另类胡塞尔——胡塞尔现象学的"标准化"和"非标准化"的解读 (续)

9．问题三,胡塞尔悬置了标讣陛（indication）——如今我们称它为标示性（indexicality）。这是胡塞尔把符号的表达性维度分离出来,并且赋予优先地位,强化意义与指称之间的对立、甚至意识与世界之间的对立的必要步骤。既然表述行为这种现象为《逻辑研究》提供了可以通达主体性的本性的地点,胡塞尔就必然被导向关于思想（mind）的再当下化理论。在这种理论中,任何对世界的实际的因果关联的思考,     

另类胡塞尔——胡塞尔现象学的"标准化"和"非标准化"的解读

欧美学界一般认为,胡塞尔本人出版的著作代表了他的现象学思想。这种看法几乎成了解读胡塞尔现象学的标准。但是胡塞尔本人却一直把他的研究手稿看作其思想的主要代表。随着胡塞尔手稿在《胡塞尔全集》（Husserliana）中的陆续发表,欧美一批学者开始努力通过他们对手稿的批判性研究扭转这一局面。本文就是对“胡塞尔标准解读”的分析批评和对这一正在进行中的“非标准的”胡塞尔解读的阶段性总结。     

The Givenness of Other People: On Singularity and Empathy in Husserl

Human Studies - Other people figure in our experience of the world; they strike us as unique and genuinely other. This paper explores whether a Husserlian account of empathy as the way in which we...     

The relevance of Husserl today

Lecture given at the Annual meeting of the British Society for Phenomenology held at St. Edmund Hall, Oxford, on 25 March 1988. The occasion was remembering Husserls passing away fifty years ago.     

The rejection of origin: Derrida's interpretation of Husserl

Conclusion Derrida's Husserl thinks of meaning as self-presence and of self-presence as transparent and complete presence of meaning to the mind. Expression and thought are but particular modes or media of the more englobing relation of a self-acquainted life. Reflection is the highest form and telos of the other forms of presence.In contrast, the — by no means complete — Husserl who has begun to appear in my interpretation does not unconditionally subscribe to the value of presence. Not only is an important part of intentional life directed towards objects which it does not possess in their plenitude — hence its emptiness —, this part of intentional life is also blind towards itself. Reflection tries to fill this gap by grasping what is not present to a life immersed in its world. But a retreat from life is the price of presence, a presence, in addition, whose power is essentially limited by the fluidity of its material and by the limits of its bearers.And yet Husserl maintains, passionately maintains, the claim and value of reflection and of a scientific attitude which Derrida rejects with equal passion. May they not have a positive function in a frame which is no longer that of presence metaphysics? As deconstruction has evolved its philosophy of anti-presence, it has brushed away the reflexive potential of Phenomenology and chosen to reject its own origin.     

The vocation of motherhood: Husserl and feminist ethics

In this paper, I explore a confrontation between Husserl’s ethical position of vocation and its absolute ought with a feminist ethical position. I argue that Husserl’s ethics has a great deal to offer a feminist ethics by providing for the possibility of an ethics that is particular rather than universal, that recognizes the role of the social through tradition in establishing values and norms without conceding the ethical responsibility of the individual, and that acknowledges the role of both reason and desire in establishing moral values that has the consequence of breaking down the public/private distinction that has reigned in so many ethical theories. In order to make this case, I proceed with a review of Husserl’s position of the absolute ought, some typical criticisms that might be leveled at his position, and finally, responses to those criticisms that show ways in which Husserl’s position can be beneficial to the formulation of a feminist ethics that is inclusive of the emotional aspect of moral valuation, and the particularity of ethical commitments, while providing for a different way of evaluating thinking that accommodates what are usually understood to be “feminine” concerns. In addition to describing Husserl’s position, I show how that position meets some of the expectations for a feminist ethics as put forth by Iris Marion Young and Sara Ruddick.     

Husserl Bibliography

Husserl Bibliography     

Husserl bibliography

Husserl bibliography     

Husserl bibliography

International Academy of Philosophy Principality of Liechtenstein