Cross-cultural research on spatial concept development

I will first review cross-cultural research in the area of culture and cognition, with particular focus on the development of spatial concepts. I propose that the formulation best covering all empirical data is in terms of «cognitive style», i.e., spatial cognitive processes are universally available to all humans, but there are preferences for some spatial frames of reference over others. These cultural differences are under the influence of a number of eco-cultural variables. The second part will illustrate this general conclusion by research on the development of the «geocentric» frame of spatial reference, initially studied by Levinson (Space in language and cognition: explorations in cognitive diversity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). This is a cognitive style in which individuals choose to describe and represent small-scale tabletop space in terms of large-scale geographic dimensions. In Indonesia, India, Nepal and Switzerland, we explore the development with age of geocentric language as well as geocentric cognition, and the relationships between the two, as well as the environmental and socio-cultural variables that favor the use of this frame (Dasen and Mishra, Development of geocentric spatial language and cognition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).     

Idealization and external symbolic storage: the epistemic and technical dimensions of theoretic cognition

This paper explores some of the constructive dimensions and specifics of human theoretic cognition, combining perspectives from (Husserlian) genetic phenomenology and distributed cognition approaches. I further consult recent psychological research concerning spatial and numerical cognition. The focus is on the nexus between the theoretic development of abstract, idealized geometrical and mathematical notions of space and the development and effective use of environmental cognitive support systems. In my discussion, I show that the evolution of the theoretic cognition of space apparently follows two opposing, but in truth, intrinsically aligned trajectories. On the epistemic plane, which is the main focus of Husserl??s genetic phenomenological investigations, theoretic conceptions of space are progressively constituted by way of an idealizing emancipation of spatial cognition from the concrete, embodied intentionality underlying the human organism??s perception of space. As a result of this emancipation, it ultimately becomes possible for the human mind to theoretically conceive of and posit space as an ideal entity that is universally geometrical and mathematical. At the same time, by synthesizing a range of literature on spatial and mathematical cognition, I illustrate that for the theoretic mind to undertake precisely this emancipating process successfully, and further, for an ideal and objective notion of geometrical and mathematical space to first of all become fully scientifically operative, the cognitive support provided by a range of specific symbolic technologies is central. These include lettered diagrams, notation systems, and more generally, the technique of formalization and require for their functioning various cognitively efficacious types of embodiment. Ultimately, this paper endeavors to understand the specific symbolic-technological dimensions that have been instrumental to major shifts in the development of idealized, scientific conceptions of space. The epistemic characteristics of these shifts have been previously discussed in genetic phenomenology, but without devoting sufficient attention to the constructive role of symbolic technologies. At the same time, this paper identifies some of the irreducible phenomenological and epistemic dimensions that characterize the functioning of the historically situated, embodied and distributed theoretic mind.     

Brains in space: the importance of understanding the impact of long-duration spaceflight on spatial cognition and its neural circuitry

Fifty years after the first humans stepped on the Moon, space faring nations have entered a new era of space exploration. NASA’s reference mission to Mars is expected to comprise 1100 days. Deep space exploratory class missions could even span decades. They will be the most challenging and dangerous expeditions in the history of human spaceflight and will expose crew members to unprecedented health and performance risks. The development of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric disorders during those missions is considered a critical and unmitigated risk factor. Here, we argue that spatial cognition, i.e., the ability to encode representations about self-to-object relations and integrate this information into a spatial map of the environment, and their neural bases will be highly vulnerable during those expeditions. Empirical evidence from animal studies shows that social isolation, immobilization, and altered gravity can have profound effects on brain plasticity associated with spatial navigation. We provide examples from historic spaceflight missions, spaceflight analogs, and extreme environments suggesting that spatial cognition and its neural circuitry could be impaired during long-duration spaceflight, and identify recommendations and future steps to mitigate these risks.

     

Neurocognitive control in dance perception and performance

Dance is a rich source of material for researchers interested in the integration of movement and cognition. The multiple aspects of embodied cognition involved in performing and perceiving dance have inspired scientists to use dance as a means for studying motor control, expertise, and action-perception links. The aim of this review is to present basic research on cognitive and neural processes implicated in the execution, expression, and observation of dance, and to bring into relief contemporary issues and open research questions. The review addresses six topics: 1) dancers' exemplary motor control, in terms of postural control, equilibrium maintenance, and stabilization; 2) how dancers' timing and on-line synchronization are influenced by attention demands and motor experience; 3) the critical roles played by sequence learning and memory; 4) how dancers make strategic use of visual and motor imagery; 5) the insights into the neural coupling between action and perception yielded through exploration of the brain architecture mediating dance observation; and 6) a neuroesthetics perspective that sheds new light on the way audiences perceive and evaluate dance expression. Current and emerging issues are presented regarding future directions that will facilitate the ongoing dialog between science and dance.     

盲童的空间概念及其组织

以63名盲童为被试, 对17对空间词作相似性的分类。结果表明：⑴盲童的空间词概念结构有两个维度：①状态/方位;②自身参照/他物参照。⑵盲童的空间认知围绕着4个主题：①身体周围的三维方位;②空间距离;③三维边界;④空间状态。⑶视觉的缺失决定着盲童的空间词组织的特点, 语言、文化和教育对盲童的空间概念及其组织也具有重要影响。     

Captured by motion: dance, action understanding, and social cognition

In this review article, we summarize the main findings from empirical studies that used dance-related forms of rhythmical full body movement as a research tool for investigating action understanding and social cognition. This work has proven to be informative about behavioral and brain mechanisms that mediate links between perceptual and motor processes invoked during the observation and execution of spatially–temporally coordinated action and interpersonal interaction. The review focuses specifically on processes related to (a) motor experience and expertise, (b) learning and memory, (c) action, intention, and emotion understanding, and (d) audio-visual synchrony and timing. Consideration is given to the relationship between research on dance and more general embodied cognition accounts of action understanding and social cognition. Finally, open questions and issues concerning experimental design are discussed with a view to stimulating future research on social-cognitive aspects of dance.     

A hierarchical view of grounded, embodied, and situated numerical cognition

There is much recent interest in the idea that we represent our knowledge together with the sensory and motor features that were activated during its acquisition. This paper reviews the evidence for such "embodiment" in the domain of numerical cognition, a traditional stronghold of abstract theories of knowledge representation. The focus is on spatial-numerical associations, such as the SNARC effect (small numbers are associated with left space, larger numbers with right space). Using empirical evidence from behavioral research, I first describe sensory and motor biases induced by SNARC, thus identifying numbers as embodied concepts. Next, I propose a hierarchical relationship between grounded, embodied, and situated aspects of number knowledge. This hierarchical conceptualization helps to understand the variety of SNARC-related findings and yields testable predictions about numerical cognition. I report several such tests, ranging from cross-cultural comparisons of horizontal and vertical SNARC effects (Shaki and Fischer in J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 38(3):804-809, 2012) to motor cortical activation studies in adults with left- and right-hand counting preferences (Tschentscher et al. in NeuroImage 59:3139-3148, 2012). It is concluded that the diagnostic features for each level of the proposed hierarchical knowledge representation, together with the spatial associations of numbers, make the domain of numerical knowledge an ideal testing ground for embodied cognition research.     

Affective judgment in spatial context: Orienting within physical spaces containing people and things

This article reviews our experimental work about affective judgment in spatial context. This type of judgment serves to regulate one's distance toward people and things in physical space. The main idea is that orienting within physical space requires not only knowing where places are but also how places feel. This, in turn, depends on the influence of people and things contained in space on one's affective appraisal of the surroundings. Based on fundamental principles of social cognition, affective judgment in spatial context combines people's beliefs about how influence unfolds into the surroundings with comparison, categorization and information integration processes. Out comes a subjective affective representation of physical space that is cognitively coherent within a given spatial frame of reference. I review our work according to main topics and discuss four possible directions for future research.     

Relating numeric cognition and language processing: Do numbers and words share a common representational platform?

Numerical processing and language processing are both grounded in space. In the present study we investigated whether these are fully independent phenomena, or whether they share a common basis. If number processing activates spatial dimensions that are also relevant for understanding words, then we can expect that processing numbers may influence subsequent lexical access to words. Specifically, if high numbers relate to upper space, then they can be expected to facilitate understanding of words such as bird that are having referents typically found in the upper vertical space. The opposite should hold for low numbers. These should facilitate the understanding of words such as ground referring to entities with referents in the lower vertical space. Indeed, in two experiments we found evidence for such an interaction between number and word processing. By eliminating a contribution of linguistic factors gained from additional investigations on large text corpora, this strongly suggests that understanding numbers and language is based on similar modal representations in the brain. The implications of these findings for a broader perspective on grounded cognition will be discussed.     

How environmental movement constraints shape the neural code for space

Study of the neural code for space in rodents has many insights to offer for how mammals, including humans, construct a mental representation of space. This code is centered on the hippocampal place cells, which are active in particular places in the environment. Place cells are informed by numerous other spatial cell types including grid cells, which provide a signal for distance and direction and are thought to help anchor the place cell signal. These neurons combine self-motion and environmental information to create and update their map-like representation. Study of their activity patterns in complex environments of varying structure has revealed that this "cognitive map" of space is not a fixed and rigid entity that permeates space, but rather is variably affected by the movement constraints of the environment. These findings are pointing toward a more flexible spatial code in which the map is adapted to the movement possibilities of the space. An as-yet-unanswered question is whether these different forms of representation have functional consequences, as suggested by an enactivist view of spatial cognition.

     

Seeing the big picture: map use and the development of spatial cognition

This paper considers the relation between the development of spatial cognition and children’s use of maps and models. A new theoretical perspective is presented that takes into account the influences of maps on the development of spatial cognition. Maps provide a perspective on spatial information that differs in important ways from the perspective gained from direct experience navigating in the world. Using and thinking about maps may help children to acquire abstract concepts of space and the ability to think systematically about spatial relations that they have not experienced directly. In addition, exposure to maps may help children to think about multiple spatial relations among multiple locations. The results of previous studies that have demonstrated developmental differences in children’s cognition of large‐scale environments are examined from this theoretical perspective. This review suggests that the development of spatial cognition consists partly of the acquisition of models of large‐scale space, and that maps influence the development of the modern Western model.     

The cerebral representation of space: insights from functional imaging data

Functional imaging techniques, such as positron emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging, present a unique opportunity to examine, in humans, the cerebral representation of space in vivo. Space is ubiquitous and not a unitary phenomenon, and the brain uses visual, vestibular and proprioceptive inputs to produce multiple representations of space subserving spatial cognition, ranging from gaze control to remembering multiple complex large-scale environments. Functional imaging studies have shown the importance of the parietal cortex in perceptual, motor, attention and working memory aspects of body-centred human spatial cognition. Functional imaging has also revealed pathways in humans homologous to those found in monkeys for the separate processing of spatial location and object identity. There are further suggestions of similar differentiation in working memory. The importance of the medial temporal region in the recall of spatial location has been confirmed also and novel virtual reality paradigms are now providing insights into the cerebral representation of spatially-extended large-scale environments. We still have much to learn about the cerebral representation of space in the human brain and functional brain imaging, in concert with patient studies and animal models, will allow us to continue investigating.     

The Impossibility of Relations Between Non-Collocated Spatial Objects And Non-Identical Topological Spaces

I argue that relations between non-collocated spatial entities, between non-identical topological spaces, and between non-identical basic building blocks of space, do not exist. If any spatially located entities are not at the same spatial location, or if any topological spaces or basic building blocks of space are non-identical, I will argue that there are no relations between or among them. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.     

OUTSOURCED COGNITION

Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes of the individual are substantially and explanatorily distinct from the relevant external states and processes. In consequence, the individual remains a cognitive unit that is both central and indispensable in the explanations of cognitive science. As a case study, I consider the epistemology of testimony. I will argue that important epistemological categories may be preserved by adopting the hypothesis of outsourced cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition. Moreover, I will argue that the outsourced cognition hypothesis deepens the problems that beset an extended epistemology of testimony.     

Sensations as Representations in Kant

This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ‘subjective representations’ and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to possess intentionality, I argue that Kant does not use the term ‘Vorstellung’ to refer to intentional mental states exclusively. Sensations do not possess their own intentionality, but they nevertheless perform a representational function in virtue of their role as the matter of empirical intuition. In empirical intuition, the sensory qualities given in sensation are combined with the representation of space to constitute the intuited appearance. The representational function of sensation consists in sensation being the medium out of which intuited appearances are constituted: the qualities of sensations stand in for what the understanding will judge (conceptualize) as material substance.     

Is language necessary for human spatial reorientation? Reconsidering evidence from dual task paradigms

Being able to reorient to the spatial environment after disorientation is a basic adaptive challenge. There is clear evidence that reorientation uses geometric information about the shape of the surrounding space. However, there has been controversy concerning whether use of geometry is a modular function, and whether use of features is dependent on human language. A key argument for the role of language comes from shadowing findings where adults engaged in a linguistic task during reorientation ignored a colored wall feature and only used geometric information to reorient [Hermer-Vazquez, L., Spelke, E., & Katsnelson, A. (1999). Sources of flexibility in human cognition: Dual task studies of space and language. Cognitive Psychology, 39, 3-36]. We report three studies showing: (a) that the results of Hermer-Vazques et al. [Hermer-Vazquez, L., Spelke, E., & Katsnelson, A. (1999). Sources of flexibility in human cognition: Dual task studies of space and language. Cognitive Psychology, 39, 3-36] are obtained in incidental learning but not with explicit instructions, (b) that a spatial task impedes use of features at least as much as a verbal shadowing task, and (c) that neither secondary task impedes use of features in a room larger than that used by Hermer-Vazquez et al. These results suggest that language is not necessary for successful use of features in reorientation. In fact, whether or not there is an encapsulated geometric module is currently unsettled. The current findings support an alternative to modularity; the adaptive combination view hypothesizes that geometric and featural information are utilized in varying degrees, dependent upon the certainty and variance with which the two kinds of information are encoded, along with their salience and perceived usefulness.     

Multiple systems of spatial memory and action

Recent findings from spatial cognition and cognitive neuroscience suggest that different types of mental representations could mediate the off-line retrieval of spatial relations from memory and the on-line guidance of motor actions in space. As a result, a number of models proposing multiple systems of spatial memory have been recently formulated. In the present article we review these models and we evaluate their postulates based on available experimental evidence. Furthermore, we discuss how a multiple-system model can apply to situations in which people reason about their immediate surroundings or non-immediate environments by incorporating a model of sensorimotor facilitation/interference. This model draws heavily on previous accounts of sensorimotor interference and takes into account findings from the stimulus-response compatibility literature.     

Visual spatial constancy and modularity: Does intention penetrate vision?

Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals in computing such constancy. I then provide a stringent condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes a computational condition for cognitive penetration: cognition must serve as an informational resource for visual computation. This requires proposals regarding semantic information transfer, a crucial issue in any model of informational encapsulation. I then argue that intention provides an informational resource for computation of visual spatial constancy. Hence, intention penetrates vision.     

A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists)

I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the conspicuous disconnect between the sentential character of the data structures they posit and the nonsentential qualitative character of our perceptual experiences of corporeal (i.e., spatial, kinematic, and dynamic) properties. Along the way, I will question the viability of some externalist remedies for this disconnect, and I will explain why the computational theory put forward here falls quite clearly beyond the useful bounds of the Chinese-Room argument.     

Radicalizing numerical cognition

In recent decades, non-representational approaches to mental phenomena and cognition have been gaining traction in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. In these alternative approach, mental representations either lose their central status or, in its most radical form, are banned completely. While there is growing agreement that non-representational accounts may succeed in explaining some cognitive capacities (e.g. perception), there is widespread skepticism about the possibility of giving non-representational accounts of cognitive capacities such as memory, imagination or abstract thought. In this paper, I will critically examine the view that there are fundamental limitations to non-representational explanations of cognition. Rather than challenging these arguments on general grounds, I will examine a set of human cognitive capacities that are generally thought to fall outside the scope of non-representational accounts, i.e. numerical cognition. After criticizing standard representational accounts of numerical cognition for their lack of explanatory power, I will argue that a non-representational approach that is inspired by radical enactivism offers the best hope for developing a genuine naturalistic explanatory account for these cognitive capacities.