; quite another to decide how the wrongness of killing non‐human animals compares with the wrongness of killing human beings. It is argued that while species makes no difference to the wrongness of killing, the possession of certain capacities, in particular the capacity to see oneself as a distinct entity with a future, does. It is claimed, however, that this is not the only factor to be taken into account: pleasant or happy life is in itself good. The application of these conclusions to killing animals for food is then considered, with some passing reflections on infanticide.     

A RANDOMNESS‐BASED THEODICY FOR EVOLUTIONARY EVILS

We develop and knit together several theodicies in order to find a more complete picture of why certain forms of (nonhuman) animal suffering might be permitted by a perfect being. We focus on an especially potent form of the problem of evil, which arises from considering why a perfectly good, wise, and powerful God might use evolutionary mechanisms that predictably result in so much animal suffering and loss of life. There are many existing theodicies on the market, and although they offer helpful resources, we combine and further develop several proposals to produce a composite theodicy that avoids certain shortcomings of the individual theodicies. An important element of our project is locating a role for randomness in cosmic and biological evolution. In particular, we show how randomness might enhance or enable certain goods, including everlasting goods, at the risk of temporary evils.     

The Analogical Argument for Animal Pain

Philosophical defenders of animal liberation believe that we have direct duties to animals. Typically a presumption of that belief is that animals have the capacity to experience pain and suffering. Notoriously, however, a strand of Western scientific and philosophical thought has held animals to be incapable of experiencing pain, and even today one frequently encounters in discussions of animal liberation expressions of scepticism about whether animals really experience pain.
The Analogical Argument for Animal Pain responds to this scepticism by claiming that it is just as reasonable for me to believe that animals feel pain, given my only evidence for this is shared behaviour and physiology, as it is for me to believe that other humans feel pain on the basis of similar evidence. In this paper I expound and defend this Argument.     

INCREASING OUR COMPASSION FOOTPRINT: THE ANIMALS' MANIFESTO

Our relationships with animals are wide‐ranging. When people tell me that they love animals and then harm or kill them I tell them I'm glad they don't love me. Many individuals, including scientists, ignore their responsibility when they interact with animals and fail to recognize that doing something in the name of science, which usually means in the name of humans, is not an adequate reason for intentionally causing suffering, pain, or death. “Good welfare” usually is not “good enough”. Existing regulations allow animals to be treated in regrettable ways that demean us as a species. Compassion is the key for bettering both animal and human lives. A good way to make the world a more compassionate place for animals is to increase our compassion footprint. We could begin by deciding that we will not intrude on animals' lives unless our actions are in the best interests of the animals irrespective of our desires. It is simple to make more compassionate choices about what we eat and wear and how we educate students, conduct research, and entertain ourselves at the expense of animals. The time to make these changes is long overdue.     

Are people really more patient than other animals? Evidence from human discounting of real liquid rewards

In previous studies, researchers have found that humans discount delayed rewards orders of magnitude less steeply than do other animals. Humans also discount smaller delayed reward amounts more steeply than larger amounts, whereas animals apparently do not. These differences between humans and animals might reflect differences in the types of rewards studied and/or the fact that animals actually had to wait for their rewards. In the present article, we report the results of three experiments in which people made choices involving liquid rewards delivered and consumed after actual delays, thereby bridging the gap between animal and human studies. Under these circumstances, humans, like animals, discounted the value of rewards delayed by seconds; however, unlike animals, they still showed an effect of reward amount. Human discounting was well described by the same hyperboloid function that has previously been shown to describe animal discounting of delayed food and water rewards, as well as human discounting of real and hypothetical monetary rewards.     

The Question of Human Animality in Heidegger

Heidegger thinks that humans enjoy openness to being, an openness that distinguishes them from all other entities, animals included. To safeguard openness to being, Heidegger denies that humans are animals. This position attracts the criticism of Derrida, who denies the difference between humans and animals and with it the human openness to being. In this paper, I argue that human difference and human animality are not mutually exclusive. Heidegger has the conceptual resources in his thought and in the history of philosophy to affirm human animality while safeguarding the human difference. A cause transforms the meaning of a condition. The case of the human hand, an animal appendage that serves our openness to being, illustrates splendidly this transformation. The human hand not only grasps things in its environment but also points things out, makes things, acts, and welcomes others in the world. Humans are animals transformed by openness to being.     

A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism

Many people in the animal welfare communityhave argued that the use of nonhuman animals inmedical research is necessarily based onspeciesism, an unjustified prejudice based onspecies membership. As such it is morally akinto racism and sexism. This is misguided. Thecombined capacities for autonomy and sentiencewith the obligations derived from relationssupport a morally justifiable rationale forusing some nonhuman animals in order to limitthe risk of harm to humans. There may be a fewcases where it is morally better to use a neversentient human than a sentient animal, butthese cases are few and would not fulfill thecurrent need for research subjects. The use ofnonautonomous animals instead of humans inrisky research can be based on solid moralground. It is not necessarily speciesism.     

Volunteering to Help Conserve Endangered Species: An Identity Approach to Human–Animal Relationships

This study explores identity in providing voluntary help for endangered animal species. Identity is a cornerstone of social psychological explanations of helping behaviour but has not been understood in relation to human–animal relationships. Open‐ended questionnaires were administered to 111 volunteers working in a range of international conservation projects aimed at protecting endangered animals. Participants were asked their reasons for volunteering, choice of project, experiences and expectations. Thematic textual analysis explored common features across the dataset. Themes identified were identifying with animals, humans dominating nature and collective identity with the organization and fellow volunteers. The paper suggests social psychological knowledge about helping behaviour be applied to understand human–animal interactions to offer insight into the conditions under which we will engage with conservational and environmental concerns and provide aid. Social psychology has been slow to apply its knowledge to an examination of human responses to the challenge of loss of biodiversity. To act, humans must identify with those they seek to protect. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's understanding of death as the cessation of agency: a test using sleep versus death

An important problem faced by children is discriminating between entities capable of goal-directed action, i.e. intentional agents, and non-agents. In the case of discriminating between living and dead animals, including humans, this problem is particularly difficult, because of the large number of perceptual cues that living and dead animals share. However, there are potential costs of failing to discriminate between living and dead animals, including unnecessary vigilance and lost opportunities from failing to realize that an animal, such as an animal killed for food, is dead. This might have led to the evolution of mechanisms specifically for distinguishing between living and dead animals in terms of their ability to act. Here we test this hypothesis by examining patterns of inferences about sleeping and dead organisms by Shuar and German children between 3 and 5-years old. The results show that by age 4, causal cues to death block agency attributions to animals and people, whereas cues to sleep do not. The developmental trajectory of this pattern of inferences is identical across cultures, consistent with the hypothesis of a living/dead discrimination mechanism as a reliably developing part of core cognitive architecture.     

The representative animal

The anthropocentric approach to the study of animal behavior uses representative nonhuman animals to understand human behavior. This approach raises problems concerning the comparison of the behavior of two different species. The datum of behavior analysis is the behavior of humans and representative animal phenotypes. The behavioral phenotype is the product of the ontogeny and phylogeny of each species, and this requires that contributions of genotype as well as behavioral history to experimental performance be considered. Behavior analysis tends to favor the ontogenetic over the phylogenetic component, yet both components are responsible for the performance of each individual animal. This paper raises questions about the role of genotype variables in the use of representative animals to understand human behavior. Examples indicating the role of genotype in human behavior are also discussed. The final section of the paper deals with considerations of genotype in the design of animal experiments.     

ANIMAL SUFFERING,EVOLUTION, AND THE ORIGINS OF EVIL: TOWARD A “FREE CREATURES” DEFENSE

Does an affirmation of theistic evolution make the task of theodicy impossible? In this article, I will review a number of ancient and contemporary responses to the problem of evil as it concerns animal suffering and suggest a possible way forward which employs the ancient Jewish insight that evil—as resistance to God's will that results in suffering and alienation from God's purposes—precedes the arrival of human beings and already has a firm foothold in the nonhuman animal world long before humans are ever tempted to go astray. This theological intuition is conferred renewed relevance in light of the empirical reality of evolutionary gradualism and continuity and in view of the recent findings of cognitive ethology. Consequently, I suggest that taking biological evolution seriously entails understanding “moral evil” as a prehuman phenomenon that emerges gradually through the actions and intentions of “free creatures” which—as evolutionary history unfolded—increasingly possessed greater levels of freedom and degrees of moral culpability.     

Parasitic pedagogies and materialities of affect in veterinary education

The present article contributes a critical post-humanist analysis of emotion, education, and human–animal relations, including a reinterpretation of previous research on “shared suffering” (Haraway, 2008, Porcher, 2011) in human–animal instrumental encounters. Considering how formal education, particularly a professional education program such as veterinary medical education that relies heavily on scientific “facts” about animals and biotechnology, recruits bodily and sensory affect to mediate techniques of animal exploitation, the article asks how we can begin to make sense of such an affective animal didactics? Drawing on ethnographic material from three events in theoretical and practice-oriented veterinary education, the article explores how bodily and sensory human/animal/technology intimacy enters education as a pedagogical device and as a subtle reinforcement of bio-economic parasitism on farmed animals' productive and reproductive capacities. The article reworks the notion of “shared suffering” into forms of modulation and distribution of affect to conceptualize a particular didactics of incorporating human/nonhuman interaction in the bio-economic microphysics of education.     

Responsible Relationship: Imago Dei and the Moral Distinction between Humans and Other Animals

In light of modern evolutionary science, some theologians have criticized using the image of God to distinguish humans from other animals. This concept, however, still offers rich theological insight into the natures of both humans and other animals. Following the relational interpretations of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, this article explores how the imago Dei may be used to distinguish human creatures without necessarily implying a division in kind between humans and other animal creatures. Humans are distinguished not by any superior abilities they might possess, but by the character of their relationship to God and other creatures.     

NAMING THE HUMAN ANIMAL: GENESIS 1–3 AND OTHER ANIMALS IN HUMAN BECOMING

Recently the paleoanthropologist Pat Shipman has proposed what she calls the animal connection as the human trait that connects all other traits. Theologians and biblical scholars have proposed many relational, functional, and ontological interpretations of the image of God in humans and human nature, but have generally not included a connection with animals. Genesis 1–3, however, weaves human and animal creation in a variety of ways, and Adam's naming of other species implies they are understood as family or kin. Thus Genesis 1–3 understands a relationship with other animals as integral to human becoming and uses family or kinship as a root metaphor for human–animal relations.