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1.
Arto Laitinen 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):25-38
Misrecognition from other individuals and social institutions is by its dynamic or ‘logic’ such that it can lead to distorted
relations-to-self, such as self-hatred, and can truncate the development of the central capabilities of persons. Thus it is
worth trying to shed light on how misrecognition differs from adequate recognition, and on how misrecognition might differ from other kinds of mistreatment and disregard. This paper suggests that misrecognition (including nonrecognition) is a matter of inadequate responsiveness to the normatively relevant features of someone
(their personhood, merits, needs etc.), and that if the kind of mistreatment in question obeys the general dynamic or ‘logic’
of mutual recognition and relations-to-self, then it may be called ‘misrecognition’. Further, this article considers the multiple
connections between misrecognition and human fallibility. The capacity to get things wrong or make mistakes (that is, fallibility)
is first of all a condition of misrecognition. Furthermore, there are two lessons that we can draw from fallibility. The first
one points towards minimal objectivism: if something is to count as a mistake or incorrect response, there must accordingly
exist a fact of the matter or a correct response. The other lesson points towards public equality: if our capacity to get
things right on our own is limited, then public, shared norms will probably help. Such norms are easier to know and follow
than objective normative truths, and they may contain collective cumulative wisdom; and of course the process of creating
public norms embodies in itself an important form of mutual recognition between citizens. 相似文献
2.
Peter Langland-Hassan 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):145-173
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising. 相似文献
4.
Kim Sungmoon 《Dao》2011,10(3):291-309
This article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s understandings of human nature are qualitatively
different, which is responsible for the difference in their respective normative political theory of a civil polity. This
article has two main theses: first, where Hobbes’s deepest concern was with human beings’ unsocial passions, Xunzi was most
concerned with human beings’ appetitive desires (yu 欲), material self-interest, and resulting social strife; second, as a result, where Hobbes strove to transform the pathological
(anti-)politics of resentment into the politics of recognition by creating rational egalitarian citizenship under the all-encompassing
constitutional sovereign power, Xunzi attempted to nourish human beings’ basic appetitive desires (yu 欲) by instituting a li 禮 ordered civil entity. This article concludes by showing how Confucian civility that Xunzi reconstructed by means of the
li 禮 can effectively deal with unsocial passions. 相似文献
5.
Kelly Staples 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):93-106
This article focuses on the account of disrespect found in Honneth’s theory of recognition. In it, I am particularly interested
in the form of misrecognition or disrespect which is the negation of respect, and which is clearly represented by statelessness. Respect, for Honneth, is closely connected to legal recognition. Guided
by Honneth’s view of critical theory as ‘not entirely without a foundation in social reality’, the article puts together an
analysis of the political dynamics of his model of disrespect. This analysis is used to challenge certain aspects of Honneth’s
political theory and in particular the implications of his conception of the state. The article argues that the way in which
the state is used has the effect of obscuring significant political obstacles to recognition, and in particular, the way in
which the state limits respect. 相似文献
6.
William S. Sax 《International Journal of Hindu Studies》2000,4(1):39-60
Conclusion Our understanding of South Asian society and history is sometimes muddled by the rigid distinctions we make between ‘religion’
and ‘politics.’ The resurgent appeal of Hindu nationalism, the involvement of Hindu renouncers in contemporary Indian politics,
and the continuing relevance of religious issues to political discourse throughout South Asia, show that such a distinction
is of limited utility. In this essay, I have examined the notion of digvijaya in some detail, in an attempt to show that this ‘most important Indian concept with regard to sovereignty’ was always both
a ‘religious’ and a ‘political’ phenomenon. When it was performed by Hindu kings in the classical period, the ‘political’
dimension of digvijaya was foregrounded, while in the medieval and modern periods, when it was associated primarily with Hindu renouncers, its ‘religious’
aspects were paramount. But neither ‘political’ nor ‘religious’ aspects were ever absent from any of the digvijayas discussed here because religion and politics were mutually entailed in the digvijaya at all times, just as kings and renouncers were—and still are—alter-egos of each other. I am tempted to conclude that the
digvijaya melded religious and political domains. Yet perhaps even to speak of ‘melding’ religion and politics is a peculiarly modern
kind of discourse. Perhaps we need to rethink our categories and recognize that politics always has a religious element, while
religion is always a political force. 相似文献
7.
Matteo Bonotti 《Res Publica》2011,17(2):107-123
Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious
political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains
the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction
imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political
liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’
political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily
understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives
on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative
implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to
allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness
and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which
may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to
religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of
reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious
partisanship. 相似文献
8.
Aaron Rizzieri 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(2):235-242
Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation
between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs
on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced
belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition. 相似文献
9.
We argue that Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative and alienation provides a largely untapped, though potentially fruitful way
of re-thinking the question of political agency within the context of globalization. We argue that the political agency of
many around the world has been placed in an exceedingly fragile position due to the rapid pace of globalization, the movement
of multi-national corporations from their previous national headquarters, etc. We use Ricoeur’s work to argue that the alienation
of globalization is not something that can be simply overcome either in a unified world-state or a retreat to protectionist
nationalism, because institutional mediation—and consequently alienation—is in some sense constitutive of all politics: the
world of political representation operates by its own set of rules, which are at least partially disconnected from the represented
world. Using the work of Mouffe, a radical democratic theorist, we then flesh out an ideal of agonistic citizenship (which
recognizes both the need for and the inevitability of discursive struggle in politics) in a number of overlapping communities
of interest, rather than tying political participation solely to the sovereign government of my state. The state will remain
important, but because globalization has disenfranchised so many from their participation in “local” modes of self-governance
(tied to the state in which they live), we have a responsibility to re-envision what political participation means outside
the traditional context of the state. Rather than merely citizens of a particular state, we need to begin thinking of ourselves
politically—and then acting—as “citizens” of Green Peace, Human Rights Watch, Doctors Without Borders, or whatever other supra-local
concrete universals or communities of interest to which we belong, investing the time and energy there that we might previously
have invested solely in our state’s government. (By implication, we must also ensure that these organizations work in transparent
democratic ways themselves.) We believe that by re-plotting our narratives of political engagement in this way, we can positively
respond to the alienation created by globalization, while avoiding both the extremes of “McWorld” (hyperglobalism) and “Jihad”
(complete skepticism towards, or war against globalization) that Benjamin Barber and David Held have recently described.
相似文献
John F. Whitmire Jr.Email: |
10.
Antonio Calcagno 《Human Studies》2009,32(1):33-51
This article focuses on Michel Foucault’s concepts of authorship and power. Jacques Derrida has often been accused of being
more of a literary author than a philosopher or political theorist. Richard Rorty complains that Derrida’s views on politics
are not pragmatic enough; he sees Derrida’s later work, including his political work, more as a “private self-fashioning”
than concrete political thinking aimed at devising short-term solutions to problems here and now. Employing Foucault’s work
around authorship and the origins of power, I show that Derrida is indeed fashioning himself. This self-fashioning is not
merely private or fanciful. Rather, I argue that Derrida can be read as employing what Foucault would call “technologies of
the self” to not only show the play of possibility and impossibility at work in all politics and thought, but also to use
his savoir to create two important and potentially constructive power structures. First, there is the power of deconstruction itself
as a “militant critique” that calls for a forceful and irreducible justice. Second, there is the power of Derrida himself,
understood as leaving behind a legacy of himself as the “originator” of deconstruction and as a public intellectual.
相似文献
Antonio CalcagnoEmail: |
11.
Edmund N. Santurri 《The Journal of religious ethics》2005,33(4):783-814
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls casts his proposals as an argument against what he calls “political realism.” Here, I contend that a certain version of “Christian political realism” survives Rawls's polemic against political realism sans phrase and that Rawls overstates his case against political realism writ large. Specifically, I argue that Rawls's dismissal of “empirical political realism” is underdetermined by the evidence he marshals in support of the dismissal and that his rejection of “normative political realism” is in tension with his own normative concessions to political reality as expressed in The Law of Peoples. That is, I contend that Rawls, himself, needs some form of political realism to render persuasive the full range of normative claims constituting the argument of that work. 相似文献
12.
Uljana Feest 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):391-411
This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-J?rg Rheinberger’s notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology. I argue that Rheinberger’s approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose
some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger
is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (“epistemic things”)—especially in the contexts
of exploratory experimentation—namely our lack of knowledge about them. I argue that this analysis needs to be supplemented
with an account of what scientists do know, and in particular, how they are able to attribute rudimentary empirical contours to objects of research. These contours
are closely connected to paradigmatic research designs, which in turn are tied to basic methodological rules for the exploration
of the purported phenomena. I suggest that we engage with such rules in order to develop our own normative (epistemological)
categories, and I tie this proposal to the idea of a methodological naturalism in philosophy of science. 相似文献
13.
An antinomy of political judgment: Kant,Arendt, and the role of purposiveness in reflective judgment
Avery Goldman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):331-352
This article builds on Arendt’s development of a Kantian politics from out of the conception of reflective judgment in the
Critique of Judgment. Arendt looks to Kant’s analysis of the beautiful to explain how political thought can be conceived. And yet Arendt describes
such Kantian reflection as an empirical undertaking that justifies itself only in relation to the abstract principle of the
moral law. The problem for such an account is that the autonomy of the moral law appears to be at odds with the social cohesion
of Kantian political life. The ensuing contradiction can be deemed the antinomy of political judgment. Kant’s conception of
reflective judgment offers such an inquiry considerably more to work with than Arendt uncovers. In particular, the regulative
principle of the purposiveness of nature that is shown to direct all reflection can be seen to offer the solution to this
antinomy. 相似文献
14.
Mikel Burley 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(2):81-94
This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch.
These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death
vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one’s virtuousness
appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein’s mystical conception of safety, unlike some others, requires
no claim about one’s own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. 相似文献
15.
Martha Nussbaum proposes a universal list of human capabilities as the basis for fundamental political principles. She claims
that the list, in an Aristotelian spirit, might be justified by an ongoing inquiry into valuable human functionings for the
good life. Here I argue that the attractiveness of Nussbaum’s theory crucially depends on the philosophical possibility of
a non-reductionist understanding of naturalism and on resolving the tensions between ethical and political aspects of the
role of capabilities. Through a comparison of Nussbaum’s approach with those of Aristotle and (less familiarly) Hume, I try
to show that in these alternative versions we find valuable resources for the kind of non-reductionist model which might,
in line with Nussbaum’s own objectives, provide the basis for a capabilities-based critique of dominant modes of normative
theorizing and their influence in public discourse.
This article was presented at the UK Association for Legal and Social Philosophy Conference on Equality, 5–7 July 2004, University of Wales, Newport. I am grateful to Gideon Calder, Herman De Dijn, Carlos
Steel, Jochim Lourduswamy, Toon Vandevelde and two anonymous referees for this journal for their comments and suggestions. 相似文献
16.
Robert Jubb 《Res Publica》2011,17(3):245-260
In this paper I try to illuminate the Rawlsian architectonic through an interpretation of what Rawls’ Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy say about Rousseau. I argue that Rawls’ emphasis there when discussing Rousseau on interpreting amour-propre so as to make it compatible with a life in at least some societies draws attention to, and helps explicate, an analogous
feature of his own work, the strains of commitment broadly conceived. Both are centrally connected with protecting a sense
of self which is vital for one’s own agency. This allows us to appreciate better than much of the literature presently does
the requirement for Rawls that justice and the good are congruent, that a society of justice does not disfigure citizens’
ability to live out lives relatively unmarked by relations of domination. Some comments on G. A. Cohen’s critiques of Rawls
are made. 相似文献
17.
Claudia Welz 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(2):267-285
This paper develops the thesis that personal identity is neither to be taken in terms of an unchanging self-sufficient ‘substance’
nor in terms of selfhood ‘without substance,’ i.e. as fluctuating processes of pure relationality and subject-less activity.
Instead, identity is taken as self-transformation that is bound to particular embodied individuals and surpasses them as individuated entities. The paper is structured in three parts. Part I describes the experiential givenness
of conflicts that support our sense of self-transformation. While the first part develops an inter-subjective topography of
emotional movements, the second part pays attention to their temporal dimension. We work with conflicts and get transformed
by them also in the way we remember them. Part II focuses on the process of self-understanding that accompanies conflicts
and their metamorphosis in memory. Part III compares and discusses different models of a ‘relational ontology’ of the person,
which question the idea that we are defined only by how we define ourselves—just as they question the idea that one’s identity
is independent of how one relates to one’s having changed. 相似文献
18.
James B. Freeman 《Argumentation》2005,19(3):331-346
Relevance of premises to conclusion can be explicated through Toulmin’s notion of warrant, understood as an inference rule,
albeit not necessarily formal. A normative notion of relevance requires the warrant to be reliable. To determine reliability,
we propose a fourfold classification of warrants into a priori, empirical, institutional, and evaluative, with further subdivisions possible. This classification has its ancestry in classical
rhetoric and recent epistemology. Distinctive to each type of warrant is the mode by which such connections are intuitively
discovered and the grounds on which we ultimately justify them. The classification of warrants is thus epistemic. We illustrate
the difference by contrasting empirical physical with institutional intuition, and argue for the advantages of this approach
over Toulmin’s conception of field dependence. 相似文献
19.
Wylie Eng Sarah Moore Leon Grunberg Edward Greenberg Pat Sikora 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》2010,29(2):104-120
The current study examined how work support resources and working from home influenced forms of work-family conflict (WFC)
in employees at a large corporation. Scales measuring employee’s general WFC, time-based WFC, and strain-based WFC were used
to evaluate the extent to which employees experienced work-induced conflict at home. Two forms of working at home were assessed,
days worked at home and extra hours worked at home, and five variables measured the extent of one’s support resources: work
social support, organizational support, individual consideration from one’s manager, idealized influence from one’s manager
and contingent reward from one’s manager. We predicted that days worked at home would be negatively related to the three forms
of WFC, while the extra hours worked at home would be positively related. Moreover, we hypothesized that the five support
variables would moderate the relationship between extra hours worked at home and the types of WFC. The data supported some
of the predictions, and the implications of these findings are discussed. 相似文献
20.
Fabienne Peter 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(4):373-387
Political egalitarianism is at the core of most normative conceptions of democratic legitimacy. It finds its minimal expression
in the “one person one vote” formula. In the literature on deliberative democracy, political equality is typically interpreted
in a more demanding sense, but different interpretations of what political equality requires can be identified. In this paper
I shall argue that the attempt to specify political equality in deliberative democracy is affected by a dilemma. I shall illustrate
the political egalitarian’s dilemma by a hypothetical choice between two informational bases for political equality: Rawlsian
primary goods and Amartya Sen’s capability approach. The political egalitarian’s dilemma reveals a clash between the requirement
of ensuring equal possibilities to participate in the democratic process and the requirement of subjecting substantive judgments
to deliberative evaluation. As such, the dilemma is a variant of the procedure vs. substance dilemma that is well-known in
democratic theory. While it has sometimes been argued that deliberative democracy solves the tension between procedure and
substance, the political egalitarian’s dilemma shows that this tension continues within deliberative democracy.
相似文献
Fabienne PeterEmail: |