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1.
Inductive probabilistic reasoning is understood as the application of inference patterns that use statistical background information
to assign (subjective) probabilities to single events. The simplest such inference pattern is direct inference: from “70%
of As are Bs” and “a is an A” infer that a is a B with probability 0.7. Direct inference is generalized by Jeffrey’s rule and the principle of cross-entropy minimization.
To adequately formalize inductive probabilistic reasoning is an interesting topic for artificial intelligence, as an autonomous
system acting in a complex environment may have to base its actions on a probabilistic model of its environment, and the probabilities
needed to form this model can often be obtained by combining statistical background information with particular observations
made, i.e., by inductive probabilistic reasoning. In this paper a formal framework for inductive probabilistic reasoning is
developed: syntactically it consists of an extension of the language of first-order predicate logic that allows to express
statements about both statistical and subjective probabilities. Semantics for this representation language are developed that
give rise to two distinct entailment relations: a relation ⊨ that models strict, probabilistically valid, inferences, and
a relation that models inductive probabilistic inferences. The inductive entailment relation is obtained by implementing cross-entropy
minimization in a preferred model semantics. A main objective of our approach is to ensure that for both entailment relations
complete proof systems exist. This is achieved by allowing probability distributions in our semantic models that use non-standard
probability values. A number of results are presented that show that in several important aspects the resulting logic behaves
just like a logic based on real-valued probabilities alone. 相似文献
2.
Joshua Sack 《Synthese》2009,169(2):241-257
This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool,
2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences
of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on
trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic
dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial
σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 相似文献
3.
John J. Kineman 《Axiomathes》2011,21(3):393-437
A synthesis of the two primary theory structures in Robert Rosen’s relational complexity, (1) relational entailment mapping
based on category theory as described by Rosen and Louie, and (2) relational holism based on modeling relations, as described
by Kineman, provides an integral foundation for relational complexity theory as a natural science and analytical method. Previous
incompatibilities between these theory structures are resolved by re-interpreting Aristotle’s four causes, identifying final
and formal causes as relations with context. Category theory is applied to introduce contextual entailment algebra needed
to complete the synthesis. The modeling relation is represented as a recursive four-cause hierarchy, which is a unit of both
whole and part analysis (a ‘holon’) that relates realized and contextual domains of nature as complementary inverse entailments
between structure and function. Context is a non-localized domain of distributed potentials (models) for existence, as contrasted
with the realized domain of localized interactive and measurable events. Synthesis is achieved by giving modeling relations
an algebraic form in category theory and by expanding relational analysis to include contextual entailments. The revised form
of analysis is applied and demonstrated to examine Rosen’s M-R diagram, showing that structure–function relations imply adaptive
interaction with the environment, and that contextual relations imply three forms of the M-R entailment corresponding with
the generally known three forms of life; Archaea, Bacteria, and Eukaryota, which can be represented by their holon diagrams. The result of this synthesis is a consistent foundation for relational
science that should have important implications in many disciplines. 相似文献
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6.
Jesper Kallestrup 《Synthese》2006,151(2):273-295
David Chalmers’ conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don’t fit into
the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But given semantic assumptions that are essential to the conceivability
argument, there is reason to believe in microphysical strong necessities. This means that some of Chalmers’ criticism is unwarranted,
and the rest equally afflicts the dualist. Moreover, given that these assumptions are independently plausible, there’s a general
case to be made for the existence of strong necessities outside the psychophysical domain. 相似文献
7.
Joshua Gert 《Synthese》2006,150(2):171-183
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called
the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers.
The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include
the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy between moral properties and
secondary qualities. This paper argues that Holland’s extension depends crucially on the fact that his target is a direct response-dependent account of moral value. His argument does not work against such accounts of more basic normative notions such as ‘harm’ or ‘benefit’. And
these more basic notions may then serve as the basic normative building blocks for an indirectly response-dependent moral
theory.
* Thanks to Mark Timmons for helpful and friendly comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to an audience at
the 2003 Pacific APA, and to the reviewers
for this journal. 相似文献
8.
Theo A. F. Kuipers 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(3):313-330
Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic
version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences,
instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also
be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional
for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all three cases, the guiding idea is to explicate these intuitions
by explicating the crucial notions as appropriate ‘concretizations’ of their deductive analogs, being ‘idealizations’. It
turns out that the comparative version of the proposed HP-method amounts to the likelihood comparison (LC-) method applied
to the cumulated evidence. This method turns out to be not only functional for probabilistic empirical progress but also for
probabilistic truth approximation. The latter is based on a probabilistic threshold theorem constituting for this reason the
analog of the deductive success theorem.
相似文献
Theo A. F. KuipersEmail: URL: www.rug.nl/filosofie/kuipers |
9.
Philippe Schlenker 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):115-142
Stalnaker (1978) made two seminal claims about presuppositions. The most influential one was that presupposition projection is computed by a pragmatic mechanism based on a notion of ‘local context’. Due to conceptual and technical difficulties, however, the latter notion was reinterpreted in purely semantic terms within
‘dynamic semantics’ (Heim 1983). The second claim was that some instances of presupposition generation should also be explained in pragmatic terms. But despite various attempts, the definition of a precise ‘triggering algorithm’ has remained somewhat elusive. We discuss
possible extensions of both claims. First, we offer a reconstruction of ‘local contexts’ which circumvents some of the difficulties
faced by Stalnaker’s original analysis. We preserve the idea that local contexts are computed by a pragmatic mechanism that
aggregates the information that follows from an incomplete sentence given the global context; but we crucially rely on a modified
notion of entailment (‘R-entailment’), whose plausibility should be assessed on independent grounds. Second, we speculate
that local contexts might prove necessary (though by no means sufficient) to understand how some presuppositions are triggered.
In a nutshell, we suggest that a presupposition is triggered when the semantic contribution of an expression to its local
context is in some sense ‘heterogeneous’. Without giving an analysis of the latter notion, we note that this architecture
implies that presuppositions should be triggered on the basis of the meaning that an expression has relative to its local context (what we call its ‘local meaning’); we sketch some possible consequences of this analysis. 相似文献
10.
The Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logics is extended to give a sound and complete model theory for many
propositionally quantified relevant logics (and some non-relevant ones). This involves a restriction on which sets of worlds
are admissible as propositions, and an interpretation of propositional quantification that makes ∀ pA true when there is some true admissible proposition that entails all p-instantiations of A. It is also shown that without the admissibility qualification many of the systems considered are semantically incomplete,
including all those that are sub-logics of the quantified version of Anderson and Belnap’s system E of entailment, extended
by the mingle axiom and the Ackermann constant t. The incompleteness proof involves an algebraic semantics based on atomless complete Boolean algebras. 相似文献
11.
Dmitry Zaitsev 《Studia Logica》2009,92(2):265-280
In their useful logic for a computer network Shramko and Wansing generalize initial values of Belnap’s 4-valued logic to the
set 16 to be the power-set of Belnap’s 4. This generalization results in a very specific algebraic structure — the trilattice
SIXTEEN
3 with three orderings: information, truth and falsity. In this paper, a slightly different way of generalization is presented.
As a base for further generalization a set 3 is chosen, where initial values are a — incoming data is asserted, d — incoming data is denied, and u — incoming data is neither asserted nor denied, that corresponds to the answer “don’t know”. In so doing, the power-set of
3, that is the set 8 is considered. It turns out that there are not three but four orderings naturally defined on the set
8 that form the tetralattice EIGHT
4. Besides three ordering relations mentioned above it is an extra uncertainty ordering. Quite predictably, the logics generated
by a–order (truth order) and d–order (falsity order) coincide with first-degree entailment. Finally logic with two kinds of operations (a–connectives and d–connectives) and consequence relation defined via a–ordering is considered. An adequate axiomatization for this logic is proposed. 相似文献
12.
Mark Moyer 《Synthese》2006,148(2):401-423
Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the
same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing
a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see that the intuition, ‘this is only one thing’, and the dictum,
‘two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time’, are individuating things at a time rather than absolutely and are therefore compatible with coincidence. Several other objections philosophers have raised ride
on this same ambiguity. Burke, originating what has become the most popular objection to coincidence, argues that if coincidence
is possible there would be no explanation of how objects that are qualitatively the same at a time could belong to different
sorts. But we can explain an object’s sort by appealing to its properties at other times. Burke’s argument to the contrary
equivocates on different notions of ‘cross-time identity’ and ‘the statue’. From a largely negative series of arguments emerges
a positive picture of what it means to say multiple things coincide and of why an object’s historical properties explain its
sort rather than vice versa – in short, of how coincidence is possible. 相似文献
13.
Axiomathes - According to the mixed lexicographic/additive account of ‘better than’ and similar aggregative value comparatives like ‘healthier than’, values are... 相似文献
14.
Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara 《Science and engineering ethics》2010,16(3):479-487
In contemporary science uncertainty is often represented as an intrinsic feature of natural and of human phenomena. As an example we need only think of two important conceptual revolutions that occurred
in physics and logic during the first half of the twentieth century: (1) the discovery of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics; (2) the emergence of many-valued logical reasoning, which gave rise to so-called ‘fuzzy thinking’.
I discuss the possibility of applying the notions of uncertainty, developed in the framework of quantum mechanics, quantum information and fuzzy logics, to some problems of political and
social sciences. 相似文献
15.
Bart Streumer 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(3):353-374
What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question,
and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p
1,…,p
n and q, if the conjunction of p
1,…, and p
n entails q, then there is a reason against a person’s both believing that p
1,…, and that p
n and believing the negation of q. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the other answers to this question face, and that it does not face any
other problems either. I end by showing what the relation between deductive logic, reasons for belief and reasoning is if
this answer is correct. 相似文献
16.
Theodore H. Friedgut 《Jewish History》2007,21(3-4):385-411
This article offers a detailed analysis of the forces that shaped the Lipton colony in its 50-year existence, one of several
dozen attempts to establish Jewish agricultural settlement on Canada’s Western prairies. Comparing both the particularities
and the common features of Lipton with those of other colonies will allow strengthening some of the commonly accepted generalizations
regarding these colonies, while at the same time showing other assumptions to be questionable or even myth.
* A detailed discussion of the Jewish agricultural colonies in Western Canada may be found in Yossi Katz and John C. Lehr,
The Last Best West: Essays on the Historical Geography of the Canadian Prairies (Jerusalem, 1999). Other sources discussing the colonies and the reasons for their establishment and ultimate disappearance
are: Louis Rosenberg, “Jewish Agriculture in Canada” YIVO Annual of Social Sciences 5 (1950), 205–215; Louis Rosenberg, Canada’s Jews: A Social and Economic Study of the Jews of Canada in the 1930s (Montreal, 1931); Abraham J. Arnold, “The Contribution of the Jews to the Opening and Development of the West” Transactions of the Manitoba Historical Society Series 3 no. 3, (Winnipeg, 1968–’69). 相似文献
17.
18.
Peter Langland-Hassan 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):145-173
Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we
imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom.
Three different proposals are outlined, building on theories that link visualization to sensorimotor predictive mechanisms
(e.g., “efference copies,” “forward models”). Each sees visualization as a kind of reasoning, where its freedom consists in our ability to choose the topic of the reasoning. Of the three options, I argue that the approach many will find most attractive—that visualization is a
kind of “off-line” perception, and is therefore in some sense misrepresentational—should be rejected. The two remaining proposals
both conceive of visualization as a form of sensorimotor reasoning that is constitutive of one’s commitments concerning the way certain kinds of visuomotor scenarios unfold. According to the first, these commitments
impinge on one’s web of belief from without, in the manner of normal perceptual experience; according to the second, these commitments
just are one’s (occurrent) beliefs about such generalizations. I conclude that, despite being initially counterintuitive,
the view of visualization as a kind of occurrent belief is the most promising. 相似文献
19.
Christopher H. Eliot 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2011,42(2):207-218
The problem of ceteris paribus clauses and Hempel’s problem of provisos are closely-related difficulties. Both challenge advocates of accounts of scientific
theories involving laws understood as universal generalizations, and they have been treated as identical problems. Earman
and Roberts argue that the problems are distinct. Towards arguing against them, I characterize the relationship between Hempel’s
provisos and one way of expressing ceteris paribus clauses. I then describe the relationship between the problems attributed to the clauses, suggesting that they form a single
problem-cluster. However, Hempel’s way of formulating provisos and discussing what they involve entangles provisos with the
problem of skepticism. This creates a departure in Hempel’s discussion of provisos from the distinctive problem of vacuity
which characterizes the problem of ceteris paribus clauses, though for different reasons than Earman and Roberts suggest. 相似文献
20.
Nicholas Shackel 《Erkenntnis》2006,64(3):393-401
Dretske proposes a theory of knowledge in terms of a theory of information, but wishes to deny that empirical knowledge settles
the large question of scepticism. This leads him to deny the closure of knowledge under known entailment. In a recent paper
J?ger argues that Dretske’s theory of information entails closure for knowledge, ‘at least for the kind of propositions here at issue’ (J?ger 2004:194). If J?ger is right, Dretske
is seriously embarrassed and must give something up. In this paper I show that there are two flaws in J?ger’s argument. The
principle of informational closure considered by J?ger is incompatible with Dretske’s theory of information, and J?ger’s argument
that Dretske is committed to a certain kind of substitution instance of that principle of informational closure is invalid.
I propose adequacy conditions on signalled information and use them to motivate a formulation of a general closure principle
for signalled information. I show that Dretske’s account of information satisfies the adequacy conditions, but in a way which
commits him to an instance of the general closure principle. I argue that Dretske is consequently committed to closure for
some cases of knowledge for which he wishes to deny closure. Finally, I sketch how, on the basis of the closure principle
to which Dretske is committed, J?ger’s broader argument may yet go through. 相似文献